154. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
612. For Secretary from Byroade. The delays, red tape, and frustrations of attempting to get foreign assistance construction projects in Afghan completed or, in fact, even started, under our present system are intolerable. Examples are plentiful, but feel basic premise stated in sentence above is well enough recognized in Washington so that this message need not include long or detailed chronology of lack of results.
I came to this post determined to make a constructive contribution on speeding up our work here, and I feel certain that Wollmar, head of USOM/A, did the same. I do not feel that I have been able to make much contribution because the total system under which we operate seems not responsive such personal efforts. Taking projects one by one it seems impossible at any particular time to ferret out with certainty each bottleneck and to attempt correction. One usually finds that at least half of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle are in Washington and sometimes it seems we reach a situation where neither we here, nor presumably those in Washington, can do much about putting the whole puzzle together.
Leaving aside the damage of this type of performance to our overall implementation of policy, believe situation is being created which can result in extremely critical Congress with resultant ill effects, not only on future assistance to this country, but possibly on our total foreign assistance program.
I have at times mentioned possibility of utilizing in some manner the Corps of Engineers in order to get better results on construction projects here. My latest probes in this direction contained in Embtel 432.2 This would remove our construction projects from ICA contract procedures, relieve USOM/A here of endless paper work and communications with ICA/W on these projects which occupies disproportionate share of key officials time, leave them in position do expert job on all other (and important) phases of ICA work here, and, I believe, considerably speed things up. Certainly it would appear this would be the result if decision were made at high enough level that the Corps be made responsible for crash program to correct our unfortunate reputation on these projects. To be absolutely certain of desirability of such a drastic change, however, one must know current capabilities of Corps in place such as this. Unless there is complete disagreement in Washington [Page 329] to thought that civil works portion of Corps might be used, recommend Chief of Engineers be requested send a high-ranking team here for discussion with us on the spot re road and airport construction. This would have advantage also of any independent survey of our current problems and difficulties which might prove highly useful in itself.
While choice of personnel for survey party must of course be left to Chief of Engineers, best possible combination would be General Weary Wilson and Colonel Fred Clarke. Clarke recently returned to States after serving as district engineer in Karachi and would know of current capabilities of considerably speeding up our projects. Final decision should then be taken quickly and during present period when no construction contracts are up for bidding.
The change in responsibilities proposed herein would require approval of RGA. With proper explanation I believe they would welcome change, and be encouraged thereby, but of course cannot be certain. Would therefore like approval discuss possibility without commitment with Prince Naim, as being my own idea which I willing, if he agrees, to propose to Washington. This should be done before survey party departs Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5–MSP/1–660. Confidential.↩
- Document 148.↩