The Secretary of State to
the French Chargé d’Affaires.
Department of State,
Washington, October 16,
1906.
No. 343.]
Sir: I have the pleasure to acknowledge your
note of the 18th of August last, in which, at the instance of the
chamber of commerce of Paris, attention is drawn to the perils to which
vessels are exposed by the dormant mines scattered over the open seas of
the Far East, and the suggestion is made that this subject be taken up
by The Hague conference and an international agreement effected to
prevent the liability of such dangers.
After-consultation with my colleague of the navy, I may say that this
Government would incline to favor an international agreement whereby to
restrict and regulate the employment by belligerents of dormant or other
mines which are liable to drift away from the spot of their strategic
employment and become a menace to legitimate navigation on the high seas
or in neutral waters.
While the use of submarine mines in war is as legitimate as that of
torpedoes and other dirigible explosive devices, the mutual rights of
the belligerents and their obligations toward the whole neutral world
forbid their employment except under conditions of reasonable control,
both as to the area in which they are effective and the duration of
their destructive character. Certainly the menace from drifting mines to
all shipping navigating the Yellow Sea and adjacent waters [Page 305] since and during the Russo-Japanese
war (and no one can foresee when this menace will cease nor how far
afield it will extend with the lapse of time) constitutes a condition of
affairs to which no neutral can reasonably be asked to submit, no matter
how great the military value to the belligerent of the use of the mines
from which this condition results. In view of the impossibility of
fixing the responsibility in any particular case, it is no solution of
the difficulty to argue that the belligerent is responsible for all
damage to neutral shipping resulting from his use of mines, and where
the damage to a neutral is accompanied by the sacrifice of innocent
lives the question becomes still more complex.
While it may be premature to formulate the restrictions and regulations
applicable to the case, it may be observed that in the case of
unanchored mines the conditions should be similar to those in regard to
torpedoes which are merely automobile modifications of the unanchored or
floating type, and that as to both the area of destructive influence
should not exceed that of the circle whose diameter equals that of the
run of the ordinary standard torpedo. It would seem further that
neutrals have a right to demand that belligerents who make use of
contact mines, whether anchored or unanchored, shall use only such as
shall become innocuous upon getting adrift and passing, uncontrolled,
beyond the immediate range of belligerent activity. The point which
seems proper to assert and emphasize by an international agreement is
that a belligerent has no right to seek his own safety or to attack the
enemy at the expense of probable injury to a neutral, against which no
precaution on the part of the neutral can adequately provide. The
belligerent’s remedy and duty is obviously to improve his contact mine
and prevent its becoming a terrible uncontrollable peril to innocent
mankind.
The Secretary of the Navy has furnished me with a memorandum in regard to
derelict mines off the China coasts. I have the pleasure to inclose a
copy of it for your further information.
Accept, sir, etc.,
[Inclosure.]
The Acting Secretary of the
Navy to the Secretary of
State.
Navy Department,
Washington, September 27,
1906.
Sir: Referring to your letter No. 282,
September 1, 1906, inclosing translation of a note from the French
chargé d’affaires, in which, calling attention to the danger to
commerce from dormant mines scattered over the open seas of the Far
East, he asks how a motion to effect, in accordance with the views
of The Hague conference, an international agreement to prevent the
recurrence of so serious a danger would be received by the United
States, this department has the honor to reply as follows:
- 2.
- In view of the extensive coast line of the United States,
of the great value, actual and moral, of submarine mines in
harbor defense, and of their small cost as compared to other
means giving equal results, the Navy Department considers it
highly impolitic for our Government to become a party to an
international agreement entirely prohibiting the use of
submarine mines in war.
- 3.
- As between belligerents themselves, the use of mines in
any form is no more subject to objection than is the use of
torpedoes or submarines. As a rule all new weapons in their
infancy are attacked on humanitarian or other grounds, but
in the end are accepted, provided they are not perfidious
and do [Page 306] not inflict
suffering out of proportion to the ends to be obtained. Such
was the case with the torpedo, which is now in general use,
and the arguments pro and con in the case of that weapon
apply with equal force to the submarine mine.
- 4.
- There is a division of our artillery devoted to the
defense of our seacoast harbors by mines. Lately large sums
of money have been spent to perfect this system, and the
entire scheme of mine defense is an important part of our
coast-defense system. The mines are anchored mines that can
be fired at will (observation mines), or by contact
(electro-contact mines), and regulations have been drawn up
and approved providing for the safety of neutrals and our
own vessels. Upon executive order certain areas are
proclaimed to be defensive areas, and all such vessels
placed under charge of pilots while passing through these
areas. We have a naval mine which is an anchored contact
mine, to be used for the protection of flying or advanced
bases. These mines would be dangerous under some conditions
should they break adrift from their moorings; but it would
not be difficult to so alter them as to bring them within
the proposed rule.
- 5.
- In Great Britain the system of mine defense, which has
been in charge of the army, has been turned over to the
navy. It has been publicly stated that the navy would defend
the coast ports with submarines and that no mines would be
used for this purpose. The number of submarines building in
England gives some color of truth to this statement. At the
same time it is known that their navy has frequent practice
with anchored mines and countermines and that they are
building vessels to be used for laying mines. The vessels
with the naval mines are probably intended to defend an
advanced or flying base.
- 6.
- France apparently depends largely on submarines or
submersibles to take the place of anchored mines.
- 7.
- Germany is supposed to be prepared to use mines to a large
extent in the protection of her coast, and has a number of
mine-laying vessels.
- 8.
- It is reported that Austria has a vessel prepared to place
floating mines in the path of an enemy.
- 9.
- It isobvious, however, that the unrestricted use of
submarine mines involves not only the mutual rights of the
belligerents concerned, but also the obligations of those
belligerents to the whole neutral world. Certainly the
menace from drifting mines to all shipping navigating the
Yellow Sea and adjacent waters since, and during, the
Russo-Japanese war (and no one can foresee when this menace
will cease, nor how far afield it will extend with the lapse
of time), constitutes a condition of affairs to which no
neutral can reasonably be asked to submit, no matter how
great the military value to the belligerent of the use of
mines from which this condition results. (See memorandum.)
In view of the impossibility of fixing the responsibility in
any particular case, it is no solution of the difficulty to
argue that the belligerent is responsible for all damage to
neutral shipping resulting from his use of mines, and where
the damage to a neutral is accompanied by the sacrifice of
innocent lives, the question becomes still more
complex.
- 10.
- This condition points strongly to the necessity for an
international convention restricting and regulating the use
of mines in time of war.
- 11.
- Proposed regulations followed by a full discussion of the
question can be found on page 147 of the volume
“International Law Topics and Discussions” issued by the
Naval War College, 1905. The regulations are as follows:
- (1)
- Unanchored contact mines are prohibited, except
those that by construction are rendered innocuous
after a limited time, certainly before passing
outside the area of immediate belligerent
activities.
- (2)
- Anchored contact mines that do not become
innocuous on getting adrift are prohibited.
- (3)
- If anchored contact mines be used within
belligerent jurisdiction or within the area of
immediate belligerent activities, due precaution
shall be taken for the safety of neutrals.
- The department approves the second and third of these
regulations, but would change the first to read “Unanchored
contact mines are prohibited.” If unanchored contact mines
which become innocuous after a limited time and certainly so
before passing outside the area of immediate belligerent
activities were allowed to be used, then there is room for
widely differing opinions as to what constitutes “a limited
time “or “the area of immediate belligerent activities.”
There can be little question that the time should not exceed
that of the run of the standard automobile torpedo, and the
area that of the circle whose diameter equals the torpedo’s
range. Unless contact mines meeting the conditions above [Page 307] indicated can be
constructed at smaller expense than the automobile torpedo,
which is an open question, the automobile torpedo would seem
to meet all the conditions under which it would be desirable
to use unanchored contact mines.
- 12.
- Contact mines that become innocuous on getting adrift
certainly can be made, and neutrals have an undoubted right
to insist that only such mines shall be used.
- 13.
- On the other hand, it has been suggested that the
restrictions embodied in paragraph 12 above would prevent a
vessel or fleet taking refuge in a harbor or bay from
hastily mining the channel as a protection from a pursuing
enemy. This view ignores the question of the advisability of
a vessel, even in the greatest straits, planting contact
mines under conditions which preclude her having an exact
knowledge of their location, and further assumes that mines
that can readily be planted and yet meet the conditions
imposed by paragraph 12 can not be constructed, which is by
no means certain. But granting all the above, it still
appears that even in this case the right of the neutral
prevails, and that the belligerent has no right to seek his
own safety at the expense of probable injury to the neutral,
against which no protection on the part of the latter can
provide. The belligerent’s remedy is to improve his contact
mine.
I have, etc.,
Truman H. Newberry,
Acting Secretary.
[Subinclosure.]
memorandum of derelict mines off china
coast.
Previous to and after the capitulation of Port Arthur, some 3,000 to
5,000 mines were planted by the Russians and Japanese. These mines
were anchored in and around the entrance to the harbor of Port
Arthur and for some miles outside the harbor. These were mechanical
mines with chemical fuses and were said to be anchored with chain
moorings. These moorings, in time, either corroded through or were
chafed through by the continuous movements of the water. This was
particularly the case during the severe winter storms of that
locality.
The submergence of the mines after going adrift depended upon the
point of fracture of the chain; if close to the mine, the mine
floated on the surface and in smooth weather could be sighted. If
the fracture was near the bottom, the mine was drawn under by the
weight of the chain, floated beneath the surface and could not be
seen.
Of those sighted, about 100 to 150 were reported to the offices of
the captains of the ports on the China coast, the latitude and
longitude were seen being given, and all vessels were warned of
their locality.
The above number was naturally but a small percentage of those
adrift.
Few were seen to the southward of Shanghai and the majority of those
reported were sighted between Newchwang and the Saddle Islands. Many
mines floated ashore on the coasts of Japan, especially along the
western and northwestern coast, and some were reported on the
northeast coast.
Many coastwise merchant steamers and numerous Japanese vessels were
sunk by these derelict mines.
In September, 1905, the vessels of our fleet steamed in squadron from
Chefoo to Shanghai, passing some 5 miles from Shantung Promontory;
an hour later on the same day a Batterfield and Swire steamer,
pursuing the same course, struck a derelict mine and sunk in 10
minutes with a loss of 16 lives.
Following is a list of the ships known to have been destroyed by
derelict mines off the China coast during the years 1904, 1905, and
1906:
| Name. |
Nation. |
Year. |
Name. |
Nation. |
Year. |
| Nakonoura Maru |
Japan |
1904 |
|
American |
1905 |
| Shintaiping |
Russia |
1904 |
Marko Maru |
Japan |
1905 |
|
China |
1904 |
Hsieh-ho |
China |
1905 |
| Lucia |
British |
1904 |
Leho |
British |
1905 |
| Kashing |
China |
1904 |
Sanchin Maru |
Japan |
1905 |
| Laina Chiyoda Maru |
Japan |
1904 |
Silvia |
Germany |
1906 |
| Tiberius |
Germany |
1904 |
|
British |
1906 |
|
China |
1905 |
Toyotomic Maru |
Japan |
1906 |
| Sobralance |
British |
1905 |
Nangpo |
China |
|
| Cheyetsu |
Japan |
1905 |
|
|
|
