168. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State0

1299. Cabot-Wang talks. 114th meeting.1 2 hours 10 minutes. Deptel 967.2

1.
Wang opened saying since last meeting USG had increased tension in Taiwan Straits area and furthered hostile acts in Asia as whole. Serious warnings 222 through 230 issued and special emphasis given activities destroyer Edgar Holm (?) off Fukien and KWang Tung coasts and its entry into territorial waters east of LeiChou Peninsula at 0705 on December 19. Wang termed this outrageous provocation and demanded our side put an end to such.
2.
He then accused us of jointly planning and organizing recent “Chiang gang” activities against Mainland. Said they had abundant evidence establish our complicity these matters. Complained we had set up guerrilla section under MAAG for such purposes. Also complained of “blue sky” joint maneuvers and of increased aid in form F104Gs and new U-2 planes despite President’s earlier saying we had no plans to sell further U-2s.
3.
Wang made quite a point of fact ChiComs would hold USG exclusively answerable for Chiang harassments large or small now or in the future. Also claimed we were trying to turn Sino-Indian dispute into another front against China and at same time were urging Japan to join with South Korea in setting up Northeast Asia military bloc to serve our purposes in preparing for nuclear war.
4.

I said I had to disagree with practically everything Wang had said. Said I would report warnings as usual (assume Department has them already) and especially the one alleged clear intrusion into territorial waters. Followed with substance paragraph two3 reference telegram [Page 349] on alleged intrusions, then substance paragraphs 1,4

FYI: Omit reference our proposal for renunciation force and related assurances. We wish to see if Wang brings up. If he specifically asks whether our position unchanged, direct reply to mutual renunciation force, but avoid reiteration of assurances given at June 23, 1962 meeting.” 35 and 46 reference telegram on Mainland operations, Laos and prisoners.

5.
Wang reiterated claim CPR sovereignty Paracels and repeated accusation US participation in recruiting, training, and dispatch of agents to Mainland. Said our accusation continued activity in Laos was pure fabrication. Said US had not yet withdrawn all its military forces from Laos and it is US which should be condemned for maintaining troops there. Said illegal persecution by India of Chinese nationals was not at all to be compared with China’s retention of mere handful of American “criminals”. Wang then warned US against sending aid to India saying this would prove not to be in our interest.
6.
I said we could not accept Wang’s seeming view our ships and planes do not have right be on high seas in neighboring waters to Chinese territorial waters. I mentioned Wang’s complaining that US ship movements in that area were not “normal.” I said I thought we could both agree on fact that conditions in that area were not normal either but those conditions have to be met. I pointed out several governments claim Paracels. As for Laos we had scrupulously observed all provisions Geneva agreements and regretted ICC had been obstructed from observing activities in Communist-controlled areas. Said we could not accept warning about giving aid to India. US will consult its own interests in this matter. I then covered newsmen subject in accordance reference telegram.
7.
Wang repeated since CPR regarded Chiang clique as no government at all but puppet taking refuge behind US bayonets, CPR would hold USG exclusively responsible for attacks against Mainland on Chiang’s part whether large or small. Concluded by saying we had obstructed agreement re newsmen by refusing accept their reasonable proposal of September 6, 1960, designed to seek eliminate estrangement between two governments by settling peacefully subject of withdrawal [Page 350] all US armed forces from Taiwan area. I said we sincerely wanted newsmen exchange but could not be expected to accept conditions his side trying to impose. Having agreed we had both made our points of differences quite clear to the other and further elaboration not necessary now, agreed meet again April 17.
Cabot
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POLCHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva. Received at 5:46 a.m. on February 21.
  2. Cabot commented and sent recommendations in telegram 1303, February 21, which referred to the conversation as “another exercise in futility.” He sent a detailed, apparently verbatim report of the meeting in airgram A-668, February 22. (Both ibid.)
  3. Telegram 967, February 14, transmitted guidance for the meeting. (Ibid.)
  4. Paragraph 2 of telegram 967 instructed Cabot to reject the charges of U.S. air and sea intrusions which Wang had made at the last meeting, noting that the United States did not recognize the Chinese claim to the Paracel Islands and that two of the islands cited by Wang were not under the control of his side.
  5. Paragraph 1 instructed Cabot to reply to the anticipated charges of U.S. responsibility for GRC commando operations by stating that the United States was not involved in any such operations. It further stated:
  6. Paragraph 3 instructed Cabot to tell Wang that the United States had received reliable reports that Wang’s side had been sending arms and ammunition to Pathet Lao forces and that Chinese workmen building roads from Yunnan into Laos were working under the supervision of armed Chinese military engineers, although foreign troops were banned from Laos under the 14-nation Geneva agreements.
  7. Paragraph 4 pointed out that the Agreed Announcement of September 10, 1955, had provided that civilians of both sides who desired to return to their own countries could do so and stated that if some of the Chinese listed by Wang had not returned, it was not because of any U.S. obstruction.