No. 166.
Mr. Pierrepont to Mr. Evarts .

No. 264.]

Sir: I send you, inclosed, the leading editorial in the London Times of this date. It truly expresses a very large British sentiment and opinion upon the Eastern question.

I have, &c.,

EDWARDS PIERREPONT.
[Inclosure in No. 264.]

Editorial on the Eastern question from the London Times, London, Wednesday, December 5, 1877.

One of the most vehement complaints made by the partisans of Turkey is that she is deserted by the whole of Europe. The accusation is true in a very important sense, for on the continent she has not a single active friend, and, what is still more menacing, she has more than one active enemy. Russia may have done much to bring about, or at least to hasten, the present war; but whatever her guilt may be, it is condoned by continental nations. Germany is so strongly on the side of the invaders that, if she were less powerful, or Turkey less weak, some energetic remonstrances might be addressed to Berlin. Partially, no doubt, this sympathy springs from an alliance from the courts, begun, in a political sense, when Prince Bismarck was ambassador at St. Petersburg. The union became closer during the Franco-German war, when Russia allowed it to be understood that the entry of Austrian troops into the field would give the signal for the entry of her own. In some degree, therefore, the present behavior of Germany may be intended to repay a debt. But such a statesman as Prince Bismarck would not allow his gratitude to carry him to a Quixotic length. He is altogether free from the influence of mere sentiment; and, as he could have at least postponed the present war by a firm opposition, he would not have allowed it to break out if he had believed that it would give a shock to the permanently pacific influences of the continent. So far-seeing a man would not have sought to break the remaining strength of Turkey if he had thought that she had within herself elements of stability. But it is a sheer impossibility that such a belief should enter into a mind like his. Ever since he turned his attention to diplomacy he must have seen what must be the future course and the end of a state like the Porte. His own countrymen, also, are better fitted than any other people to read a lesson which is written over the whole page of modern history. They are second to none in their perception of general principles; they have studied history more closely than any other nation; and to any one who adds competent knowledge to this power of seeing the general current of human affairs, nothing in the future can be clearer than the course of events which will transform the Ottoman Empire. No nation would be less prone than the Germans to resist the addition of another link to a process of change which began centuries ago, [Page 240] and the end of which is already among the commonplaces of historical prediction. They would rather tend to welcome the first favorable opportunity of removing permanent causes of disquiet. Prince Bismarck found a tacit support from his countrymen when he did not use his power to hold Russia back. It would be easy to find smaller motives which will seem all-sufficient to the class of minds which are fond of explaining every important event by petty personal intrigues, but it is wiser to assume that in political as in natural operations great results must have great causes.

When we come to France we see much more apathy. Her own grievous perils at home have prevented the usual display of her fondness for diplomatic influence. The fear of Germany has also helped to keep her quiet. But, so far as she has spoken, it has certainly not been in favor of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, her part in the Crimean war was an incongruous episode, due to the wish of Napoleon III to get into the good society of his brother sovereigns, rather than to the general principles of French policy. Those principles were better seen in the support which France gave to Mehemit Ali at the risk of a war with England. Even Napoleon III, after he fancied that he had made his throne stable, returned to the traditional policy of his country by sending an armed expedition to Syria. Now, as in former times, French statesmen have assumed that the Ottoman Empire has not the elements of improvement within itself. They have, therefore, spoken no word against Russian aggression. Turning to Italy, we find that she has been much less reticent in her hostility to Turkey, and perhaps her attitude has not been so worthy as that of some other states. A weak and struggling nation, Italy has a keen eye for the detection of the forces which are shaping the future of Europe. She knows that the military center of gravity will for a long time be at Berlin. She knows that the hope of effecting Turkish regeneration by Turkish instruments is the vainest of delusions; and she seeks to secure herself in any rearrangement of territory or power. Enemies of Italy will see in such a policy the instincts which guided her medieval republics, and which the greatest of her political philosophers fashioned into a system. But at least the countrymen of Machiavelli have never been devoid of shrewdness, and their conduct may be taken as a prediction of general results. The Italians are free from the chivalry which has an instinctive liking for lost causes. If Austria has seemed to be more hesitating than the other continental states, it is only because Hungary has held her back. The Hungarians are still in that state of mental development which permits passion to hide the plainest facts, and their master passion is hatred of Russia. They have good reason to detest her. They cannot be expected to draw nice distinctions between the Russia which put down their own insurrection and the Russia of the present day. It is only natural that they should be grateful for the protection which Turkey gave to their own exiles. But it is surprising that a Hungarian of such capacity as Kossuth could expect to influence Europe by the string of irrelevant exclamations which he has contributed to a monthly magazine, and specimens of which we published on Monday. He mistakes the interests of his own country, which are not at all identical with those of Turkey, and his policy had never the slightest chance of guiding the statesmen of Vienna. The German part of the Austrian nationality are in all probabilility of the same mind as their brethren of the German Empire. The Slavs, who are destined to become a more and more important element of the Emperor Francis Joseph’s power, are strongly on the side of the Bulgarians. The military leaders of the court, if they had their own way, would have given Russia something like open aid; for they at least are inclined to agree with more than one continental statesman that Austria must find the materials of her future strength in the East rather than in the West.

Throughout the continent, meanwhile, many appeals have been made on behalf of Turkey. An active minority in all the great states has declared that she ought to be supported for the common good of Europe. But that minority has also been careful to add that the requisite help must come from England alone. Germany, we are told, can do nothing, because she is afraid of France; France can do nothing, because she is afraid of Germany; Italy can do nothing, because she must attend to her own affairs; and Austria is made powerless by her conflicting nationalities. Hence England is invited, by the warlike agitators, to do what is regarded as the common work of all. But England is no more inclined than France or Austria to plunge into a hopeless enterprise. Nor, even if she were, have the partisans of intervention among us taken the best means to secure continental alliances. They have said in a thousand forms that we ought to think of nothing but our own “interests.” For the sake of “British interests,” one of our own ambassadors had said, that Turkey must be upheld in spite of the horrors of Batak. “British interests” must override the largest considerations of political expediency and moral equity. If that were true, it would be well to cover the fact with a decent hypocrisy, instead of flaunting it in the face of Europe. Such reckless parading of “British interests” explains the preposterous belief of continental peoples that the foreign policy of England is usually guided by cynical selfishness. Happily it is not true that the real interests of England are bound up with the maintenance of intolerable wrong and of an impossible administrative [Page 241] system. No country has a more vital interest in such a settlement as will secure peace in Turkey, by permitting the growing nationalities and religions to emancipate themselves from the grasp of a barbarous and decaying caste. But the general interests of peace might suffer if the war were to be waged until the whole fabric of Ottoman authority in Europe should collapse in the shock of this one contest. Yet such is the peril which must be faced if the Turks be encouraged to resist much longer. Let Plevna fall, let the war roll to the south of the Balkans, and a far more dangerous element of disturbance than the Slavonic subjects of the Porte will be brought into the field. The sending of a Russian army corps toward Epirus and Thessaly would give the opportunity for which the Greeks have been impatiently waiting ever since their war of liberation. They hate the Turkish rule with a passion of which the more sluggish Bulgarians are incapable. Intellectual pride, it may be intellectual vanity, impels them as much as political ambition to escape from the old domination; and even those Greeks who are the brain of the Ottoman Empire would be the first to turn against the Turks if they saw that their race could at last seize what they believe to be its heritage. Thus, if the war continue, and new populations be brought within the scope of its influence, the result may easily be the reduction of the Ottoman Empire, in Europe, to Constantinople and an adjoining province. Those people who, in the name of British or of continental interests, encourage the Turks to continue the combat are really luring them on to destruction. British interests, if they mean anything at all, ought to make us constantly and emphatically warn the Turks that they will not receive the slightest aid from England.