CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE OFFSHORE ISLANDS CRISIS
The Under Secretary chaired the meeting.
The paper under consideration was one of July 10, 1961, prepared
primarily by FE:CA and entitled “Contingency Planning for Possible Renewed
Chinese Communist Attack on the Offshore Islands”.11. A copy of the paper as revised on July 14 is ibid.,
China.
It was brought out in preliminary discussion that the Chinese Communists
have the capability of taking the offshore islands, though the military
price would probably be high. They could also, at any time, start a
renewed crisis which might be intended for other purposes rather than
actual capture of the GRC positions
there.
There followed considerable discussion of the desirability of bringing
about a GRC evacuation, though the paper
under consideration is based on the assumption that the GRC remains wholly committed to remaining
on the islands. The comment was made that, in issues such as this one,
US policy revolves around points fixed by our supposed satellites and
that recovery of US freedom of decision would impose costs which cannot
be fully weighed, but which would undoubtedly be considerable.
One participant suggested that, while the paper envisages handling
another crisis much like the last, the situation is now different in at
least three respects: (1) We have a different President who has made
different statements on the subject; (2) there is a different situation
in Europe (Berlin), with consequent greater need for solidarity with our
(NATO) allies; and (3) it will not
be possible next time to keep the issue out of the UN.
Another pointed out in rebuttal: (1) Whatever the President may have said
about the offshore islands' evacuation, they are still under GRC occupation; (2) while the greater
solidarity needed in NATO suggests we
press for evacuation of the offshore islands, there is also a different
situation in Asia which, it might be argued, operates in the opposite
direction; and (3) the paper does envisage our taking a new crisis
immediately to the UN.
There was some disagreement on this last matter. One participant agreed
we would need to consider taking the issue to the UN but pointed to the pitfalls we might encounter in
handling it there. Another believed a new offshore crisis could not be
kept out of the UN and that we had best
take the initiative in order to have a better chance of controlling the
way the issue might be handled. (Still another indicated, after the
meeting broke up, that the UN appeared
the only suitable vehicle for handling the issue in a non-belligerent
context. During the last crisis we agreed to resume Ambassadorial talks,
which are still continuing although our exchanges about Taiwan and the
Strait have reached a sterile impasse. If a crisis now broke out despite
the Warsaw talks, we might need to seek a different forum. The UN should provide that different forum.)
It also was brought out there is need for a contingency plan in case of a
pro-Communist military coup on Taiwan. The FE planning advisor agreed, and made note of the
requirement.
* Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot
67 D 548, Secretary's Policy Planning Meetings. Secret. Drafted by
Edward E. Rice of the
Policy Planning Council. The meeting was one of a series of such
meetings held irregularly by the Secretary and principal officers of
the Department.
1 A copy of the paper as revised on July 14 is ibid.,
China.