253. Special National Intelligence Estimate0

SNIE 42-62

THE OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA

The Problem

To assess the prospects for political and economic stability in South Korea through 1970, with particular reference to the impact of major changes in the level and type of US support and assistance.

Note

The last estimate on Korea was NIE 14.2/42-61, “The Outlook for Korea,” dated 7 September 1961.1 It dealt with the major trends and prospects in South Korea, with particular attention to the impact of North Korea on the south over the next two or three years. That estimate remains substantially valid, in our opinion, and it should be consulted for the background of the present estimate.

The introduction to the present estimate is intended to bring NIE 14.2/42-61 up to date in the briefest possible manner. Parts II through V assess the prospects for South Korea through 1970. Part VI discusses the probable impact of a substantial reduction of South Korean armed force strengths and, concurrently, a substantial increase in the amount of US economic aid. For the purpose of this section it is assumed that US aid during the period FY 1964-1968 would be based upon a phased reduction of about one-third in present Republic of Korea (ROK) armed force strength and, concurrently, an increase in assistance for a comprehensive and balanced economic development program on the order of $50-$100 million per year.

Conclusions

1.
As far as we can see at present, the political situation in South Korea during the period of this estimate will probably be characterized by vigorous dissension and factionalism in both military and civilian circles. We believe that the military will continue to dominate the state, [Page 553] even though the government may be ostensibly civilian. Occasional abrupt changes of leadership by coup d’etat may be in prospect. (Paras. 9-13)
2.
The economic outlook is grim but not hopeless. Assuming a continuance of US aid at approximately present levels and a reasonable degree of political stability, there will probably be some improvement. An increase in the amount of US aid, if effectively used, could speed up the rate of economic growth and in the long run would probably contribute to political and social stability. At best, however, economic advance will be slow. (Paras. 14-17, 27-29)
3.
The Communist powers will continue their attempts to destroy the independence of South Korea by various forms of political warfare and subversion. The greatest threat to the country lies in the possibility that political dissension, economic stagnation, and social unrest will render it increasingly vulnerable to this Communist effort. (Paras. 21-23)
4.
As long as the Communist powers believe that the US will defend South Korea, they will almost certainly not launch an overt military invasion.2 Accordingly, a reduction of strength of the South Korean armed forces, by anything up to about one-third of present numbers, would probably not in itself increase the likelihood of invasion from the north. It would, however, produce considerable political unrest within the country, which would possibly be great enough to endanger any government initiating the measure.3 (Paras. 24-26, 30-33)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section of the estimate, comprising 7 pages.]

  1. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 42-62. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on April 4 except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
  2. Document 243.
  3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would state this sentence as follows: As long as the Communist powers believe that the US will defend South Korea with the kind and degree of force necessary quickly to defeat any invasion, they will almost certainly not launch an overt military invasion. [Footnote in the source text.]
  4. For the positions of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; see the footnote to paragraph 25. [Footnote in the source text. The footnote to paragraph 25 stated that the above officials believed that the chief deterrent to military and paramilitary action against South Korea was a “combination of the Communist belief that the US will defend South Korea, present US-ROK military capability in South Korea and the additional military strength the US can immediately bring to bear in that area.” These officials opposed any reduction in ROK forces on the grounds that it would have serious and unassessable consequences for the strategic balance in the Far East.]