Washington, March 4, 1961, 8:43 p.m.
931. Following is guidance for 103rd meeting:
1. Begin your presentation with following prepared statement: “Mr. Ambassador, since last meeting a new administration has taken over conduct of affairs of United States Government. This administration is firmly committed to cause of freedom. It also recognizes that far-reaching differences exist between basic concepts of our two sides. Developments such as statement issued December 6, 1960 following ‘Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties,’ and in particular official comments issued by your side since January 20 criticizing new United States administration, have made us even more aware of basic differences between us. In all frankness we are not encouraged by lack of civility displayed by your side toward United States and its government. Nevertheless, for our part we are willing to overlook what your side has said and follow procedure of discussing differences between us in manner which would avoid mutual recrimination and be more conducive to cause of peace. We believe that if your side will follow suit, these discussions can then deal with specific points in ways which would accord with best interests our two sides.”
2. Continue along lines that in our view most productive first step toward improving conduct of talks would be to resolve problem of Americans imprisoned by Wang's side. As Wang may have observed, USSR's release of American airmen held by it11. Reference is to the release on January 25 of two members of the crew of a U.S. RB-47 aircraft, which had been shot down on July 1, 1960. has helped bring about climate of civility between US and USSR. Although we do not underestimate extent of basic differences dividing us, we regard this climate of civility as being preferable to one of rancor and bitterness, and as opening up possibility for improvement in US-USSR relations. If Wang's side can deal with matter of imprisoned Americans in spirit similar to that of USSR, practical obstacle to better relations between Wang's side and ours can be eliminated.
3. Tell Wang that further step toward improving relations between our two sides would be his side's admission of American newsmen. Remind Wang that his side did not interpose question of agreed announcement in admitting Edgar Snow, who had validated passport issued by United States Government. We would be pleased to see his side admit in same fashion any or all of remaining newsmen who are eligible receive such passports, and to facilitate process of selection will provide him with complete list of newsmen who as of this moment have been designated by their organizations to make trip. (At this point hand Wang newsmen list, as transmitted in separate telegram.)22. Telegram 930 to Warsaw, March 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-461) Invite Wang provide us with list of his side's correspondents who desire entry into United States, and assure him that we will take under immediate consideration the issuance of visas to these individuals once they apply. You may tell Wang that in this way we believe arrangement can be worked out whereby his side's correspondents can be admitted to United States in numbers which would be equal to number of American newsmen admitted by his side. Foregoing approach intended satisfy Wang's side's insistence on reciprocity while at same time honoring United States immigration laws, which must, of course, be complied with. In our judgment this approach provides simple and workable means of effecting travel of newsmen, and we urge Wang's side give it full consideration.
4. In event Wang raises question of Taiwan and reiterates call for United States withdrawal, mention that throughout history of talks we have never sought to compel his side abandon its claim to Taiwan. We have attempted only to gain his side's agreement to press its claim by peaceful means rather than by threat or use of force. Accordingly, renunciation of force is fundamental ingredient in any constructive and meaningful discussions between us on this issue, and our past position this subject remains unchanged.
5. Conceivable that Wang may raise topic of food shortages on China mainland and accuse United States of attempting magnify situation for propaganda purposes. If so, cite press conference remarks President Kennedy January 25 to effect that United States has no intention of offering food merely to make propaganda efforts.33. Kennedy stated that if there was both a desire and a need for food, “the United States would be glad to consider that need, regardless of the source.” He added, however, that the Chinese Communists had recently been exporting food and had been expressing “a rather belligerent attitude” toward the United States. The President concluded: “there is no indication, direct or indirect, private or public, that they would respond favorably to any acts by the United States.” For text of these remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 15. However, in case there is serious desire for food or need for food on part of Wang's side, then United States would be glad to consider answering need. If people's lives are involved, United States will always do what it can to help on purely humanitarian grounds. (Conversely, in unlikely contingency that Wang should actually express interest in receiving United States food aid, inform him you will refer any request for same to Department.)
6. In unlikely event that Wang should raise subject of nuclear test negotiations, respond as follows:
If Wang should depose a formal statement on an agreement to discontinue testing you should refer to continuing interest of United States Government in disarmament in all its aspects and accept statement, with an indication that it will be transmitted to Washington for study. If Wang should inquire generally about progress of negotiations you should respond in general terms that negotiations are to resume on March 21 and that we are hopeful that Soviet concessions to permit adequate on-site inspection and other features of effective control will make possible an early agreement on suspension of testing as envisaged in joint US-UK declaration of March 29, 1960.44. For text of this declaration, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, pp. 318-319.
In very unlikely event that Wang should raise question of applicability of an agreement to Peiping we should refer to United States draft treaty article which provides for the accession of additional states “whose accession the (Control) Commission or Preparatory Commission finds would contribute to the achievement of the purposes of the treaty and which deposits an instrument of ratification or an instrument of acceptance in accordance with the provisions” of the treaty. We should refer also to our position on phasing of installation of system, according to which control posts would be extended to all of Asia exclusive of the USSR in a second phase to begin within one year after the treaty enters into force and to be completed within five years after treaty enters into force.
If Wang should raise question of an atom-free zone in Far East we should, without disclosing any particular United States interest in such a zone, try to ascertain what part, if any, of the Chinese mainland they would propose to include in such a zone.
7. Counter any charges raised by Wang to extent you deem necessary, using guidance or procedures employed in previous instructions.
* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-461. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Holdridge, except paragraph 6, which was drafted by Robert G. Sturgill of the Disarmament Administration; cleared by Parsons and cleared in draft in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Legal Adviser's Office, the Disarmament Administration, and the Department of Defense; approved for transmission and signed by Rusk. A memorandum of March 2 from Parsons to Rusk enclosing the draft telegram for his approval states that it was drafted in accordance with Rusk's oral comments to Parsons on his February 19 memorandum (Document 4).
1 Reference is to the release on January 25 of two members of the crew of a U.S. RB-47 aircraft, which had been shot down on July 1, 1960.
2 Telegram 930 to Warsaw, March 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-461)
3 Kennedy stated that if there was both a desire and a need for food, “the United States would be glad to consider that need, regardless of the source.” He added, however, that the Chinese Communists had recently been exporting food and had been expressing “a rather belligerent attitude” toward the United States. The President concluded: “there is no indication, direct or indirect, private or public, that they would respond favorably to any acts by the United States.” For text of these remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 15.
4 For text of this declaration, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, pp. 318-319.