Of course the opinions of Mr. de Lesseps are highly colored by the interest
which he must feel in the success of his enterprise, and for the expression
thereof he is, perhaps, not fairly subject to criticism.
[Inclosure in No.
302.—Translation.]
Mr. Pereira to the
Secretary of Foreign Relations of
Colombia.
* * * * * * *
When I was introduced into the room in which was Mr. de Lesseps he was
engaged in an animated conversation with the North American general, Mr.
Henry Shelton Sandford (the same who went to Bogotá, in the years 1860
and 1861, with the double charge of representing there the North
American Government and the Panama Railroad Company), whom he was
endeavoring to convince that the American policy in questions relative
to the canal showed great injustice and very little wisdom.
Upon my arrival he paused in order to present me to General Sandford, as
the secretary of the Colombian legation in France, and to add that I
could, without doubt, give him creditable information upon the latest
phases of the subject. Introduced thus directly into the conversation I
stated that I was unable to give them any authentic account of what had
occurred, since I had received nothing; still less could I guarantee the
authenticity of what the public press had published, but I was inclined
to believe that at bottom there was much truth in what was said.
According to the newspapers a protocol of conference had been signed in
Washington, whose official text I did not know, but that I imagined
would prove to be that given by the press; that our minister, in view,
without doubt, of the gravity of the question, had believed it necessary
to go in person to submit to the consideration of the Government of
Bogotá the propositions of that of Washington; that in Colombia all this
had caused much alarm, and that the Senate had unanimously authorized
the executive power to denounce the treaty of 1846, upon the provisions
of which the American Government based its pretensions to erect forts
upon the isthmus.
“The question of the neutrality of the canal,” said Mr. de Lesseps, “has
no other true or practical solution than that which the logic and
principles of international law indicate; to respect the sovereignty of
Colombia in that territory. If Colombia permit, which she will not, that
the United States construct fortresses there she will undoubtedly lose
the isthmus. There remain to her, then, but two paths; to celebrate [Page 360] with the principal European
maritime powers treaties similar to that which binds her to the United
States, or denounce the latter contract, as the Senate has suggested,
and which, without doubt, is the best that can be done if she would
avoid complications in the future. Under any circumstances the diplomats
will continue to agitate the question in order to arrange everything
upon paper; but the important point is that meanwhile I may open the
canal.
“Diplomacy has never served but to recognize accomplished facts. The
sword or genius opens a highway according to its mode without caring for
idle discussion, and diplomacy comes afterwards to say that what was
done was well done. For more than thirty years I have served as a
diplomat, and I have never had occasion to do otherwise.
“When it was proposed to open the Suez Canal, the same questions arose
that arise to-day. All the powers began negotiations with the object of
reaching a general agreement and guarantee in common the neutrality of
the canal. The negotiations are still pending, but the question is
resolved in the manner most simple and that best conduces to the
interests of all. The men-of-war and the armies of all the nations of
the earth may pass through without any distinction. In the last year
97,000 soldiers of different nations passed through the canal.
“England was no less hostile to the Suez Canal than the Americans show
themselves to be to-day to that of Panama. Lord Palmerston directed
various protests, full of threats, to the Ottoman Porte, with the object
of forcing him to revoke the concession for the opening of the canal.” *
* *
“Lord Palmerston proved to be a great statesman,” here interrupted Mr.
Sandford.
“And nevertheless the English cabinet finally consented that the work of
excavation should be begun when the enterprise was already almost
completed.
“For that reason I say to Americans and Europeans, negotiate, negotiate as much as you wish, if before you have
terminated your discussion I shall have opened the canal and solved the
problem.”
“But the conditions of the canal of Suez,” objected the general, “were
not the same as those of Panama. There the neutrality is effective,
because it is to the interest of all the maritime powers of the first
order; here we are the only maritime power menaced, and, it gives me
pain to confess it, we have not a war marine that can advantageously
oppose that of England for example. Our extensive Pacific coast is
to-day well defended by two men of war; the canal opened, that defense
would be insufficient. Ours is a country of work and of peace. We have
no such armies as in Europe, and have cause to fear everything from a
canal in which our preponderance shall not make itself exclusively
felt.”
“These fears, replied Mr. de Lesseps,” are unfounded. To-day all nations
desire peace and work. Without doubt, English fleets may pass through
the canal, but yours, also, may do the same, and really this is not a
serious argument. Every road brings us nearer, it is true, but it serves
equally for offense as for defense. The navigation of the seas is free.
No nation, be she perhaps the most powerful, may say to the others,
‘Your ships cannot pass through here.’ * * * ”
“The canal is an artificial work that does not enter the case; it is the
Strait of Gibraltar to America.”
“That is an error; the canal as the strait is ever the sea. What I am
going to do is join the waters of two oceans that nature has separated.
Gibralter is an inaccessible rock, where, by an exceptional situation,
the English have succeeded in fortifying themselves in what they won in
honest war; but the same will not happen with Panama. This is an open
territory of a sister nation of which you cannot possess yourselves
without violating the law of nations nor without a struggle, long,
tenacious, and without quarter. The Colombians have, as I, Spanish blood
in their veins, and the last one will die rather than consent to such
spoliation. You are a great, strong, and rich nation; they, few in
numbers, helpless and poor, but no matter. It will make no difference,
because you cannot commit an act like that, which would be unworthy of
such a people, which I am pleased to call the most advanced upon the
globe. And, besides, it is not so easy as it would appear to conquer a
nation, warlike and of such glorious traditions, that counts upon the
immense moral force that justice, right, and the sympathies of the
civilized world give it.
“As for me,” he added in an outburst of noble enthusiasm, “I would be
honored, to crown my career, to be killed there, defending with arms in
my hand the independence and integrity of Colombia!”
His interlocutor, partly discomfited and part in doubt, said to him, “You
are very young.” “Not very,” replied instantly the illustrious old man,”
when I visited San Francisco and Chicago, I said to their people, who
appeared to doubt the success of my enterprise, ‘You are great cities,
not one-third as old as I am, and it is very difficult to make me
believe that you can doubt the incomparable power of labor, you who are
its most surprising manifestation.’” And terminating the interview, he
said to Mr. Sandford, “I return to the beginning. The canal will be
built, and its neutrality will be preserved, not because diplomacy will
resolve the question, but because it is demanded [Page 361] by the very nature of things, by
universal interest and our own business (undertaking), which consists in
the ships of all nations, whether men of war or merchantmen, passing
through it without other condition than the payment of their respective
contributions.”
Such were, if not with his own words, the ideas expressed in substance by
Mr. de Lesseps. Perhaps I may have misunderstood some point or committed
errors, but, as the mail goes to-day, I have no time to correct the
account I have just written; and thus I send it, hoping that the
secretary will not ill receive the liberty I have taken.
I am, &c.,
