No. 213.

Mr. Schenck to Mr. Fish

No. 43.]

Sir: You will have noted the discussion which took place in the House of Commons on Friday last, the 4th instant, on the motion of Sir Charles Adderley for the production of copies of instructions given by Her Majesty’s government to their commissioners at Washington. I now send you, in form for preservation, a full report of that debate, taken from the London Times of last Saturday.

I have, &c.,

ROB’T C. SCHENCK.

[Untitled]

Parliamentary intelligence.—House of Commons, Friday, August 4.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON.

Sir C. Adderley, in bringing forward this subject, said he was sorry that so important a discussion as he now wished to introduce should come on at such an hour, (nearly half-past 5.) He also greatly regretted the delay which had occurred in that house, having an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the Washington treaty. It was, however, better that the house should express an opinion on that treaty even now than that it should express no opinion upon it at all. If the house were to take no notice whatever of the late Washington treaty, what would be the opinion of the world as to the view taken by this country of that instrument? All that would appear to the world and all that would appear to the arbitrators who were about to arbitrate on the subject, as indicating the feeling of this country in regard to the treaty, would be these three facts—First, that Her Majesty had conferred almost the highest honor on one of the commissioners who negotiated it; second, that the other house of Parliament had refused to indorse a resolution condemnatory of the treaty and, third, that the House of Commons had apparently given its perfect consent to that treaty by total silence. It would evidently be deemed, from those three facts, by the arbitrators, and by the world at large, that this country thought it had gained a signal triumph and made an extraordinarily good bargain for itself and for its colonies under that treaty, whereas the fact was that this country had made an enormous concession in the interests of peace. [Hear, hear.] Now, it could not be held to be too late to consider that subject in that house, or at least it was equally too late when it was discussed elsewhere; for it was then remarked by one of the highest authorities who took part in the debate upon it in the other house that the treaty was already in honor accepted by this country and signed by Her Majesty’s plenipotentiaries.

It was important that the House of Commons should now express some opinion upon that treaty. The arbitration was still before them—the possible burdens thrown on the tax-payers of this country were still before them; and what was still more important, new rules of international and maritime law were established by that treaty, [hear, hear,] and it would be strange if the representatives of a commercial people [Page 453] like ours did not think it was worth while even to give any opinion upon those new rules. [Hear.] In opening the subject he would state, as briefly as he could, the view he took of the conduct of the government in reference to the treaty. He had not one word to say against the commissioners, personally or otherwise. They appeared to have faithfully and efficiently carried out the instructions they received from the government during the course of the negotiations. The circumstances were simply these: At the end of last year, apparently, Lord Granville thought it necessary to instruct Sir Edward Thornton to urge on Mr. Fish, as absolutely necessary for the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, that there should be a conference on the subject of the fisheries. It was proposed that the conference should be held at Washington, by commissioners to be appointed by both governments. In January the subject was opened to Mr. Fish, who, on the part of the President, accepted the proposal on condition that the Alabama claims should be added to the subjects of the conference. Within forty-eight hours Sir Edward Thornton cordially thanked Mr. Fish for so accepting the proposal, and acquiesced in his condition, further adding the claims of British subjects on the United States, and of American citizens against the British government for damages received in war to the subjects of conference. This was agreed to; and the commissioners were immediately appointed. Now, on these preliminaries he ventured to make this remark; he thought it unfortunate that this country was made a petitioner for a conference, the subjects of which were of far more importance to America than to us. The subject of the fisheries, for instance, which country was most interested in its settlement? The country in possession, and whose rights were undoubted to exclude others from the waters, or the country which wished to be admitted to a share of those rights? He did not mean to say that it was desirable the then state of the fishery question should continue. Far from it. After the cessation of the reciprocity treaty the United States fishermen were admitted to those waters upon licenses, but these were so difficult to maintain that their exclusion was enforced by an armed Canadian flotilla. The position of the two parties was reversed when England became the petitioner. If that was the case with reference to the fishery question, how much more so was it the case with the Alabama claim? England had comparatively no interest in the settlement of that question. The claim had already been discredited by the exaggeration of the Americans themselves. The sober, thinking men of America had tacitly admitted that we stood well in the matter, by their refusing the arbitration when it was first offered. He must say without any reflection on the statesmen of that great country, it was an unfortunate result of their democratic institutions that they must always have some election cry, and no cry was so effective as a cry against England. Could there be a better election cry than this, with reference to which we stood clear in the eyes of the world? He had only one other remark to make in passing. It appeared that, from the moment when the negotiations began, the subject which was added to the terms of the conference—the Alabama claim—became the principal one, and the fishery claim, for which the conference was got, became subsidiary, and assumed a very minor part in the progress of the negotiations. With reference to the treaty itself, he would merely remark as to the personages chosen to nominate the arbitrators, the Americans had certainly no reason to complain of them. The Emperor of Brazil, both by recent events and his position of neighborhood, was not likely to be unfavorable to the Americans; and the President of the Swiss Republic, by the nature of the institutions of his country, was not likely to be antipathetic to the Americans; while the place where the arbitrators were to meet—Geneva—was about as favorable to the Americans as the city where the negotiations were begun—Washington. The claims connected with Canada were, first, the Fenian claims; second, the fishery claims; third, arrangements with regard to trade; and fourth, the arrangement of boundaries. He drew no distinction between Canadian and English interests. They were both imperial and had been treated throughout as one. The understanding throughout the negotiations was that neither interest should be settled without the other. They were to be established or dropped together. The interests, in fact, were identical. To begin with the Alabama claim, its reference to arbitration was not new. It had been proposed for arbitration by the convention signed by Lord Clarendon and Mr. Reverdy Johnson. What were the terms of that convention? “Whether England had fulfilled her obligations at the time the Alabama sailed.” The American Senate refused to consent to that arbitration. Why? Clearly because they foresaw that England was clear; but now America accepted the arbitration. Why? Because of the change made in the terms of reference. The reference now was, whether England, in 1851, had fulfilled her obligations in new and stricter terms drawn up in 1871. The question now was, whether in a matter of mutual obligation new rules should be adopted different from those on which the obligation rested. When the Americans rejected the first arbitration they put themselves in the wrong; and they accepted it on the new terms, hoping to put us in the wrong. It was on these terms that we had consented to refer the claims. It had been said that no rules had been laid down of international law at the time, and therefore it was necessary to put in terms rules by which this arbitration should be guided. But the language of [Page 454] the commissioners in conference struck this ground of defense from under them; he cause they admitted distinctly that the rules on which the arbitration was proposed did not exist, and were not in force at the time—that the principles on which the arbitration was agreed on were not in force at the time the Alabama sailed.

He did not pretend to enter into the merits of these new rules; he should be glad to have the opinion of the honorable and learned member for Richmond (Sir R. Palmer) on that subject. Different views were taken of these new rules. Some argued they were very good for England for the future, but, curiously enough, the ground on which they said so was because England had generally been belligerent. Now he held that was not true. Others took a very strong view against these new rules, and said they were altogether retrograde and in direct antagonism to international law, and that they would either become a dead letter or a very great hardship on English commerce. But it mattered very little what the merits of the new rules might be for the future; what he asked was, whether it was wise or an act of self-stultification to offer ourselves to be tried on the fulfillment of a mutual obligation by rules different from those on which the obligation itself rested. By the new rules it was stipulated that “due diligence should be given. Did not that itself mean that what the old principles demanded was not “due diligence”—that the “diligence” demanded by the old principles of maritime neutrality was less than “due?” The change was a restriction of the rules by which we were to be tried, and a chance was given of a verdict being found against us. He believed that even on these stricter rules we should stand clear, and it would be distinctly proved that we fulfilled our obligations. But that did not at all justify the proceedings to which he had alluded. He knew it was said by some that, whether this was an act of stultification or not, it was in the interests of peace—that a nation like this ought to be magnanimous—that it was the highest duty of nations to promote peace—that nothing was so noble as magnanimity, and if England could not afford to be magnanimous what nation could? But there were limits beyond which magnanimity became folly, subjecting the actors to suspicion of want of proper spirit and self-respect. When in the eyes of the world we apparently stood clear to agree to change the standard of right in order to give our accusers the advantage and ourselves the chance of condemnation was an act in which magnanimity passed into folly, and the sublime into the ridiculous. With respect to the other minor claims, namely, those of British merchants on the United States, and the claims of the United States on England for damages during war, there was only one question he had to put, and that was put by Lord Cairns in another place, which had received no answer. That question was why there was a limit put on the treaty to the date of the claim of the British merchant, while no limit was placed to the Alabama and the smaller claims. The claims of British merchants for damage in war must be made between the 13th of April, 1861, and the 9th of April, 1865, which was at least six months before the end of the war. But there was no such restriction on the other side. When the question was put why this difference existed, the only answer was that no doubt the American Government would fairly acknowledge any further claim. But that, he thought, was no satisfactory answer; the question remained to be answered. He now proceeded to the last group of subjects, namely, the Canadian claims: First of all, there were the Fenian claims. It seemed to him there was no possibility of defending the course which government had instructed the commissioners to take on the subject of the Fenian claims. Whatever gave weight to the Alabama claims gave tenfold weight to the Fenian claims. With regard to the Alabama, the question was whether the British government had watched her with due diligence so as to prevent her escape. But it was known that fifty regiments of Fenians were drilling from day to day. Their movements were regularly reported to the American Government, but they always excused themselves from interference with their movements on the grounds of electioneering emergencies. On the other hand, we had stretched the law against ourselves to admit the Alabama claims. It was not the amount of the Fenian claims on which he laid stress so much as on the principle which was involved. The second Canadian claim was as to the fisheries. It was said that Canada had the right of setting aside this treaty; but that was not correct. Canada had only the same right in this respect as the Parliament of the country or the Congress of America had; because the treaty necessitated a certain amount of legislation by each of these powers. The Canadian part of the treaty could not be carried out without the passing and repealing of certain acts. But, at the same time, he must say these fisheries were of enormous value to Canada. Their value had been greatly increased by improvements she had herself carried out. They were great nurseries of seamen destined,he hoped, to become one day a great Canadian navy. That being so, these fisheries ought not to be shared in without adequate payment. The only question, therefore, was as to the terms on which both countries should be admitted to these waters. Licenses would be impossible, and exclusion still more so, and the terms mentioned in the treaty were the only ones upon which an arrangement could be made, viz, that all the seas being open equally to both countries, the difference of value should be estimated between them, and the possessors of the least valuable fisheries should compensate by paying the difference. The Canadians [Page 455] would always have an advantage from fishing in their own waters, their trade being already established, besides which they were closer to home. They also had the advantage of superior waters, and that they would not lose by a common right of fishery. Canada, however, seemed to have become blinded by a long-continued controversy until she had identified in her own mind the reciprocity treaty and the fisheries, as if they were inseparable subjects. Good, however, might be done by lookers-on who could take a wider view of the matter, and show that there was no inseparable connection between those subjects, but that, on the contrary, Canada, looking upon her own great fisheries as a means of enforcing free trade, was selling her fisheries for nothing, because free trade was working itself out by a natural process, and the Canadians were certain to obtain it, for some articles were already being freely admitted into the American markets.

Those who put an end to the reciprocity treaty in the middle of the American civil war, when there were no members for the Southern States in Congress, did so not from protectionist views, but rather from an idea in the minds of the Northern States that the termination of that treaty would so embarrass Canada as to lead to annexation. In that they had been entirely disappointed, for the cessation of that treaty had done infinite good to Canada, having stimulated her to find a large foreign trade independent of the Americans. The trade with America had rapidly increased since the cessation of that treaty, as there were many articles of absolute necessity for which America was dependent on Canada, and America, in imposing duties on these articles, was making her own citizens pay and injuring Canada as little as possible. The Canadians were mistaken in connecting the revival of the reciprocity treaty with the opening of their fisheries, which should stand entirely on its own merits. He was not without hope that Canada would find the terms of the treaty were much more favorable to her than she at first imagined. The money compensation ought to balance the different value of the fisheries, in addition to which the free admission of their fish to the American markets was of such infinite value that it had already reconciled the maritime provinces to the treaty. The dislike to the treaty seemed to be confined to Upper Canada. There were also to be considered the trade arrangements, such as the opening of the St. Lawrence below the 45th parallel of latitude; but that to America was nothing new, beyond its being made a matter of treaty. Again, on the Canadian canals Americans paid only the same duties as the Canadians themselves. Of course, if a war broke out it would be in the power of Her Majesty to close the passage of the St. Lawrence to the Americans. On the other hand, the opening of Lake Michigan to the Canadian merchants was of very great importance, because on the south of that lake was that great emporium of middle America, Chicago, and no greater advantage could be secured to the Canadians than the free navigation of that lake, in addition to which there was the concession of the coasting trade with the ports on those lakes. With respect to the boundaries he had nothing to say, because any dispute was to be settled by arbitration, and to the arbitrators he could offer no objection. With regard to the San Juan boundary, he heard that documents had recently been discovered which would tend to the maintenance of the British claim to that portion of the boundary. On the whole, he was of opinion that the government ought, at all events, to offer some defense of their conduct with regard to the negotiations on these points: First, the mode in which they initiated this conference; secondly, their substitution of the Alabama claims as a primary topic of conference when it was merely an addition to that conference; thirdly, their consent to substitute rules for our trial as to the fulfillment of obligations different from those which were primarily received; fourthly, the obvious inequality of foregoing on our part the similar and much stronger Fenian claims; and, lastly, the limit given to closing the claims of British merchants, whereas no limit was given to the claims against ourselves. On all these points the house should receive information from the government, who ought to defend the instructions they had given to the commissioners who in they had sent to Washington. At the same time the house would, he believed, express a feeling which prevailed throughout the country by saying that, apart from any mistakes in the process of negotiation, it was the cordial and unanimous wish of this country that those negotiations might end in cementing permanent peace and good will between the two countries [cheers] and in removing any irritation or causes of future dispute between two kindred nations, that ought to go hand in hand in promoting the prosperity of the world. [Hear, hear.] However wanting in equity might have been the negotiations on some points, he hoped the mistakes of administration would not hinder kindly relations between these two countries, for such relations would best rest on mutual self-respect. [Hear, hear.] He moved for the production of copies of any instructions given by Her Majesty’s ministers to their commissioners at Washington during the negotiations.

Sir Roundell Palmer said it must be satisfactory to the house to find that on the colonial branch, on which the right honorable gentleman was entitled to speak with the greatest authority, the treaty of Washington was entirely approved by him. He was indebted to the right honorable gentleman for having (with the assistance of government) brought this subject forward, because he felt that it would not become [Page 456] the house to separate without devoting some time to a review of this matter. He took the deepest interest in it because he was a member, though a subordinate one, of the government, during whose tenure of office there arose many of the transactions out of which this treaty sprung, and also because he, in common with every British citizen, had a desire that the honor of this country in all public matters might be maintained; that, in all arrangements growing out of all disagreements between this and other countries, there should be taken due measures to obtain security for the future; and also, if it were possible, cordial good will should subsist between ourselves and that great country on the other side of the Atlantic which had sprung from us. [Hear, hear.] On our side that good will had subsisted without interruption, and the difficulty to many of them of forming a sober estimate of these transactions was increased by the wonder how it could be possible that our feeling toward the United States could be misunderstood by them.

There had not been a time at which we were not willing to have made great sacrifices in order to maintain cordial relations with the United States, but no sacrifices were worthy of a great nation or could tend to the maintenance of cordial relations which involved in any degree a sacrifice or compromise of public honor. [Hear, hear.] Nor would it have been consistent with wisdom to enter into any arrangements for the removal of present differences unless regard was had to the future, and there was a likelihood of their containing securities against future interruption. Regarding, in the first place, the considerations connected with our national honor, he did not regard that honor as compromised by what had been done, but, even taking the low ground of the honor of the government, of which he was a member during the American war, he could not agree that its honor or credit had been compromised, for had he thought it had been, he could not have expressed his acquiescence in the arrangements which had been made. He believed that that government did nothing during that critical period but what was honorable and upright. That which had been made one of the main subjects of criticism was, to his thinking, one of the most satisfactory points of the treaty; viz, that while consenting to certain rules for the future, and allowing them to be applied as rules of judgment with respect to the past, we had guarded ourselves against being supposed to admit that if it should appear to any arbitrator that, being tried by those rules, our conduct was at that time in any respect wanting, we had distinctly declined to admit that those rules were laid down as rules of international obligation between ourselves and the United States at the time of the transactions, so that even if an award on those principles could be made against us, it stood on record that we had not admitted anything derogatory to our honor as to our having been at that time under any such obligations as between nation and nation. He desired to place before the house his view of the transactions which had led on the part of this country to the arrangement in question. If the present moment was not favorable to a complete appreciation of our conduct, he did not doubt that history would do justice to it, for there never was, in his opinion, a more honest, fair, true, or consistent neutrality professed or observed by any nation than that which wo observed during the American civil war. [Hear, hear.] It should be remembered that nations were represented by their governments, and in a free nation there would be various feelings and interests, and great, freedom in the expression of opinion. Englishmen did not impute ill-will or wrong to the United States because there might appear in the newspapers or circulate in society language which seemed to be inconsistent with a kindly feeling, because they knew well how to distinguish between the nation and the freedom of individuals composing it, and they hoped the same judgment would be applied to them. Tried by this test, the course taken by the government was, from first to last, one of strict, honorable, and loyal neutrality. The first thing they did was to issue a proclamation of neutrality for the purpose of making it understood that we meant to submit to the exercise of belligerent rights on the part of the United States against those of our citizens who might be found guilty of running a blockade or of introducing contraband of war, and, at the same time, of warning our citizens that they would be subject to those penalties. So far from that being an unfriendly act, the moment the war actually broke out it was a duty that we owed, both to the Americans and ourselves, to issue such a proclamation. To say that we were not to recognize the civil war as a fact, and to make it known that we acknowledged the rights of war when they were asserted, was difficult for us to understand. [Hear, hear.] Yet, for a long time that was made the head and front of our offending, but it had now disappeared from the category of imputations. The next step of the government was to issue rules against the use of our ports and waters as places of hostile operations. We would not allow any ships to remain for more than a limited time in our ports, nor would we allow any pursuit or attack to be initiated in our waters, or prizes to be brought in, or supplies of coal or other articles to be obtained except within the narrow limits which international hospitality prescribed. The government thus prevented our ports from being used as a basis of hostile operations. The next question was whether we should recognize the blockade of the whole sea-board of the Union, there being a great difficulty in maintaining it and numerous questions having been raised as to its validity. Other [Page 457] neutral powers on the Continent had been angry when we had established blockades in former years, and they were much dissatisfied with the decisions of our prize courts in enforcing them. Some of them refused to recognize the blockade of the American ports with its unavoidable infirmities, especially in the early part of the war, but England declined to adopt that course, and stated that she would, when a neutral, abide by those rules which she had laid down for others when she was a belligerent. That war lasted a considerable time, and both in this house and out of it, on the Continent of Europe as well as in this country, overtures and suggestions were made for the recognition by us of the South, which had established its own government. [Hear.] Those suggestions were steadily resisted by our government, and in every public act the government not only maintained an attitude of neutrality honorably and with integrity, but they did so in as friendly a spirit as was consistent with the nature of that neutrality toward both the branches of that great country which we were sorry to see at variance with each other, and whose reconciliation was the thing we most desired. Our law with regard to ships was founded on the precedent of the United States, and was an improvement thereupon, for one of the ablest of American writers (Mr. Beales,) who was not friendly toward us in controversy, admitted the great defects of their law in comparison with ours.

It should be remembered that during the progress of the war our government made overtures to the Government of the United States for a revision of the neutrality laws of both countries, and those overtures were received with courtesy, and even with an expression of satisfaction, but with the distinct statement on the part of the Government of the United States that they did not see how our law could be improved. Really, therefore, they did not call upon us to make an alteration of our law, because they thought their law, which was of inferior stringency, was sufficient, and when pressed by Spain, in 1818, to make their own law more stringent, they declined to do so. The law of the United States was inferior to ours in this cardinal point—that it coupled the arming of ships within the jurisdiction with the fitting out of them in such a manner that it would be hardly possible for them to stop an unarmed ship. The Alabama, for instance, would not have been an offender against the United States law according to any ordinary principles of construction, and certainly she could not have been stopped under the detaining clauses of the statute, because she went out unarmed and received her armament elsewhere. The United States, therefore, thought our law was sufficiently stringent, and they did not press us to alter it, although our government, if they had thought it insufficient, would have been anxious to change it—a thing it would not have been easy to do—and for the proposal to have been made in Parliament without being carried would not have improved the situation of affairs. Neutrality laws were evidence of what both countries admitted to be the measure and limit of their obligation, and it was not to be supposed that the United States, having made their original law in 1793 or 1794, and their present law in 1817, when the war between Spain and Portugal was going on, considered that any obligation rested upon them to go beyond that form of law. We did not conceive that anything in our foreign enlistment act rested upon international obligation; we conceived that it rested upon our own legislation, and that it was designed to enable ourselves the better to vindicate and enforce within our own jurisdiction our own neutrality; and there could be no doubt that the United States took the same view of the matter. We did not for a moment say that the United States had not a right to call upon us bona fide to put in force our own law for the preservation of our neutrality; we distinctly admitted they had that right; but we said they had it upon the footing of persons asking us to enforce our own laws, and not upon any footing prior to, paramount to, or superior to our own laws; that they must seek to have that law enforced as all other laws were enforced, according to our own system of jurisprudence, and that it must be applied in cases where evidence was forthcoming, where juries and judges would say—or where at least there was a fair probability they would say—it had been infringed. We could not suppose they would imagine it was their right to ask us to act arbitrarily, as if we were not a people governed by Parliament and by laws. In this state of things we recognized their right to call upon us bona fide to the best of our power, by every means which the law gave us, to stop proceedings of this kind, the fitting out of these ships. We undertook to do this by diplomatic negotiations which were made between our government and the United States; we at all times professed our determination to enforce our own law according to the construction put upon it by our own law officers; and the construction put upon it at that time, though undoubtedly very questionable, was that most favorable to the United States, which made the arming of ships within this jurisdiction not essential here as it seemed to be under the United States act, but which considered the fitting out of a ship for warlike purposes as sufficient to warrant interference. The rule that a vessel must be specially adapted, wholly or in part, for warlike uses within the jurisdiction was very much in controversy when it came into court in the Alexandra case, and two judges declared that the large and beneficial construction of the law on which we had always acted was right, two that it was wrong, and the judgment of the court, in point of [Page 458] form, was with those who thought it wrong. Nevertheless, the government being advised that the larger and more favorable view was the right view, always acted upon it. He mentioned this because the rule which was now adopted, even though it might not coincide with the view some lawyers took, did coincide with the view the government took of the measure of our own obligations. We stopped altogether five ships, and it was a total mistake to suppose that in the case of the two rams there was any assumption of power beyond the law, because the government acted on evidence which they thought to be sufficient. In the cases of the Georgia and Shenandoah, nothing was done within this jurisdiction, and no information was given to the government. The Shenandoah was not even suspected by any one in this country, and it was not until she got into Portuguese waters that she received her armament. As to the Alabama, she was officered by Americans and was armed at the Azores, but here she was equipped as a ship destined for the merchant service. On the 23d of June, 1862, Mr. Adams gave Earl Russell information, unaccompanied with evidence, and the government made inquiries and could learn nothing. Without proof of the destination of the belligerent, there was no case which could be acted upon. Mr. Adams then obtained a considerable body of evidence, which he sent to Earl Russell, who submitted it to the law officers of the Crown on the Saturday evening, so that they did not get it until Monday morning; their opinion that it was sufficient was not received until Tuesday morning, and that morning the vessel went away. Of course the law officers of the Crown would attend to urgent business on Sundays, but in this case the papers were not sent to their offices until late on Saturday evening, and, in the ordinary course, Sunday intervened before they received them; but there was as much diligence as was ordinarily exercised in legal matters for the government, as well as for private persons, and there was sufficient to show that the government acted with good faith. As to what followed, when ships were in the hands of belligerents, we did exactly what the United States would have done under similar circumstances, and we did not allow the ships to enter any of our ports.

While the arbitration was pending it would not become him to enter into detail so much as he otherwise might have done as to the concurrence of the authorities of the United States themselves in the principles upon which hitherto we had acted. It could not be wondered that, if we thought it a matter of national honor to act when we were neutrals on the principles we evinced as belligerents, we should expect the United States when they were belligerents to act on the principles they avowed as neutrals; and had they done so this controversy would not have been so long kept alive. All their authorities on jurisprudence, notably Wheaton, had held that the fitting out of armed ships in neutral territory for a belligerent was lawful, and during the French revolutionary war no one thought of holding the United States responsible for captures on the high seas, not brought into their own ports, of privateers which the French had fitted out in the most remarkable manner in the ports of the United States, most openly, and in defiance of the legal sovereignty of the United States themselves. The idea of holding them responsible for the prizes brought into the ports of the United States was never advocated; and even as to them they declined to be responsible for their restitution, when they had been brought in before a particular day in 1793, on which notice was given to the French minister that he was not to be permitted to use the ports of the United States any longer. As to all brought in before, they declined responsibility, and our government did not press it; as to all after, they undertook to restore them; and in cases in which it was admitted proper diligence had not been used, it was afterward agreed by treaty to make compensation. Between 1815 and 1818 there was a controversy between Spain and the United States with respect to ships fitted out in the ports of the United States which had committed depredations on the ships of Spain during her wars with her colonies, and uniformly the United States maintained that they were not responsible for the captures made by those ships, that their obligation was to enforce their own law upon sufficient evidence, and that failing the production of it they were not responsible. The controversy closed in 1819 with a treaty which involved the cession of Florida, and by which all claims on both sides were waived without prejudice to the attitude the United States had assumed. A similar controversy between the United States and Portugal was carried on from 1816 to 1850, and over and over again the United States refused to refer any such claims to commissioners, saying that there was no responsibility for acts done beyond their jurisdiction, even by their own citizens, and although the ships had been armed in their own ports. Surely this country could not be considered as acting otherwise than in a spirit of bona fide neutrality when it uniformly professed to adhere to that measure of obligation which the United States had laid down for themselves. He maintained that Lords Russell and Clarendon were perfectly justified, in the first instance, in declining to go into arbitration; they were only doing the very thing which had been done by the United States in the controversy with Portugal as recently as 1850. The real truth of the matter was that this country did not like to be at variance with the United States. Whatever might be the measure of our obligation, whatever the legal view of it, this country most deeply regretted that ships had [Page 459] escaped from our shores and committed depredations on the commerce of the United States, [hear,] and we preferred to waive a strict examination of the question on legal and international grounds in order to get a settlement of it which should bring security for the present and peace and good will for the future. Those were the feelings with which Lord Stanley negotiated the treaty with Mr. Reverdy Johnson; and when that step had been taken it became manifestly impossible to go back. While he did not wish to say a word against the treaty which Lord Stanley negotiated, which fairly expressed the sentiments and wishes of the country, he had no hesitation in saying that he greatly preferred the present proceeding. [“Order, order.”]

It was now turned 10 minutes to 7 o’clock, when, by the standing orders, the debate could not proceed, and

Colonel Wilson Patten rose to suggest that, considering the importance of the subject and of the speech, and that it was so desirable to preserve the continuity of both, the debate should be resumed at 9 o’clock.

Mr. Baillie Cochrane had no objection to postpone the motion which stood first in his name if he were promised one hour on Tuesday at 2 o’clock.

Mr. Gladstone could not give the desired pledge, and

The Speaker made the order for resuming the debate the first after supply.

Mr. Gladstone moved that the house, at its rising, should adjourn to 12 o’clock on Saturday, which was agreed to, and it was stated that no supply would be taken, but that the bill relating to the judicial committee of the privy council would be considered.

The sitting was suspended at 7 o’clock.

The house re-assembled at 9 o’clock.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON.

On the order of the day for going into committee of supply, Mr. Eastwick, Mr. Baillie Cochrane, and Sir W. Lawson, who had notices on the paper which were entitled to precedence, yielded to an appeal of Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Gladstone, and allowed the debate, which had been interrupted at 10 minutes to 7 o’clock, to be resumed, on condition that an opportunity would be afforded next week for bringing on their respective motions.

Sir Roundell Palmer said that when the sitting was suspended he was endeavoring to express what he felt on the subject of the arrangements between Lord Stanley, then secretary for foreign affairs, and Mr. Reverdy Johnson for a general arbitration of the questions in dispute between the two countries. He confessed that Lord Russell, the illustrious man under whom he had the honor to serve, and on whom fell a great part of the responsibility for the affairs to which reference had been made, was, in his opinion, perfectly justified in declining to go to arbitration at all. That was a course exactly similar to that which had been taken by the United States when a similar question arose between the United States and Portugal. He did not, therefore, himself share in the prevalent feeling of satisfaction at the arrangement made by Lord Stanley and Mr. Reverdy Johnson. It appeared to him to be attended with such considerable risk of unsatisfactory results that, as far as he was concerned, he would have preferred that matters should remain in the position in which they stood under the previous administrations of Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston. His reasons were these: In the first place, he would never have been a willing party to any arbitration whatever of any point which seemed to him to involve the honor of this country or the good faith of the government. [Hear, hear.] There were matters fit for arbitration, but this was not one. Every country was answerable for its own honor, and no referee whatever ought to be called in to determine questions of that kind. That was equally true with regard to questions of good faith. Of course it was not the intention of Lord Stanley to refer any question of honor to arbitration. But in such a reference as that to which he and Mr. Reverdy Johnson agreed, it was manifest that if there had been an unfavorable award against this country, it would have been capable of being represented as affecting the honor and good faith of this country. [Hear.] All matters were left entirely at large; there was no question, from the proclamation downward, which had been in difference between the two countries which was not involved in that reference, and whatever award might have been made either party would have been at liberty to place its own construction upon it. Arbitration between nations was a very good thing, and certainly we, as a nation, were bound to take that view, seeing that at the time of the declaration of Paris we concurred in a proposition that it was desirable to refer to arbitration all international disputes which would admit that kind of solution. But such international references had their disadvantages as well as their advantages. It was extremely difficult to find an arbitrator or arbitrators of whose absolute, rigid, judicial impartiality there could be no reasonable degree of doubt. He did not at all decline to follow his right honorable friend opposite in some observations he had made as to the particular powers chosen as arbitrators in the present case. He was perfectly ready to admit that they were as trustworthy, honorable, and capable as [Page 460] any arbitrators that could be chosen in the whole civilized world. [Hear, hear.] But of all such high arbitrators this must be said, that they could not enter without a certain degree of bias upon the consideration of certain great public questions. We and the United States were the two great maritime powers of the world; we could not possibly find as arbitrators any power like ourselves. In one respect that would tend to impartiality of decision, but in other respects there would be a risk of encountering a current of opinion different from that which has prevailed between the two countries parties to the arbitration, and possibly there might be an unconscious bias of political interest arising from the point of view which the powers called in to arbitrate might naturally regard similar questions. Bearing that in mind, he would never have been a willing party to making any reference whatever to a form of international arbitration which could possibly result in an award which might be regarded by the world at large, or by the other party, as affecting the honor and the good faith of this country. That appeared to him a great objection to an arbitration simply at large, such as that agreed upon by Lord Stanley and Mr. Reverdy Johnson. There was another consideration of less importance, which, however, deserved to be mentioned. The elements of the question then proposed to be referred to arbitration were not at all limited or defined. It would have been competent for the arbitrators to have awarded against us upon any of the numerous grounds vaguely involved in the whole matters in dispute. For instance, if they thought that we ought not to have issued any neutrality proclamation, and they were not bound to give their reasons for the award. He did not fear on that point, because his impression had always been that while we were really clear on the main points we were a thousand times more clear on that. [Hear, hear.]

But the matter would have been attended with this inconvenience, that whichever way the award was given, whether for us or against us, nobody would have known the principles upon which it was founded. Suppose the award were in our favor, what might have followed? How would that party in the United States which had been irritated themselves, and had constantly fomented irritation against Great Britain, have regarded an award unfavorable to them? They might have said: “The arbitrators have determined that what was done in Great Britain was right in international law. Very well; then it is not necessary to use due diligence to prevent ships of war from being fitted out and armed to operate against the commerce of a belligerent power, for we assert that Great Britain did not use due diligence.” The result, therefore, might have been to exonerate us from responsibility and pecuniary liability, but at the same time to establish it as a rule among nations that whether they had neutrality laws, such as the United States, and we had or not, governments were not under any sort of obligation towards each other to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out and armament of ships of that description. Such a view as that would not have tended to satisfactory relations between the two countries, for if in the case of a war in which Great Britain was involved, those who had participated in the irritation against us wished to connive at ships like the Alabama being fitted out against our commerce, the award would not in the least have stood in the way of such a disposition; nay, it would rather have led to its more open indulgence. It seemed to him that this country, if it were to have its own will and its own way, would never go to war at all, feeling that war was a great crime and a great wickedness. [Hear, hear.] That being so, he did not look forward to frequent wars on the part of this country. But that very feeling was likely to involve us in the disagreeable alternative either of having to go to war or of submitting to such affronts and insults that our most honorable men and wisest statesmen would consider that war was the lesser evil. Suppose that in the background, then, that great country, the United States, which ought to be our friend, was in such a frame of mind as to be inclined to ally itself with our opponents, or not to be very active in enforcing the neutrality laws against its own citizens, what would be the result? We knew what it had been in the case of Spain and Portugal, to which he had already referred. Therefore a decision favorable to us might leave us in no respect better off with regard to security than we were before. By that mode of arbitration, it should be observed that no rule as to the future would be agreed upon between the two countries. Whatever was vague and disputable in international law before would remain so still. On the other hand, if the award were against us, it would have laid down no rules whatever, and the United States would have been quite entitled, if it suited their convenience, to stand on the letter of their laws and say in our case, as they did in that of Spain and Portugal before: “We shall put the laws in force whenever we have sufficient information and proof of the facts, but we are not obliged to make a better or stronger law than we have already.” This country became irrevocably committed to the principle of arbitration on this subject, both by the action of Lord Stanley and the subsequent action of Lord Clarendon, members of two successive governments representing both the great parties in this country. He expressed no opinion whether the course they adopted was wise or unwise. But when that course was adopted it was totally impossible for the government to avoid repeating the offer of arbitration which they had made on the subject before. Mr. Fish said a removal of the differences which arose during the rebellion in America was essential [Page 461] to the restoration of cordial and amicable relations between the two governments. It would have been mere mockery to deal with the fishery question and other things and to omit to include this when we were told we never could have a restoration of amicable relations unless this was included.

The first question was whether Her Majesty’s government should have insisted on the renewal of the Reverdy Johnson treaty. Was it reasonably possible for them to do so? Could it be supposed that the United States would, without modification, agree to the very thing which they had rejected? He apprehended the house would agree with him that it was desirable that arrangements should be made to give the greatest possible amount of security for a good understanding for the future, to insure us against acts of retaliation in case we should be at war, and thereby prevent other countries from supposing that in case of war between us and them the United States would commit acts of retaliation on our commerce. If we had obtained that for the future we had got a very excellent thing, which we should not have got under the arrangement made by Lord Stanley with Mr. Reverdy Johnson. The manner in which these rules were worded had the appearance of a thing which in point of fact was impossible—namely, the creating for the future by an agreement between two nations of new rules of international law. We might make rules binding between the two nations which, in case the world adopted them, would no doubt become established rules of international law, but so long as they rested on a contract only between the two nations, they would be binding only on the two nations. He should have liked the phraseology of these rules if it had been different from what it was. But it should be remembered that to negotiate a treaty at Washington was a different thing from negotiating a treaty at London. With regard to forms of expression, the American commissioners had an advantage, because they were at home and could at once communicate with their government, whereas the British commissioners, owning to the delay which would occur in communicating by letter with Her Majesty’s government, would not think it worth while to oppose the introduction of forms of expression insisted upon by the American commissioners. The first rule was that a “neutral government is bound to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace, and also to use like due diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.” That appeared to him to be a very good rule. What was meant, by “due diligence?” He supposed it was meant that a neutral should use all the means in its power. It had been objected that the latter part of the rule departed from the former because it did not repeat the words “has reasonable grounds to believe;” but that, he thought, was a very ill-grounded criticism. “Like due diligence” implied the words “has reasonable ground to believe” used in the former part of the rule, and there was no necessity to repeat those words. We, by our present foreign enlistment act, had ample powers to prevent the fitting out, &c., of such a vessel as was referred to in this rule, and the United States must pass a bill as stringent as that which we passed last session. He had no doubt they would. With regard to the second rule, he confessed when he first read it he was somewhat alarmed. He thought it was expressed with a degree of vagueness which might be dangerous, and which might be extended to things which he did not think it possible the commissioners could have meant. The second rule is this, that “a neutral government is bound not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms or the recruitment of men.” On this point he had been fortunate enough to elicit from the right honorable gentleman at the head of the government, in reply to a question he put to him on the 13th of June last, a most satisfactory answer, to the effect that this second rule was understood by Her Majesty’s government and by the British and American commissioners as applying solely to vessels cruising or carrying war against a belligerent, and not to the case of military supplies or arms exported for the use of a belligerent from neutral ports or waters in the ordinary course of commerce. The right honorable gentleman had proceeded further to state that the President of the United States himself understood the rule in that sense, and would be the first not only to admit and allow, but to contend for, that construction of it. In the face of such an assurance on the part of the great states which were parties to this treaty it would be unbecoming for him to criticise the vagueness of the language in which the rule was couched, and without doubt this construction of it would be clearly laid before those foreign powers who were to be asked to accede to it. The third rule, being a mere corollary of the other two, required no separate comment. As far as these rules applied to the future, therefore, we had gained the assurance of a good and useful understanding between the two nations, which would go far toward repaying us for any pecuniary loss which we might possibly sustain in consequence of the award being founded upon these rules, instead of upon the principles of international law which [Page 462] were actually in existence at the time of the escape of the Alabama. The future observance of these rules to which foreign nations were to be asked to accede would tend to promote a good understanding between all the powers, and to preserve the peace of the world. In dealing with the question of the retrospective application of these rules to the matter in dispute he apprehended that it was to be expected that the United States would not have agreed to be bound by them in the future unless we had assented to their operation being made retrospective, and, therefore, in his judgment it was worth our while to run the risk of having to undergo a pecuniary sacrifice in order to insure their adhesion to these rules. The terms of the treaty gave us this further advantage, that they distinctly set forth that for the sake of securing a good understanding between the two countries we agreed to be bound by conditions that were not in existence at the time when the cause of dispute arose. But, after all, the United States had a right to call upon us to execute in good faith our municipal law, and there was not such a very great difference between our municipal law and the language of these rules. The language of the first rule only differed from that of the 7th section of our own foreign enlistment act, which was in force at the time, by introducing the words to the effect that vessels which come within the ban were those which had been specially adapted in neutral ports in whole or in part to warlike uses. It was perfectly true that Lord Chief Baron Pollock and Baron Bramwell, as well as other great legal authorities, had thought that these words did not convey the true meaning of our foreign enlistment act, which, in their opinion, was intended to apply only to those vessels which should be armed completely and which left our waters in a condition to commence hostilities. But this had never been the opinion of the government, who, following the view taken by Barons Channell and Pigott, thought that the act would apply in cases in which vessels might not be completely armed and equipped, but merely adapted for war. Therefore, the application of this rule retrospectively was not so violent a change in our obligations as might have been supposed at first sight.

The other rule, as interpreted by the right honorable gentleman at the head of Her Majesty’s government and by the minister of the United States, corresponded in like manner with the 8th section of our foreign enlistment act. It dealt with the renewal or augmentation of warlike equipments of belligerent vessels. The clause in the old foreign enlistment act applied only to ships actually in the war service of a belligerent power at the time when their equipment was augmented, whereas this rule extended also to ships intended to be used for the purpose of war service. Indeed, he maintained that these rules corresponded with each other, and did not go beyond the obligation we imposed on ourselves by our municipal law. Looking at all the circumstances, he was well content to acquiesce in and accept the recent arrangement with all its imperfections. [Hear.] He did not propose to go info all those matters which his right honorable friend opposite had touched upon with much more authority in regard to the colonial aspect of the question, but he might remark that he agreed with his right honorable friend that it was a blemish that the demands of Canada against the United States for the damage done by Fenian raiders should not have been included in the treaty. [Hear.] He was the more anxious to say this because the demands of the United States against Canada in reference to the landing of certain confederates at St. Albans were not only complied with, but anticipated by the spontaneous action of the Canadian legislature, which at once voted the money necessary to make good the losses. The United States might, he thought, feel on calm consideration that the principle of the reference we agreed to make applied at least as forcibly to the Fenian raids. Nevertheless, if from the arrangement which had been entered into permanent peace and good will were brought about between two great countries, he was willing to pay a greater price for such a result than we should have to pay under this treaty. [Hear, hear.]

Sir S. Northcote felt it was impossible for him to add anything to the arguments advanced by his honorable and learned friend the member for Richmond in favor of the general principle and provisions of the treaty, and with regard to other questions raised by his right honorable friend, (Sir C. Adderly,) it might appear more proper that he should leave it to Her Majesty’s government to answer questions and dispose of objections which came rather within their cognizance than within the cognizance of an individual member of the late high commission. Still, there were two considerations which induced him to trespass for a short time on the attention of the house. First of all, he desired to express a hope that his right honorable friend would not press the motion, because he could say, from his own experience in the conduct of the negotiations, that although there existed a not inconsiderable amount of correspondence between Her Majesty’s government and the commissioners, it would not in his opinion be advantageous to any one that that correspondence should be given to the world. It was thought desirable on all accounts that the negotiations should be conducted with that freedom which was only possible among those who knew that their communications with one another would be private. The questions the commissioners had to deal with were of the most delicate character. They affected the good relations [Page 463] between two great powers, and had given rise to much misunderstanding in times past. In order to settle them permanently, and bring about the establishment for a long time to come of thoroughly amicable relations between the two countries, it was desirable that the commissioners should communicate among themselves in the freest and most unreserved manner, and that they should embody their conclusions in the form of documents which really represented the substance of all that passed, but which abstained from raising questions of an irritating character. In order to maintain a thorough good feeling between the two countries it was better, he felt convinced, that the matter should remain as at present, and that the public of England and America should see the result at which the commissioners had arrived without going into all the questions raised and discussed in the course of the negotiations.

It had been remarked in discussions out of doors and in another place that, according to the correspondence and protocols laid on the table, the British commissioners appeared to have done nothing but assent to whatever was proposed by the American commissioners. This, however, was not at all the case. Long and animated discussions occurred on every point that was raised. Indeed, it often happened that days elapsed before an understanding was arrived at, and it would surely be most unwise and unnecessary to renew the battles which had been fought in the State Department at Washington. [Hear, hear.] All that was necessary to be known was the general course of the negotiations and the arguments which were finally adopted. The government, he believed, were prepared to give explanations on any point which might be raised, but he thought it undesirable to lay upon, the table of the house correspondence of a confidential character. He seized this opportunity of saying, on his own part and on the part of the other commissioners who were not officially connected with the government, that there was substantially no difference of opinion between them on any of the important points of the negotiations, and, therefore, it was not to prevent its being known, that they were overruled in any manner by Her Majesty’s government, that he thought the production of the correspondence inexpedient. Undoubtedly the position of a commissioner like himself who was not officially connected with Her Majesty’s government was one of some delicacy. Having undertaken the office, it would have been exceedingly difficult and improper for him to set up private and individual opinions, except in matters of extreme importance and urgency, in the way of thwarting the arrangement that had to be made; and therefore it might be assumed that, the responsibility lying on the government, the commissioners were not all in accord as to the arrangement that was effected. Speaking, however, for himself, although he did not mean to say there might not have been points on which there was a slight difference of opinion, he must state that he never found himself in a position of that kind. He cordially accepted and heartily rejoiced in the arrangement in which he had taken a part. [Hear, hear.] If he ventured to refer to the saying that this was a treaty of which every one was glad but no one proud, he only did so for the purpose of saying that he was, at all events, the exception which proved the rule. He would go further, and say that he hardly understood the frame of mind of the persons who made use of that expression, for if it meant that the treaty was one we ought to be ashamed of no person ought to be glad that it was concluded. If the treaty contained anything derogatory to our national honor we ought not to be glad but extremely sorry that it had been entered into. He believed, however, that in its main outlines the treaty was one which the national honor, in the true sense of the term, not only justified but demanded. [Hear.] It must not be supposed that he arrogated to the commission any of the credit which more properly belonged to Her Majesty’s government, who were responsible for the arrangements. [Hear.] His right honorable friend had complained that a limit of time had been introduced with regard to the claims of British subjects, whereas there was no limit of time with regard to the Alabama claims. Now, it was perfectly true that the claims of British subjects were limited to certain dates, which were intended to correspond with the period of the American civil war; but with regard to the claims arising out of the acts of the Alabama and other vessels of the same class, there was no necessity whatever for introducing any limit of time, because by mentioning particular vessels the class of claims was sufficiently defined. [Hear, hear.] If the treaty had spoken of the claims of British subjects generally, many claims of a miscellaneous character might have been sent in which there was no object in including in the arbitration. The claims arising out of the acts of the Alabama and other vessels were most clearly defined in the treaty. The honorable member for Richmond had remarked that the previous conventions left many points vague and introduced a number of claims which we could never have admitted. They were left so vague, indeed, that it would have been possible, under those claims to have raised a number of questions which this country was not willing to submit to arbitration. They might have raised questions with regard to what they called England’s premature recognition of belligerency, and the consequential damages arising from the prolongation of the war, and with regard also to other questions which this country could not have admitted. Instead of this being the case, however, the treaty, as actually concluded, narrowed the questions at issue [Page 464] very closely by confining the reference solely to losses growing out of the acts of particular vessels, and so shutting out a large class of claims upon which the Americans had heretofore insisted. He contended, therefore, that the high joint commission had upon this point worked substantial advantage rather than injury to this country. His right honorable friend had made it a ground of complaint that the commission gave precedence to the Alabama claims over the question of the Canadian fisheries; but this complaint was based upon a misconception of the facts of the case. It was true that the commission grew out of a proposal to refer the question of the fisheries to a commission, but as a fact all the questions then at issue between the two countries were included in the reference, and a reference to the protocols would show that the fisheries question was first dealt with, and the general principle on which it was settled was decided upon. [Hear, hear.] The question of the manner and time in and at which the negotiations were commenced was one on which it was more proper that the government should speak than himself, but he might say he was perfectly satisfied, from what he heard while in America, that Her Majesty’s government did wisely in taking the opportunity that offered of commencing the negotiations which had resulted in the treaty now under discussion. Her Majesty’s government could not have honorably withdrawn from the original offer to refer to a commission the question of how the matters in dispute could best be settled. The Americans naturally felt that to accept the limits of the reference originally proposed by England would have left unsettled several questions which they desired to have set at rest, for the sake not of their own country merely, but in the interests of peace all over the world. [Hear, hear.] This view was, in his opinion, sound at bottom, though it had been stated, from time to time, in language calculated to irritate and offend certain classes of people in this country. It would not have been satisfactory to patch up this particular quarrel on a basis unlikely to afford a permanent settlement, and he therefore regarded the treaty which had resulted from lengthened negotiations as one with which all parties concerned ought to feel satisfied. The treaty not only opened the door for the settlement of a difficult and disagreeable question, but laid the foundation of important principles of international law which would hereafter prove of benefit not to England only but to the whole world. [Hear, hear.] Without doubt the consciousness that if England became engaged in a war her commerce would or would not be seriously injured by predatory incursions on the part of other states, and especially of America, would weaken her position in the eyes of the world and render her less able to speak with authority in the councils of nations. [Mr. C. Bentinck.—“No, no.”] If his honorable friend said that it was of no importance for England, when speaking in the councils of Europe to be able to point to America as being on friendly terms, there could be no argument between them. [Hear, hear.] It might be that England would be perfectly able to defend her commerce, but her position would be much more strong if she was on friendly terms with the United States, and no other nation could expect or hope to construct and arm in America vessels of the Alabama class to be used against English commerce on the high seas. [Hear, hear.] Another and very strong reason why there ought to be perfect friendliness between England and America was that this country desires to develop her great colonial empire. [Hear, hear.] No part of the British Empire was more strongly interested in the maintenance of freindly relations between England and America than was the Dominion of Canada, which would derive more advantages from the conclusion of the treaty than any other part of the Queen’s dominions. At the present moment Canada was organizing and spreading herself over an enormous and sparcely-populated area, a process which required, above everything else, confidence, peace, and time. Canada lay on the frontiers of a country which, however well-disposed toward England, had a restless and energetic people, but he did not think any American statesman believed otherwise than that it was the interest of his country for Canada to flourish, and that an attempt at annexation would result in no good to America. If jealousy and bad feeling arose between England and the United States, Canada would be the first portion of this empire to feel it. England might, perhaps, in such a case, be able to defy the power of America to injure her dominions at home, but the trade, commerce, navigation, and credit of Canada would suffer at once, and therefore it was in the interest of peace between the two nations that the uncomfortable feeling which had unhappily existed should be terminated. Now, he would ask, how were the interests of Canada affected by the concessions made with respect to the fisheries? The fact that the British Empire was made capable of admitting the United States fishermen to these fisheries in itself proved that Canada was rightly in possession of them. And in return for these concessions Canada gained what she greatly wanted, a market for her fish. [Hear, hear.] When, therefore, it was said that Canada complained of the provisions relating to this matter, he believed that these complaints did not come from the fishing provinces, [hear;] and to show that this question was regarded very differently in America, he might mention the circumstance that a petition presented by the fishermen of Gloucester, in Massachusetts, complained that those portions of the treaty were all favorable to the Canadian fishermen, and unfavorable to the fishermen of the United States. General [Page 465] Butler, too, who certainly did not usually mince matters, had denounced this bargain as one that was bad for the United States. Therefore, what had happened was simply what happened in most bargains, both sides wanted more than they could get, and consequently declared that they had the worst of it. [Cheers.] But it was said, “What you have really failed to do is this, you have given away our fisheries, and have failed to get for us what we value far more than money, the reciprocity treaty?” But free trade was a point in which both Canada and America were far behind ourselves. They found that the renewal of the reciprocity treaty as it stood was a point which would not be conceded. Were they then, because they could not obtain this renewal, to sacrifice an arrangement which was clearly to the interest of all concerned? One thing, too, was certain, that they were more likely to obtain for Canada a reduction of duties levied upon articles admitted into the United States markets by allowing things to work for themselves than by insisting upon the renewal of the reciprocity treaty, because the Americans would naturally have argued, “If England and Canada are so exceedingly anxious to get this treaty, and if they are ready to make us concessions of a kind which we admit to be valuable for the sake of getting it, there must be something very good to them in this bargain, and if good to them it must be bad for us.” He believed, however, that in course of time, and as these great states developed and obtained more power in the councils of the nation, they would carry the doctrine of free trade for their own benefit, and the benefits which would result from free trade would a few years hence be obtained for Canada without her being called upon to give any compensation at all in return. [Hear, hear.]

He felt perfectly convinced that they were acting directly in the interests of Canada herself in not pressing this question prematurely, and in directing the attention of Canada to that which was really of primary importance to her—namely, the consolidation of her dominion, the maintenance of peace with her neighbor, and the completion of her great lines of communication by river, by canal, and by railway. [Hear, hear.] His honorable and learned friend had commented upon a certain amount of ambiguity appeared to exist in the wording of the second rule, and in these arrangements there was, no doubt, some confusion occasionally, owing to the difficulty of telegraphic communication. But the question whether this rule was open to the interpretation put upon it by his honorable and learned friend was raised in America before the treaty was confirmed by the Senate. The matter was fully discussed and considered, and it was concluded that the intention of the rule was clearly to limit it to the case of naval operations But, although the intention was clear in the arrangement effected between this country and the United States, if they were to invite other nations to accede to those rules, it would, of course, be of importance that no room for doubt should be left as to the meaning of the rule, and he believed he was correct in saying that negotiations had already been opened by Her Majesty’s government with the United States which would effectually secure this object. He was perfectly convinced that the spirit in which this treaty had been offered and negotiated by England, and had been accepted and negotiated by America, was one of the utmost friendliness and cordiality, and that throughout America there was but one feeling on the general question involved in this treaty, and that was a feeling of satisfaction that a cause of difference which might, under other circumstances, have developed into something unpleasant, and even threatening, had been put an end to. [Cheers.] They heard, from time to time, incautious language used here with regard to that great nation, and, undoubtedly, in America extraordinary language was occasionally employed in the public journals and elsewhere with regard to England, but he altogether denied the statement that no cry was so popular in America as a cry against England. [Hear, hear.] What the Americans desired was that we should treat them not as they had been somewhat sarcastically termed as spoilt children, but on the same footing as other great nations, like France and Germany, [cheers,] and the peculiar susceptibility which the Americans displayed at anything which they regarded as contumelious or disparaging in the attitude of England towards that country as contradistinguished from the feeling with which they regarded a similar attitude on the part of other nations, was in itself a proof that they regarded us with exceptional affection and not with exceptional hostility. [Cheers.] There never was a time when it was more important for the maintenance of the great position of England in the councils of Europe and of the world, and for the development of the great colonial empire of England, to the importance of the consolidation of which some were, perhaps, not sufficiently alive, that we should maintain a thoroughly good understanding between all the branches of the Anglo-Saxon race. There never was a moment when we had a greater opportunity, and at which a greater responsibility rested upon us than this moment, and he firmly believed that the treaty of Washington, although it might be open to captious observations, and might possibly contain some real defects, was, as a whole, a great step in the promotion and toward the attainment of this desirable end. [Cheers.]

Mr. Gladstone, mentioning the period of the session as an apology for following the right honorable gentleman opposite, said he was desirous of making, without further delay, such observations as the occasion seemed to call for on his part, and he was glad [Page 466] they would be of an agreeable character. His right honorable friend the member for Staffordshire had been, the critic of the Washington treaty, and, subject to some exceptions, even his judgment upon it had not been very unfavorable; and he gave a very emphatic and weighty opinion that Canada in particular had reason to congratulate herself on the result of the negotiations. After the powerful and masterly argument of the honorable and learned member for Richmond, it was unnecessary for him to enter into the question at large, and, carefully avoiding such an attempt, he wished to say, with respect to the period of the American war, how extremely just the remarks of his honorable and learned friend had been. We lived in times when the duties of neutrals were gradually becoming more and more delicate and difficult; of all neutral countries our position was most delicate and difficult, from the extent and complications of our foreign relations, which formed so large a proportion of our national activity; and we knew from anxious and painful experience in the past, as we must anticipate for the future, that whatever uprightness of intention we might have, and however assiduously we might guard ourselves, it would not be possible for us to escape being suspected when causes of conflict occurred. In the case of the war between France and Germany, nobody could suppose that there was any bias on our part toward one side or the other, and yet we failed to give that satisfaction which we honestly endeavored and desired to give. He did not wish to imply that in the case either of those countries or that of America he complained of complaints which were the natural results of excitement on the part of men engaged in desperate conflict, and of the delicate nature of the questions with which neutrals had to deal, and he believed that uprightness of intention and due and reasonable care would secure avoidance off quarrel and ultimately in time of peace a general acknowledgment of our impartiality. There were many circumstances which would account for the sensitiveness of the United States, and on the part of the British government there were many plain, palpable, and undeniable facts which would convince any impartial man not only of our desire to maintain neutrality, but of our desire to make extraordinary efforts with that object. Some of these circumstances had been referred to by the honorable and learned member for Richmond, and others, from their nature, it would be hardly generous or fair to refer to. There were, however, one or two which had never been fully noticed in this country, and which it was only fair to Lord Russell and to the government of that day, and to Great Britain as a nation, to bear in mind. One had relation to a matter happily settled in the negotiations in which the right honorable gentleman opposite had borne so distinguished a part. It would be remembered that in 1860 we offered to settle the San Juan difficulty by arbitration, but no answer was ever returned to our proposal. During the civil war in America, had there been any ungenerous disposition on our part, we had a favorable opportunity, and he had almost said a fair one, for it would have been a natural exercise of an undoubted right of pressing for an answer to our proposal, and how difficult would have been the position of the American Government if it had been disposed to refuse. Although there was no other mode in which the question could be settled, our proposal was allowed to stand over from the autumn of 1860, and until after the conclusion of the civil war. Was it possible to conceive a more emphatic instance of a fair and liberal disposition on the part of the government of this country? Another instance which it was worth mentioning was connected with the flotilla which was built in this country for the government of China. That flotilla was intended to be manned by British officers and crews, and it was so manned; it was found difficult to arrange the relations between the British naval force and the official persons of the government of China; the government of China determined, as they were perfectly entitled to do, to break up that flotilla; and although we had no responsibility for that flotilla, and the vessels were of little value to the British navy, for fear the slightest whisper should go forth, or the slightest suspicion should arise that the vessels, when cast upon the market of the world, had been so cast upon it with a view to their purchase by the confederates, to be used against the United Stated States, the government of this country at once determined to be the purchasers of those vessls. He affirmed that the history of nations offered no more remarkable instance of a disposition to give the largest interpretation to the obligations of neutrality; and if the fortunes of that war had been different, if the confederates had established their independence, and if they had called us to account, although our answer might have been good, we should not have confronted them with the same conscientiousness that we could now confront the Government of the United States. When the present government came into office, they committed our foreign relations to the charge of Lord Clarendon, a statesman of great ability, long experience, singular cordiality, and charming manners. Our relations with the United States was the first question to which he addressed himself; and, notwithstanding his contrast of the arbitration then proposed with that now agreed upon which had been made by the honorable and learned member for Richmond, the house would feel that Lord Clarendon judged wisely in taking up the labors of Lord Derby. The wish of Lord Clarendon and of his government was frustrated by the refusal of the American Senate—a refusal which we all much lamented at the time, and on which comments [Page 467] might he made; but, however disposed we might be to be critical with respect to the refusal of the Senate and the nature of the representations laid before it, we might dismiss them from our minds in face of the treaty we had to consider. Although it was important in the interests of Canada that there should be a settlement of the fisheries question, it was still more important to the interests of the United States; but, without determining that it might be said of nations as of individuals that, when two had a difference, whichever had the greatest interest in settling it, that nation deserved praise which was most ready to promote a settlement. With respect to the Alabama claims, after what had happened, it was impossible for us to undertake the initiative; but having, as we had, these other matters open and requiring settlement, it was a great advantage that by pressing negotiation upon the fishery and the colonial questions we were able to relieve the American Government from what he believed they might themselves feel to be a false position. It was difficult for the Americans, while it was impossible for us, to propose negotiations upon the Alabama claims; but the proposal which it was open to us to make with respect to colonial questions at once removed the difficulty from the path of the American Government, and enabled them to take upon themselves a responsibility they would otherwise probably have been unwilling to assume, and to put all these controversies in the way toward a peaceful and satisfactory solution. His right honorable friend complained of the Alabama question having been thus treated in a certain sense as a secondary and collateral phase of a government question; and why not? It was the main question, and it formed a sine qua non in the minds of the Americans to the settlement of any of the other questions, and the desire of the Americans to settle the Alabama claims became an effective instrument in the hands of the British negotiators for obtaining on behalf of our colonies better terms than it would have been possible otherwise to obtain. Another point raised by his right honorable friend was one on which he admitted that he was not able to make so satisfactory an answer, be meant the Fenian claims. [Hear, hear.]

It would have been just and fair if those claims had been included in that great settlement, but it was not to be supposed that, because they were not so included, they had therefore ceased to exist. The Fenian claims remained in all their validity, and it was the duty of Her Majesty’s government to see that the just interests of Canada growing out of those transactions in her relations with the United States were not disparaged. The reason why those claims were not included in the present settlement was simply because they were unable to include them, and because they did not think it right to abandon the whole of those extensive arrangements because they could not bring within their scope that single and comparatively limited point. There was one matter in respect to which his right honorable friend gave to his criticisms for once almost a declamatory tone. His right honorable friend said the reference now to be made to an arbitrator amounted to this—whether in 1861 England bad fulfilled rules which only came into existence in 1871; and he added that, though magnanimity might be a good thing, yet they were changing the standard of right and passing almost from the sublime to the ridiculous. The answer to that was supplied by the speech of his honorable and learned friend, (Sir Roundell Palmer,) who had pointed out, with the utmost clearness and force, that there were two kinds of duties devolving on neutrals, viz, those arising from international and those arising from municipal law. He accepted what had fallen from his honorable and learned friend without deduction any more than without addition when he showed that the principles embodied in the first of the rules in the treaty of Washington were the very principles for which the executive of this country contended in our courts, and therefore it was not too much for the American Government to expect that the British should be prepared to act upon them in ultimately settling the controversy with regard to the Alabama question. No doubt a great concession had been made to America, but that concession had lain in this, that we had consented to go to arbitration as to our conduct in the administration of our own municipal law. That, undoubtedly, might be called stretching, somewhat, at least, the measure of strict necessity in respect to the fulfillment of international duties; but was there anything unreasonable in that principle? It was conducive to peace. He did not see that it involved disparagement to honor. As far as regarded the specifications contained in those rules, his honorable and learned friend had shown that they had added nothing to the claim which the American Government was already able to establish against them out of their own months, while they had obtained the basis of that most important understanding and covenant between the two countries for the regulation of the future which he trusted would ultimately harden and widen into an extension of international law for the benefit of the world. There had been in some minds a supposition that that arbitration was a phantasm conjured up by them to cover, with decent forms, a foregone conclusion. On the part of Her Majesty’s government he begged most emphatically to disclaim any such idea or intention that arbitration would be a real, an honest, an energetic, though, no doubt, a friendly contention. All the resources, as be trusted, of argument, of knowledge, and of legal skill would be used for the purpose of establishing the upright conduct of England, and her fulfillment of her international duty: and the same, he doubted not [Page 468] and he hoped, would be done on the part of America. The two countries would enter into it as a perfectly real, though amicable, contest, subject only to this condition—that, as they were bound by honor, they would, either of them, cheerfully accept the result, whatever it might be. He observed with the utmost satisfaction the spirit of dispassionate calm with which the whole matter had been considered in this country; there had been, on the one hand, a free development of those friendly and fraternal feelings which he trusted the English race in England would always entertain toward the English race in America. With extended and improved communications, we were by degrees attaining a condition which the old vulgar error about the feelings of America toward us might be dispelled. His right honorable friend (Sir S. Northcote) had given them an ample and, as he believed, a most just description of the sentiments entertained on the other side of the water; and coming as it did from his right honorable friend, he trusted it would have a great effect in assisting the beneficial process going forward in this country, which was rapidly becoming undeceived with regard to the existence of prejudice and antipathies, which on many occasions had, perhaps, been by us too lightly assumed to prevail among the great body of the American people through our having before our eyes peculiar phenomena in regard to certain portions of that people—phenomena painful to ourselves, but not less painful, he believed, to the bulk of intelligent Americans than to us, those intelligent Americans having some reason to feel, too, that the true root of the hostile feelings cherished in America, but not by America, toward England did not lie on their side of the water, but originated in the unhappy condition of a portion of the United Kingdom itself. Therefore the more that beneficial settlement was examined the more he believed the people of this country would arrive at the conclusion that without the slightest disparagement of honor, without any risk other than that which every man who engaged in a controversy ought to be disposed to face—viz, the risk of having it decided against him, if so it should be—that treaty had laid the foundation of future advantage in the administration and action of international law, and had likewise, by removing the last of all serious causes of dispute between those two great countries, done much toward the accomplishment of the great work of uniting them in the ties of affection where they were already bound by the ties of interest, of kindred, of race, and of language, thereby promoting that strong and lasting union between them which was in itself one of the main guarantees for the peace of the civilized world. [Cheers.]

Mr. Baillie Cochrane said that after the eloquent peroration which had just been addressed to the house, any one who rose to differ from the right honorable gentleman must incur the odium of not sufficiently estimating the value of the blessings of peace. But, although no one set a higher value upon them than he, he also valued the honor of the country, and thought that even such a treaty as this might be purchased too dearly. From the papers which had been furnished to the house he thought he could make, out a strong ease against the government, under whose instructions the commissioners had acted, and after reading those papers he was astonished either that commissioners should have been found to sign such a treaty, or that the House of Commons should approve it. Only three short papers had been presented to the house, and he regretted that the whole of the correspondence was not published, for it might have thrown some light on the extraordinary proceedings at Washington. He desired to know in what position this country stood with respect to the American Government, what we had gained and what we had sacrificed, and whether this country stood higher in the opinion of Europe in consequence of the negotiation of this treaty. It should be remembered that the demand for this high commission emanated from England, for in the first place Sir E. Thornton communicated with Mr. Fish, proposing simply to bring before a commission the question of the fisheries. To that Mr. Fish replied that the President desired the re-adjustment of other claims, without which the proposed high commission would fail to re-establish a lasting friendship between the two governments. The answer of the government was that all other claims, both of British subjects and citizens of the United States, arising out of acts committed during the civil war, should be referred to the commission. The right honorable gentleman said that the Alabama claims were more important than the fisheries; but how did he reconcile that with the fact that the fishery claims were the only ones brought before the American Government in the first instance? With reference to the protocols of the conference, the right honorable gentleman had said that the first question submitted to the conference was that of the fishery claims, but there was not a single word about that in the protocols. The first claim made by the Americans was for $14,000,000 for the injury done to their commerce by the Alabama and other cruisers. Then the American commissioners desired that the Britsh commissioners should place on record an expression of regret by Her Majesty’s government for the depredations which had been committed by those vessels, and it was next stated:

“Although Great Britain had from the beginning disavowed any responsibility for the acts of the Alabama and the other vessels, she had already shown her willingness, for the sake of the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States, to adopt the principle of arbitration, providing that a fitting arbitrator could be found.”

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The right honorable gentleman had said there was no reference to arbitration, but here was the offer. It was added:

“The American commissioners expressed their regret at the decision of the British commissioners, and said further that they could not consent to submit the question of the liability of Her Majesty’s government to arbitration unless the principles which should govern the arbitrator in the consideration of the facts could be first agreed upon. The British commissioners replied that they had no authority to agree to a submission of these claims to an arbitrator with instructions as to the principles which should govern him in the consideration of them. They said that they should be willing to consider what principles should be adopted for observance in future.”

That showed that the principles laid down were not to be retrospective. Then—

“The American commissioners replied that they were willing to consider what principles should be laid down for observance in similar cases in future, with the understanding that any principles that should be agreed upon should be held to be applicable to the facts in respect to the Alabama claims.”

This was on the 8th of March, and the commissioners telegraphed for instructions, but it did not appear that anything more was done until the 3d of April. On that date —

“The British commissioners stated that they were instructed by Her Majesty’s government to declare that Her Majesty’s government could not assent to the proposed rules as a statement of principles of international law which were in force at the time when the Alabama claims arose, but that Her Majesty’s government, in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries, and of making satisfactory provision for the future, agreed that, in deciding the questions between the two countries arising out of those claims, the arbitrator should assume that Her Majesty’s government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in the rules which the American commissioners had proposed.”

On the 5th of April the American commissioners, referring to the hope which they had expressed on the 8th of March, inquired whether the British commissioners were prepared to place upon record an expression of regret by Her Majesty’s government for the depredations committed by the vessels whose acts were now under discussion; and the British commissioners replied that they were authorized to express, in a friendly spirit, the regret felt by Her Majesty’s government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and for the depredations committed by those vessels. He considered that proceeding exceedingly humiliating to this country. Then the claims of British subjects arising out of the civil war were brought forward. The nature of those claims was perfectly clear; but, with something like an ironical insult to the British commissioners, the American commissioners said that they supposed they were right in their opinion that British laws prohibit British subjects from owning slaves; they therefore inquired whether any claim for slaves, or for alleged property or interest in slaves, can or will be presented by the British government, or in behalf of any British subject, under the treaty now being negotiated, if there be in the treaty no express words excluding such claims. Was it possible that they could suppose that the English proprietors in Canada were slave-owners? The British commissioners replied that by the law of England British subjects had long been prohibited from purchasing or dealing in slaves, not only within the dominions of the British crown, but in any foreign country, and that they had no hesitation in saying that no claim on behalf of any British subject for slaves or for any property or interest in slaves would be presented by the British government. It was plain that the American commissioners were only laughing at the British commissioners. At the conference of the 26th of April the British commissioners again brought before the joint high commission “the claims of the people of Canada for injuries suffered from the Fenian raids. They said that they were instructed to present these claims, and to state that they were regarded by Her Majesty’s government as coining within the class of subjects indicated by Sir Edward Thornton in his letter of January 26, as subjects for the consideration of the joint high commission.” The American commissioners replied that they could see no reason to vary the reply formerly given to this proposal, and the British high commissioners said that, under these circumstances, they would not urge further that the settlement of these claims should be included in the present treaty, and that they had the less difficulty in doing so as a portion of the claims were of a constructive and inferential character. But now the right honorable gentleman said that it was intended to bring forward these claims at a future period, though the British commissioners gave them up. He did not believe that anybody reading the papers could say that anything had been obtained from the American commissioners, and it appeared that everything was sacrificed on the part of the English. When all this was done it was represented that peaceful relations had been established with America, but peace might always be obtained with any country by accepting humiliating terms. In the ease of the reciprocity treaty the British commissioners asked most humbly that it might be restored in principle, but the American commissioners declined altogether to negotiate on the basis of that treaty. He contended that in [Page 470] these negotiations England had been subject to insult, an humble apology had been made to America, and Canada, had been deeply injured. The right honorable gentleman said that Canada approved the Washington treaty, but he could see nothing in the papers to that effect, though it might be that, in consequence of the formation of the Dominion, the interests of the smaller states were sacrificed to those of the greater. He could not help feeling that the proceedings of the commission had only resulted in degradation to this country.

Mr. Anderson did not intend to enter upon the general merits of the treaty, or he could show that the first ground of complaint, that this country was too ready to acknowledge the Confederate States as belligerents, was a most unjust accusation, for the American Government themselves acknowledged the confederates as belligerents by the very act of blockading the southern ports. He wished to know why the 9th of April had been fixed upon as the date on which all British claims were to cease and determine. For his own part he must charge the commissioners with having failed to look sufficiently after the claims of British subjects. At the period which they assented to as being the end of the civil war no less than three confederate armies were in the field, and there was in the interval a great destruction of property, some of which, no doubt, belonged to the people of this country. There was, in his opinion, very little reason to suppose that the commissioners had not been imposed upon in the matter, and, indeed, in all cases of diplomatic negotiations with the United States we seemed to get the worst of the bargain.

Mr. Rathbone contended that it was of the greatest importance to this country, since the treaty of Paris, that the precedent of the Alabama should be canceled. It was besides, in his opinion, a proof of very had citizenship that a man should, by fitting out such a vessel, imperil the peace of the country to which he belonged. The government, in his opinion, had earned the gratitude of the country by appointing the commission, and especially for having nominated as one of its members the right honorable baronet the member for North Devon.

Mr. Whalley commented on the fact that while the prime minister stated that the claims on account of the Fenian raids were still open, and that it was competent for the Canadian government or our own to press them, it appeared from the paper which the honorable member for the Isle of Wight had read that those claims had been given up by the commissioners. The Canadians fully understood that the Fenian raids were merely part of a system acted on by a power which had exercised and still continued to exercise great influence over states. That influence was at the root of the Alabama question. The whole object of the organization to which he referred was to foment and create war. The deliberate action of the Roman Catholic hierarchy was directed to produce dissension bet ween America and this country, and one advantage from enforcing the claims on account of the Fenian raids would be that it would enable the Americans to emancipate themselves from the influence to which he had referred.

The motion for the production of the correspondence was then withdrawn.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON.

To the Editor of the TimesSir: Permit me to request the insertion of the following rectification of certain points in your generally excellent report of my remarks in the debate on the Washington treaty, on which I should wish what I said to be quite accurately understood.

1. When Lord Palmerston’s government, in 1863, made overtures to the Government of the United States for a revision of the neutrality laws of both countries, Mr. Adams stated (as the conversation was recorded at the time by Lord Russell) that the Government of the United States “did not see how their own law” (not, as it stands in the report, “our law”) “on that subject could be improved.” Mr. Adams himself reported his own words as being that his Government thought their own law “of very sufficient vigor.”

2. I did not say that the Alabama was “equipped as a ship destined for the merchant service,” but that she was built here to order, as an article of merchandise, and was not so equipped as to be capable of hostilities when she sailed from this country. I added the dates of the communications, upon that subject, between Mr. Adams and Lord Russell. A month elapsed between Mr. Adams’s first communication on the 23d of June, 1862, and the transmission by him to the Foreign Office of any evidence in support of it, which was not done till the 22d of July, the board of customs being in the meantime unable to obtain any information on the cardinal point of the destination of the ship. Only one of the depositions sent by Mr. Adams on the 22d of July contained really material evidence on this point. Two more depositions were sent (with Mr. Collier’s opinion of the 23d of July) in another letter from Mr. Adams; dated the 24th of July, which was not received at the Foreign Office till Saturday, the 26th. On Monday, the 28th, these papers were considered by the law officers of the Crown; on the same evening their report was made, and it was in Lord Russell’s hands early on the 29th. Orders were then immediately sent to Liverpool to stop the vessel, but on the same day he escaped.

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3. I did not say, with respect to the Alabama and other vessels, after they had passed into the hands of the belligerents, that “we did not allow these ships to enter any of our ports,” which would have been contrary to well known facts, nor did I speak of what the United States “Would have done” under similar circumstances. The sentence on that subject should stand thus:

“As to what followed, when ships were in the hands of belligerents, we did exactly what the United States had done under similar circumstances. When any ship had once been commissioned as a public ship of war by a belligerent power over whom we had no jurisdiction, no proceedings or inquiry having previously been held within our jurisdiction as to that ship, we did not consider ourselves bound or entitled to refuse to allow her, like other ships bearing a similar commission, to enter any of our ports.”

4. I did not refer to Wheaton, or other American authorities, as saying generally that “the fitting out of armed ships in neutral territory for a belligerent was lawful.” I referred to the American jurists anterior to the civil war as generally laying down the doctrine that commercial dealings in ships of war, as in other contraband, were not prohibited by international as distinguished from municipal law; and I referred particularly to a passage in Wheaton’s History of International Law, in which he treats it as a clear proposition that the sale and delivery of armed vessels by neutral citizens within neutral territory, to a belligerent power, is lawful jure gentium.

5. In speaking of the transactions of 1793–’94, I said that “the idea of holding the United States responsible for the prizes ‘not’ brought into their ports was never advocated; and, even as to those which were so brought in, they declined,” &c.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

ROUNDELL PALMER.

30 Portland place, August 5.