287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea0
Washington,
January 26, 1963, 2:03 p.m.
451. Reference Seoul’s 527, repeated Tokyo 130, CINCPAC 115.1
- 1.
- Department commends your excellent handling and reporting of fast-changing situation.
- 2.
- We agree with your assessment (telegram 520)2 that compromise solution of factional
struggle within junta would offer best hope of [Page 620] peaceful transition to civilian rule
under conditions favoring longer term political stability.
- A.
- We hope Chairman Pak’s maneuvering will not lead to victory and unchallenged leadership of Kim Chong-p’il, particularly if his victory left him free to carry out his plans for authoritarian-type political party.
- B.
- Military coup by forces opposing Kim Chong-p’il would also be most undesirable. Unfortunate precedent of military intervention in politics would be strengthened, and transition to civilian government might be frustrated. Also if leadership such a coup were restricted to Hamg-yong faction we would question whether it could command significant popular support.
- 3.
- Your efforts to promote compromise solution have our full support.
Rusk
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1-2662. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Norred and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- In telegram 527, January 26, the Embassy reported that after Berger and Meloy met with Pak and Kim Chong-p’il on January 25, they realized that the plan Pak outlined to Berger (see footnote 1, Document 286) to resolve the crisis within the SCNR was not working. The two problems were Kim Chong-p’il’s resignation as chairman of the government’s political party (Democratic Republican Party) and the reorganization of the junta to remove Kim Chong-p’il’s appointees. What was really at stake, the Embassy reported, was a power struggle between Kim Chong P’il and his supporters versus most of the military men who led the revolution and wanted to reduce Kim’s power in favor of their own. Should both sides refuse to compromise, there could be a showdown with possible armed clashes, and the plans for smooth transition to civilian government would be in a shambles. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00.1-2662)↩
- Dated January 24. (Ibid., 795B.00/1-2463)↩