Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

241. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 11, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Program for Return to Civilian Control of the Government of the Republic of Korea¹

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. H. L. T. Koren, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
• Mr. Il Kwon Chung, Korean Ambassador to the United States

The Secretary called in Ambassador Chung this afternoon and said he wished to make some comments as a friend on some matters the Korean Government was going to decide in the next few days, emphasizing he did not wish to presume in questions which were of course for decision by the ROKG.

The Secretary referred to the conversations President Kennedy had last June with Chairman Khrushchev.² Khrushchev made the point that the Soviet Government was going to back popular regimes all over the world and that it was historically inevitable that Communism would triumph in these countries. Khrushchev said that the U.S. finds itself the “gendarme of the status quo” and the U.S. would inevitably lose if we took this role against the will of the peoples. The President, in turn, pointed out the hypocrisy of this statement in that there was no Communist government currently in power which had achieved its status through free elections. Khrushchev had pointed to Korea as being vulnerable to his kind of penetration and that the military orientation of the present government made it susceptible to pressures from underneath such as would be stimulated by Khrushchev himself.

The Secretary stated that the ROK has a stake in the opinions of other states forming the body of the UN. The importance of the UN to Korea has been demonstrated over a considerable period, particularly in 1950, when a number of members joined the U.S. in resisting invasion not just for policy reasons, but also reflecting the general sentiment and opinion of the peoples. ROK has needed UN support in the past and may need it in the future. It is, therefore, vital for the safety and security of the ROK that it engender respect among the UN peoples.

The foregoing two comments, the Secretary said, were connected with the moves presently contemplated by the ROK toward reestablishment of constitutional government, and have a bearing on what will be shortly announced regarding elections. The Secretary expressed concern should elections be announced for as far away as 1963. Such a date would raise doubts whether this was indeed a serious proposal and whether the step was actually contemplated by the government.

The Secretary suggested consideration by ROKG of scheduling elections before the 1962 General Assembly meeting. He said that how the Korean question came before this year’s General Assembly was not particularly serious, it being understood that the new government must have time to formulate and begin implementation of its governmental planning. It was reasonable to expect other governments would adopt a wait-and-see policy; however, this attitude would undoubtedly run out by the end of one year.

Indicating he had not discussed this idea with his colleagues, the Secretary wondered whether, if the ROKG did not feel it could announce elections before 1963, it might consider not specifying a date. The date of May 1963 might give the impression that the ROK feared elections. Mr. McConaughy thought there was something to be said for deferring announcing a specific date, but that it was our understanding that the Korean public were eagerly anticipating a specific announcement on August 14, and omitting a timetable would be a great disappointment. Ambassador Chung seconded this and the idea was dropped. In this connection, the Secretary inquired of the Ambassador how he felt the Korean people would react to the 1963 date. Ambassador replied it was hard to answer this definitely. He had been away on a trip until a few days ago and he had left Korea over four years ago, so he did not feel in a position to make a judgment.

The Secretary emphasized the spirit in which he made his comments. It was not up to the U.S. to say “when” but he considered it a friendly act to point out to the Ambassador the effect of the proposed election date on other countries and on the ROKG’s international relations. Such a long postponement would undoubtedly be picked up by the communists and used in their propaganda. We have been encouraged by the progress made so far by the present government but he felt he ought to express our feeling of concern over the matter of election date. The decision was, however, entirely an ROK matter. The Secretary realized the great concern the ROKG felt on this matter, and the fact that it must balance many things. He hoped that the ROKG would take into account the fact that the date for elections will have an influence on the international position of the ROK. Many governments to whom the ROK has and will turn to for friendship are concerned over this matter, have consulted with us, and are anxious to see a steady progression to constitutional status.

The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for his advice. He did not feel in a position to give a definite answer, but he would try his best to influence his government and advise it in accordance with the Secretary’s wishes.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/8-1161. Confidential. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on August 17.
1. In an August 11 memorandum drafted by Manhard and sent by McConaughy to Rusk FE recommended that he make four main points to Ambassador Il Kwon Chung: elections should be held earlier, the United States appreciated Pak’s confidence in Berger and his frankness, the United States welcomed the ROK desire to reopen negotiations with Japan for better relations, and the U.S. desire to assist Korean economic development was undiminished. (Ibid., 601.95B11/8-1161)
2. For documentation on the Kennedy-Khrushchev discussions at Vienna in June 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume V.
3. On August 21-22 Major General Kim Dong Ha, Chairman of the Steering Committee of the SCNR, met with McConaughy and Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Ball during a visit to Washington. Both McConaughy and Ball stressed in their talks with General Kim the need for unity in the junta, fair and free elections in 1963, and continued economic reform. (Memoranda from Koren to McConaughy and McConaughy to Ball, both August 21; memoranda of conversation, August 21 and 22; ibid., 795B.00/8-2161 and 611.95B/8-2261)