311. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State 0

64. Ref: Embtel 56 info Tokyo 8 CINCPAC 12.1

1.
With Pak’s latest moves (see reftel) hand of Pak-Kim Chong-p’il group has been strengthened, and Korea has moved into another period accentuated instability. We believe these moves were undertaken for following reasons:
A.
Outright clash between junta moderates led by Kim Chae-ch’un and pro-Kim Chong-p’il group had reached acute stage which could not be resolved by compromise. In making decision Pak chose go along with pro-Kim hard core with which he is most closely linked.
B.
Pak’s growing concern he cannot win a free election owing to Korea’s food difficulties, accelerating price inflation, and declining popular confidence in ability of military junta to govern effectively and honestly.
C.
With this group in control it would be easier either to rig elections, if held this year, or to deal with reaction if Pak decides to postpone them again and prolong military rule. In latter event he will use excuse that “food crisis, irresponsible political criticism, and economic and political confusion and instability” do not permit elections to take place.
D.
Probability of junta’s need to toughen repressive policy to curb press and opposition criticism as well as criticism from within certain military elements in effort maintain Pak-Kim group in power.
E.
Need to tighten control in order to cover up Pak and Kim Chong-p’il’s responsibility for stock market scandal and other misdeeds.
F.
Desire to set stage for Kim Chong-p’il’s return when Pak decides the time is right or if he feels that he cannot manage the situation without Kim’s presence.
2.
Timing of latest developments worth mentioning. That they came after additional US food commitment and additional $15 million support assistance announced, and universities recessed for summer is probably not just coincidence. Pak knows US reaction to these moves will be adverse but, encouraged by Kim Chong-p’il, he believes that US is so committed in Korea that we will have to accept his actions. With enhanced control of the reins of power, we expect that Pak will now press ahead rapidly to try settle with the Japanese in order open up that line of aid and credit. He knows US must under any circumstances provide substantial SA, PL 480 and military assistance, and with this and Japanese contribution he believes he can manage to deal with rising economic difficulties, particularly if US begins go slow on support. However, he probably counts on US desire for ROK-Japan normalization to inhibit our opposition to junta actions.
3.
Once again the small group that constitutes core of the original revolution have shown their determination to maintain power. Characteristics of this group have in course of last year become more and more apparent. These are:
A.
A “will to power” and a willingness to be ruthless.
B.
Frequent rejection of US advice on political matters and tendency to originate and support unsound economic policies.
C.
Touchy ultra-nationalism and barely concealed anti-Americanism, which manifest themselves openly whenever we oppose a course of action taken by govt or fail to respond as they may wish.
D.
Continued prominence within the group of political advisors with pro-Communist backgrounds who have extraordinary influence. Despite frequent US objection to these individuals and widespread criticism in Korean Govt and political circles, their influence has not diminished and they play an important role in Democratic-Republican Party.
E.
Distrust and disregard of independent civilian political forces and of normal democratic processes.
F.
Desire to concentrate greater power in hands of narrower leadership group with deliberate elimination of opposing elements within the junta, until in latest move power concentrated almost exclusively in Pak and Kim group.
4.
We believe that military junta under this leadership will continue and intensify the attitudes and actions spelled out above. This likely lead to increasing repression of opposition, proposal of irresponsible economic policies, ever-widening gap between govt and people, accentuation of corrupt practices, and little chance of an election along acceptable lines if an election is held at all.
5.
Now more clear than ever that junta will do anything necessary to hold power. With this latest drive for maintenance of power, the junta may have added to its problems and may have over-reached itself. The political and economic situation may worsen along following lines:
A.
In face of prospect of repression and govt’s failure to modify rigorous conditions preventing free elections, opposition is seriously considering active boycott elections and will increase anti-govt agitation. Up till now opposition has been weak and divided. More serious efforts to unify will be made.
B.
Further purges may occur within govt and military to remove or neutralize anti Kim Chong-p’il elements and those moderates unwilling to go along with hard line. (We have already received reports of possibility further cabinet changes including key figures such as Prime Minister, Chairman Economic Planning Board, and Home Minister.)
C.
Economic situation will remain difficult. Continued inflationary pressure with danger of further run-down foreign exchange reserves and resultant loss of business confidence may be anticipated.
D.
Public attitude toward junta will become increasingly hostile in face of mounting political and economic problems.
6.
If events unfold as now appears likely, we anticipate that we will soon find ourselves unable to support the junta not only because nature these actions is offensive to us, will generate increasing opposition from articulate elements and widen gap between govt and people, but also because their methods of governing do not give promise of avoiding confusion and greater economic and political difficulty.
7.
We are moving into a period where we must consider what steps we take as this process unfolds. We must also consider the prospects of and the moves toward acceptable alternatives. We propose:
A.
To guard against a close political identification with junta.
B.
To constantly emphasize our position on the necessity of free public discussion and fair elections this year.
C.
To increasingly associate our economic assistance with our requirements for improved ROKG performance on the economic front and be prepared to withstand the anticipated ROKG charges of interference for political reasons and indifference to their economic problems. In the process we should continue to supply essential food requirements and support of military forces.
D.
To work more closely with opposition elements, especially those which we believe are best suited to our purpose and most responsive to our guidance. Our objective is not to stimulate opposition to overthrow govt by sudden action, but to try to help create opposition to which we can turn as an alternative to junta in any situation that may develop. An opposition is needed in Korea and our influence should be brought to bear as appropriate in order to help in its formation and survival.2
8.
Specific actions should now be taken to make our position clear. As a beginning we should:
A.
Adhere to decision (of which Killen has already informed ROKG) to withhold $15 million SA on grounds inadequate implementation stabilization measures until and unless adequate corrective action is taken. On same basis withhold DL approvals.3
B.
Stimulate US press interest in junta’s misdeeds, e.g. stock market scandal, use of torture to extract confessions from defendants in current coup plot trials, and expected repression of press and opposition.
C.
Use occasion of Foreign Minister’s visit to Washington to question him and ROK Ambassador Kim Chong-yol closely about govt’s political intentions and when govt intends to announce date of elections. They should be asked whether govt intends allow opposition membership in election committees to count ballots and should be told that US considers this essential for fair election. Dept should make clear US opposition to return Kim Chong-p’il and our attitude toward elections and suppression of opposition or press in light take-over dominant role by Kim machine. Subject should also be discussed with Kim Chong-o before he returns to Korea.
9.
We should work along these lines, recognizing that we will probably elicit a sharp reaction as junta seeks hold power, and that we may reach a point where we can no longer support Pak. There is always possibility of some sudden sharp actions by Korean elements which will bring [Page 656] about immediate end of junta rule, but resort to intensified police state methods would make this more difficult.
10.
We offer the above for Dept’s consideration and comment. Recommend Tokyo not discuss foregoing analysis of situation with Japanese at this time.
Berger
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 S KOR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. In telegram 56 from Seoul, July 12, the Embassy reported a series of ROK governmental changes announced by the SCNR, the most prominent of which was the replacement of Kim Chae-chun as KCIA Director by Kim Hyong-uk. The Embassy commented that these moves represented a strengthening of Kim Chong-p’il’s forces and an “ominous indication” that Pak Chung-hui was preparing the ground for the return of Kim Chong-p’il. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 78 to Seoul, the Department of State stated that it concurred in the courses of action recommended in paragraphs A-D. The Department noted that in working closely with the opposition, the Embassy should avoid “identifying ourselves with opposition or giving the appearance of seeking overthrow of government.” (Ibid.)
  4. In telegram 78 to Seoul, the Department indicated that these recommendations in paragraph A had already been approved. The Department noted that it was attempting to interest the press in Korean developments and that it was replying candidly to press questions without attempting to apologize for or to conceal the junta’s deficiencies.