At about the same date the privy seal, which had been held by Lord
Beaconsfield, in addition to his functions as first lord of the treasury,
was conferred on the Duke of Northumberland, and the secretaryship for
Ireland given to the right honorable James Lowther.
The Earl of Derby, who had offered his resignation as foreign secretary at
the time when Lord Carnarvon retired, finally tendered it again last week to
Her Majesty, who accepted it, and transferred the seals of that department
to the Marquis of Salisbury. The vacancy thus occasioned in the India office
was filled by the appointment of Mr. Gathorne Hardy, who, it is understood,
is to be raised to the peerage, and that in the war office made by the
retirement of Mr. Hardy was supplied by Colonel Stanley, a brother of Lord
Derby.
I received yesterday a note from Lord Derby announcing his resignation, which
I answer immediately, expressing my sense of the promptness and courtesy
which on his part had uniformly distinguished our official intercourse, and
my sincere wishes for his health and happiness.
I had at the same time a letter from Lord Salisbury, stating his assumption
of the seals of the foreign office, and inviting me to meet him there on the
3d instant, at three o’clock, to confer with him upon any business in regard
to which I had any instructions from my government. In my reply I
congratulated his lordship upon his accession to office, and stated my
readiness to meet him at the time and place indicated. In the short
interview which accordingly took place he received me with great
cordiality.
The withdrawal of Lord Derby from the cabinet at this critical moment is
regarded as a decided expression on his part adverse to its policy on the
“Eastern question,” which policy has been clearly defined by a circular
which Lord Salisbury addressed, immediately upon his taking office, to the
British diplomatic representatives abroad.
I send by this post a copy of this document as presented to both houses of
Parliament.
The relations between Great Britain and Russia are regarded as very critical.
The common opinion is that they must result in a collision. Both nations are
making active preparations. The Russian ambassador, with whom I talked
yesterday, evinced considerable anxiety, while the members of the cabinet,
with whom I also conversed, showed great firmness.
The British ministry is now a unit on this important question, and in my
judgment they represent the feelings of a majority of the nation.
But these circumstances, however critical in appearance, seem to me to be
only the reasonable adjuncts of a strife between parties, each one of whom
is determined, if possible, to secure its own objects, but which by no means
involve the certainty of a war. The British view having now been clearly
defined in Lord Salisbury’s circular, Russia can remain [Page 260] in doubt no longer, and will probably meet it
by a counter-proposal, which I confidently expect will lead to the adoption
of a common ground for a permanent peace. This is manifestly for the
interest of both the immediate parties, as well as for that of the rest of
Europe.
It is believed by some people here that Prince Bismarck has certain purposes
in his policy which so far have not been openly exhibited. One supposition
is that he covets to annex Holland; another that he desires to extend the
German Empire over the German speaking people of Austria. A good reason,
among many, why such conjectures are improbable is, that the acquisition of
either of these territories would add to the Roman Catholic population of
the empire so largely as to overcome his anti-Roman Catholic policy.
Much speculation exists also as to Russia’s designs in the far East. It is
suggested that these should be counteracted by the transfer of Egypt to
Great Britain, which is openly advocated in some journals, and notably by
Mr. Dicey, the able editor of the Observer, in this month’s number of The
Nineteenth Century.
Any such intention, however, is not admitted by the British Government,
possibly because there are embarrassments connected with the acquisition of
Egypt which must first be privately removed.
Notwithstanding the views I have above expressed and which I have formed
after such consideration as my limited term of residence here has enabled me
to give to the facts of the case, it is proper for me to state that a
contrary opinion is held by many persons in well informed circles, who not
only believe that war is imminent, but that when it occurs it will not be
confined to England and Russia alone.
[Inclosure in No. 58.]
Further correspondence respecting the affairs of
Turkey.
Foreign
Office, April 1,
1878.
dispatch addressed by the marquis of
salisbury to her majesty’s embassies.
My Lord, Sir: I have received the Queen’s
commands to request your excellency to explain to the government to
which you are accredited the course which Her Majesty’s Government have
thought it their duty to pursue in reference to the preliminaries of
peace concluded between the Ottoman and Russian Governments, and to the
European congress which it has been proposed to hold for the examination
of that treaty.
On the 14th January, in view of the reports which had reached Her
Majesty’s Government as to the negotiations for peace which were about
to be opened between the Russian Government and the Porte, and in order
to avoid any possible misconception, Her Majesty’s Government instructed
Lord A. Loftus to state to Prince Gortchakow that, in the opinion of Her
Majesty’s Government, any treaty concluded between the Government of
Russia and the Porte, affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871, must be
an European treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the
powers who were parties to those treaties.
On the 25th January the Russian Government replied by the assurance that
they did not intend to settle by themselves (“isolément”) European
questions having reference to the peace which is to be made (“Se
rattachant à la paix”).
Her Majesty’s Government having learned that the basis of peace had been
arranged between the Turkish and Russian delegates at Kyzanlik,
instructed Lord A. Loftus, on the 29th January, to state to the Russian
Government that Her Majesty’s Government, while recognizing any
arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish delegates at Kyzanlik for
the conclusion of an armistice and for the settlement of bases of peace
as binding between the two belligerents, declared that in so far as
those arrangements were calculated to modify European treaties and to
affect general and British interests, Her Majesty’s Government were
unable to recognize in them any validity unless they were made the
subject of a formal agreement among the parties to the treaty of
Paris.
[Page 261]
On the 30th January, Lord A. Loftus communicated this declaration to
Prince Gortchakow, and his highness replied that to effect an armistice
certain bases of peace were necessary, but they were only to be
considered as preliminaries and not definite as regarded Europe; and
stated categorically that questions bearing on European interests would
be concerted with European powers, and that he had given Her Majesty’s
Government clear and positive assurances to this effect.
On the 4th February the Austrian ambassador communicated a telegram
inviting Her Majesty’s Government to a conference at Vienna, and Her
Majesty’s Government at once accepted the proposal.
On the 5th February, his excellency addressed a formal invitation to Lord
Derby, stating that:
“L’Autriche-Hongrie, en sa qualité de puissance signataire des actes
internationaux qui ont eu pour objet de régler le système politique en
Orient, a toujours réservé, en présence de la guerre actuelle, sa part
d’influence sur le règlement définitif des conditions de la paix
future.
“Le Gouvernement Impérial de la Russie, auquel nous avons fait part de ce
point de vue, l’a pleinement apprécié.
“Aujourd’hui que des préliminaires de paix viennent d’être signés entre
la Russie et la Turquie, le moment nous semble venu d’établir l’accord
de l’Europe sur les modifications qu’il deviendrait nécessaire
d’apporter aux traités susmentionnés.
“Le mode le plus apte à amener cette entente nous paraît être la réunion
d’une conférence des puissances signataires du traité de Paris de 1856,
et du protocole de Londres de 1871.”
On the 9th instant the Austrian Government proposed that instead of the
conference at Baden-Baden, as previously contemplated, a congress should
be assembled at Berlin. Her Majesty’s Government replied that they had
no objection to the change, but that they considered “that it would be
desirable to have it understood in the first place that all questions
dealt with in the treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey should be
considered a subject to be discussed in the congress; and that no
alteration in the condition of things previously established by treaty
should be acknowledged as valid until it has received the assent of the
powers.”
On the 12th March Count Beust was told that Her Majesty’s Government must
be perfectly clear on the points mentioned in the letter to him on the
9th instant before they could definitely agree to go into congress.
On the 13th Her Majesty’s Government explained further the first
condition:
“That they must distinctly understand, before they can enter into
congress, that every article in the treaty between Russia and Turkey
will be placed before the congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but
in order that it may be considered what articles require acceptance or
concurrence by the several powers, and what do not.”
On the 14th the Russian ambassador communicated the following telegram
from Prince Gortchakow:
“Toutes les grandes puissances savent déjà que le texte complet du traité
préliminaire de paix avec la Porte leur sera communiqué dès que les
ratifications auront été échangées, ce qui ne saurait tarder. Il sera
simultanément publié ici. Nous n’avons rien à cacher.”
On the 17th Lord A. Loftus reported that he had received the following
memorandum from Prince Gortchakow:
“In reply to communication made by Lord A. Loftus of the dispatch by
which Lord Derby has replied to the proposal of Count Beust relating to
the meeting of the congress at Berlin, I have the honor to repeat the
assurance which Count Schouvaloff has been already charged to give to
Her Majesty’s Government, viz, that the preliminary treaty of peace
concluded between Russia and Turkey shall be textually communicated to
the great powers before the meeting of the congress, and that in the
congress itself each power will have the full liberty of its
appreciations and of its actions.”
In a dispatch received on the 18th Lord A. Loftus stated that Prince
Gortchakow had said to him that of course he could not impose silence on
any member of the congress, but he could only accept a discussion on
those portions of the treaty which affected European interests.
Lord Derby having asked Count Schouvaloff for a reply from Prince
Gortchakow, his excellency informed him, on the 19th, that he was
“charged to represent to Her Majesty’s Government that the treaty of
peace concluded between Russia and Turkey—the only one which existed,
for there was no secret engagement—would be communicated to the
Government of the Queen in its entirety, and long before (‘bien avant’)
the assembling of the congress. The Government of the Queen, in like
manner as the other great powers, reserved to themselves at the congress
their full liberty of appreciation and action. This same liberty, which
she did not dispute to others, Russia claimed for herself. Now, it would
be to restrict her, if, alone among all the powers, Russia contracted a
preliminary engagement.”
On the 21st Lord Derby replied that Her Majesty’s Government could not
recede from the position already clearly defined by them, that they must
distinctly understand, [Page 262] before
they could enter into congress, that every article in the treaty between
Russia and Turkey would be placed before the congress, not necessarily
for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered what articles
required acceptance or concurrence by the other powers, and what did
not.
Her Majesty’s Government were unable to accept the view now put forward
by Prince Gortchakow, that the freedom of opinion and action in congress
of Russia more than any other power would be restricted by this
preliminary understanding.
Her Majesty’s Government therefore desired to ask whether the Government
of Russia were willing that the communication of the treaty en entier to the various powers should be treated
as a placing of the treaty before the congress, in order that the whole
treaty, in its relation to existing treaties, might be examined and
considered by the congress.
On the 26th Count Schouvaloff wrote to Lord Derby that the imperial
cabinet deemed it its duty to adhere to the declaration which he was
ordered to make to the Government of the Queen, and which was stated in
the letter which he had the honor to address to him, dated the 19th
March.
As different interpretations had been given to the “liberty of
appreciation and action” which Russia thought it right to reserve to
herself at the congress, the imperial cabinet defined the meaning of the
term in the following manner: “It leaves to the other powers the liberty
of raising such questions at the congress as they might think it fit to
discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting or not
accepting the discussion of these questions.”
Her Majesty’s Government deeply regret the decision which the Russian
Government have thus announced.
How far the stipulations of the treaty of San Stefano would commend
themselves as expedient to the judgment of the European powers it is not
at present possible to decide. But even if a considerable portion of
them were such as were likely to be approved, the reservation of a
right, at discretion, to refuse to accept a discussion of them in a
congress of the powers would not on that account be the less open to the
most serious objection. An inspection of the treaty will sufficiently
show that Her Majesty’s Government could not, in a European congress,
accept any partial or fragmentary examination of its provisions. Every
material stipulation which it contains involves a departure from the
treaty of 1856.
By the declaration annexed to the first protocol of the conference held
in London in 1871, the plenipotentiaries of the great powers, including
Russia, recognized “that it is an essential principle of the law of
nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a
treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of
the contracting powers, by means of an amicable arrangement.”
It is impossible for Her Majesty’s Government, without violating the
spirit of this declaration, to acquiesce in the withdrawal from the
cognizance of the powers of articles in the new treaty which are
modifications of existing treaty engagements, and consistent with
them.
The general nature of the treaty, and the combined effect of its several
stipulations upon the interests of the signatory powers, furnish another
and a conclusive reason against the separate discussion of any one
portion of those stipulations apart from the rest.
The most important consequences to which the treaty practically leads are
those which result from its action as a whole upon the nations of
Southeastern Europe. By the articles erecting the New Bulgaria, a strong
slave state will be created under the auspices and control of Russia,
possessing important harbors upon the shores of the Black Sea and the
Archipelago, and conferring upon that power a preponderating influence
over both political and commercial relations in those seas. It will be
so constituted as to merge in the dominant slave majority a considerable
mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views
with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it not
only in nationality but in political tendency and in religious
allegiance.
The provisions by which this new state is to be subjected to a ruler whom
Russia will practically choose, its administration framed by a Russian
commissary, and the first working of its institutions commenced under
the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political
system of which in future it is to form a part. Stipulations are added
which will extend this influence even beyond the boundaries of the New
Bulgaria. The provision, in itself highly commendable, of improved
institutions for the populations of Thessaly and Epirus, is accompanied
by a condition that the law by which they are to be secured shall be
framed under the supervision of the Russian Government. It is followed
by engagements for the protection of members of the Russian Church,
which are certainly not more limited in their scope than those articles
of the treaty of Kainardji, upon which the claims were founded which
were abrogated in 1856.
Such stipulations cannot be viewed with satisfaction either by the
Government of Greece, or by the powers to whom all parts of the Ottoman
Empire are a matter of [Page 263] common
interest. The general effect of this portion of the treaty will be to
increase the power of the Russian Empire in the countries and on the
shores where a Greek population predominates, not only to the prejudice
of that nation, but also of every country having interests in the east
of the Mediterranean Sea. The territorial severance from Constantinople
of the Greek, Albanian, and Slavonic provinces which are still left
under the Government of the Porte will cause their administration to be
attended with constant difficulty, and even embarrassment, and will not
only deprive the Porte of the political strength which might have arisen
from their possession, but will expose the inhabitants to a serious risk
of anarchy.
By the other portions of the treaty analogous results are arrived at upon
other frontiers of the Ottoman Empire.
The compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania, the extension of
Bulgaria to the shores of the Black Sea, which are principally inhabited
by Mussulmans and Greeks, and the acquisition of the important harbor of
Batoum, will make the will of the Russian Government dominant over all
the vicinity of the Black Sea. The acquisition of the strongholds of
Armenia will place the population of that province under the immediate
influence of the power which holds them; while the extensive European
trade which now passes from Trebizond to Persia will, in consequence of
the cessions in Kurdistan, be liable to be arrested at the pleasure of
the Russian Government by the prohibitory barriers of their commercial
system.
Provision is made for an indemnity, of which the amount is obviously
beyond the means of Turkey to discharge, even if the fact be left out of
account that any surplus of its revenues is already hypothecated to
other creditors. The mode of payment of this indemnity is left, in vague
language, to ulterior negotiations between Russia and the Porte. Payment
may be demanded immediately, or it may be left as an unredeemed and
unredeemable obligation too weigh down the independence of the Porte for
many years. Its discharge may be commuted into a yet larger cession of
territory, or it may take the form of special engagements subordinating
in all things the policy of Turkey to that of Russia. It is impossible
not to recognize in this provision an instrument of formidable efficacy
for the coercion of the Ottoman Government, if the necessity for
employing it should arise.
Objections may be urged, individually, against these various
stipulations; and arguments, on the other hand, may possibly be advanced
to show that they are not individually inconsistent with the attainment
of the lasting peace and stability which it is the highest object of all
present negotiations to establish in the provinces of European and
Asiatic Turkey. But their separate and individual operation, whether
defensible or not, is not that which should engage the most earnest
attention of the signatory powers. Their combined effect, in addition to
the results upon the Greek population and upon the balance of maritime
power which have been already pointed out, is to depress, almost to the
point of entire subjection, the political independence of the Government
of Constantinople.
The formal jurisdiction of that government extends over geographical
positions which must, under all circumstances, be of the deepest
interest to Great Britain. It is in the power of the Ottoman Government
to close or to open the straits, which form the natural highway of
nations between the Ægean Sea and the Euxine. Its dominion is recognized
at the head of Persian Gulf, on the shores of the Levant, and in the
immediate neighborhood of the Suez Canal. It cannot be otherwise than a
matter of extreme solicitude to this country that the government to
which this jurisdiction belongs should be so closely pressed by the
political outposts of a greatly superior power that its independent
action, and even existence, is almost impossible. These results arise,
not so much from the language of any single article in the treaty, as
from the operation of the instrument as a whole. A discussion limited to
articles selected by one power in the congress would be an illusory
remedy for the dangers to English interests and to the permanent peace
of Europe, which would result from the state of things which the treaty
proposes to establish.
The object of Her Majesty’s government at the Constantinople conference
was to give effect to the policy of reforming Turkey under the Ottoman
Government, removing well-grounded grievances, and thus preserving the
empire until the time when it might be able to dispense with protective
guarantees.
It was obvious that this could only be brought about by rendering the
different populations so far contented with their position as to inspire
them with a spirit of patriotism, and make them ready to defend the
Ottoman Empire as loyal subjects of the Sultan.
This policy was frustrated by the unfortunate resistance of the Ottoman
Government itself, and, under the altered circumstances of the present
time, the same result cannot be attained to the same extent by the same
means. Large changes may, and no doubt will, be requisite in the
treaties by which Southeastern Europe has hitherto been ruled.
But good government, assured peace, and freedom for populations to whom
those blessings have been strange, are still the objects which this
country earnestly desires [Page 264] to
secure. In requiring a full consideration of the general interests which
the new arrangements threaten to affect, Her Majesty’s Government
believe that they are taking the surest means of securing those objects.
They would willingly have entered a congress in which the stipulations
in question could have been examined as a whole, in their relation to
existing treaties, to the acknowledged rights of Great Britain and of
other powers, and to the beneficent ends which the united action of
Europe has always been directed to secure.
But neither the interests which Her Majesty’s Government are specially
bound to guard, nor the well-being of the regions with which the treaty
deals, would be consulted by the assembling of a congress whose
deliberations were to be restricted by such reservations as those which
have been laid down by Prince Gortchakow in his most recent
communication.
Your excellency will read this dispatch to the minister for foreign
affairs and give him a copy of it.
I am, &c.,
