313. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State 0

277. Re Embtel 64 rptd Tokyo 12. CINCPAC 4.1

1.
Course of events in Korea since mid-July bears out assessment of situation contained reftel. This current review should be read against background analysis reported reftel which remains largely valid. Evidence continues to mount that junta is dominated by hard core elements in SCNR and Democratic-Republican Party and that they have extended and deepened their control while moderate elements are being neutralized or eliminated. Pak remains key figure and his association with hard core more confirmed than ever.
2.
Certain actions planned by hard core have been forestalled, principally by reason of US position. Kim Chong-p’il’s return appears once again to have been postponed, sweeping cabinet changes temporarily averted, and danger of repression of opposition criticism may have been lessened in short term by US stand taken in Song Yo-chan case. Nevertheless [Page 658] we remain convinced that hard core is determined perpetuate its power by any means.
3.
This objective has become more difficult in face increased public criticism of regime, especially in urban areas. Earlier govt hopes for smoothly run elections, with victory for Pak and DRP through reasonably fair election process, are giving way to apprehension that victory will not be easy. As result junta is now reacting more sharply to criticism, harassing press and other critics and have plans to take even more repressive action to dampen criticism when necessary.
4.
The dominant group in the junta, operating from a narrower power base, is increasingly preoccupied with internal factional maneuverings and the problem of maintaining power. ROK CIA has been reorganized by hard core elements, re-staffed with Kim Chong-p’il supporters in key positions, and is now working to reestablish its power over govt and political policy-making. Opposition to the hard core from members of the anti-Kim Chong-p’il group who have been ousted from positions of influence, continues to be manifested, but has not been effective nor cohesive.
5.
Key to Pak remaining in power continues to rest in support of ROK military forces. Junta’s prestige has doubtless suffered in armed forces over past months. A factor in this has been effect of rising prices on low paid officer and enlisted personnel. However, in absence some explosive situation which would galvanize public opposition (e.g., wholesale election rigging), the ROK Armed Forces appear likely remain responsive to junta leadership and senior commanders appear willing to go along with junta plans. Those commanders who show any sign of faltering or opposition will continue to be removed or shifted from key positions.
6.
Civilian political opposition forces have been making strenuous efforts to unite against regime but continue to suffer badly from old ills of factionalism, personal ambition and short-sightedness. Ability of civilian politicians to organize against junta will be given decisive test during next two weeks. Prospects for effective unity have deteriorated with recent inter-party squabbling and public image of opposition leadership has suffered. With presidential election only about seven weeks away, opposition still has not settled on single candidate and party merger initiatives have been unsuccessful. Funds are short and competition among aspirants for presidency and Assembly strong and possibly even bitter. Moreover, realizing danger presented by opposition united behind single presidential candidate, govt is doing all it can to weaken, divide and harass opposition. Although opposition leaders express confidence that tide is running in their favor, there is no evidence at this time that popular discontent with military govt has been converted into positive [Page 659] support for opposition. If opposition closes ranks behind single candidate this could change.
7.
Election campaign will be in full swing in few days. As things heat up regime will intensify efforts to promote Pak’s candidacy, and denigrate opposition leaders and their capacity to govern. Govt is counting heavily on bumper rice crop which appears in making to reverse decline in govt’s popularity and to create favorable public attitude at election time. A promising crop already doing much to remove the pressure on food prices and the food shortage psychology which have continuously plagued govt since February. Junta will seek to capitalize on Pak’s prestige and constructive achievements of past two years while playing down failures. Success in elections will be sought through good party organization, use of govt administrative organs, plentiful funds and use of ordinary powers of govt. If this is not enough, hard core determined to take whatever other measures needed. However, the job today is too divided politically and the opposition too active to predict that resort to repressive measures will not back-fire. Extreme repression on the part of the regime could set off chain reaction of opposition-public defiance, especially in cities.
8.
Political differences built up over past year have an air of permanence about them which presents us with outlook for protracted period of political struggle. Opposition now has only one purpose in mind, downfall of military govt and junta leadership as soon as possible. If that not possible by means of elections, and many opposition leaders believe junta’s policies preclude such possibility, then opposition will lie in wait for whatever occasion or events can speed up the process of change.
9.
In present circumstances, outlook is for Pak victory but DRP chances of winning majority in Assembly are poor. With tougher prospects in Assembly elections, junta will be inclined to tougher measures in effort secure majority. A substantial Pak victory could have significant effect on Assembly elections and the interval between presidential and Assembly elections would be used by DRP to develop more enthusiasm for its candidates.
10.
Whichever way one looks at the situation, the prospect for emergence stable and effective govt is not apparent:
A.
A Pak victory with no majority in the Assembly would create a troublesome problem of governing. Normally in such a situation the solution would lie in a coalition, but the hostility and lack of trust on both sides is such that this will not be easy and may not be possible.
B.
Pak and Govt Party may win majority in Assembly and if the elections were not flagrantly rigged there may be no serious public protest.
C.
In either above cases, return of Kim Chong-p’il at some stage is inevitable, and he together with hard core, would dominate govt. This [Page 660] could produce renewal of fighting within regime between pro and anti-Kim Chong-p’il elements.
D.
If by any outside chance opposition succeeded in presidential and Assembly elections, they would be plagued by internal divisions, and there would be a struggle between civilians and the defeated junta with danger of another coup.
11.
At this stage of Korea’s political development it is too much to expect that any govt could be stable or effective in a Western sense or that economic and political actions would not be sometimes erratic. It remains our judgment that the resolution of Korean political problems should continue to be left primarily to the interplay of domestic political forces. There is not much we can do at the moment to change things without precipitating a sharp upheaval which would not resolve conflict at this stage and might set off chain reaction of disorders. We must be guided by patience and principles; patience to allow Korean dynamics to work out their own solutions; and principles to set limits of behavior as well as targets for achievement. We should avoid interjecting ourselves prematurely into internal political affairs or become too committed to a given solution. We should remain wedded to the principle of fair elections, and assume a critical stance when that principle is threatened.
12.
There are those in junta who believe US will have to go along with anything which they may do. We have taken pains to prove them wrong on a number of occasions (e.g., currency reform, extension military rule, Kim Chong-p’il, Song Yo-chan). In future we must be sure to exert immediate pressure when junta moves off course which we consider acceptable. Repressive political actions need to be exposed and criticized, and irresponsible economic policies penalized. We should do this not only because of our natural distaste for repressive or irresponsible actions, but also because our long term interests are not served by US acquiescence in unpopular, unjustified acts. This may increase the risk of open confrontation with junta, which has shown its dissatisfaction when crossed, but we should be prepared ride out any repercussions however sharp.
13.
In these circumstances we continue believe US policy should be geared to preparing for various possible alternatives in fluid situation. We are still of the opinion expressed in para 7 reftel that US for time being should continue to:
A.
Guard against a close political identification with junta, while at the same time seeking to influence their actions when these are unacceptable;
B.
Constantly emphasize our position on necessity free public discussion and fair elections;
C.
Increasingly associate our economic assistance with our requirements for improved ROKG performance on the economic front;
D.
Maintain a close association with responsible opposition elements and as appropriate use our influence to support development of a viable opposition.
E.
Maintain a close association and influence with armed forces leaders who in the end may prove to be the arbiters should there be internal upheaval.2
14.
General Howze and Killen have seen this message.
Berger
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 S KOR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Document 311.
  3. In telegram 206 to Seoul, September 11, the Embassy concurred in recommendations A-E. The Department suggested that it would “not be overly troubled” by the election of Pak as President if the opposition controlled the National Assembly. Unlike the Embassy’s assessment the Department did not believe that Pak Chung-hui was supported by the ROK military, but rather that he was not opposed by it. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S KOR)