Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ⁰

Seoul, February 13, 1963, 6 p.m.

561. Policy. Ref: Embtel 557 rptd Tokyo 145 CINCPAC 128.¹

1. It has become increasingly apparent that USG must within next few days make fundamental decision on our attitude toward Chairman Pak, his government and their plans for election and transition to civilian govt.

2. Fear of Kim Chong-p’il’s power, dissension among revolutionary leaders, growing public knowledge of Kim’s stock market operations, dissatisfaction with ROK CIA general record of interference, and growing opposition criticism of govt’s policies and actions, have been combining to weaken govt’s unity and discredit it in eyes of people, even in countryside where govt previously enjoyed considerable support. Economic situation involving rising prices and inflationary pressures being exaggerated beyond its real significance. Economy not in as bad condition as attributed, however, there has been loss of confidence which has added to political difficulties. Public apprehension that military govt is losing US confidence is also contributing to gradually rising atmosphere of uneasiness. There is probability of trouble in which students and even other groups will participate, Universities reopen March 1 and both govt and opposition leaders have indicated to US student political activity expected thereafter. Now apparent govt party will find it difficult to win a fair election. Pak reportedly showing signs of concern over his ability to resolve political and economic instabilities.

3. Two weeks ago there was outside chance that if Kim Chong-p’il left govt party country situation might remain reasonably stable during transition. It now appears that Kim’s retirement from scene would be helpful but would not in itself suffice to deal with whole complex of factors which are evolving. Yun Po-sun and Ho Chong have made strong pleas to us that both Kim and Pak must withdraw with Pak continuing in caretaker role until after election, or there will be no hope for political stability. A very different view is being advocated by some revolutionary leaders, who fear calling off election, reimposing martial law, and holding power for another year or two. These are symptoms of crisis, and it can only be resolved if USG throws full force of our position into situation.

4. In our view establishment of political and economic stability and restoration of public confidence now require fundamental actions:

A. On economic side, there must be immediate checks on inflationary pressure and moves to stabilize the won. Killen is working with new Chairman EPB to develop policies to accomplish this. The measures required would mean sharp modification of current govt economic policies re budget management, credit, and money supply, and trimming 5-year economic plan projects. These would probably be politically unpalatable, especially to Kim Chong-p’il and his govt party. Pak might more easily carry out these measures if he removed himself from political campaign and assumed caretaker role with our support.

B. On political side, threat to stability might be reduced if Pak announced that he will keep revolutionary pledge to return power to civilian hands, will not run as candidate and will assume caretaker role until transfer accomplished. With US support Pak could hold military forces together on side of orderly transition, and deal with any counter move against his decision. Such a decision by Pak would necessitate negotiations with party leaders, changes in political party law and election law (it is too late to change constitution), probable delay in elections until June or July, and lifting all political purification bans. Kim Chong-p’il would need to leave Korea.

5. I cannot go much further here on my own initiative without clear Dept decision and support. If Pak sees me, as I requested and tells me he has decided to withdraw from presidential race and assume caretaker role, this may be genuine, but he will be under most terrific pressure to reverse himself and almost certainly government party conference February 25 will seek to draft him. Alternately, he may tell me he has weighed all factors and decided no course is desirable, but one which promises to minimize instability is for him to run. If Pak is drafted or runs voluntarily for president, Kim Chong-p’il will stay. In any of these cases, I will urge him to talk to opposition leaders, especially Ho Chong and Yun Po-sun before making his decision final. In absence of Dept’s instruction I do not feel that I can say anything more to him except that I will report his views to Dept.

6. It is evident from foregoing and our recent telegrams that Koreans heading for crisis. Everyone now speaks of “big trouble” ahead soon, and we are getting appeals from all sides to bring our influence to bear and stabilize situation. There are now no simple solutions. We can do several things:

A. Not intervene and let situation develop. This I think dangerous, and an abdication of our responsibilities.

B. Encourage Pak to run for president, which means Kim Chong-p’il will stay. This will align US with a govt increasingly unpopular, alienate US from the people, and may involve US in support of a govt that may have to resort to force to deal with discontent both within its ranks and outside. I cannot see us following this course because it will probably fyt [not?] produce stability. It will produce a govt which will be basically undemocratic, even more difficult to work with, and will vest unacceptable power in hands of Kim Chong-p’il.

C. Tell Pak that Kim Chong-p’il must leave country for a year, and that he must negotiate with opposition leaders for adjustments in elevation [election?] law. That it would be preferable for him to retire to caretaker role, but if he feels this would create too much instability we will abide by his decision, and our further attitude toward situation and this govt will depend on conduct of elections and course of development. This may or may not be acceptable to opposition and may or may not produce stability, but it deals with some of basic problems in picture. This may involve a further postponement of the elections.

D. Tell Pak and opposition leaders that only solution is to form govt of national unity, that will govern say for one year, while new election laws, political party laws, and constitution are drafted for eventual transition. This would involve us in formation of a new govt in which Pak possibly could serve as Acting President, Ho Chong possibly as PriMin, etc. Kim Chong-p’il would have to leave country. There is much to be said for this but it will be almost impossible to realize.

7. Next two weeks are critical and I would urge Asst Secy Harriman to plan to come here next week in order to:

A. Establish USG position;

B. Emphasize to all parties here seriousness of our concern with situation;

C. Assist us in working out acceptable understanding between Pak and opposition for transition to civilian rule; and possible understanding on ROK-Japan settlement;

D. Throw full weight of US behind solution we decide on.

Berger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 12 S KOR. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD. Michael Forrestal sent a copy of this telegram to the President noting: “The political situation in Korea is reaching disturbing proportions.” Forrestal wrote that telegram 561 summarized the situation, and that Harriman was in the process of formulating recommendations. When this was done, Forrestal would arrange a meeting with the President to hear the recommendations and the advice of other interested Departments. (Memorandum from Forrestal to Kennedy, February 14; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 8/62-3/63)
1. In telegram 557, February 11, Berger reported on a conversation that he had with Kim Chong-p’il, lasting over 2 hours. According to Kim, Pak was deeply discouraged and would not run for President, but Kim was trying to convince him to change his mind. Kim also said that he would retire from politics himself. Berger observed that Kim’s motivation for imparting this information was subject to multiple interpretations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 12 S KOR)