270. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 0
Washington,
July 26,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Redeployment of US Forces from Korea
- 1.
- Consistent with your request I have been looking into implications of a redeployment of one of the US divisions in Korea. I discussed the matter briefly with Admiral Felt during my trip last week with Secretary McNamara and I have informed Ambassador Berger, Eyes Only, of our pending review.1
- 2.
- In pursuing this question I have found that the interagency committee developing the report in response to NSC Action 2447 (Review of the Military Aid Program)2 has moved rather far along in evolving proposals which relate to levels of Korean forces and of US aid in relation thereto. Though NSC Action 2447 is primarily addressed to US Military Assistance and its problems, the Action does direct that the review of [Page 589] Korean Military Assistance plans and programs should take into account and make recommendations in connection with “the desirable level of US forces in Korea.” This latter point has not been adequately addressed in the work of the interagency committee developing the report in response to 2447. The issue has largely been assumed away, i.e., that the importance of the present levels of US forces in Korea is assumed to be manifest. The study then focuses on levels of Korean forces and related aid problems. Since NSC Action 2447 is cast in terms of a review of US foreign aid activities it is understandable why the basic strategic policy implications surrounding the US force commitment have not emerged clearly. As I see it, however, the preliminary direction in which that Report is moving would severely prejudice any serious consideration of a US force withdrawal since a large reduction in Korean forces will probably be recommended.
- 3.
- As a result of the foregoing I propose to discuss this matter with Fowler Hamilton, Paul Nitze and Governor Harriman with a view to seeing how the fundamental question which you raised, and which is explicitly raised by the NSC Action 2447, can best be brought into focus. I am also going to let McGeorge Bundy know what we are doing so as to assure full coordination with the White House.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/7-2662. Top Secret. Drafted by Seymour Weiss of G/PM. A note on the source text indicates Rusk saw the memorandum.↩
- Reference is to telegram 80 to Seoul, July 27, in which Weiss and Johnson informed Berger that the principal presumed advantages to the United States would be “increased tactical flexibility” and “balance of payment savings” by stationing the troops in a dollar area such as Okinawa. They stressed that they appreciated the disadvantages of the proposal and reiterated that no decision had been yet made. (Ibid., 795.00/7-2762)↩
- See Document 251.↩