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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXII, Northeast Asia, Document 158


158. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of StateSourceSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1362. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Geneva, Stockholm, and Moscow. 968. Cabot-Wang Talks. 113th Meeting.11. Cabot sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 972, December 14, and sent a detailed, apparently verbatim report of the meeting in airgram A-478, December 15. (Ibid., 611.93/12-1462 and 611.93/12-1562, respectively) He sent further recommendations in telegram 1182, February 1. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US) 2 hours 20 minutes. Deptels 530 and 695.22. Telegram 530 to Warsaw, October 13, reported that it had been necessary since June to reemphasize the gap between the two sides on basic issues in order to make clear that the United States had not changed its commitment to the GRC but that since that point had been made, Cabot should return to concrete issues and should limit his opening presentation to the prisoner and newsmen issues. (Ibid., 611.93/10-1362) Telegram 695 to Warsaw, December 7, reaffirmed those instructions with some modifications. (Ibid., 611.93/12-762)

1. After confirming previous agreement (Embtel 749)33. See footnote 1, Document 154. that this would be only 113th meeting and I would open, I covered American prisoners and exchange newsmen in accordance numbered paragraph 3 first reference telegram and 1 second reference telegram.44. Paragraph 3 of telegram 530 reiterated the U.S. position on the prisoner issue. Paragraph 1 of telegram 695 instructed Cabot to refer to Chou En-lai's statement to Malcolm MacDonald that the United States wished to impose restrictions on Chinese journalists that they would not accept on American journalists visiting China (see Document 156) and to counter by referring to previous discussions. Wang said essential objective our meetings Washington try to settle question of restoration Taiwan to Mother Land. Since US persisted in policy of hostility and refused accept reasonable proposals, no progress made. Wang said during first stage of talks Chinese thought pending resolution of main issues, we could deal with some minor problems. Therefore, during 1956 and 1957 his side had many proposals, e.g. lifting of trade embargo, exchange of persons and cultural intercourse, rendering of judicial aid by both sides, and exchange of newsmen. Claimed his side had not distorted record re newsmen but we had rejected his reasonable proposal of September 6, 1960. Only after our side had raised obstacles to solution various concrete matters had his side concluded pending settlement to basic issue between two sides no progress could be made.

2. Wang continued saying 9 more serious warnings issued since previous meeting. Complained US had engaged with ChiNats in big parachute maneuver in Taiwan and it was matter of public knowledge that armed agents sent to mainland in attempt prepare ground for invasion were all trained and equipped by US. Enumerated series of visits by high-ranking US military officers to Taiwan recently. Said General Taylor quoted Christian Science Monitor, US would probably use tactical nuclear weapons in any conflict with Communist China. Washington Post also reported many US military men advocated nuclear weapons should be used in fighting in Asia. Said our claim US would not be responsible if Chiang attacked mainland without our consent was obvious attempt to prepare ground in advance for shirking our responsibility in backing invasion.

3. Wang continued accusing US of meddling India massive military aid and instigating India to carry on extensive war against China. Our apparent design was to utilize India to strike at China and keep her engaged in a new direction.

4. I said I scarcely thought matter of American prisoners was side issue as implied in Wang's remarks. We feel strongly these men should be released under the one real agreement reached in these talks. We have tried honorably carry out our side of bargain.

5. Re newsmen, I said Wang's proposal would in effect have us abandon solemn treaty with GRC. Did not see how he could consider proposal reasonable or expect us do any such thing. Again denied we occupying Taiwan. Re parachute maneuver I said it was true we furnished certain military training advice. In view our defense treaty, we see no impropriety in this.

Re alleged agents sent to mainland reminded Wang his side had repeatedly refused renunciation force in area China and has repeatedly used force in that area. Could scarcely expect other side remain passive under circumstances. Said position I expressed to him last June remained that of my government re mainland invasion.55. Telegram 530 to Warsaw instructed Cabot to state, if Wang mentioned Chiang Kai-shek's threats of action against the mainland, that he had explicitly stated the U.S. position concerning attack on the mainland and had nothing to add to or subtract from that statement.

6. I said Government and people of US were shocked by open aggression his side against India. Followed with substance paragraph 2 second reference telegram66. Paragraph 2 of telegram 695 authorized Cabot to state that the purpose of U.S. aid to India was to “help India resist efforts by Wang's side to impose its views concerning boundary by force of arms. United States would wish to see peaceful solution, but one which Indians can accept with honor.” and paragraph 7 first reference telegram.77. Paragraph 7 of telegram 530 reported that Kuo Mo-jo, President of the PRC Academy of Sciences and a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, had charged in a September 26 speech that Kennedy had surpassed Hitler and Tojo in savagery and tyranny; it called this “highly offensive to American people” and instructed Cabot to ask Wang whether it represented the view of the authorities on his side.

7. In response my request for details, Wang listed by areas and dates alleged intrusions serious warnings 215 through 221. I promised report these to my government but assume they are available to Department through NCNA broadcasts and Peoples Daily.

8. Re prisoners, Wang said not a single American civilian in China and desiring to return was being detained. Four American “convicts” are serving sentences. They committed offenses against Chinese law and it is natural that they must serve their sentences. Claimed there were number of Chinese desiring to return but being obstructed.

9. Re Sino-Indian border, Wang said this question was legacy of history. Chinese Government had consistently advocated fair and reasonable solution through peaceful means. Peace-loving nations and people throughout world urging India accept proposals made by Chinese Government. Said our Secretary of State and Ambassador to India had been abetting and exhorting India to carry out its military venture. Said we had openly announced recognition of illegal McMahon line despite fact that Secretary Herter in 1959 indicated US would not recognize that line.88. Reference is apparently to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter's statement at a press conference on November 12, 1959, that the United States had taken no position on the Sino-Indian border dispute since the question had not previously arisen. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1190-1191. Asked whether words of Kennedy Administration or Eisenhower Administration were to be believed.

10. After reiterating familiar line re Taiwan, Wang then (in response to my mention of Kuo Mo-jo's speech) said ChiComs almost daily had to put up with all sorts offensive comments, attacks, and vilifications made by American publications and high-ranking members US Government against policies social system and leaders his country. It was his side which had most to complain about on this subject.

11. I said if Wang would furnish particulars on Chinese desiring go to mainland but allegedly obstructed, my government would be pleased investigate. Added if Wang's side wished under present circumstances to alter arrangement whereby Indian Embassy is its agent on this question, I am sure my government would have no objection. Said we had never agreed because persons had been convicted constituted reason for them not to be released under agreed announcement. Re Indian border, I said we were not trying to establish what is right and wrong, but what is clear is that his side by military action had taken territory which had long been in Indian hands. We had furnished arms of which he spoke only after heavy fighting had broken out. Added penultimate sentence paragraph 6 first reference telegram.99. The sentence reads as follows: “Apparent position of Wang's side may be summed up in few words: ‘Aggression consists in preventing his side from using armed hostilities to accomplish its objectives.’”

Next meeting February 22.

Cabot

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1362. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Geneva, Stockholm, and Moscow. 968. Cabot-Wang Talks. 113th Meeting.11. Cabot sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 972, December 14, and sent a detailed, apparently verbatim report of the meeting in airgram A-478, December 15. (Ibid., 611.93/12-1462 and 611.93/12-1562, respectively) He sent further recommendations in telegram 1182, February 1. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US) 2 hours 20 minutes. Deptels 530 and 695.22. Telegram 530 to Warsaw, October 13, reported that it had been necessary since June to reemphasize the gap between the two sides on basic issues in order to make clear that the United States had not changed its commitment to the GRC but that since that point had been made, Cabot should return to concrete issues and should limit his opening presentation to the prisoner and newsmen issues. (Ibid., 611.93/10-1362) Telegram 695 to Warsaw, December 7, reaffirmed those instructions with some modifications. (Ibid., 611.93/12-762)

1 Cabot sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 972, December 14, and sent a detailed, apparently verbatim report of the meeting in airgram A-478, December 15. (Ibid., 611.93/12-1462 and 611.93/12-1562, respectively) He sent further recommendations in telegram 1182, February 1. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US)

2 Telegram 530 to Warsaw, October 13, reported that it had been necessary since June to reemphasize the gap between the two sides on basic issues in order to make clear that the United States had not changed its commitment to the GRC but that since that point had been made, Cabot should return to concrete issues and should limit his opening presentation to the prisoner and newsmen issues. (Ibid., 611.93/10-1362) Telegram 695 to Warsaw, December 7, reaffirmed those instructions with some modifications. (Ibid., 611.93/12-762)

3 See footnote 1, Document 154.

4 Paragraph 3 of telegram 530 reiterated the U.S. position on the prisoner issue. Paragraph 1 of telegram 695 instructed Cabot to refer to Chou En-lai's statement to Malcolm MacDonald that the United States wished to impose restrictions on Chinese journalists that they would not accept on American journalists visiting China (see Document 156) and to counter by referring to previous discussions.

5 Telegram 530 to Warsaw instructed Cabot to state, if Wang mentioned Chiang Kai-shek's threats of action against the mainland, that he had explicitly stated the U.S. position concerning attack on the mainland and had nothing to add to or subtract from that statement.

6 Paragraph 2 of telegram 695 authorized Cabot to state that the purpose of U.S. aid to India was to “help India resist efforts by Wang's side to impose its views concerning boundary by force of arms. United States would wish to see peaceful solution, but one which Indians can accept with honor.”

7 Paragraph 7 of telegram 530 reported that Kuo Mo-jo, President of the PRC Academy of Sciences and a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, had charged in a September 26 speech that Kennedy had surpassed Hitler and Tojo in savagery and tyranny; it called this “highly offensive to American people” and instructed Cabot to ask Wang whether it represented the view of the authorities on his side.

8 Reference is apparently to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter's statement at a press conference on November 12, 1959, that the United States had taken no position on the Sino-Indian border dispute since the question had not previously arisen. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1190-1191.

9 The sentence reads as follows: “Apparent position of Wang's side may be summed up in few words: ‘Aggression consists in preventing his side from using armed hostilities to accomplish its objectives.’”