276. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 0

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Force Level, Korea

I have examined the question of withdrawing a U.S. division from Korea as a means of increasing the flexibility of our military posture in the Western Pacific. Although the withdrawal of one division would probably not materially dilute the deterrent effect of the presence of U.S. forces, there are a number of negative considerations.

It appears that proximity to Korea is important in light of a finding by the JCS that in the event of a combined North Korean-ChiCom attack, the presence of two U.S. divisions would be necessary at the outset. Thus, Okinawa would provide the best alternate location for the division. Hawaii and the Philippines are both comparatively distant. Difficulties with this alternative are a) the present lack of sufficient transportation in the opening days of a conflict, and b) the lack of sufficient airfield and port facilities in Okinawa rapidly to effect the movement of the necessary size.

In addition, there are also a number of disadvantages of a political and economic nature. Such a withdrawal would likely have an unsettling effect on the Korean Government in its present stage of development [Page 600] and might trigger a demand by the ROKs for a change in command relationships which we would find unacceptable. It would militate against carrying out the reduction in ROK Army force levels which we are presently contemplating as a means of increasing the availability of local resources for economic development purposes. The concomitant loss of the 9.3 million dollars which accrues to Korea by virtue of the presence of a division would be equivalent to reducing Korea’s export level by about 22.7 per cent. Accordingly, an increase in supporting assistance would be required, a doubtful possibility at best.

Acquisition of the necessary additional land in Okinawa (with 1539 persons per square mile already one of the most densely populated areas in the world) would likely produce political repercussions which might militate against continued U.S. use of that vital base.

In light of these arguments it would appear inadvisable to withdraw a U.S. division from Korea at this time.

The DOD position is at Tab B.1 Departmental inputs are at Tabs C and D.2

Recommendations:

1.
That you approve this conclusion as a basis for current drafting on NSAM 2447 (study of future economic and military aid levels and U.S. force level, Korea).3
2.
That you sign a letter to Ros Gilpatric (Tab A)4 which conveys this conclusion but raises questions regarding future possibilities.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.56311/8-2862. Top Secret. Drafted by Wallace C. Magathan of G/PM and cleared by Peterson, Allen S. Whiting of INR, Joseph J. Wolf of AID, and “informally” by William Bundy of DOD/ISA.
  2. Document 274.
  3. Tab C was a memorandum from Jeffrey C. Kitchen of G/PM to Johnson, recommending that Johnson send the package forward to Rusk. Tab D was a memorandum from Wolf to Magathan, September 1, which has not been found.
  4. Rusk initialed his approval on September 19. Reference should be to NSC Action No. 2447.
  5. Tab A was a September 19 letter from Rusk to Gilpatric, agreeing that it was “inadvisable to withdraw a U.S. Division at this time,” but suggesting that the Department of Defense improve sea and airlift capabilities in the Far East and then “examine alternative possibilities such as the Philippines.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.56311/8-2862)