[Report of the Secretary of the Navy.]
Sir: I respectfully submit the following report of the Navy Department and the naval service for the past year:
The Navy of the United States now consists of 179 ships of all classes and in all conditions. These are calculated to carry, when in commission for service, 1,390 guns, exclusive of howitzers and small carronades.
Since the date of the last report, the news of the loss of the Saginaw, on the 29th day of October, 1870, at Ocean Island, in the Pacific, was received at the Department, and in May last the tug Primrose was sold at the navy-yard in this city.
Of the 179 ships remaining on the Navy list, 29 are sailing-ships, and the remainder side-wheel steamers, or sailing-vessels with auxiliary screws; 53 of them, armed with 601 guns, are in service, attached to the various fleets and stations as regular cruisers, dispatch-boats, hospital, store, receiving, and practice ships; these, with the tugs and small vessels in use at the various navy-yards and stations, make the force in commission for all the purposes of naval service.
Of the remainder, 6 are nearly ready for sea, and will join the various squadrons as soon as their crews can be enlisted and organized; 52 are monitors, only one of which is now in commission, the balance being laid up at the various stations, but principally at League Island, where, in the fresh water of the Delaware, their iron bottoms deteriorate with far less rapidity than in the salt water of the other stations; 17 are under repair at the various yards; 13 are on the stocks, never having been completed and launched; and the balance of those whose names are on the list are laid up in ordinary.
Of these last a very large proportion, including, as a general proposition, almost all those built of unseasoned white oak, are unfit for use, and cannot be repaired with advantage.
Built with great rapidity, of the only material available during the pressing emergencies of the war, and many of them designed for special purposes, the necessity of which has passed away, the cost of repairing them would be entirely out of proportion to the results to be obtained, [Page 62] either of service or endurance. Their usefulness has passed or is passing away. They make a part of the necessary expenditure of the great war, and the nation must accept the loss, and from its abundant resources must supply the deficiency which is thus occasioned. Unless something is done in this direction, our cruising navy, now by no means powerful, indeed scarcely respectable for a nation of our rank and responsibilities, will soon almost wholly pass out of existence as an arm of our national power.
It is certainly true, as suggested in your last annual report, that, situated as our country is, “the Navy is our only means of direct protection to our citizens abroad, or for the enforcement of any foreign policy;” and while we may have some reason to hope that in our own generation we may see the beginning of an end of warlike strife among the more enlightened and free of civilized nations, yet we cannot expect that the world will be wholly civilized in our day, or that freedom will come to it without contention. Barbarism will still respect nothing but power, and barbaric civilization repels alike interference, association, and instruction. Even in civilized communities, ambitious, selfish, and turbulent passions still sway the actions of men, and arbitrary power will not yet resign, without a struggle, its hold on the organizations of civilized society.
Not only on the shores and among the islands of our continent, but in every seaport of civilized Europe, in Asia, from the shores of the Bosphorus to the head of navigation on unnamed rivers on the confines of the Chinese Empire, in Japan, in the islands and semi-continents of the East, and among the groups of the Pacific and the Southern Oceans, our citizens claim and need our protection. In every quarter of the known world they are found occupying every field which enterprise dares to invade or energy avails to conquer; and everywhere, outside of our own limits, wherever they enter, they carry with them affirmative, and sometimes aggressive, ideas of freedom and progress, antagonistic alike to the traditions, customs, and habits of the people, and the Ideas and practices of the local governments.
Such is the result of our progressive civilization upon the enterprising and affirmative spirit of our people. Its effect is apparent in every land that they penetrate; and we cannot afford, either as a Government or as a people, to neglect wholly our responsibilities as a representative nation, nor our national obligations to our citizens who, wherever they are, claim the countenance of our Government and the protection of its flag.
I feel it my duty again to press these considerations, so often presented already, in the hope that in their own time the representatives of the people will give their attention to the situation, and take efficient measures, at least, to check the decline of our naval power.
The limits and duties assigned to the various cruising stations have not been changed since my last report, and the naval force given to each has not been materially changed. The vessels actually in commission [Page 63] on some of the stations are less in number than formerly; but this decrease is rather apparent than real, for in almost all there has been an actual increase of the active force. This has been done by putting out of commission the unwieldy iron-clads, which could only lie inactive in harbor or were towed slowly and at great expense from port to port, and substituting for them, as far as the Department has been able, small and active cruisers, by which means we are enabled to occupy continually a larger extent of cruising ground and visit more frequently the ports assigned to each station, and generally to render more effective service in every department of public affairs where the presence and aid of the Navy is necessary, without greater expense of men and money.
The force on the North Atlantic station is still under command of Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, who held that position at the making of the last report. The force on this station consists of the Severn, the Swatara, the Nantasket, the Nipsic, the Kansas, the Pawnee, the Terror, with the Worcester and Canandaigua just fitted for the station, and the Shawmut now on duty there, but ultimately destined for the South Atlantic—in all 10 ships, mounting 70 guns, all active cruisers, except the Terror, which is an iron-clad of the Monitor class.
The South Atlantic station remains, as at the date of the last report, under command of Rear-Admiral Lanman, with a fleet consisting of the Lancaster, (flag-ship,) the Ticonderoga, and the Wasp, with the Wyoming already fitted for the station—4 ships, mounting 40 guns, besides the Shawmut, detained for the present on duty on the North Atlantic station.
The fleet on the Pacific station, still commanded by Rear-Admiral John A. Winslow, consists of the California, the Pensacola, the Narragansett, the Saranac, the Mohican, the Resaca, the Ossipee, the Onward, and the St. Mary’s—in all 9 ships, mounting 99 guns, and divided into two squadrons, viz: the North Pacific and the South Pacific, commanded respectively by Commodore Roger N. Stembel and Commodore David McDougal.
The European station is now commanded by Rear-Admiral Charles S. Boggs, who relieved Rear-Admiral Glisson on the 28th day of January last. The ships belonging to this fleet are the Brooklyn, the Plymouth, the Guerriere, the Wachusett, the Shenandoah, the Juniata, and the Wabash, with the Congress about to sail—in all 8 ships, with 139 guns.
On the Asiatic station, of which Rear-Admiral John Rodgers is still the commandant, we have the Colorado, the Benicia, the Alaska, the Ashuelot, the Monocacy, the Idaho, and the Palos, with the Saco, now on her way through the Suez Canal, and the Iroquois, under orders to join the squadron—in all 9 ships, mounting 97 guns.
Of these ships on the various stations forty have been more or less refitted and repaired at home or abroad since my last report, and four others, all of the smaller class, now at the various navy-yards, will be ready for sea in periods varying from twenty to sixty days.
[Page 64]During the year the Navy has also supplied 16 officers and 220 men for duty in the Coast Survey service; has completed the survey of the Darien and Tehuantepec routes, has made extensive surveys and soundings for telegraph cables, and, under the direction of Congress, fitted out and dispatched three store-ships loaded with provisions, by the charitable people of our country, for the sufferers from the European war, and has, under like direction and under your order, sent out a vessel, completely fitted, equipped, and supplied, to explore the Arctic Ocean “toward the North Pole.”
All these are appropriate and valuable duties for the Navy in time of peace, and are proper expenditures of its material and force; and while they add to the information of the world, and contribute to civilization and advancement, they afford to the officers and men employed a proper and practical school of service and instruction.
midway islands.
In my last annual report it was stated that the work of deepening the harbor of Midway Islands, prosecuted under the authority of an act of Congress approved March 1, 1869, would of necessity cease in October, 1870, on account of the exhaustion of the fund appropriated for the purpose. Accordingly work on the cut was discontinued on the 21st of the month named, and the working party embarked on the Saginaw October 28, for San Francisco. The reports of Commodore Sicard, detailing the progress of the work, will be found in the Appendix. This officer estimates that to complete the canal to a width of 175 feet will require about forty-six Months’ work, at a cost of $187,000, without counting the cost of removing the débris or “small stuff.” Such would, he thinks, cost as much more.
wreck of the saginaw.
Leaving Midway Island on the 28th of October, Commander Sicard, of the Saginaw, determined to run to Ocean Island, a small island lying about one hundred miles to the westward of Midway, to rescue any sailors who might have been wrecked there, and who, being out of the ordinary track of vessels in that part of the Pacific, would have little chance of relief from any other source. This expedition, though in the direct line of his duty as the commander of a naval vessel, was fraught with the usual perils of navigation in unknown and dangerous waters; and about 3 o’clock on the morning of the 29th of October the Saginaw, running slowly in the darkness, was wrecked on a reef outlying the island for which she was bound. With great exertion and the exercise of much energy and skill, all on board, including the officers and men of the ship, and the working party from Midway Island, were safely landed, with a small allowance of provisions and materials rescued from the wreck. Cast upon the shores of an uninhabited island, [Page 65] with scanty means of subsistence, out of the line of travel, and more than one thousand miles from the neatest port of refuge or relief, then it was that the commanding officer of the Saginaw illustrated the benefits of the comprehensive education and strict training which he had received at the hands of the Government, and exhibited the high personal qualities which characterize him as an officer. Ably seconded by his subordinate officers of every grade, Commander Sicard took, immediately, every possible means for the health, safety, and final relief of those who were committed to his command. Whatever could be saved from the wreck was at once secured; measures were immediately taken to keep up the health, spirits, and discipline of the men; fresh water was distilled by means of an old boiler; and everything was organized so that there was no waste of either provisions, material, or labor.
The boat fittest for the service was promptly repaired, provisioned, and equipped, as far as might be, for the perilous voyage, and, manned by one officer and four men, all of whom volunteered for the service, was dispatched to Honolulu, the nearest port from which relief could be expected. After her departure work was vigorously pushed on the island; and when finally rescued, the shipwrecked mariners, with well-directed labor, had almost completed, from the material of their old ship, a new schooner, perfectly seaworthy, and sufficient, under favorable circumstances, to carry the whole shipwrecked party to a port of safety. I have thus collated some of the facts of this case to illustrate my high opinion of the energy and ability displayed by Commander Sicard and his comrades on this occasion, and to show how well such conduct repays the favor of the Government.
The little party who volunteered for the voyage in a small boat to Honolulu, to bring relief to their comrades, more than fifteen hundred miles across a winter ocean, consisted of Lieutenant John G. Talbot, executive officer of the Saginaw; William Halford, coxswain; Peter Francis, quartermaster, and John Andrews and James Muir, seamen. They left Ocean Island on the 18th of November, and after a voyage of thirty-one days, during which they encountered terrible difficulties and danger, and endured much privation and suffering, they arrived, on the 19th of December, off the Island of Kanai, one of the Hawaiian group. They had previously lost their oars in a storm, and in attempting to land the boat was upset, and Lieutenant Talbot and three of the men, already exhausted by privation and suffering, were drowned in the surf. William Halford alone survived, and reached the shore in safety with the dispatches from Commander Sicard. Mr. Pierce, our minister to the Sandwich Islands, at once chartered a vessel, which, with a Hawaiian steamer proffered by the government, sailed the same day, and relieved the shipwrecked crew of the Saginaw. The thanks of the Department are due to Mr. Pierce and to the Hawaiian government for their energy and kindness.
[Page 66]The death of Lieutenant Talbot closed a career of unusual promise, and in it the Navy lost a brilliant and beloved member. A skillful sailor, an accomplished officer, and a Christian gentleman, his self sacrifice has arrested the attention of his comrades, and will remain an example to the service, which in life his virtues adorned, and whose highest qualities were illustrated in the crowning heroism of his death. His comrades of humbler rank will not be forgotten. With him they faced the dangers of the lonely ocean, and offered their lives, with his, to save their shipwrecked messmates; and no one can estimate how much of danger and suffering, perhaps of death, was saved through the courage and endurance of the sole survivor of that gallant boat’s crew.
tehuantepec canal.
The Department is in receipt of the report and accompanying maps of the Tehuantepec surveying expedition, under the command of Captain R. W. Shufeldt, United States Navy.
This expedition was authorized by act of Congress, and an appropriation made therefor. A small corps of naval officers was detailed for the work, and the steamer Mayflower placed at the disposal of Captain Shufeldt. The Kansas was ordered to accompany the expedition for the purpose of surveying the river Coatzacoalcos and its bar. The Cyane was ordered to assist the expedition in the survey of the harbors and lagoons on the Pacific coast. It was known that surveys had before been made for a railroad, and the feasibility of supplying the summit-level with water reported by Señor Moro, in 1848, and the main object of the present expedition was to determine, ultimately, the question whether a sufficient supply of water for a ship-canal across the isthmus could be obtained. For this purpose a careful and thorough examination was made of the country adjacent to the lowest passes, under the immediate supervision of Civil Engineer E. A. Fuertes. Señor. Moro’s proposition was first examined into and found to be impracticable. The attention of the party was next turned to the Rio Corte, or Upper Coatzacoalcos, as the only solution of the question of water supply, and it was found practicable, by means of a feeder, to supply upward of cubic feet of water per second. For the technical part of the engineering question, Captain Shufeldt refers to the report of the chief engineer of the expedition. This is accompanied by twenty maps and profiles, with many calculations to prove that a ship-canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec is not only practicable, but that the obstacles in the way of the canal-route are of the most ordinary nature.
The party was joined, on the 10th of January, by three Mexican commissioners, who worked in perfect accord with our own force.
The season of the year prevented the running of a line to the Atlantic; yet, from the thorough surveys previously made for railway purposes, and the general information gathered on the frequent journeys of the party, it is assumed that the canal can start at the head-waters of ship [Page 67] navigation of the river Coatzacoalcos and run thence along its right bank and the valley of a tributary to the dividing ridge at Tarifa, descending through the Tarifa Pass, across the plains, to its Pacific terminus. The total lenqth of such a canal will be 172 miles, including river navigation. It will require locks to overcome a height of 732 feet. The Coatzacoalcos River, forming the harbor at the Atlantic side, is well sheltered, and will require dredging at only a few points. The Salina Cruz Harbor, on the Pacific, is exposed to the south winds, and a breakwater is proposed, to convert this roadstead into a safe harbor. No estimates have been made as to the cost of the work, since a minute survey of the whole region would have required larger means and more time than were at the disposal of the officer in charge.
Full and interesting accounts of the geology, natural history, and productions of the country accompany the report.
darien canal.
The survey of the Isthmus of Darien, under Commander T. O. Selfridge, which had been interrupted by the advent of the rainy season last year, has been successfully conducted in spite of the great obstacles met in making way through a dense and almost impenetrable wilderness.
The Guard and Nipsic were detailed for this service upon the Atlantic coast, and the Resaca upon the Pacific. Commander Selfridge sailed from New York in December last. His attention for the past year has been directed mainly to that portion of the isthmus bordering upon the valley of the Atrato, known properly as the Tuyra and Napipi routes.
The route of the Tuyra and Atrato Divers had been reported upon most favorably by former explorers, and hopes were, entertained that these reports might prove true. Five months were spent in the examination of this route, a line of levels 120 miles long was run from ocean to ocean, and though the divide in one portion was found to be not over 400 feet in height, the very broken nature of the country which was developed seems to render this portion of the isthmus impracticable for this enterprise.
The survey of the Napipi route has been productive of far more favorable results, and has illustrated the possibility of a ship-canal between the two oceans.
The line adopted by Commander Selfridge commences at the mouth of the Atrato, in the Gulf of Darien, ascends that river for 150 miles to the mouth of the Napipi, and thence across, in the valley of the latter, to the Pacific Ocean, at Cupica Bay. The Atrato is navigable the whole of this distance for ships of the largest size, having a width of 1,500 feet and a depth nowhere less than 30 feet. The actual length of the necessary canal is 31 2/10 miles, the distance from the Atrato River to Cupica Bay, of which 23 miles is a flat plain, with a rise of 90 feet, and no difficulties of construction. The remaining 8 miles present the only [Page 68] engineering obstacles; here the hills rise to a height of 600 feet and descend almost precipitously to the Pacific.
Commander Selfridge’s report will be found in the appendix. His estimates of cost are based upon a canal 120 feet wide and 26 feet deep. It is proposed to lock up to a summit level of 90 feet, at which point the canal is fed by the Napipi River with a volume, at its lowest stage, of over 500,000 cubic feet per hour—a quantity which can be doubled by a feeder 3 miles long. The 8 miles beyond the summit level include a cut averaging 125 feet deep and a tunnel 5 miles long. The successful operations at the Mt. Cenis and Hoosac tunnels, with the modern improvements in drilling machines and explosives, seem to solve successfully the problem of great tunnels, which now cost but little more than open cuts. The total cost of such a work in this country is liberally estimated at $95,000,000, which, adding twenty-five per cent. for contingencies, makes a total of $125,000,000. This route presents not only the great advantage of most excellent harbors at each terminus, but its low cost, compared with other lines, its construction in rock, requiring but a small outlay for annual repairs, the proximity of the heaviest portion of the work to the Pacific Ocean, the absence of swamps, and the comparative healthiness of the position, give it a prominence which repays the cost and labor of the expedition.
These surveys, in addition to developing this excellent route, have, in clearing away the doubts and ignorance hanging over the Isthmus of Darien, in the fixing of its geographical positions, and in giving positive knowledge of the interior, its inhabitants, products, rivers, and mountains, added much to the general information of the scientific world.
The whole of the Isthmus of Darien, as embraced in the instructions of the Department, dated January 16, 1870, having been surveyed, Commander Selfridge returned with the expedition to the United States in July last.
It is gratifying to know that, notwithstanding the privations and hardships incident to this service, and the prevailing idea of the un-healthfulness of the climate, no lives have been lost in the prosecution of these surveys. Most of the work has been done by graduates of the Naval Academy, who, readily adapting themselves to the various duties required of them, have given an additional proof of the usefulness of that institution.
supplies for france and germany.
In pursuance of a resolution of Congress approved February 10, 1871, three naval vessels, the Worcester, the Supply, and the Relief, were detailed for the transportation of supplies furnished by our people for the sufferers of the European war which was then raging. The vessels soon had full cargoes, shipped respectively at Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, and started on their noble mission; each under instructions [Page 69] to deliver their cargoes at the points designated by the agents of the relief associations of the respective cities. Having successfully fulfilled their instructions, they returned safely to the United States to the ports from which they started.
expedition toward the north pole.
By the ninth section of an act approved July 12, 1870, “the President of the United States was authorized to organize and send out one or more expeditions toward the North Pole, and to appoint such person or persons as he may deem most fitted to the command thereof; to detail any officer of the public service to take part in the same, and to use any public vessel that may be suitable for the purpose; the scientific operations of the expedition to be prescribed in accordance with the advice of the National Academy of Sciences.”
Mr. Charles F. Hall, a traveler of great experience in that locality, was appointed by your order to command the expedition fitted out under this authority.
The Perriwinkle, now called the Polaris, a small steamer of 387 tons, was selected for the service, and thoroughly prepared and strengthened at the Washington navy-yard to encounter the perils of polar navigation. Mr. Hall himself was permitted to suggest and supervise the preparation of the vessel, and to recommend the persons selected to accompany him.
The general instructions given to Mr. Hall by this Department, those for the scientific operations of the expedition, prescribed by the National Academy of Sciences, and the main correspondence and reports connected with the expedition, from its organization to its arrival at Upernavik, are embraced in the Appendix to this report.
The Polaris left Washington June 10, arrived at New York the 14th, completed there her crew and outfit, and sailed the 29th. Touching at New London, St. John’s, and Holsteinberg, in Greenland, she reached Godhaven on the 4th of August. The United States steamer Congress, detailed to convey to Greenland such stores of the expedition as the Polaris could not carry, sailed from New York on the 25th of July, and came up with the Polaris at Godhaven on the 10th of August.
The Danish authorities at Godhaven extended every facility to the officers of our ships, and contributed by every means in their power to the success of the expedition.
The Polaris took her departure from Godhaven August 17, and reached Upernavik the next day, whence her adventurous crew has sailed into the unknown Northern Ocean, full of hope and vigor, and bearing with them the good wishes of the world.
The Congress, having accomplished successfully the duty assigned to her, left Godhaven August 19, and arrived at New York on the 21st of September.
[Page 70]corean expedition.
Our minister to China having been instructed to arrange and conclude, if possible, a convention with the people who occupy the peninsula of Corea between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, for the protection of sailors and other strangers shipwrecked on their coast, it became necessary to that end that he should visit the capital of the country, or at least put himself in direct communication with the authorities. With this view, and with the assent of the authorities of China, to which country the government of Corea is tributary, our minister sailed, in May last, from Nagasaki to Boisée anchorage, on the Sale River in Corea, in the Colorado, the flag-ship of Rear Admiral Rodgers, commanding our Asiatic fleet. The admiral was accompanied by the Alaska, the Benicia, the Monocacy, and the Palos. He was ordered thus to transport and convoy the diplomatic representative of our Government, to exhibit, in his behalf, such force as was proper to illustrate his dignity in the eyes of the people, who respect only the exhibition of power, or as might be necessary to insure the safety of the expedition and vindicate, if need be, the honor of the flag. The wisdom and necessity of this policy was shown in the events which followed.
After the arrival of the fleet at the anchorage, and after communication with and visits from the local authorities, and the assurance on our part, and understanding on theirs, that the expedition was not only peaceful but friendly in its objects, a surveying party, engaged in the peaceful occupation of making surveys and soundings, in the interest of science and for the safety of commerce, after having been allowed, with the understood consent of the authorities, and without protest or challenge by any one, to pass up the channel to a point past the Corean forts, far separated from and beyond the reach of assistance from the main body of the fleet, was suddenly and treacherously attacked while in the difficult navigation of an unknown passage swept by strong tides and tilled with hidden rocks. The surveying boats were obliged to repass the forts, under a fierce fire of cannon suddenly opened upon them, and maintained with vindictive spirit and energy. The small vessels which had accompanied the party hurrying into action answered the fire of the forts, and, driving the Coreans from their works, rescued the surveying boats from danger, with only two of our men wounded.
It was determined, by the concurrent judgment of our minister and Admiral Rodgers, that an explanation should be at once demanded, and that ample time should be given the Coreans to understand the situation and make proper reparation.
This was done, and ten days were allowed to pass, during which no movement was made by Admiral Rodgers, nor was any explanation offered by the Coreans. An attack was then planned and carried out upon the forts and citadel from which the outrage had been committed.
[Page 71]A party of sailors and marines were landed, and, after a difficult march over an almost impassable country, the forts were assaulted and captured June 9th and 10th. The officers and men engaged in this attack displayed perseverance, steadiness, and courage highly creditable to the country and the service.
Five forts were captured and destroyed, fifty battle-flags taken, and 481 pieces of artillery fell into our hands. Upward of two hundred and forty Coreans were killed and a few captured.
Our own losses were three killed and ten wounded; among the former was Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee, a gallant and promising young officer, who fell at the head of his men, himself first inside the enemy’s citadel.
Finding it impossible to conclude the peaceful treaty, and not authorized to continue hostilities, except to repel and punish attack, the fleet left the anchorage of Boisée on the 3d of July, and arrived at Chefoo on the 5th of the same month. The latest dispatches indicate that though the direct object of the expedition has failed, yet the punishment which was inflicted upon our treacherous assailants, and the gallant conduct of our forces, has not failed to make an impression upon the people of the Chinese coast, and to contribute materially in its effects to the consideration and comfort and perhaps to the safety of our citizens located there.
reports of bureaus.
The reports of the several bureaus of the department will be found in the appendix, together with the report of the admiral, presenting in detail many subjects to which I am unable to allude in this report; I commend them to the careful perusal of all interested in the service.
The Naval Observatory has well earned its reputation as an admirable institution, and the works of its officers in late years have placed it in the foremost rank at home and abroad. It is ably and economically administered, and I commend it to the favorable consideration of Congress.
The Hydrographic Office has, during the past year, made marked progress, and its publications, both in books relating to navigation and charts, reflect great credit on the officer in charge and on those attached to the office. The report of the hydrographer, Captain R. H. Wyman, is embraced in the report of the chief of the Bureau of Navigation. I particularly recommend that some additional appropriation be made for the advancement of this work, so necessary to our naval and commercial marine. While every great maritime nation is yearly prosecuting the survey of unexplored or insufficiently determined avenues to commerce, the United States has remained idle, and, taking advantage of the work of other nations, has by no means returned to them an equivalent. The means should at least be furnished for the prosecution of more general [Page 72] surveys, particularly in the Pacific Ocean and the waters most traversed by our commercial marine.
The Marine Corps, besides discharging well all their ordinary duties on land and at sea, have also been employed during the past year to accompany the various surveying parties on the isthmuses, and have been called upon several times for the protection of the civil officers engaged in the execution of the revenue laws. For their efficiency and services in this behalf they have received the thanks of the Treasury Department.
navy-yards.
I again call attention to the necessity of developing our most important navy-yards.
The commercial nations of Europe, from their enormous arsenals, are able to strike our shores sharply and suddenly.
Our own yards are generally small in area and very deficient in water front; developed on no well-considered plan, they are imperfectly adapted to the changed condition of construction and equipment.
At Mare Island, in California, we have ample space, abundant water front, and, happily, all the requirements of a great naval arsenal.
It is unnecessary to dwell upon our great naval interests in the Pacific, or upon the immense importance of improving the invaluable naval site, in the immediate vicinity of our great Pacific City.
At League Island we have had the same ample area and water front, and the means of easily converting its back-channel, into an admirable wet-basin, like those in Europe, while the excavation thus made will raise the island to a requisite height.
The Department has been able, on the appropriation made last year for this purpose, to contract with responsible parties for the building of a commodious wharf, and for the dredging of a considerable basin in the back-channel, and the filling in to a proper level of about ten acres of the island, or nearly half the area of the present working yard at Philadelphia.
A navy-yard so amplé in its proportions, in the midst of our great coal and iron region, easy of access to our own ships, but readily made inaccessible to a hostile fleet; with fresh water for the preservation of the iron vessels so rapidly growing into favor, surrounded by the skilled labor of one of our chief manufacturing centers, will be invaluable to our country. With the resources of Mare Island on the Pacific and League Island on the Atlantic shore, fully developed on a well-considered plan, the country would receive a great accession of strength, and find new bulwarks against foreign aggression,
At New London, also, the appropriation of $10,000, made by Congress, has been found sufficient for the building of a small but convenient dock, and that station is now in use for laying up ships in ordinary, as a point convenient to our repairing-yards at New York and Boston.
[Page 73]iron-ship building-yards.
In March last, I had the honor to make a report to the Senate, in obedience to a resolution of that body, upon the subject of the proposals made to the Department “for establishing iron-ship building yards and docks to economize expenditure in the Navy, and to aid in restoring commerce.”
This subject is much too comprehensive for cursory discussion in this report, but I have already, in my first annual report, spoken of its great importance to every interest of the country, and I hope to be able hereafter to present some system to be matured under the deliberations of Congress.
naval pension fund.
The pension-roll on the 1st of November, 1871, was as follows:
| 1,430 | invalids, annually receiving | $130,654 25 |
| 1,703 | widows and children, annually receiving | 260,644 00 |
| 3,133 | persons, receiving a total of | 391,298 25 |
expenses and estimates.
The whole expenditure of the Department and the service since the date of the last report is $19,265,240 52, including the payment of invalid pensions and adjudicated prize-money, and the appropriations of Congress for the payment of bounties and claims of various kinds to the first of the present month.
The appropriations for the current fiscal year amount in the whole to $20,964,717 25, and the expenditures from these appropriations are considerably within the proportion applicable to the period which has elapsed since its commencement.
The estimates for the general expenses of the service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1873, amount to $19,925,507 02, and are as follows:
| Pay of officers and seamen of the Navy | $6,500,000 00 |
| Current repairs of buildings, docks, and incidental expenses in navy-yards, &c | 1,046,000 00 |
| Pay of civil establishment in navy-yards, hospitals, &c | 338,786 00 |
| Ordnance and Torpedo Corps | 1,142,942 00 |
| Coal, hemp, and equipments | 1,500,000 00 |
| Navigation, navigation supplies, &c | 137,000 00 |
| Hydrographic work | 28,500 00 |
| Naval Observatory, Nautical Almanac, &c | 65,900 00 |
| Repairs and preservation of vessels | 3,300,000 00 |
| Steam machinery, tools, &c | 1,650,000 00 |
| Provisions | 1,587,600 00 |
| Repairs of hospitals and laboratories | 25,000 00 |
| Surgeons’ necessaries | 50,000 00 |
| Contingent expenses of various departments and Bureaus | 1,307,000 00 |
| Naval Academy | $193,408 25 |
| Support of Marine Corps | 1,049,652 70 |
| Deficiencies of Marine Corps | 3,718 07 |
| 19,925,507 02 |
and to these is added the sum of $507,200 for permanent improvements at the several navy-yards and stations.
These estimates, it will be perceived, are in the aggregate more than $1,200,000 less than the estimates made for the current year, and more than half a million less than the appropriations made by Congress for that period. It must not be forgotten, however, that they are made closely for the mere maintenance of the naval establishment as it is, and that needed improvement demands increase of appropriations.
reduction of the navy.
The subject of the reduction of the personnel of the Navy has been much discussed, and it becomes not only those who are charged with the responsibility of the question, but also all who are interested in its solution, to meet and consider it deliberately and fairly, keeping in view at once the history of the country and of the service, and looking to the honor and welfare of both.
Though it is sometimes alleged, as a matter of complaint, that there are more officers of the Navy, especially of the higher grades, than are required for the service, yet it is a fact that, notwithstanding the promotions so hardly earned by many gallant officers during the late war, notwithstanding the admiration which they conquered and the high consideration which they deserve at the hands of a Government, which owes its preservation as much to them as to any other class of its servants or people, still the whole number of active officers in the higher ranks of the Navy is considerably less now than it was before the war.
As a matter of fact, the whole number of officers of the three highest grades of the Navy, (including lieutenants and those above them,) on the active list in 1859, was 535, while on the 1st of July, 1871, the number of officers on the active list in the eight highest grades (including lieutenants and those above them) was 488, or 47 less than before the war. Notwithstanding this condition, I recognize the desirability of reducing the military establishments of the country, of every kind, to the lowest point consistent with the dignity and safety of the country and its important interests, and with that attitude of good faith and generosity which becomes a great government and a prosperous people toward its faithful and devoted servants. With all these considerations in view, I am of the opinion that there are some grades in our Navy now established by law which may be safely and properly reduced or dispensed with in time of peace.
The grades of Admiral and Vice-Admiral, assimilating to those of General and Lieutenant General in the Army, were properly established as the recognition and reward of brilliant service in the late war.
[Page 75]These conditions have been fully met by the character and services of the very distinguished officers who have filled, and now fill, these grades. But the grades themselves are not required for the ordinary service of our Navy in time of peace, and they would lose their peculiar significance of honor, if continued after the termination of the war, beyond the lives of its most conspicuous actors. I therefore suggest that these two grades be allowed to lapse with the lives of those who now hold them.
The grade of commodore, after the lapse of the grades of Admiral and Vice-Admiral, the grade next to the highest of the service, can also, I think, be dispensed with at this time. The number of officers of this grade is fixed by law at 25. As our Navy is now organized, these officers are not absolutely required for any special duty. It is necessary for the efficiency of the service, and for the dignity, influence, and success of our naval representation abroad, that our fleets on foreign stations should be commanded by officers of the rank of rear-admiral at least. This is the lowest grade of officers to whom the fleets of any naval power are committed, and it is with this grade, or with those of higher rank, that our commandants abroad are to come in constant contact, in every country, and before every people of the world, in the discharge of every duty which may devolve on them, relating either to the policy, interest, influence, or honor of our country. Under these circumstances, to commit the command of our fleets to officers of less rank would not only strike at the efficiency and dignity of the service, and often place it and the power it represents, in official consideration abroad, below that of every petty power, from Portugal to Hayti; but would in many parts of the world always postpone and often endanger the interests of our Government and citizens, to a degree out of all proportion to the small additional expense incurred for officers of the grade referred to.
The number of rear-admirals is limited by the general provisions of the law to ten. These are now temporarily increased by two, who are retained on the active list because they have received the express thanks of Congress for distinguished services; with five cruising stations, and a pressing necessity for a sixth, by a division of the Pacific station, this number of rear-admirals is only sufficient to afford commandants, and relief for our fleets abroad, and that without taking into consideration any diminution in the number available, by reason of accident or sickness; to reduce this number would be neither statesmanship nor economy.
Our fleets abroad are, however, generally too small in time of peace to be advantageously divided into squadrons. This leaves the grade of commodore, in such times, without appropriate command at sea, and without duties on shore which may not be discharged by officers of other grades. I therefore suggest that no more promotions be made to this grande after a date to be fixed by law, and that, after this grade shall have lapsed by the death, retirement, or promotion of the present [Page 76] incumbents, promotions be made to the grade of rear-admiral, by selection as vacancies occur, from the list of captains. This plan will in a short time work the abolition of the whole grade of commodores, twenty-five in number, without real injury to the service or to any one connected with it. The grade of commodore will pass away, and though the captains on the active list will not reach and enjoy its honors, those of them who are deserving will reach the grade of rear-admiral at an earlier and more active age, while only those who are not deserving will miss promotion.
I would further suggest, in accordance with the spirit of the recommendation made this year by the Vice-Admiral, as a member of the Board of Visitors to the Naval Academy, that the term of cadetship for midshipmen be increased by law from four years to six, two of which, at least, shall be spent at sea. The reasons for this change I will take occasion to present more at large hereafter. By this means, the number of officers annually entering the naval service will be reduced by one-third. We may add to these reductions by dropping the mates now employed on temporary duty, except those who have peculiar claims by reason of war service or special fitness. When these reductions are consummated, we will, besides reducing by one-third the number of officers annually entering the service, have accomplished, since the 15th of July, 1870, (including the reductions made by the act of that date,) a reduction of near three hundred in the number of line officers now authorized by law, with an annual saving to the public Treasury of near a half million of dollars.
This is, I think, as far as reductions can be carried at this time without injury or danger. In making these suggestions of reduction, I am conscious that I shall not meet the views of those whose interests are directly affected, and possibly I shall not entirely satisfy those who, on imperfect information or immature reflection, may think further reduction proper. To the first of these classes, I would say that I have made the suggestions after much consideration, and in clear view of the interests of the service, as well as of the country. For the information of the latter class, I beg to present again the following explanations, which I have heretofore made in a less formal manner, showing the many important and complicated duties and requirements of the service:
Our naval organizations are small, and in service are largely separated from and independent of each other. Each organization, however small, must be complete in itself for every purpose of service, with its complement of officers, sufficient in number and experience for every kind of duty and responsibility.
More than one-half of the officers on the active list are now actually at sea. But they cannot, no officer can or should, remain always at sea. The efficiency of the service and common humanity alike require that they should have regular relief from their distant and dangerous duties. But if this were otherwise, still they must come home in the [Page 77] ships which carried them out, because the seamen are enlisted for only three years, and must be returned to the United States for discharge, and their officers must come with them.
There are, however, other reasons why all the officers cannot be kept always at sea.
They are needed for shore duty; duty required by law, duty as essential to the efficiency, good order, and safety of the Navy, as is sea service itself.
Ships are neither built, nor manned, nor armed, nor equipped, nor largely repaired at sea. All the business connected with the building, preserving, and repairing of war vessels, with recruiting and enlisting men, with providing ordnance, means for navigation, equipment, provisions, clothing, medicine, hospitals, &c., &c., must be attended to on land. Hence the necessity of navy-yards, and naval stations, and an adequate number of officers and men to manage, conduct, and protect them.
The education of cadet midshipmen requires its quota of both officers and vessels.
Courts-martial and courts of inquiry, composed of commissioned officers, as required by law, are as indispensable in administering naval law and justice as are civil courts in civil affairs.
Boards of examination and retiring boards are required by law, and boards of survey and inspection are a constant convenience and necessity.
Officers are also constantly required and employed on other important duty not connected with the several squadrons: some in acquiring a knowledge of the signal code; some, under requirement of law, on the Light-House Board, with the Coast Survey, the Observatory, and Hydrographic Office; some, in obedience to resolutions of Congress, in making soundings for telegraphic cables; and some in exploring the routes of the great interoceanic canals.
Officers of competent rank, knowledge, and experience are required for all these duties, alike by the necessities of the service and the provisions of existing laws.
Whether they are engaged in active duty or waiting orders, justice and sound policy concur in requiring, what existing laws also require, that the pay of naval officers shall, to some extent, continue. If this were not common justice, it would be at least common prudence. No maritime and naval power has ever been or ever will be guilty of the folly of turning its naval officers adrift the moment their cruise is ended.
Navy officers fit for important commands require the training and experience of years, and cannot be obtained at a moment’s notice, nor be called into existence by proclamation or legislation, even upon the spur of rebellion or invasion. They are only prodnced by long-continued processes of instruction and development.
False economy may seek to scatter our officers and cripple our service, [Page 78] leaving our interests unprotected on every sea, but wise and liberal statesmanship will alone avail to protect our commerce, secure our foreign interests, and maintain our national honor.
In conclusion, I must again express my renewed obligations to the chiefs and officers of the several Bureaus, and to the accomplished Chief Clerk of the Department, and his associates, for the constant and effective energy and skill with which I have been assisted in every branch of departmental duty.
The President.