282. Eyes only for the Secretary. Although Wang did not respond positively to first part my
informal presentation (Embtel 281)11.
Document 52. I considered occasion
sufficiently favorable to proceed with expansion of remarks suggested in
Deptel 22122.
Document 50. which I emphasized was
purely personal contribution advanced to see if impasse could in some
way be broken.
I concluded by informing Wang
that, after short holiday, I should return to Warsaw on August 28, to
stay here until September 2 when I would depart for Washington. I told
him that, had he any response to make to my presentation, I would be
available to meet with him privately some time between August 28 and
September 2.
Wang replied: I also think both
sides should seek out common ground. It is most important both countries
act responsibly in field of international affairs in order that peace be
preserved. It is duty of both of us to resolve quarrels and strife
between us. Concern which you have expressed concerning war with regard
to Taiwan, however, is superfluous. We have said many times Taiwan is an
internal matter for China in which US has no right to interfere. If the
US were to act in conformance with President Truman's statement and not
interfere, then I believe greater half of Taiwan problem would be
solved. Once Taiwan problem is normalized then basic issues between
China and US can be solved. It is unwise for US Government to pay so
much attention to small advantages only to lose important ones. For
example, US persistence in its economic blockade against China has not
prevented our reconstruction; on contrary, this blockade only hurts US
economy. In similar way, US opposition to restoration to China of its
legal position in UN does not prevent
development of our friendship with peoples of the world but it does do
great harm to US prestige. Perhaps you do not now share my views but I
believe day will come when you will realize this truth.
I haven't heard about desire to have Dr. Samuel Rosen go to China. I will
look into this matter and if it is necessary to have another
conversation with you, I will let you know.
I then explained again to Ambassador Wang that this was apparently case in which Chinese
doctors hoped to have Doctor Rosen visit China in order to demonstrate
his new technique to them but that failing any small gesture of concession from ChiComs side we
had to discourage visit. I then once again expanded on our conviction
that if both sides will seek resolution of small practical questions,
this would promote relaxation of tension and maintenance peace.
I also took up his frequent reference to January 1950 statement by
President Truman that US regarded resolution of Taiwan problem as
internal affair of Chinese. I said outbreak of Korean war had changed
the opinion of the American people concerning the ability of small
nations in Asia to withstand by themselves external aggression. Basing
himself on this new conviction of the American people, President Truman
in June of 1950 had made second statement33. Reference is to a statement made by Truman on June 27, 1950; for
text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 492. which
took completely altered situation into account.
The meeting broke up with both of us assuring the other that despite the
obvious seriousness of our differences, we must all exert every effort
to resolve the problems between us.
Comment: With excellent interpreters on both sides and with reiteration
of the theme through formal meeting and both halves of informal talk,
Wang could hardly have
failed to get the point of our approach. His fallback on classic ChiCom
position was to be expected as initial reaction but he was far from
hostile and at end he felt himself obliged to pay tribute to idea of
efforts toward improvement. Since ChiComs will doubtless wish weigh our
suggestions in light many other factors, I question if I shall hear from
Wang before my departure
September 2. Interesting he did not belabor ChiCom UN membership issue, probably for reasons of
pride and desire show lack of concern. Significant also he wished avoid
appearance of rupture of talks by insisting on tentative date three
months hence for next meeting.
Beam
* Source: Department of State, Central Files,
611.93/8-1761. Secret; Priority.
3 Reference is to a statement made by Truman on June 27, 1950; for
text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 492.