232. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Korea
PARTICIPANTS
-
Japan
- Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda
- Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka
- Kiichi Miyazawa, Member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet
- Shigenobu Shima, Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
- Koichiro Asakai, Japanese Ambassador to the United States
- Toshiro Shimanouchi, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter
-
United States
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
- Edwin O. Reischauer, United States Ambassador to Japan
- FE—Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary
- Walt W. Rostow, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- NA—Richard L. Sneider, Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs
- LS—James J. Wickel, Interpreter
Prime Minister Ikeda said that a question of utmost difficulty for Japan is the problem of Korea. From its own experience of governing Korea for 40 years, Japan recognizes that the Koreans are difficult to deal with, being exclusive and self-willed. The problem is what to do at the present time. The Prime Minister claimed that Japanese relations had not been formalized with the Republic of Korea and as a result of the recent coup there is very little that Japan can do. The Japanese people do not like the recent developments and would like to see an early restoration of civil government. However, since the coup is an accomplished fact, the situation must be dealt with as it now stands. The Prime Minister pointed out that the Japanese are powerless to influence Korean political developments and therefore hope that the U.S. will restore civil government. To do so, however, Japan feels that it is necessary first to restore economic stability and is prepared to cooperate with external assistance to Korea to accomplish this objective.
The President said that the United States had been hopeful regarding the ability of the former regime to gain increasing popular support. [Page 490] We now face a very difficult situation which concerns us greatly, particularly in the light of the large scale unemployment and discontent in Korea. He said that we intend to use our influence to move the new regime to a restoration of constitutional methods and civil rule, but this will be a slow process. The President pointed out that the United States has spent a considerable amount of money in Korea with little to show for it in view of the serious economic difficulties and discontent. However, we intend to continue aid to this country. He said it would be most helpful to bring about agreement between Japan and Korea, although we recognize this is difficult due to the nationalistic flavor of the coup group and the popular dislike in Japan for militaristic regimes. One aim of our policy in Korea is to attempt to establish close relations between Japan and Korea. We also consider that Japanese assistance, particularly for power development, would be very helpful.
The President asked whether, in the Prime Minister’s judgment, a communist seizure of control of South Korea would have an extremely adverse effect on Japan. The Prime Minister replied that the record of Japan’s long history testifies to the fact that the security of Korea is, in effect, a domestic problem for Japan. Japan has a very vital stake in Korea. Japan is willing to accept even the present regime since it is anti-communist. Although it is important to bring about an improvement in the present situation, it is even more essential to prevent a communist takeover of South Korea.
The President suggested that there be further talks with the Secretary on the Korean question, and the Prime Minister agreed.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Japan, Ikeda Trip, Memcons and Follow Up. Confidential. Drafted by Richard L. Sneider. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) Korea was one of the topics discussed at the meeting. For additional information on Ikeda’s visit, see Documents 330–339.↩