272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea 0

109. Ref: Seoul’s 85.1

1.
Our problem with Kim Chong-p’il and CIA appears to Dept as crystallization more general problem we have all foreseen: How effectively to counter trends toward totalitarian control and ambitions of young colonels for political and personal power, and how to keep Korea somewhere near road toward democratic development.
2.
As you have pointed out, it is not realistic for us to insist on full-blown democracy and complete disappearance of military leadership in 1963. On other hand, continuing usefulness of Korea to us in terms our long-range objectives depends upon maintenance of some forward momentum toward evolution of free society. We can tolerate ups and downs, but not major reversal.
3.
Seems inescapable that we must be prepared accept either Pak Chong-hui or man selected by him as Korea’s leader for next few years, subject to proviso that this leadership must be legitimated by people through processes sufficiently free and fair to be acceptable in Korea and world. Pak is only figure now in sight who seems to possess sufficient intelligence, vision, breadth of contact, forcefulness, personal reputation, [Page 592] and access to power (especially over military) to fulfill present leadership requirements.
4.
As you have recommended, we therefore should work with Pak, manifesting our support for him implicitly rather than explicitly, continuing to make clear that our support flows from our general policy toward Korea and not from commitment to any individual or group, and using our support for him as basis to influence his courses of action along lines acceptable to us.
5.
First course of action concerns Kim Chong-p’il. Just as we should not support any individual qua individual, we should not overtly so oppose anyone. However we can make it clear, as you already have done, that a director of espionage and secret police should not at same time be principal policy maker and second-ranking leader of modern state, even in transition period; nor should same man whose function it is to serve as watchdog over government and society serve also as head of vast and uncontrolled executive apparatus which is set above established governmental apparatus and stifles it. Hence if Kim is to continue run CIA, he should head his intelligence apparatus, make his recommendations, and limit himself to those roles, leaving policy decision and execution to established executive arm even when he believes his men might do it faster or better. Alternatively, Kim might be removed from picture gracefully, say as Ambassador to Japan where he seems to have been so successful in negotiations. Pak might be reminded that principal distinction between top leader and his associates is that former alone exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of national affairs while subordinates handle assigned parts. If this distinction is blurred, status of leader is also blurred, and consequently his power. Hence imperative that Kim accept his specialized role.
6.
As corollary to above, and as basis for continuity of revolution, power and effectiveness of executive branch of government should be enhanced, including greater role for Cabinet. This branch, with its organization and personnel, has legitimacy of centuries of history, constitutional sanction, and largely civilian staffing. It needs more motivation, discipline, esprit de corps, and efficiency; but if it is harassed and pushed aside by CIA and military, it can never hope to improve; and if its work is to be taken over by uncontrolled ad hoc organizations, these sooner or later will fall prey to same weaknesses as present bureaucracy, as well as lacking legitimacy and hence public acceptance. On other hand, if bureaucracy can be strengthened, motivated, and brought to support revolutionary objectives, it can be most powerful means of assuring continuation of revolution under successor civilian government. Effective bureaucracy with sense of pride, ideals, and esprit de corps can be much more immune to undesirable political pressures than weak and underpaid organization of past, and hence can be expected to remain on reasonable [Page 593] course toward national development. Extra-legal executive agencies, such as those under CIA, should be either abolished or merged into established government structure.
7.
Second course of action concerns transition to civilian government. Following propositions suggested for comment:
a.
Eventual success of revolution depends upon consensus of Korean people that its goals desirable and attainable; that revolutionary program conceived and pursued for people’s benefit, not that of junta alone or its individual members; that government is led by men best equipped to carry out this program; and that channels exist through which people can express views, exert influence, and have sense participation.
b.
This consensus can best be promoted by (1) protecting prestige and reputation of military leaders as able, sincere men dedicated to national welfare above all else; (2) legitimating government through legitimate expression of popular will in referendum and elections; (3) primary reliance on persuasion and firm leadership rather than terror; (4) avoidance of unreasonable promises or unreasonable demands.
c.
If revolutionary leaders are convinced that their goals and programs are valid, and that Free World ideals they profess to support are valid, then they should be willing accept challenges and risks of unrigged elections.
d.
On other hand, fraudulent election victory would negate everything they stand for.
e.
Such fundamental and far-reaching reforms as revolutionary leaders envisage cannot be accomplished overnight, except in their most superficial and least meaningful aspects; too much haste and pressure will actually retard social and economic progress; hence long view is essential, and setbacks are inevitable.
f.
Korean people are basically sensible, pragmatic, independent-minded, but suspicious of government; therefore if they are approached sincerely, sensibly, and pragmatically, and if their suspicions thus in some measure alleviated, they are most likely to support revolution at polls, while trickery, bribery and pressure will do lasting damage whatever statistical election outcome might be.
g.
Best way of dealing with expectable opposition vote is to split it among contending candidates rather than suppressing it. (This procedure would also shed useful light on relative popularity of opposition leaders.)
h.
Progressive increase in freedom of action and expression as election time approaches would be valuable demonstration of military leaders’ good faith. Removal additional individuals from political purification lists, and termination martial courts and other emergency control measures, would be useful this connection. Skillful public debate [Page 594] on opposition political claims and pronouncements, based on objectives, background, and experience of military leaders with good public-relations counsel, could turn increased freedom to leaders’ advantage.
8.
Third course of action concerns civilian participation, necessity of which you have emphasized. Believe Pak should open channel of communication with senior political leaders, inviting their suggestions, and in course of dialogue on future of country, endeavor to gain support of some of them by accepting at least portions of proferred advice, and possibly by constituting an informal council of elder statesmen which would have certain emoluments and status attached to it but would also have degree of independence. Senior leaders’ nominees might be given Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions as initial step in gaining their confidence.
9.
Fourth course of action concerns post-election control. Continuation of CIA-like apparatus in some form probably inevitable, regardless of U.S. arguments pro or con, but exclusive reliance must not be placed on it. Continued ties between military and civilian bureaucracy, perhaps with latter protected through some sort of civil service commission, plus plurality military government members and supporters in national assembly and Pak or his nominee as chief executive, backed by continued implicit power of armed forces, should insure continuity of revolution. Another possibility might be small legislative Upper House, half of whose members appointed for first term of, say, six years, and other half subjected to re-election after three years. Frank expression of military leadership’s influence through such means might be preferable to rigging of elections for single legislation house.
10.
You authorized approach Pak at appropriate time and in appropriate circumstances and discuss situation along foregoing lines in context US desire to be helpful, making above points as your own or as US Government’s as seems most expedient, and emphasizing that our concern with specific problems or individuals, such as Kim Chong-p’il, is solely in context our general concern with Korean security, progress, and prosperity, which is in US interests as well as Korea’s.
11.
In regard your relations with military government, Dept continues to have utmost confidence your ability to handle situation, and is prepared to back you up in future as in past. Dept agrees with your policy of refusing deal with Kim Chong-p’il except on CIA matters, and not surprised that this policy, as well as your firmness on other matters, has resulted in some back-pressure and bitterness. Dept believes we are on right track and proposes we stay on it, having in mind of course the need for the eager, sensitive, and by now somewhat confused revolutionary leaders to have the sweet judiciously mingled with the sour.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/7-2762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Macdonald; cleared by Yager, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rice; and approved by Harriman.
  2. Document 271.