379. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Embassy in Japan0
US-JAPAN COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
Tokyo, November 25-27, 19631
US-Japan-Okinawa
The United States administration of Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus is provided for by Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, entered into in 1952, which states that Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to place the Ryukyu Islands under UN trusteeship with the US as the sole administering authority. The Article also gives the [Page 791] United States the right to exercise all governmental powers pending such a proposal. The US has not made any proposal for trusteeship but has retained its control over the Ryukyus, and has developed, principally on Okinawa, extensive military bases of major importance.
During the Occupation and the period immediately following the Peace Treaty, Japan’s interest in the US administration was minimal and Ryukyuan issues had little or no bearing on political developments in Japan. This interest increased markedly, however, in 1955 when Ryukyuan dissatisfaction with US land rental policies assumed serious proportions. Although this dissatisfaction was alleviated by changes in US policies, Japanese interest in the welfare of the Ryukyuans has continued and problems in US administration are frequently used by Japanese leftist elements for their own political ends and for the purpose of arousing sentiment against the continued use of the Islands for US military bases.
Responsible LDP leaders recognize that US bases in Okinawa are vital to defense of Japan and free Asia but at same time they must take into consideration wide feeling among Japanese that the Ryukyus should be returned to Japan in the not too distant future. As result GOJ “in principle” desires return of the Ryukyus. Since the US, for security reasons, cannot comply, it inevitably is placed in a position of public “disagreement” with its Japanese partner even though the present Japanese Government understands and tacitly accepts need for retention of Okinawan bases by US.
As nationalism revives in Japan Okinawa can, unless wisely handled, become cause of serious trouble between US and Japan even if Japan continues to have a conservative government.
The problem we face is to prevent a situation from arising in which GOJ will be under such domestic pressure on the Okinawan issue that in the interest of self-preservation it will feel required to place serious pressure on its US partner to return the Ryukyus. It already faces constant agitation on the issue from the Left. If this should combine with pressure on right from renascent nationalism, the results could be extremely serious.
The new policy announced by President Kennedy on March 19, 19622 constitutes an effort to meet this challenge. Under it we hope (a) to work out a cooperative relationship which will permit Japan to provide more aid for the Ryukyus and generally work with us in the best interests of the Ryukyuans; and (b) to reduce dissatisfaction in the Ryukyus by providing more economic assistance, by permitting gradually increased autonomy for the GRI and by eliminating grievances to the extent possible in the field of civil rights. The GOJ can thus evidence its concern for [Page 792] the Ryukyus and increase its role there, and thereby meet the requirements of nationalism and reduce its vulnerability to Leftist pressures without compromising our administrative authority. Moreover, the Ryukyuans can be kept relatively content.
For the past year the US and Japanese Governments have been engaged in negotiations, in accordance with the Presidential statement of March 19, 1962, to implement a cooperative relationship in providing assistance to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and their economic development. The negotiations are directed toward the establishment of a Consultative Committee in Tokyo which will plan and coordinate aid policies and a Technical Committee in Okinawa to implement programs. The Embassy in July, 1963 submitted to the Foreign Office the USG draft of an agreement for the establishment of the two committees. In late September it received the GOJ counterdraft which it forwarded to Washington for review. The Embassy is now awaiting Washington advice prior to resuming negotiations with the Foreign Office, and anticipates that a considerable amount of negotiation will be required to arrive at mutual agreement.3
[Here follows an analysis of economic problems in the Ryukyus.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 1 JAPAN-US. Limited Official Use. The paper was transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A-549 from Tokyo, November 15. Drafted by William H. Bruns, First Secretary and Political Officer, and Chadwick Johnson, Second Secretary and Industrial Officer.↩
- Concerning postponement of this meeting, see Document 385.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 352.↩
- A detailed Embassy analysis of U.S. and Japanese objectives in the Ryukyus and the Bonins is in airgram A-1677 from Tokyo, May 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL JAPAN-US) See the Supplement. Other documentation on this topic during 1963 is in Department of State, Central Files POL 19 RYU IS, POL RYU IS-US, and DEF 15 RYU IS-US. An agreement providing economic and technical assistance to promote the economic development of the Ryukyu Islands was concluded by an exchange of notes at Tokyo April 25, 1964, and entered into force that day. For text, see 15 UST 1371.↩