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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXII, Northeast Asia, Document 175


175. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of StateSourceSource: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.

1607. Cabot-Wang Talks. 115th Meeting11. Cabot commented on the meeting in telegram 1608, April 18. He noted that the “list of US sins re Taiwan, Mainland, Laos and Vietnam unusually long, and Wang was considerably shriller and more vehement than usual, also more mendacious.” He stated that since his own initial presentation had been “relatively moderate,” he subsequently “spoke rather sharply” and “having rejected Wang's warning about Laos, I gave him in turn a veiled warning.” (Ibid.) He sent a detailed report of the meeting in airgram A-846, April 20. (Ibid.) 2 hours 20 minutes. Deptel 1245.22. Telegram 1245, April 12, provided guidance on a number of subjects. (Ibid.)

(1) I opened with substance Deptel 125133. Telegram 1251, April 15, provided guidance concerning Laos. (Ibid.) Telegram 1260 to Warsaw, April 16, noted a Chinese Communist statement that day charging the United States with responsibility for the current Laos crisis and instructed Cabot to make a presentation on Laos in his opening statement. (Ibid.) on Laos followed with Agerholm portion paragraph seven reference telegram,44. Paragraph 7 concerned Chinese Communist charges of U.S. intrusions since the last meeting. It stated that Wang's protest at the last meeting on the Edgar Holme evidently referred to the USS Agerholm, which at the time indicated was at least 20 miles from the nearest land. and paragraph two (handling Wang letter enclosing identifying information on deportees).55. Paragraph 2 asked Cabot to raise three deportation cases with Wang, suggesting that he introduce them as coming under agenda item one, although no similar cases had been raised in that context. The cases concerned three deportable individuals who wished to go to mainland China; Cabot was to ask whether the authorities there were willing to admit them. It also suggested that he ask Wang what services if any his side currently expected the Indian Embassy in Washington to perform with regard to travel of Chinese persons, noting that this was intended as a practical inquiry, not as a needle on Sino-Indian relations. I then reminded Wang of our interpretation agreed announcement re prisoners but added quite apart from this, would be gratifying receive word of promised review of their cases. Concluded with substance paragraph one reference telegram, giving Wang pouched materials on wrecked vessels.66. Paragraph 1 instructed Cabot to give Wang information concerning several small wrecked vessels washed ashore at Okinawa and neighboring islands in late January and early February.

(2) Wang expressed appreciation for information re missing fishing boats and promised later reply concerning deportees. Added for moment Chinese nationals may still apply at Indian Embassy Washington.

(3) Wang spoke of serious warnings 231 through 239. Said our non-recognition their sovereignty over Paracels and other islands expose US designs commit aggression against his country and is part of US pattern to abet Chiang in invasion of mainland. Gave long line “brass hats” recently visiting Taiwan as indication insidious scheme brewing against mainland, as was also joint military operations Southern Formosa. Asked why guerilla section established under Military Advisory Group, why transport carriers recently supplied Chiang, why training schools for agents in Tamsui and Hualien established, if we did not plan abet invasion. GRC would not survive single day without US occupation Taiwan and responsibility for GRC actions placed by PRC where it belongs: On US.

(4) Turning to Laos, Wang said evidence indicates US should be held responsible for assassination Quinim.77. Quinim Pholsena, Lao Foreign Minister, was assassinated on the night of April 1 by a guard at his residence. US has brought officers of Chiang gang to Plaine Des Jarres and neutral police officer has been assassinated. Recent fighting and assassinations engineered and master-minded by US which has involved SEATO protection in violation Geneva accords. US has concealed nine hundred military personnel and thousands of troops of satellite states in Laos, continues air drop agents in rear of Lao patriotic forces. US has stepped up suppression South Vietnamese people and is trying to get Philippine troops to take part in Vietnam war. US has introduced rocket-firing helicopters and used noxious chemicals. US continues incite India oppose China and plans supply it with missiles. Ambassador Galbraith has made “scheming trip” to Chinese-Sikkim border. At SEATO meeting Rusk did not conceal his hostility to Southeast Asian countries and China. US will be held responsible for consequences if war rekindled in South-East Asia. Wang said was instructed give me and through me to my government serious warning urging US to rein in horse at edge of precipice and stop playing with fire (sic).

(5) I covered remainder paragraph seven reference telegram except for FYI, then spoke at some length on our relations with GRC, stressing defensive nature of alliance, but should occasion arise—which we hope will not—we would honor our commitments. No plans for invasion mainland included. We will continue send “brass hats” consult re defense Taiwan. I continued with denial US complicity Laos assassinations and stressed we had lived up to Geneva agreements. Said chemicals we have used in Vietnam were defoliants, harmless to humans. Followed with substance paragraph five reference telegram on aid to India.

(6) Wang responded with supremely dry lecture of history of Paracels, ending with observation omission reference no sovereignty of islands in Japanese Peace Treaty (concocted single-handedly by US) was insidious maneuver linked with our Treaty of Alliance with Chiang.

(7) Wang stressed we faced with dangerous prospect in Laos. US must strictly abide by Geneva accords if it does not want to see renewed conflict and US must stop interference in internal affairs and withdraw all military personnel. Chinese especially shocked by US employment Chiang bandits create trouble in Laos. This was something Chinese people could never tolerate or permit. In speaking again of chemical warfare Vietnam arousing indignation of world, mentioned Bertrand Russell letter and protest in NY Times by 62 Americans.

(8) I made obvious rejoinders including observation our Treaty with GRC had followed ChiCom use of force against our troops in Korea.

(9) Wang cited January 31 ICC report as proving Pathet Lao skirts clean. I said this belated investigation was after careful Pathet Lao preparation and did not alter its record of obstruction ICC activities.

In view planned leaves Wang suggested August 7 for next meeting. I voiced no objection but stated I assumed should urgent cause for meeting arise on either side, presumably we could meet earlier.

Cabot

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.

1 Cabot commented on the meeting in telegram 1608, April 18. He noted that the “list of US sins re Taiwan, Mainland, Laos and Vietnam unusually long, and Wang was considerably shriller and more vehement than usual, also more mendacious.” He stated that since his own initial presentation had been “relatively moderate,” he subsequently “spoke rather sharply” and “having rejected Wang's warning about Laos, I gave him in turn a veiled warning.” (Ibid.) He sent a detailed report of the meeting in airgram A-846, April 20. (Ibid.)

2 Telegram 1245, April 12, provided guidance on a number of subjects. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 1251, April 15, provided guidance concerning Laos. (Ibid.) Telegram 1260 to Warsaw, April 16, noted a Chinese Communist statement that day charging the United States with responsibility for the current Laos crisis and instructed Cabot to make a presentation on Laos in his opening statement. (Ibid.)

4 Paragraph 7 concerned Chinese Communist charges of U.S. intrusions since the last meeting. It stated that Wang's protest at the last meeting on the Edgar Holme evidently referred to the USS Agerholm, which at the time indicated was at least 20 miles from the nearest land.

5 Paragraph 2 asked Cabot to raise three deportation cases with Wang, suggesting that he introduce them as coming under agenda item one, although no similar cases had been raised in that context. The cases concerned three deportable individuals who wished to go to mainland China; Cabot was to ask whether the authorities there were willing to admit them. It also suggested that he ask Wang what services if any his side currently expected the Indian Embassy in Washington to perform with regard to travel of Chinese persons, noting that this was intended as a practical inquiry, not as a needle on Sino-Indian relations.

6 Paragraph 1 instructed Cabot to give Wang information concerning several small wrecked vessels washed ashore at Okinawa and neighboring islands in late January and early February.

7 Quinim Pholsena, Lao Foreign Minister, was assassinated on the night of April 1 by a guard at his residence.