255. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
An expression of your concern over the apparent new impasse in the ROK/Japanese negotiations would be highly desirable at this point.
These talks have dragged on fitfully since 1951. ROK animosity stemming from thirty-five years of Japanese rule in Korea was long the chief obstacle; ROK claims were ridiculously high. The new ROK military regime, however, is interested in an early settlement because General Pak needs money for his ambitious development program. But his effort, sparked by his talks with Ikeda last November, has now run into Japanese stalling.
Ikeda has been fighting a balance of payments problem brought on partly by his own ten-year development plan. He foresees little relief before November and hesitates to arouse public criticism by new foreign obligations. He also faces upper house elections and wants reelection as Liberal Democratic Party chief this summer. Leftist opponents are looking for an issue with which to embarrass Ikeda. Moreover, Ikeda’s recognition of the need to stabilize the ROK political and economic situation is still not strong enough to overcome his suspicion that the US may be [Page 556] gradually withdrawing support for South Korea in the expectation that Japan will assume responsibility. Reischauer says it may be late autumn before Tokyo is willing to consider serious talks again. But the Koreans threaten “other action” if a settlement is not reached by the end of the year.
As the attached cables1 indicate, the issues still dividing the two countries are exceedingly complex. State has been reluctant to see us get involved too directly, lest we incur the onus of an unpopular settlement or end up paying a large portion of the bill. Nonetheless, our interests dictate an early resolution of this issue in a manner which will bring Japan to assume a greater share of the burden of subsidizing South Korea—a matter at least as important to Japan’s security as to ours.
State is working up an action program to get things moving again. However, I recommend the attached nudge from you2 to put steam behind this exercise and to let the ambassadors know of White House interest. At least some quarters in State would not be at all averse to such a nudge.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Komer. Secret.↩
- Telegrams 2617, 2901, and 2933 from Tokyo, March 20, April 18 and 21, telegram 966 to Seoul, April 12, and airgram A-321 from Seoul, March 29, were indicated as attachments, none found attached. (All in Department of State, Central Files, 294.9541/3-2062, 294.9541/4-1862, 294.9541/4-2162, 294.9541/4-562, and 794.56211/3-2962, respectively)↩
- Document 256.↩