I fully appreciate your concern at continuing violence in British Guiana
and your desire to find some way of preventing a situation developing
which could necessitate postponement of the elections you intend holding
in the colony later this year. I also sympathize with your capable and
courageous Governor in his efforts to carry out his responsibilities
under such trying conditions. In the circumstances I am somewhat
hesitant to raise again the doubts and misgivings about a pre-election
coalition which we expressed to your people at the recent London talks.
Since, however, we are in complete agreement on the constructive
objectives we are pursuing in British Guiana, I have no hesitation in
doing so.
In the first place we seriously doubt that Jagan, who has been using violence for political
purposes, would be likely to forego such tactics if a coalition were
formed. Apart from that consideration there is, in our opinion, the very
real possibility that a pre-election coalition would adversely affect
the electoral prospects of the PNC and
the UF by confusing the supporters of
those two parties. A coalition of the PPP and PNC excluding the
UF would endanger the hoped for post
election PNC–UF coalition which at the moment is the only possibility of
replacing the Jagan Government.
In short, we share your view of the importance of holding the elections
later this year but are concerned that nothing be done in the
pre-election period in the quest for order and security which would
jeopardize the currently hopeful electoral results.
Since the London talks on July 16 and 17 there have been several
developments in British Guiana which may be relevant. The strike of the
sugar workers has been ended in what amounts to a defeat for Jagan. Whether this will result in any
immediate improvement in the security situation, of course, remains to
be seen. I also understand that Jagan has broken off his “unity” talks with Burnham and D'Aguiar. In the course of those talks
he clearly indicated that the coalition he seeks has as its objective
postponement of the elections. He showed no interest in a coalition
limited to a brief pre-election period but insisted on a five year
coalition.
1 Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 19 BR GU. Top
Secret. Drafted by Shullaw.
2 In a personal message to
Rusk, attached to an
August 17 covering note from the British Embassy, Sandys' deputy, Sir Hilton Poynton,
reported that the risk of violence was diminished and the case for a
temporary coalition was therefore less strong. Poynton stated that
he was sure that Sandys would
agree, upon his return from holiday, that the idea should not be
pursued under these circumstances. If, however, violence were to set
in again at the pitch it reached in June and July, a temporary
coalition might be reconsidered. (Ibid.)
3 Printed from a copy that bears this
typed signature.