No. 35.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish

No. 74.]

Sir: My dispatches Nos. 70 and 71 informed you of all that had occurred up to the 2d instant, including the hostile reception the smaller vessels met with while absent on a surveying expedition. In addition, the latter contained my opinions with reference to what should be done immediately, without waiting further instructions, to prevent danger to the lives and property of our people in China as well as Corea. A careful review of the situation in consultation with the admiral, confirmed me in the opinions I had formed; and also that the dignity of the Government of the United States would be seriously compromised unless [Page 127] reparation be sought, and enforced if necessary, for the unprovoked assault upon the vessels. It also seemed reasonable that a demonstration such as was contemplated would, if successful, convince the Government that we would not tamely submit to insult and injury, and so impress it with a sense of our ability to redress wrongs as to cause it to be more careful in the future. Nor did it seem likely that such a step would by any possibility lessen the chances of negotiation, and it might improve them, for evidences were multiplying that all our overtures made in a conciliatory spirit would be peremptorily rejected. Although fully impressed with this belief, and skeptical in regard to any favorable results coming through delay, I still deemed it my duty to discourage hasty action, and advised delay in seeking forcible redress and retaliation until the Government should have had time to learn the facts and disavow its responsibility for the outrage, if the course of the military authorities was unauthorized. In this view the admiral fully concurred; and besides, our success would be rendered more certain by a delay of ten days, as the state of the tides would then be more favorable, which would insure greater safety to the vessels and more efficiency to their co-operation. It was also decided to confine the movement to the capture and destruction of the forts that had participated in the attack upon our vessels, and not go beyond that point, although abundant precedent could be found to justify the infliction of the most extreme punishment and damage upon this government and people, after unprovoked hostilities had once been inaugurated by them in such a treacherous manner. I was the more inclined to confine our hostile efforts within these limits, because I doubted whether the President contemplated the use of force further than the redress of wrongs and insults, and because the capture and destruction of these defensive works would be likely to produce the same effect upon the government as any more extensive operations which did not include the occupation of the capital.

The correspondence with the local officials, copies and translations of which are herewith inclosed, will show the earnest and persistent efforts that were made to adjust the difficulty amicably, and the stubborn reticence of the government touching this particular affair, as well as all matters connected with my mission.

I deem it proper to observe, in this connection, that the history of negotiations and intercourse between western nations and oriental governments goes to prove that every artifice which human ingenuity can devise will be resorted to to maintain their own superiority, and prove to their people the absolute inferiority of foreigners. Refusal to negotiate is usually the first step, and when compelled by force or otherwise to recede from that position, every effort is made to induce foreign ministers to treat with native officials of low rank and position. In illustration of this peculiarity, I beg to call your attention to the communication from the King of Corea to the board of rites, Peking, (inclosure 5.) You will observe that a reply to my letter is evaded rather than refused. The King affirms, however, that “a minister of the Emperor must not have relations with a foreign state,” and prays “that the Emperor (of China) will send forth a special edict to exhort and instruct” me in my duties.

My own observation add experience, as well as the experience of others, convinced me that concession on these points would lower my position, lessen my influence, and thus render the task more difficult; I therefore determined to adopt a firm and dignified policy—to demand as a right, and not solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy due from one nation to another; to submit to no semblance of inferiority by consenting to consult or correspond with officials of inferior rank that might, [Page 128] and probably would, be put forward to meet me; to seek such guarantees as would render reasonably safe the lives and property of American citizens that might be wrecked upon these shores as a right which the United States could properly claim for its citizens and not as a concession which Corea could grant or refuse with equal propriety. This course I have steadily pursued; and when officials of low rank came in person or wrote letters the secretaries were deputed to meet them and reply to their communications. This will explain why it is that the correspondence with the local officials has been conducted in the name of Mr. Drew.

The local Official near here and his superior, the governor of Kang-Hoa, were informed that a disavowal of responsibility for the outrage was expected from the government, and that, to enable this to be done, a reasonable time would be allowed; and it was clearly intimated that the failure of the government to comply with this reasonable demand would leave the admiral at liberty to pursue such a course as he might deem proper to obtain redress. (See inclosures 2 and 6.) The replies of these officials (inclosures 3 and 4) contain, you will observe, nothing that can be construed into an apology. They simply express regret at the necessity, but approve of the acts of the military authorities. Indeed I feel sure that the governor of Kang Hoa has military as well as civil jurisdiction, and is really the person who planned the attack and issued the orders to fire upon the vessels. So great was the anxiety of the admiral as well as myself to avoid, if possible, further hostilities, that orders were given to Captain Blake and Mr. Drew (inclosures 7 and 8) to cause hostilities to be suspended whenever they could obtain any reasonable assurance that peaceful negotiations would be assented to by the government. They did receive, while on the way up to the forts and before the attack was made, a communicatian from the Kang-Hoa magistrate, (inclosure 9) but as it contained only a repetition of his former statement they very properly paid no attention to it.

The expedition started on the 10th and returned on the 12th instant. The work it was sent to do was successfully and fully accomplished. Five forts were taken, which, with the munitions of war found in them, were completely destroyed. About two hundred and fifty of the enemy’s dead were counted lying on the field, fifty flags and several prisoners were captured and brought away; among the latter were some-wounded. Several books, manuscripts, orders, &c., were found. The contents of these documents are interesting, and enable a better and more reliable estimate to be made respecting the attitude and action of the government than was possible from our previous sources of information.

It was deemed advisable to bring away but few prisoners, only a number sufficient to demonstrate that we do not treat prisoners that fall into our hands cruelly, and that wounded men, although enemies, are humanely and tenderly cared for. Our loss was three killed and nine wounded. For full particulars of the engagement I beg to refer you to the Navy Department, where complete reports of the admiral will be found.

All accounts concur in the statement that the Coreans fought with desperation, rarely equaled and never excelled by any people. Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort were killed at their posts. They exhibited a bravado and recklessness that it is hard to account for upon any other hypothesis than that finding there was no chance for escape, and believing that no quarter would be shown by us to prisoners, they concluded to perish fighting, even after all hope of success was gone; either this, or that their government had threatened the soldiers defending that particular fort with dire retribution in case of defeat. Some [Page 129] such reasons must have existed, because there were outside of the fort, but in the immediate vicinity, several thousand troops which were kept at bay by the field artillery with small effort. Instead of recklessly rushing on to destruction, these troops showed little inclination to come within the range of the weapons of our troops. A proposition was made to release the prisoners on parole, (inclosure 10.) to which a reply was returned (inclosure 11) saying that the prisoners had incurred a severe penalty from their own government by surrender, and it was immaterial whether they were released or not. After a detention of a few days they were all unconditionally released. It is to be hoped that our humane treatment and release of these prisoners may disabuse the minds of the common people of their unjust suspicions regarding foreigners, and induce the government to spare the lives of those who may by misfortune or reverses in war fall into their hands.

The officers and men engaged in the expedition all behaved nobly. Their gallantry and heroism were conspicuous, reflecting upon themselves great credit, and upon the Navy and the Government represented by it honor and renown. I should be doing less than my duty were I to omit to add my testimony to these acts of devotion, or to acknowledge my obligations for the cheerful co-operation of Admiral Rodgers, and the zealous and efficient support of the officers of the fleet in all things where the honor or interests of the United States are involved.

On the 15th instant, addressed a dispatch to the King, (inclosure 15,) and caused it to be sent to the prefect of Foo-Ping-Foo with a request that it should be sent to the capital. It was returned on the 17th instant with a note from the prefect (inclosure 16) saying that, he dare not forward a dispatch to his sovereign. To this I caused a reply to be sent (inclosure 17) requesting him either to send the dispatch or inform the court that I desired to communicate with His Majesty or a high minister. This met with the same refusal as the former one had, (see inclosure 18.)

The first opportunity that offers will be availed of to open communication with the government, if it can be done without discredit, nor will my efforts to accomplish, what the Government desires be relaxed until all reasonable and honorable means are exhausted, and I am convinced that further delay will serve no useful purpose. I have, however, little hope of bringing the King to any proper terms. Everything goes to prove that the government from the first determined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiation or even discussion; and that the recent demonstration, which would have produced a profound impression upon any other government, has little or no effect, favorable or otherwise, upon this. The operations of the 10th and 11th were more significant than those of the English and French in 1858, when the capture of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho River, caused the government of China to immediately send ministers and conclude treaties at Tientsin, and yet this government shows no sign which leads to the belief that there is any change in its attitude of defiance to all other nations.

I have the honor, &c.,

F. F. LOW.

Inclosures.

No. 1. Paper found attached to a pole on Guerriere Island, from the prefect of Fu-Ping, 3d of June, 1871.

No. 2. Reply of Mr. Drew to prefect of Fu-Ping, an explanation or disavowal of the attack of June 1 required, 5th June, 1871.

[Page 130]

No. 3. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew. Reply to foregoing will be made by his superior officer, 7th June, 1871.

No. 4. Kang-Hoa high magistrate’s reply to No. 2; attack of June 1 regretted but justified, 6th June, 1871.

No. 5. King of Corea to board of rites, Peking.

No. 6. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate; his letter (No. 4) not satisfactory, 7th June, 1871.

No. 7. Admiral Rodgers’s instructions to Captain Blake for Fort du Conde expedition, 9th June, 1871.

No. 8. Mr. Low’s instructions to Mr. Drew, for same expedition, 9th June, 1871.

No. 9. Kang-Hoa high magistrate, to Mr. Low in reply to No. 6, 9th June, 1871.

No. 10. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate, prisoners will be released on parole, 13th June, 1871.

No. 11. Prefect of Fudging to Mr. Drew, in reply to No. 10, 14th June, 1871.

No. 12. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; indignant comments on the capture of Fort du Conde, 12th June, 1871.

No. 13. Memorandum of intimations that a reply is wanted to No. 12, 13th and 14th June, 1871.

No. 14. Mr. Drew to prefect of Fu-Ping, in reply to No. 12, inclosing dispatch from Mr. Low to King of Corea, 15th June, 1871.

No. 15. Mr. Low’s dispatch to the King of Corea, 14th June, 1871.

No. 16. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; he declines to forward and returns Mr. Low’s dispatch to the King, 17th June, 1871.

No. 17. Mr. Drew to the prefect of Fu-Ping, 18th June, 1871.

No. 18. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; reply to No. 17; still declines to forward the dispatch to the King; reasons assigned, 20th June, 1871.

No. 1.

In the fourth month of the year, Mow-chew, [1868,] Captain Febiger, captain of your honorable country’s admiral’s vessel, came and anchored in the Barrier Cantonment of the marine guard of Jaw-Ho prefecture, Ping-Yang province. I was at that time the prefect. The communications between us offered no cause of offense, the one to the other, and the captain went away peacefully.

Now, again, your honorable country’s vessels come and anchor within the borders of the prefecture of Foo-Ping, and truly in a different manner. I avail myself of this communication. Do not hold back your valued reply.

Our kingdom is placed east of the Eastern Sea. Your honored country is located west of the Western Ocean. All winds and sands for the extent of more than 70,000 li. (23,000 miles.) How can there ever have been vessels coming and going between us? From Tan-Chi [early Corean king] down these 4,000 years there has been no communication between your country and ours. It may then well be said that it is Heaven’s limitation that has placed us so remote from each other, and earth that has hung us so far apart as to cut us off from each other.

Our respective dispositions are mutually dissimilar; our guiding principles are not alike.

We find that in the autumn of the year Ping-Yin [1866] there suddenly arose a troublesome involvement [of us] in a matter of mutual concern. The destruction in the Ping-Yang river [of the General Sherman] was brought swiftly on by themselves; and for the wreck in the Kang-Hoa prefecture, who is to be blamed?

There was formerly not a particle of ill-feeling existing between us. Why should arms now drag us into mutual resentment? Yet, unless destruction leave [you] to repentence, you will again be taking upon you to constantly return toward us. What affairs would you transact? What words speak? Will you wish to take possession of [Page 131] our land and people, or will you wish to consult upon and carry out friendly relations? If you are going to want us to give away laud and people, then let me ask how can 3,000 li [1,000 miles] of river, hill, city, and country be lightly thrown away? If you will desire us to agree to negotiate and carry out friendly relations, then let me ask how can 4,000 years’ ceremonies, music, literature, and all things, be, without sufficient reason, broken up and cast away? It does not consist with right, it cannot be spoken of.

You do not hold the course of justice, [lit., as the bear keeps to his native hill, and the fish keeps his native water,] but, on the contrary, dare to consult mere expediency, [lit., act as the heron with the shell-fish.] Having experienced every difficulty and danger in tossing over billowy seas [to our country,] how long, let me ask, can you annoy [lit., ravage] district and prefecture?

It would be better early to mark out a right course of action and each remain peacefully in his own place.

We inform you, that you may ponder and be enlightened.

From the general guardian of Foo-Ping prefecture. [No name signed.]

No. 2.

Reply to a communication found on Guerriere Island, on Saturday morning, June 3.

A reply from Edward B. Drew, acting secretary of legation of the United States.

A communication was found on shore two days since, purporting to come from the guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture, which has been read, and the contents thereof made known to the minister and admiral.

They have instructed me to make reply, that our intentions in coming to your country were peaceful, as was announced to your sovereign by letter from Peking in advance. He was told that the minister had important business with the government, and hoped that a person of high rank would be sent to meet him when the vessels reached the coast of your country, to whom the full particulars could be made known, and with whom all matters could be arranged and settled. This course is still open if the King chooses to avail himself of it.

We do not want your land or men, nor anything that will affect your ceremonies, music, or literature.

Your people have met our peaceful overtures by an unprovoked and wanton attack. The admiral hopes that it will prove that all this was done by the common people, without the sanction of the government; and has concluded to allow sufficient time to pass to enable the King to learn of it, and send an apology for this outrage if it was unauthorized, before taking any further steps. It now lies with your government to say whether it will disavow this outrage, and send a high officer to meet and consult with the minister, and endeavor to settle the business in an amicable manner, or whether, by failing to do so, leave the minister and admiral to pursue such a course as they may deem proper to obtain redress for the wrongs done to us. It is a question which His Majesty should seriously consider before taking up a warlike attitude. Five or six days longer will be allowed the government to consult and determine what it will do.

When Captain Febiger was here, he was told that the King could not treat with him because he did not come by order of the President. Now the high minister of the United States to China is sent by special orders of his sovereign, with the most peaceful intentions and friendly assurances, and without warning you fire upon the vessels and try to destroy them. How is this? The vessels now here are part of a large fleet that is constantly kept by the Government on the coasts of China and Japan. When they need repairs, others are sent to take their places. They are constantly within two or three days’ sail of your country, and if they choose, can destroy your towns and annoy your districts and departments for an unlimited number of years. But this is not our wish. We desire peace and friendly feelings to exist between our country and all others. China and the United States are friends, and the high ministers of each country are received in the other and treated with respect. If anything occurs which may lead to trouble, it is discussed and settled in a friendly manner, without resorting to hostilities.

If the government sends any notifications of its intentions, the communication should be sent to the ship. No boats or messengers will be molested that bring letters or persons who desire to discuss matters with us.

A necessary communication.

To the Guardian General of Foo-Ping Prefecture.

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No. 3.

Li. Guardian General of Fu-Ping Fu to Mr. Drew, June 7 th.

A communication in reply. On receipt of your dispatch in answer to my former one, I read its contents carefully.

I have control of local matters only, and dare not take on myself to discuss any matters belonging to the central government; I have accordingly transmitted your reply to my superior officer, the minister, who is general and governor of Kang-Hoa prefecture; and have to-day heard that a dispatch from him has just been sent on board your honorable vessel.

I trust that all future correspondence will be carried on with the official above named, as I cannot presume to interfere in it further.

A necessary communication in reply to Mr. Drew, acting secretary of legation.

No. 4.

Translation of dispatch brought on board Colorado from Kang-Hoa high official.

Cheng, guardian of the prefecture of Kang-Hoa, Corea, ex officio general and governor, sends a communication to his excellency the American minister.

In the spring of this year the board of rites, Peking, forwarded a dispatch conveying a letter from the honorable American envoy; to this my government speedily sent a reply, fully discussing the matters referred to, which it was requested might be transmitted through the same channel [board of rites] to your excellency.

We feel that—inasmuch as politeness and deference are held in such general estimation in your honorable country that she has long possessed a fame far beyond all other states—your excellency must most probably so clearly comprehend the propriety of things as to take no light or hasty action. Why now do you cross from afar the vast ocean to penetrate another country? Even though you disclaim all purpose of killing or harming us, who can help being puzzled and suspicious?

The barriers of defense of a country are important places, within which it is not allowable for foreign vessels to make their way [without some previous understanding.] This is the fixed rule of all nations. Hence it was the ascent [of the river] to the sea-gate by your vessels the other day that brought on the engagement between us, [literally, the affair of mutual firing and alarming,] which, as you say that your intentions in coming [to this country] are good, it is much to be regretted should have occurred. On the arrival of your vessels, the court warned the civil and military authorities along the coast to avoid most carefully any thing which should cause trouble or arouse ill-feeling, yet when your honorable vessels, not considering the fixed regulation of another country, penetrated its important pass, how could the officers, appointed to guard [the closed portals of] the frontier, whose duty it is to take measures of defense, calmly let it go by as of no consequence? Pray do not then be offended at what occurred.

It is not perhaps because the board of rites at Peking had not yet transmitted our reply, [to your letter to the King of Corea,] thus leaving your excellency unacquainted with the various circumstances of my country, that [your coming to Corea] has taken place. Therefore, I now have the honor to inclose duplicate of this reply, from the perusal of which you may perhaps derive full and complete information. The non-intercourse of Corea with foreign states is a settled principle, established by our ancestors five centuries ago; a principle of which the whole world has heard, and of which the Emperor of China also is graciously aware. It is precisely because we must not break through the ancient policy [of our ancestors] that we cannot discuss and cannot settle that which the honorable envoy desires to discuss and to settle, whatever it may be. Why do you then wait for a high official to meet you?

The myriad lands and the countless living sustained on the earth, and canopied by the sky, should all act in consonance with the nature originally bestowed upon them, and it is the will of Heaven and earth that the states of the East, and the nations of the West, regulating each in its own way its administration and its doctrines, and governing each its own people, should move on prosperously and concordantly without encroaching upon and taking away what is another’s. Surely your excellency is acquainted with this truth.

Appreciating the hardships of a voyage of 10,000 li of wind and wave, I send some worthless articles as a trifling assistance to your table, as becomes the host. I trust [Page 133] you will not refuse to receive them, though insignificant. I am aware of the deficiencies of this dispatch.

A necessary communication.

[Note.—With the foregoing were brought three bullocks, fifty chickens, and one thousand eggs, which were declined.]

No. 5.

Translation of duplicate of the King of Corea’s dispatch to the board of rites, Peking, in reference to his excellency Mr. Low’s letter, of 7th March, sent to the King through the board.

A communication in reply. On the 10th April I received the honorable board’s dispatch forwarding copy of the record of its bureau of foreign relations to this effect: “This board on the 22d March memorialized the Emperor in reference to the transmission of a letter to Corea, and on the same day the great council returned a minute stating that it had reverently received the imperial will. We have taken due note. This minute being received by the board, its duty is to send copies of its original memorial, the imperial edict, the Tsury-li Yamen’s original memorial, and the American letter to the King of Corea for his cognizance in the premises,” and accordingly inclosing copies of the Tsury-li Yamen’s memorial, the board’s memorial, and the American envoy’s letter.

Besides acknowledging receipt of the board’s dispatch, with its several inclosures, I would humbly observe that the service of forwarding the letter is indeed out of the usual course. I ascribe it to the board’s anxiety that no mistake should be made in a matter of such delicate concern. The board has performed this special act in respectful intimation of the Emperor’s fostering favor toward me; and for such perfect attentiveness I am inexpressibly grateful.

The letter forwarded by the admiral’s envoy has reference primarily to two merchant vessels which came to this country in 1866, one of which was wrecked and her crew saved, while the crew of the other was killed, and the cargo destroyed; the American Government not knowing why such very different treatment as this was exhibited, wishes to inquire into the circumstances. Furthermore, it desires that some arrangement be devised for the relief of any American merchant vessel which may in future meet with disaster on this coast, and that friendly treatment should be accorded, &c.

Our humble country has the sea on three sides, and whenever stranger vessels of a foreign nation come to our shores in distress, they are either assisted with food and whatever they require, and enabled to sail away again; or, if the vessel is disabled or lost, her crew are escorted through by land to the supreme capital, [Peking,] thence to be sent to their homes; in each case the wishes of those concerned are regarded, and no obstacle is raised. In this we do not fail reverently to give effect to the exceeding benevolence and plenteous virtue of our holy dynasty, [the present dynasty of China,] which desires all things without exception, under heaven and upon the earth, to follow out their original nature, and the outpost state [Corea] has held this custom as to vessels in distress as its firm rule and established policy for a long period. Moreover, there have been from first to last three occasions of American subjects particularly having been rescued in distress, and sent forward under protection, viz, in the 5th year of Heen Feng, the 4th of Tung-Chih, and the 5th of Tung-Chih, [1855, 1865, and 1866.] The dispatches are all in the archives of the honorable board, and as the affairs were comparatively recent, the country in question can hardly fail to have a knowledge of them. When men have come from afar through the dangers of the sea, they are objects of sympathy; how then could any one think it right to maltreat and destroy them?

The statement about a vessel being destroyed, and her crew killed in Corea, has reference, no doubt, to the event of the autumn of 1866, in the Ping-Yang River, [General Sherman.] The details of that affair were all set forth in the dispatch to the board of the 22d day, 8th moon, 5th year Tung-Chih, [September 30, 1866,] and need not now be reiterated. Again, on the 25th day 3d moon, 7th year of Tung-Chih, I wrote in reply to a dispatch from the board of rites still more explicitly, and inclosed copy of the answer of Poo Cheng-hwuy, intendant of Hwang-Hai province, to the American commander, [of the Wachusett,] winch answer had been prepared and held in readiness for delivery; on this occasion the board was further prayed that the American envoy might be so admonished [by the Emperor of China] as to resolve his doubts and suspicions and prevent further confusion.*

Again, in the 3d moon of the 7th year of Tung-Chih, the American Commander Febiger came, saying that he wished to inquire into this affair, and presented dispatches to the different local magistrates of Ping-An and Hwang-Hai. These magistrates answered very clearly, giving the circumstances of a strange vessel having [Page 134] pushed her way in the autumn of 1866, of wounds and injuries inflicted on the inhabitants, of the detention with indignity of an officer, and of the consequent exasperation of the people, resulting in self-provoked disaster and destruction; they made a complete explanation to dispel all doubts, and Captain Febiger, on receiving the reply, went away. I ventured to think that thenceforth the people of that country, knowing fully the affair, and understanding the right and wrong of it, there would be no more occasion for coming with doubts and suspicions to make inquiry. Why now does the American minister, in his letter, again express ignorance as to the rescue of one of the crews, and the destruction of the other?

He says that the Government of the United States has so much regard for its sailors and countrymen that it will never permit other countries, as they please, to misuse or destroy them; this, surely, is a point in which all nations are alike. America will not allow its people to be maltreated; nor will this country allow its people to be maltreated. In this respect, if we exchange places and reflect, there is surely no difference. Such being the case, the reason for the self-provoked destruction of the vessel in the Ping-Yang River is perfectly intelligible without stopping to discuss it. We appeal to the natural public sentiment of justice among men, and to the controlling presence of God and the spirits. If the American vessel had not abused our people how could the Corean officials and people have wished to maltreat them first?

The letter under consideration expresses the hope that friendly treatment will be accorded. If the strange states of the extreme sea desire a relationship of good will with us, then, in reverent imitation of the virtue of the great dynasty which treats kindly men from afar, we shall prove not to be ignorant of the usages of hospitality. But as to the expression, “consult and arrange about intercourse,” I do not know what it is wanted to “consult and arrange,” and what the intercourse desired is to be about. “A minister of the Emperor must not have relations with a foreign state.”

For kindly commiserating and sending home the crews of foreign ships which have met with disaster, not only has our country a constant rule of its own, but it also imitates, in this regard, the profound benevolence of the heavenly dynasty [of China;] then, without waiting to “consult and arrange,” the minister may feel secure from all apprehension. But supposing he does not cherish good will, but comes to commit wanton violence, then in keeping them off or destroying them we shall also be discharging our natural duty of shielding the heavenly dynasty. It is quite enough for the American Government to hold in control its own people, and keep them from improper interference with others; why go so far as to discuss whether there shall be intercourse with foreign states or not?

Heretofore foreign nations have been in ignorance of the character and productions of this country, and we have been repeatedly pestered with applications for commercial intercouse; but that is entirely out of the question with this country, and that merchants would not find it profitable was set forth in a communication to the board in the fifth year of Tung-Chih, somewhat as follows: It is universally known that our humble state is a small dependency in a corner of the seas; that the people are poor and the articles of commerce scanty; that the precious metals and previous stones are not found here, while grains and cloth fabrics are not abundant; that the productions of the country are insufficient to meet domestic wants; and if they were permitted to flow out abroad, thus impoverishing us at home, this insignificant land would certainly be in extreme danger, and difficult to protect from ruin; furthermore, that the habits of the people are sparing and plain, the workmanship rude and poor; and that we have not a single article worthy of commerce with foreign nations. The constant wish for commercial intercourse, while the utter impossibility of this country’s entering into relations of trade, and the unprofitableness of it also to foreign merchants, are such as are above described, is no doubt to be ascribed to the want of full knowledge on the part of the people of remote countries on the subject.

Now, although this letter of the American envoy has not spoken out fully, yet as it asks for an official to consult and arrange [business] affecting both countries, it most likely allndes to this sort of thing, [viz, commercial intercourse.] As the rescue and forwarding home of shipwrecked crews is provided for by existing laws, it is unnecessary to take further trouble to make a fixed arrangement. Besides this subject, there is nothing else to consult and settle, and it is not necessary to come and go to and fro to no purpose.

I humbly hope that the honorable board will lay before the throne all the facts connected with this matter, and that the Emperor will send forth a special edict to exhort and instruct the envoy of the nation in question so as to overcome the doubts and dispel his anxiety, and thus each of us be left to himself without trouble. I shall then be inexpressibly happy. In my insignificance, relying on the Emperor’s love and affection, I have emptied my whole heart in extreme fear and reverence.

The contents of the letter of the American envoy do not indicate that a reply is expected; nor should I. The ruler of a colonial state dare not commit such a breach as to trouble the honorable board to forward a reply.

I solicit your intelligent glance and your indulgence.

[Page 135]

No. 6.

The undersigned has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter addressed to his excellency the minister, inclosing a copy of one from the government to the board of rites, Peking. The contents thereof have been made known to the minister and admiral; and I am instructed to reply that they regret to see a disposition on the part of the government to decline ail friendly discussion of the business which his excellency is sent to transact; and instead of apologizing for the unprovoked attack upon our vessels, the course of the military authorities is justified.

The admiral hoped it would prove that the attack was unauthorized, and that when the news of it came to the King he would disavow it, and send a high official to consult with the minister.

The admiral concluded to allow sufficient time to elapse for this to be done before taking any further steps. Three or four days of the time allowed still remain, and if, at the expiration, no disposition is manifested on the part of His Majesty looking to peaceful consultation and arrangement, the admiral and minister will then feel at liberty to pursue such a course as they may deem proper. In consequence of the shortness of the time now remaining for you to come to a decision, I deem it better to send this short reply rather than wait to make a full answer to your note.

The minister and admiral direct me to say that while they highly appreciate the kindly disposition manifested in sending the presents, they cannot, under existing circumstances, be accepted, and are therefore respectfully declined.

No. 7.

Admiral Rodgers to Commander H. P. Blake

Sir: The attack to be made upon the Corean forts on the Salée River, which recently treacherously fired on our surveying party, is committed to you.

The attacking force will consist of the “Monoeaey,” “Palos,” the four armed steamlaunches, and the armed launches and boats of the fleet; the latter conveying the landing force detailed from the ships, under the immediate command of Commander L. A. Kimberly.

The vessels are to approach the point selected for anchorage, shelling the forts and drawing out the soldiers occupying them, before the boats are permitted to leave the ships to make the landing.

When the enemy shall have been driven out of their works, the force under Commander Kimberly will effect a landing, the armed launches supporting and covering the debarkation. The most serious difficulties which I apprehend lie in the natural obstacles of rocks, shoal water, and furious currents; and if it should be found impossible to hold the vessels in the position necessary to secure the boats and to cover the force on shore, you will embark the landing party at your discretion.

The object sought in this expedition being simply to take and destroy the forts which have fired on our vessels, and to hold them long enough to demonstrate our ability to punish such offenses at pleasure, it is my present purpose to withdraw the whole force after a period of about twenty-two hours has elapsed, or at the last of the flood-tide of the day following the capture.

Should you decide that the position gained may be held indefinitely long, or that there is a prospect of any material advantage in doing so, you will then, by steam launch, communicate with me.

The only object sought by the expedition to this country is to make such a treaty as the minister has been instructed by the Government to secure, if he may; and you will therefore take advantage of any overtures which may be made toward peace, if they shall seem to you to offer a reasonable opportunity of attaining the ends which the Government has in view, or to afford a cover for the withdrawal of your force should that be desirable; referring, of course, the matter of terms to be granted to the minister and myself.

All that I have here written has been amply discussed; but should incidents arise giving an unexpected complexion to the aspect of affairs, you must use your discretion.

Anything you shall decide upon will, I am sure, meet deserved approval.

Wishing you and your command success and a safe return,

I am, &c.,

JOHN RODGERS.

A true copy.

H. G. B. Fisher, Secretary.
[Page 136]
No. 8.

F. F. Low to Edward B. Drew

Sir: It is the intention of the admiral to send an expedition to-morrow to Fort du Conde to take and destroy it, if possible. The whole will be under the immediate command of Homer C. Blake, esquire, U. S. N., who will be furnished with full and explicit instructions by the admiral. I desire you to accompany Captain Blake on the “Palos” to facilitate communicating with the native officials, if opportunity offers.

As the object of my visit to Corea is to open negotiations with a view to making a treaty, this fact should be kept prominently in view; and the admiral has so instructed Captain Blake. The naval forces are simply a means to an end. If, therefore, at any time during the absence of the expedition, overtures should be made by which it would appear that there is a reasonable prospect of a minister being sent to confer and con suit with me, and that further offensive operations would be likely to embarrass friendly negotiations, it is my desire that all hostile action should cease as soon as it can be done with safety and honor. The decision touching this latter point will rest with Captain Blake, guided by his instructions; but you are at liberty to make known my views to him if you deem it advisable.

I am, &c.,

FREDERICK F. LOW.

True copy: Edward B. Drew.

No. 9.

Translation of dispatch brought by a junk and intercepted by the expedition to Fort du Conde, on the 10th June.

Cheng, guardian of Kang-Hoa-fu, Corea, ex-officio general and governor, makes a reply to his excellency the American minister.

I beg to observe that your honorable dispatch contains many things I had not anticipated. I am still [as when writing you before] perplexed and pained. As your excellency said you were coming on a peaceful and friendly errand, our court proposing to treat you in a befitting manner, before [receiving from you information of your arrival,] sent officials of the third rank to inquire whether your voyage had been prosperous, and further to ask what the business was which you wanted to discuss and arrange.

This was the course of politeness, but contrary to expectation your subordinate officials said that those persons were not of high rank, denied them an interview, [with your excellency,] and sent them back. Before the officials who had been sent to inquire of the fatigues of your voyage got back to the capital, your honorable vessels suddenly entered our narrow pass [from the sea.] Although you had said that you would inflict no injury, yet, as the vessels on board which you came [up the river] were vessels of war, and were full of implements of war, our people and soldiers could not but be filled with alarm and suspicion, and knew not what to make of it. Now, I apprehend that the way of concord and the rule of propriety in entering another country do not justify this. As this place has before been the scene of battle, it is always strictly guarded. Although I deeply regret the firing affair—induced by the sudden sight of an unusual thing—and the alarming of your people, still, to defend a pass leading into your territory is what you would do were the case your own.

Your blaming us recently—as is shown by the [demand for an] apology is truly incomprehensible. Your excellency’s insistance upon meeting a high official with whom to consult and settle matters, I presume from your letter of last spring, had reference solely to the affairs of the two merchant vessels in the year 1866. Of these, one was destroyed, while the crew of the other was rescued; and you wished to get at the reason for this difference of treatment, and to make provision for future cases of disaster to American vessels on our coast. That one of the vessels [alluded to] was a trader of your country was not known to us; and the violent and lawless Tsuy-Lan-heen, who came in her, himself brought on the destruction that occurred—it was not our people who maliciously commenced it. The dispatches that have passed first and last to clear up your suspicions [in this case] have not been few, and it is not now worth while to discuss it further.

As to rescuing American vessels in distress, our country already has a regulation on this point, and there is, therefore, no necessity for going further and laying it down after consultation.

Again, as our country and yours are separated several myriad li, as if our borders were under a different heaven, we do not interfere with each other’s tranquillity; then [Page 137] without waiting to lay it down in a definitive compact* peace exists already in the very fact [of our distance and non-interference.]

To go into a lengthy discussion and debate for more or less, while friendship is what is wished for, will only lead to trouble. With these considerations your excellency can clearly decide which course would be advantageous and which the reverse. Instead of taking such steps as you please, you should rather reflect and consider well what I have said.

Why should you have been so narrow as to decline the trifling presents offered? I cannot sustain my regrets at this.

No. 10.

Mr. Drew to Cheng, guardian of Kang-Hoa prefecture, ex-officio general and governor

The soldiers and officers of your honorable country who were taken prisoners by us in the fight of the 11th instant, are now held on board our ships, where they are being supplied with food and taken care of. If your excellency desires their return, they will be released on requisition by you, accompanied by a distinct undertaking that they shall not fight against us again.

A necessary communication.

A list of prisoners—15 in number, wounded and unwounded—accompanied the above.

No. 11.

Translation of a dispatch received 15th June, 1871, on Guerriere Island, by hand of two messengers from the magistrate of Fu-Ping prefecture.

Li, guardian general of Fu-Ping prefecture, Corea, makes a communication in reply I have received and read the dispatch handed upon the sea-shore, viz, that which was to be forwarded to his excellency the authority of Kang-Hoa. Your honorable ships, coming with professions of friendliness and amity, delayed our military plans and caused us consequent loss. His excellency the magistrate of Kang-Hoa, has already incurred our court’s severe reprimand. He already is under punishment, but is retained at his post. He is calling out and selecting soldiers and braves, and is steadily preparing picked and keen (men and material) with the purpose of satisfying in the fullest degree his anger; I therefore do not dare to forward your communication for his perusal. The question as to whether or no our soldiers taken prisoners shall be released and returned rests alone with you for decision. At the beginning of the breach between us, the joining of battle was first from your honored part. How then do you now say “joining battle will not be allowed?” (See note.) If you shall come to join battle, then with battle will we meet you, and there’s an end (of the discussion.) He therefore makes this reply.

Note.—He takes the passage of Mr. Drew’s dispatch stating that a condition of the release of the prisoners would be a promise that they shall not again take up arms against us, and making the phrase apply generally to all Corean soldiers, asks “Since fighting was at first upon your own motion, with what propriety do you now say ‘joining battle will not be allowed?’”

No. 12.

Translation of dispatch brought on board United States steamer Colorado, June 12, 1871.

Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture, makes a communication.

Politeness, of course, characterized our reception of you since your honorable ships came professing friendship and amity. But the course of friendship and amity, where shall we find in your abrupt dismissal of our officials who came with inquiries as to your suffering, [on the voyage;] in your wrongly entering the territory of Kuan-Hai, [Page 138] (locality of the action of 11th instant,) ignoring your ship’s short-comings from the right, and only blaming our soldiers for attempting to ward off calamity; in your utter unwillingness to listen, and your sole interest upon raising a disturbance, when the affairs had already been completely solved in correspondence?

Looking at it now, one can know thus much for certain: under outward professions of friendship you cherish false and deceitful designs. To come to your landing, and thoroughly displaying your forte of committing public buildings to the flames, burning cottages, stealing property, sweeping up everything to the veriest trifle. These are the actions of thieves and spies. In your ships you have brought many of our kingdom’s outlaws, rebellious brigands who have forfeited life, to connect yourselves with and collect such a following as guides to our neighborhoods. This is to become the lair whither pirates flee.

The upshot will be a wild and disorderly discharge of gun and cannon, the battering down of walled town and fort, the slaying and injuring army and people. Where was such unsparing and implacable savagery ever exceeded? You come with professions of friendship and amity, and wish us to treat you with politeness, and your actions, forsooth, are such as these. Not only will every urchin of our kingdom spit at and curse you, but more yet in the world but will indignantly sympathize with us, and debar you from intercourse, and break off such as you already hold. I had not thought that such as these would have been the actions of one intrusted with his kingdom’s commission to bind in friendship another kingdom.

In those sea-ports where your ships shall bereafter arrive, who will be willing again to meet you with politeness, discuss the obligations of good faith and renew friendship? I conceal the shame I feel for your honorable vessels, the shame I feel for your honorable country.

A necessary dispatch is above communicated to the secretary of the American imperial commissioners.

No. 13.

On Tuesday morning, 13th June, a paper was found attached to a pole on Guerrière Island, which read thus:

Messengers from the guardian general of Fu-Ping Prefecture [are in want of a reply to the letter brought by them on Monday, 12th June.]

On Wednesday morning, 14th June, a paper was found attached to a pole on Guerrière Island, in which the Fu-Ping Prefect again urges for a reply to his letter of the 12th June. It reads thus:

To his excellency, Mr. Drew, chief secretary of the minister: On the 25th day of this moon (June 12) I sent your excellency a letter. I cannot sustain my anxiety that it has not yet been answered, and again send this to trouble you for a reply.


From Li, guardian general of Fu-Ping Prefecture.
No. 14.

Edw. B. Drew to Guardian of Foo-Ping Prefecture

I had the honor to receive your note, dated the 12th instant, in which you complained in unbecoming language of the results which necessarily followed the wanton attack upon our vessels.

Correspondence between officials, of whatever rank, should contain none other than respectful and polite language; and as you choose to disregard the rule in this respect, it did not occur to me, until your communication came this morning, that a reply was expected.

The occurrences of the last few days, and the necessary consequences of the evil acts of your officials, of which neither you nor your government have just grounds of complaint. The minister and admiral regret the necessity which compelled this action. They hoped your government would make such reparation as would render forcible redress unnecessary. Ample time was allowed for this to be done; but instead of responding to our overtures for peace the government remained silent, and the officials from whom we heard, yourself among the number, apparently justified the attack upon our vessels. Under these circumstances how could you expect immunity? The operations of the naval forces have been confined to destroying the places from which we were assaulted and routing the soldiers that defended them; although you cannot fail [Page 139] to be aware that a large district of country, which contains many villages, lies within the reach of the guns of our ships, and which remains unmolested. This ought to afford convincing proof that we have no disposition to make indiscriminate warfare upon your country or your people.

The minister and admiral, as was announced to your government in advance, desire peace. They are ready to treat all friendly overtures in a reciprocal spirit, and it is to be hoped that your government will adopt a wise and prudent course, so that in the future all trouble may be avoided.

It is desired that you will forward the inclosed dispatch to His Majesty, the King of Corea.

No. 15.

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to China, charged with a special mission to Corea, had the honor to announce by letter, written and sent from Peking in March last, that the Government of the United States desired to come to some definite understanding with that of His Majesty with reference to the protection and rescue of seamen who might be wrecked upon the islands and coasts of Corea, and thus remove in advance all cause of a rupture of friendly relations between the two countries. To carry out this intention and allow an opportunity for all matters to be discussed and settled in a spirit of amity and good will, His Majesty was informed that the undersigned would leave his post in China temporarily and go to Corea; that he would go in ships of war, accompanied by an admiral, in order to add dignity to his mission, and not with any design of harming the people as long as the vessels and the men on board were treated with consideration and kindness. His Majesty was also informed that as we were animated by friendly motives we should expect to be received and treated in a friendly way, and the undersigned expressed the hope that a minister of suitable rank would be deputed to meet him, upon the arrival of the ships on the coast, to whom full particulars of the business could be made known, and with whom it could be discussed with a view to amicable settlement. Upon his arrival at this point no persons of suitable rank presented themselves, nor were those who came furnished with any evidence of their having been sent by the government. These men were received with politeness by the person next in rank to the envoy. They were informed that the undersigned would remain at this place some days, in order that His Majesty might send a suitable person to meet him; in the mean time some of the smaller vessels of the fleet would be engaged in exploring the channels and islands. They were requested to inform the local magistrates and the people of the admiral’s intention, so that no cause of difficulty might arise between the surveying vessels and the people. The views and intentions of the undersigned were frankly explained to the persons who came, in the full expectation that as soon as His Majesty became aware of them no delay would occur in taking steps to comply with the reasonable requests made.

After a delay of one day to allow the admiral’s intentions to be made known, the surveying vessels started on their errand of humanity, and after proceeding a few miles from the anchorage, they were, without notice, wantonly fired upon by forts and masked batteries, to which the vessels replied. No gun was fired from the vessels, or menace made, until after the batteries on shore commenced the attack. After silencing the batteries the vessels returned and reported the outrageous conduct of the military, authorities. Even after all this had occurred, so great was the desire of the admiral and the undersigned for peace that it was concluded to allow ten days to elapse before taking any further action, in the hope that it would be found that the attack was unauthorized, and that His Majesty would cause a suitable apology to be sent, and also a minister, as had been suggested. The local magistrate here and the magistrate at Kang-Hoa were informed of our lenient disposition in order that future hostilities might be avoided. These peaceful overtures being declined, or neglected, left no other Course open to the admiral than to seek redress by arms, as is usual among all civilized nations, for the wrongs and insults which our vessels had suffered. This has been fully done. The forts have been destroyed, and the armies defending them routed and scattered. Many hundreds of the soldiers were killed and wounded, and others are prisoners on board our ships.

The latter will be treated with humanity and kindness, and, upon a proper engagement being entered into that they shall not again take up arms against us, will be released and sent to their homes. It is the custom of my country to treat all prisoners that fall into our hands with humanity, and the undersigned begs to assure His Majesty that those now held captive on board our ships will suffer neither insult nor injury.

[Page 140]

The events of the past few days afford convincing proofs of our power whenever we choose to exert it. In the present instance the admiral concluded to go no further than destroying the fortifications that had assaulted his vessels, although well-established precedent would sanction the moving of our forces against any and all places of the kingdom. Although possessed of the power, my Government does not seek war or conquest. It does not wish to acquire a single inch of your territory; nor does it seek control over your people. It has no desire to disturb the institutions of the country, or interfere in any matters of local concern. On the contrary, it desires to cultivate friendly relations with His Majesty as the sovereign of an independent nation. My Government wishes to be at peace with all countries, neither giving just grounds for offense, nor allowing unprovoked assaults or insults to its vessels or people to go unredressed. When its citizens offend against the laws and customs of other countries they are duly apprehended and punished. This cannot be done unless some arrangement is made by which they can be arrested and given up for trial and punishment. Arrangements now exist for doing this in China and Japan. Why should not Corea enter into similar engagements? Will not a definite understanding on this point prevent irritation and ill-feeling? To discuss and arrange this question, as well as to provide for the protection and rescue of those who may, by misfortune, be cast upon the shores of your kingdom, are the chief objects which the undersigned had in view in coming here.

These objects he is still anxious to accomplish, and is prepared to exercise patience and forbearance in order that further hostilities may be avoided. It remains for His Majesty to decide whether the ends aimed at shall be attained peaceably, in accordance with the earnest desire of the undersigned and his Government, or whether our peaceful overtures will be met in the future, as they have been in the past, by force of arms.

The undersigned trusts that His Majesty will, upon a careful review of the whole question, conclude to meet these advances in a just and friendly spirit, and that a person of suitable rank will soon be sent to consult, with a view of arranging the questions which are likely to disturb amicable relations. The undersigned hopes for a speedy and frank reply to this note.

The undersigned has the honor to wish His Majesty health and happiness.


FREDERICK F. LOW.

Note.—This dispatch was returned by the prefect with a note, saying that he dare not forward it.

No. 16.

Translation of dispatch from the magistrate of Foo-Ping-Foo, received from Guerrière Island at 10 a. m. on Saturday, June 17.

Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping Prefecture, Corea, makes the following communication in reply to Mr. Drew, acting secretary of legation:

Your dispatch has been attentively read. Its only purport is to place the blame upon the local, civil, and military authorities. It is now unnecessary to multiply elaborate discussions as to who has been in the right, and who the reverse, in what has taken place; the duty of us, the local authorities, is that we all (according to the commands of His Majesty) should confine ourselves to defending [the districts committed to our care] or to giving battle, and to these things alone.

I dare not send up to the court the dispatch now to hand from his excellency, and beg respectfully to return it herewith.

As you must have seen that we have not fired on the men of your honorable ships landing for water, but have let them come on shore, you must, I presume, be aware that we, too, do not pride ourselves on our power to kill and injure people.

A necessary communication in reply.

No. 17.

Mr. Drew, acting secretary of legation, makes the following communication to Li, guardian general of Fu Ping prefecture.

I had the honor to receive, by the hand of a messenger yesterday morning, your note of that day, returning a dispatch from his excellency the minister to His Majesty the King. In your note you say that it is not within your province to forward the dispatch [Page 141] to its destination, and intimate that further correspondence will not be likely to serve any useful purpose.

I am instructed by his excellency to say, in reply, that your refusal to forward his dispatch to the government seems extraordinary, and that he is unwilling to believe your course would have the sanction of His Majesty were he aware of the real facts. It is hardly possible that His Majesty would so far disregard the established rules common among all nations as deliberately to obstruct all channels of communication between an ambassador of a friendly nation and the government of Corea; thus closing the door to all attempts at the settlement of differences that now exist, or that may hereafter arise, by amicable negotiation.

I am further instructed by his excellency to say that, as he contemplates a prolonged stay in the vicinity of the capital, he has concluded to retain the dispatch until means are found to forward it to its destination; and he indulges the hope that you will, upon reflection, conclude to transmit it, or make known to His Majesty that his excellency desires to send one. This is especially desirable; for if His Majesty frustrates all efforts to open negotiation the situation will be relieved of embarrassment in case the minister and admiral are compelled to seek other means to bring the business with which his excellency is intrusted to the notice of the court. A refusal by order of the government will also show to the nations of Europe, as well as to the United States, that Corea persistently declines to hold communication with an ambassador especially sent on an errand of peace and humanity.

If, however, you conclude to adhere to the determination indicated in your note, I deem it my duty distinctly to inform you that for your refusal to perform a service incumbent upon all officials of every nation, the same responsibility will attach to His Majesty as if the act was done by his express order.

No. 18.

Translation of a dispatch from the prefect of Foo Ping to Mr. Drew; received June 20, 1871.

Li, guardian general of Foo Ping prefecture, makes a communication in reply.

To the reply which I had the honor to send you the other day, I had not expected there would be a rejoinder. But I have now to acknowledge your answer, expressing surprise that I do not dare to forward his excellency’s dispatch to the court, and inquiring into the matter. An explanation of my reasons is therefore indispensable.

Although the place where your honored ships came to anchor on their arrival here* was amply suitable for intercourse and correspondence, yet you, ascending the tide, entered the narrows, and thus caused those holding the place to open fire upon you. As we had written, expressing regret at the infelicity of that affair, you might have passed it over; but no!—on the contrary, you went up a second time and fought a battle, in which many of our people were killed or wounded. Our court is terribly incensed at this, and no longer believes in the [alleged] peaceful nature of your visit. Under these circumstances, although his excellency wishes a dispatch to be forwarded, yet, in view of the utter, irreconcilability of a foreign minister’s writing our sovereign direct on terms of equality with what is due to rank, dignity, and ceremonial propriety, how could I, an humble official, venture to transmit it? Our court would certainly severely censure and disgrace me for such an act; and how could I escape this punishment? And is this a matter of no concern to his excellency? It is, after repeatedly and unremittingly revolving the matter in my mind, that, dreading the law and holding to the canons of usage, I dare not recklessly forward the dispatch.

The business which his excellency has encountered the hardships of a long voyage to consult about and arrange can, in all probability, I presume, be nothing else than that he does not fully know why, of two vessels [which came to our shores] one was rescued and the other destroyed; and because he is solicitous for the future, lest in the course of their voyages vessels may perhaps again meet with unforeseen disasters, he therefore desires to make a compact of peace, [treaty,] forever preventing the infliction of injury, and this is the way matters stand.

But can this be pronounced other than a manifestation of extreme over-anxiety and the taking of unnecessary trouble? As to the case of the vessel which was involved in misfortune by those on board her, who brought the catastrophe upon themselves, this affair was verily of a kind totally unexpected to us. As to vessels losing their course in fogs at sea, or being driven in by stress of weather, these, and all similar dangers and disasters, concern human life; that this country will with fidelity rescue mariners and send them forward by land, as they desire, is recorded as our established law, enduring as the elements. In this we imitate Heaven’s fostering care of mankind, and [Page 142] make no discrimination between those nations which are remote and those which are near. Therefore it is that the local officials along the coast are, without exception, in a state of anxious concern day and night; and among these officials I am an unworthy one. With the spirits of heaven and earth watching above and about me, how dare I use empty or deceitful expressions? I only hope that his excellency will no longer be over-solicitous and needlessly trouble himself about these matters.

Although you have not consulted about and settled any business, yet granted that you had done so, the results would have been to the above effect and nothing more, There is no need for a compact of peace, and friendly feeling will be naturally found in what I have above stated.*

Of what the unworthy officer writing has heard of as the discussions of the crowded halls of our court he has now made frank disclosure; yet, his own proper duties are limited to holding his jurisdiction or doing battle, and to these things only.

A necessary reply. To the American Chief Secretary.

  1. Vide inclosure 1, Captain Febiger’s report to Admiral Rowan, of date Chefoo, China, May 19, 1868.
  2. The two characters used in Chinese for “treaty” mean literally peace-compact.
  3. Either Isle Boisée or Bose’s Roads.
  4. The promise to rescue distressed mariners.