Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish
Sir: I have heretofore informed the Department that the most remarkable antagonism now existing in Germany relates to the constitution of the first house of the German Parliament. That house, as at present constituted, is appointed by the executive authority of each one of the twenty-five States of Germany; its votes are given as in the old Congress of the United States, not by individuals as such, but by States. An aristocratic party desires to establish a first house that shall be more analogous to the British House of Lords. On the 19th of this month, Prince Bismarck, incidentally in a speech in the diet, declared himself entirely opposed to a house of lords, and spoke in the warmest terms of eulogy of the first house, as at present constituted, as being a most “happily devised senate.” A hereditary house, he said, could not furnish an adequate counterpoise or protection against the dangers which might spring from universal suffrage in its fullest exercise of its powers; but the vote of a state he described as the resultant of all the forces contained in the state, the vote of the executive modified by the legislature and the responsible ministry of the individual state. “The sovereignty,” he said, “does not belong to the Emperor, but to the totality of the united government;’’ and in this senate the wisdom, the intelligence of each one of the five and twenty governments, can make itself heard, can contribute its part toward the complete enlightenment of the whole body. “Therefore,” said he, “I would beg of you not to touch the council of the union with an unfriendly hand. I see a sort of palladium for our future, a guarantee for the future of Germany, in this form of organization.”
The speech of Prince Bismarck confirms the conclusion to which I had come from my own observations—that in the Empire of Germany a house of peers is no longer possible, and that the American idea that no legislative office should be hereditary has established itself too firmly to be overthrown.
With regard to the manner in which the members of the first house are chosen, the method that has been adopted is the best that can, as yet, be practiced. In many of the separate states of Germany, there exists a first house in which the hereditary aristocracy is strongly represented. We choose our Senators by the concurrent or the joint vote of the two houses of the legislature; in Germany, the two houses would be perpetually at variance in their selections, and a joint ballot of two houses, one of which represents in part at least a hereditary aristocracy, could not well be taken.
The popular branch in each state might elect a more liberal council; the other branch, most certainly, a less liberal one. Thus in a conflict between a first house, after the British fashion of a house of lords, and a senate after the pattern of the American Senate, the latter has won in Germany the definitive victory. The British system finds so feeble a support that the proposition for its adoption is not likely to revive.
I add, for your information and for the consolation of statesmen who sometimes do not see their way clearly through difficulties, that, in 1862, the present Emperor, being then King of Prussia, caused a paper for his formal abdication to be prepared, and he set his signature to it. [Page 383] The interposition of his advisers prevented the consummation of the act by delivery.
I remain, &c., &c.,