Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan⁰

Washington, February 8, 1962, 9:17 p.m.

1999. Attorney General visit. Embtel 2212.¹ For Attorney General from Kaysen. I appreciate your interest in work of Task Force Ryukyus² and will be glad to see that final action by President on Task Force report³ is held up until your return. While consideration of Okinawa by UN Committee of Seventeen is definite possibility for which we must be prepared, and specific provisions for greater Japanese interest in Okinawa and greater local autonomy appear best way of meeting anticipated “anti-colonialist” criticism in this forum, do not anticipate need for action in next few weeks.

Expect report will remain internal US Govt document, with substance made public by various means, including possible Presidential announcement of acceptance recommendations, legislative proposals to Congress, and in connection negotiations with Japan.

Report has been submitted by Task Force to State and Defense for comment.⁴ Believe State will recommend its approval by President without change, but formal approval by SecState has not been sought pending conclusion current review in Defense, where concern has been expressed particularly with recommendations for increased autonomy for GRI, organizational changes in US administration and civil rights (see High Commissioner’s HCRI 1-125, repeated Tokyo).⁵

Text of report pouched Embassy early December⁶ is unchanged except for minor amendments and addition of “summary and recommendations” section at beginning of paper. Following is summary of recommendations:

A. Future US-Japan relationship would be based on economic cooperation agreement by which Japan would contribute perhaps one third of cost of US-approved economic and social development aid programs in Ryukyus. If necessary agreement could specifically mention eventual reversion of Ryukyus to Japan. (See text of illustrative agreement among Task Force working papers pouched Embassy.)⁷ Cooperation with Japan would be developed to maximum degree consistent with retaining control of base, recognizing that this will mean greater Japanese influence but need not impair US control.⁸

B. GRI should be given as much autonomy as possible consistent with security of base in order develop its responsibility and establish more viable relation between it and US. Report suggests as examples but not as specific recommendations: (1) nomination of Chief Executive by legislature, subject to HICOM approval; (2) severely limiting prior coordination of legislation with USCAR and placing coordination at initiative of majority party in legislature, and a few others.

C. US-Japan and US-Japan-GRI consultative arrangements would be for purpose of implementing economic cooperation agreement, with policy matters considered in Tokyo between Ambassador and FonMin and technical questions in Naha by US-Japan-GRI Committee. (See illustrative agreement.)

D. Aid programs would concentrate on providing short range benefits in areas where Ryukyuans are clearly worse off now than they would be under Japan and on long range economic development. Cost of recommended programs would rise from $17 million to $27 million over five years, with US share dependent on outcome negotiations with Japan.

E. Reorganization of administration to vest in a civilian Civil Administrator, appointed by SecDef in consultation with SecState and with approval of President, all administrative functions retained by US except ultimate authority of veto over acts of GRI, promulgation of basic ordinances and liaison with State and Embassy Tokyo in conduct foreign relations. Latter functions would remain with High Commissioner, who would continue to be military officer. Under Civil Administrator there would be clear division between supervision and control function on one hand and technical assistance function on other. Report emphasizes importance of attracting competent civilian personnel for USCAR.

F. Civil rights questions were also found by Task Force to be significant source of irritation and report recommends less restrictive policy in control of publications, travel and labor unions.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-KE/2-862. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Swayne, cleared with McGeorge Bundy and the Department of the Army, and approved by Rice.
1. In telegram 2212, February 8, the Embassy reported that the Attorney General had many questions on Okinawa during his visit and wished to have the Task Force’s key recommendations telegraphed to him in Tokyo. (Ibid.)
2. Documentation on the work of the Ryukyu Task Force, September 1961-March 1962, is ibid., 794C.0221, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ryukyu Islands.
3. Text of a draft report at this stage not found. The final text, dated March 1962, is ibid.
4. Dated November 30, 1961. (Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/11-3061)
5. Not found.
6. Apparently the same as that cited in footnote 4 above.
7. Not found attached. A copy of the draft, December 15, is attached to a memorandum from Harriman to U. Alexis Johnson, April 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/4-662)
8. An undated copy of these recommendations points out that the Japanese Government had “no desire to push us out of Okinawa,” but instead welcomed the U.S. base there, which contributed to Japanese security “without creating the political problems which would follow if the base were situated in Japan.” Nevertheless, the Japanese Government would “continue to speak publicly in favor of returning administration of the Ryukyus to Japan” while recognizing that the United States would not do so in the “foreseeable future.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries Series, Ryukyu, Task Force Report, 11/61-12/61)