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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXII, Northeast Asia, Document 194


194. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of StateSourceSource: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.

926. Cabot-Wang Talks. Deptel 799.11. Telegram 799, November 6, provided guidance for the meeting. (Ibid.) 118th meeting two hours 10 minutes.22. Cabot commented on the meeting in telegram 928, November 14, and sent a detailed, apparently verbatim report of the meeting in airgram A-416, November 21. (Both ibid.)

1. Wang opened with U-2 incident33. A U.S.-made, Chinese Nationalist-piloted U-2 aircraft was shot down over the China mainland on November 1. asserting that second such incident was part and parcel plot harass mainland and constituted additional evidence US hostility and aggression. Stated he instructed lodge strong protest which he hoped I would transmit. Claimed facts proved President and State Department spokesman were wrong when they stated only 2 U-2s had been sold. He cited UPI story of crash on Taiwan and Reuter's December 19, 1962 story re replacements as proof there is agreement between intelligence agencies that there will always be U-2s on Taiwan. Also claimed these aircraft under US control and supply, maintenance, use, and authority solely in US hands.

2. Wang then referred my statement last meeting44. See Document 187. re our attitude of firmness without hostility and stated our recent behaviour had given lie this statement. Cited infringement China's territorial airspace and waters, guerrilla group parachuted onto Hainan Island, “summoning” of Chiang Ching-kuo to Washington, joint exercises involving Chiang clique with 173rd Airborne Brigade and 503rd Infantry Combat Group, and air support by 5th and 13th Air Forces as wanton military provocations. He instructed lodge serious protest these activities and demand that they cease immediately.

3. Wang also alleged US had been using territories adjacent China for military activities. “Puppets” in South Vietnam and South Korea have launched agent operations. We have goaded India into provocations by equipping 6 divisions for Himalayan fighting, considering equipping two additional mountain divisions, and engaging in joint maneuvers.

4. Wang referred to our obstructive tactics in UN and Ambassador Stevenson's statements there55. On October 21, by a vote of 41 to 57 (U.S.), with 12 abstentions, the General Assembly rejected a draft resolution sponsored by Albania and Cambodia calling for the immediate removal of “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” and an invitation to the People's Republic of China to send representatives to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all its organs. (U.N. doc. A/L.427 and Add. 1) For text of Stevenson's statement before the General Assembly on October 16, see Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1963, pp. 755-758. noting his Foreign Ministry had issued statement of condemnation and protest.66. A statement issued by the PRC Foreign Ministry on October 24 is quoted in the Peking Review, vol. VI, No. 44 (November 1, 1963), pp. 3-4. He concluded with reference to Alsop tonsilectomy article as further evidence our aggressive conduct.

5. I expressed disappointment concerning his statements and reminded him we were allies of Republic of China. Replied U-2 accusations along lines paragraph 2 reference telegram.77. Paragraph 2 of telegram 799 stated that if Wang reiterated New China News Agency charges that the U-2s were under U.S. control, Cabot should state that in view of Chinese Communist previous attacks and hostility toward the GRC, the United States had authorized the sale of U-2 planes to the GRC; if Wang referred to the statements cited in footnote 5 and asked if other U-2s had been or would be supplied, he should reply that he could not discuss U.S.-GRC mutual defense plans. Stated would refer protest to Washington but expressed belief it was uncalled for in circumstances. Added that in view consistently aggressive attitude his side it natural that nations on borders would take protective actions. Explained we did not “summon” officials of other sovereign governments. Re maneuvers pointed out these designed to protect against further aggression. Re territorial infringements and guerrilla activity I replied along lines paragraph 3 reference telegram. Denied knowledge Alsop story emphasizing he obviously private individual.

6. I then raised prisoner issue (paragraph 7) reference telegram, exchange of newsmen (paragraph 8), deportees (paragraph 9) and missing servicemen (paragraph 10).88. Paragraph 7 stated that release of the U.S. prisoners would bring a strong response from the American public and expressed the hope that Wang's side would intercede with the Pathet Lao and North Korea for the release of Americans. Paragraph 8 reiterated that it would be in the interest of both sides to seek greater understanding through an exchange of newspapermen. Paragraph 9 instructed Cabot to ask Wang if his side would accept three additional deportees. Paragraph 10 stated that a recently returned Korean War nonrepatriate said he had seen American personnel identification tags from the Korean war on display at the Peking War Museum and requested that if this were true, the names and numbers from those tags should be provided.

7. Wang rejoined by stating my justification for hostile acts would not hold hot water. My reference to Republic of China could not give legal basis our occupation of Taiwan. Defenses re U-2 described as futile. Claimed we use U-2s all over and such espionage flights now part of US national policy. Claimed we intentionally aggravating tension and conducting consistent smear campaign. Cited statements by Sihanouk, former Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi, Chairman Nepalese National Assembly Bendudapa, a Kenyan Senator, a Deputy in Pakistan National Assembly and the Vice President of the Peoples Organization in Southwest Africa to prove false nature our alleged smear campaign.

8. Wang stated his side had first put forward exchange of personnel idea and had attempted promote this matter but US had placed obstacles in path by policy of hostility, relations could be normalized and obstacles in path exchange of persons could be eliminated.

9. Wang said he did not think it appropriate to discuss prisoners in North Korea and Laos at this meeting.

10. Wang expressed hope that nothing will prevent return to China of 3 deportees already accepted.

11. Wang said he would look into cases of additional 3 deportees and hoped give a reply in a few days.

12. I expressed regret we seemed be far apart on most matters this meeting. Reiterated Republic of China operating U-2s and saw no reason for responsibility to be placed on US. With reference his quotation opinions prominent individuals I affirmed their right their own opinions. I then referred to recent Soviet-Chinese exchange of communications and said that Chinese statements themselves showed that his side was aggressive. Agreed we had worked against admission to UN in belief his side not peace-loving and majority of nations agreed with us. Regretted he no longer appeared willing exchange newsmen. Re deportees I stated we did not want them to remain but they themselves had raised obstacles to their immediate deportation.99. Telegram 823 to Warsaw, November 12, reported that one deportee had failed to surrender himself and two had reopened their legal cases. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)

13. Wang misunderstood my comments about Sino-Soviet communications and thought I had referred to Soviet not Chinese statements. He stated it was inappropriate in these talks to refer to third countries and expressed view it was futile to cite Soviet statements as defense our own hostile policy. He described Soviet Union as great Socialist country whose people had glorious revolutionary tradition and said it would be premature for anyone to show delight or to attempt to profit from dispute.

14. Wang claimed our obstructive tactics UN becoming more unpopular each year and it was not up to US to determine unilaterally which countries are peace-loving. Said our obstructive tactics would go bankrupt.

15. I straightened out his confusion re my reference to Soviet and Chinese statements emphasizing the manner and reasonable man would interpret Chinese statements regarding their attitude towards matters which impinge on our interests.

16. I suggested next meeting be held January 8 but Wang requested it be January 29. I agreed.

Cabot

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.

1 Telegram 799, November 6, provided guidance for the meeting. (Ibid.)

2 Cabot commented on the meeting in telegram 928, November 14, and sent a detailed, apparently verbatim report of the meeting in airgram A-416, November 21. (Both ibid.)

3 A U.S.-made, Chinese Nationalist-piloted U-2 aircraft was shot down over the China mainland on November 1.

4 See Document 187.

5 On October 21, by a vote of 41 to 57 (U.S.), with 12 abstentions, the General Assembly rejected a draft resolution sponsored by Albania and Cambodia calling for the immediate removal of “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” and an invitation to the People's Republic of China to send representatives to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all its organs. (U.N. doc. A/L.427 and Add. 1) For text of Stevenson's statement before the General Assembly on October 16, see Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1963, pp. 755-758.

6 A statement issued by the PRC Foreign Ministry on October 24 is quoted in the Peking Review, vol. VI, No. 44 (November 1, 1963), pp. 3-4.

7 Paragraph 2 of telegram 799 stated that if Wang reiterated New China News Agency charges that the U-2s were under U.S. control, Cabot should state that in view of Chinese Communist previous attacks and hostility toward the GRC, the United States had authorized the sale of U-2 planes to the GRC; if Wang referred to the statements cited in footnote 5 and asked if other U-2s had been or would be supplied, he should reply that he could not discuss U.S.-GRC mutual defense plans.

8 Paragraph 7 stated that release of the U.S. prisoners would bring a strong response from the American public and expressed the hope that Wang's side would intercede with the Pathet Lao and North Korea for the release of Americans. Paragraph 8 reiterated that it would be in the interest of both sides to seek greater understanding through an exchange of newspapermen. Paragraph 9 instructed Cabot to ask Wang if his side would accept three additional deportees. Paragraph 10 stated that a recently returned Korean War nonrepatriate said he had seen American personnel identification tags from the Korean war on display at the Peking War Museum and requested that if this were true, the names and numbers from those tags should be provided.

9 Telegram 823 to Warsaw, November 12, reported that one deportee had failed to surrender himself and two had reopened their legal cases. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)