Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

275. Special National Intelligence Estimate⁰

SNIE 42-2-62

Washington, September 7, 1962.

SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA

The Problem

To assess the political situation in South Korea and to estimate probable developments over the next few months.

Conclusions

A. The recent outbreak of factional strife within the military junta which rules South Korea has been caused largely by controversy [5 lines of source text not declassified]. We believe that the junta, with General Pak Chong-hui as the key figure, will remain in power until the elections scheduled for 1963, and will exercise a large degree of control over the new civilian government. (Paras. 1-5, 9-12)

B. The junta currently has little popular support. Blatantly rigged elections or further economic deterioration could cause riots and demonstrations. While the regime can suppress local outbursts, massive public demonstrations could trigger coup attempts by disgruntled military leaders, perhaps acting in concert with presently disbarred political elements. The outcome of such attempts cannot be estimated, but the government which emerged from such a situation would almost certainly require a large degree of backing from the ROK military. (Paras. 6-8, 11)

C. ROK-US relations will continue to be difficult over the next few months. There will probably be some attempts to improve liaison with US officials in economic matters, although the CIA will continue its largely uncontrolled economic activities. In political matters, it is doubtful that either Pak or Kim will accept US suggestions which might impose limitations on their actions. Despite strong US pressures, it is doubtful that the issue of ROK-Japanese relations will soon be resolved. Only on the military plane will ROK-US relations remain reasonably open and friendly. (Paras. 13-17)

D. Factional strife within the junta, increased public apathy and even hostility toward the regime, and strained relations with the US have increased the danger of Communist subversive activities. Appeals to Korean nationalism and for peaceful unification may prove more effective than in the past. During the next few months, a real Communist threat to the regime is unlikely to develop, but if the political erosion, which has already commenced, is not halted and if economic stagnation persists, the problem of countering Communist subversion will become far more serious. (Paras. 18-20)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section of the estimate.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 42-2-62. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on September 7 except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.