1. Briefing Book Prepared in the United States Information Agency1
[Omitted here are the Introduction; Table of Contents; Section I: Agency Missions and Statutory Authorities; Section II: Basic Organization and Function; Section III: Budgetary and Financial Information; Section IV: Key Personnel; Section V: Significant Relationships within the U.S. Government; Section VI: Significant Intergovernmental Relationships; and Section VII: Legislative Processes and Problems.]
VIII. POLICY AND PROGRAM ISSUES; PRIORITIES
Psychological Problems in Conduct of Foreign Policy
NOTE: USIA is charged with “advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs and official statements.”
Important issues that concern USIA in its advisory role are listed in this section. On these issues, USIA also has an operational role in interpreting U.S. policies and actions to overseas audiences. (Only issues with world-wide ramifications are included here. Those of strictly area significance are left to the area papers.) Specific program recommendations will be made at a later date.
[Page 2]A. Matters of Immediate Concern
1. The Transfer of Power
A deliberate effort will be necessary to demonstrate to the world the process of orderly transition. Such an effort could help offset any sense of hiatus which might generate anxiety in countries relying on U.S. support, or encourage adversaries to act on a presumed wavering in the U.S. resolve to honor commitments of the past. The newly elected leadership should give public assurance that, while it prepares to review U.S. foreign policy, it will not unilaterally abandon or curtail any commitment affecting the rest of the world. An early statement of cardinal principles would have an excellent effect.
2. The New Leadership
A comparable effort will be required to project the new leadership—President, Vice President and cabinet officers as they are announced. After the divisiveness of the campaign much of which was reflected in editorials abroad, steps must be taken to develop sympathetic understanding and support for the new personalities on the part of opinion leaders abroad.
3. Viet-Nam
This will probably continue to be the number one priority problem. Any of the alternatives—escalation, withdrawal, or even a break-off of the Paris Peace Talks2—will present problems with respect to our allies in Southeast Asia and to those countries that have opposed our policies up to now.
4. Czech-NATO Crisis
Fear of possible Soviet moves against Romania, Yugoslavia, West Germany or Berlin—in addition to what many foreign observers see as a slow U.S. and NATO reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia3—have to a degree shaken public confidence in the safety of Europe. Two types of action should be urgently considered: (a) public statements or action specifically designed to deter the USSR from further moves; (b) more vigorous U.S. initiatives to energize NATO.
[Page 3]5. U.S. Determination for Peace
While making clear the U.S. stand against aggression, we must also bring home to world opinion our continuing commitment to peace. In this context, the new leadership could well reiterate U.S. determination to avoid nuclear war and limit the arms race; and point out its willingness to resume the temporarily abandoned dialogue with the USSR as soon as the Soviets give evidence that they will respect the rights of other nations. Strong U.S. leadership to ratify the non-proliferation treaty,4 at an early appropriate moment, could have a salutary effect in helping win adherence of such undecided nations as Germany, Israel and India.
6. World Opinion and the Current Domestic Scene
Many foreign observers see the U.S. as torn by internal conflicts, between whites and blacks, rich and poor, old and young. They see these conflicts producing violence in a country already prone to violence. Commentators speak frequently of the U.S. tradition of frontier violence and the use of guns to settle disputes; in describing present conditions, they fall back on the terms “malaise” and “sick society.” The general response is one of anxiety, the prognosis varying widely between friendly and hostile critics. Strong statements by the new U.S. leadership putting the situation in perspective would be helpful with foreign audiences.
B. Matters Requiring Special Attention Within the Next Twelve Months
1. Free World Opinion and the U.S. Role in World Affairs
There is growing fear that the U.S., troubled by domestic problems and weary of the costly Viet-Nam war, is ready to turn away from its far-reaching international commitments. Talk of a possible neo-isolationism is widespread. Hence the need for reassurance by the new leadership that—while the U.S. will modify its policies as changing circumstances require—there is a basic constancy in the U.S. participation in the world community of nations.
[Page 4]2. U.S. Role in the U.N.
As a corollary to point #1 above, an early reaffirmation of U.S. support to the United Nations would have a salutary effect on world opinion. It should include tangible evidence of U.S. commitment to the U.N., possibly in the form of concrete suggestions on U.N. peacekeeping machinery or initiatives in the disarmament field. And it should include reiteration of the traditional U.S. support for the development of international law.
3. The U.S. and the Developing World
Another area for high priority attention is the relationship of the U.S. to the developing world. Cuts in the foreign aid program and indications of a trend toward protectionism provide a backdrop for deep questioning about U.S. intentions. A major statement of the policy of the new administration, early in 1969, could do much to clear the air.
4. U.S. Arms sales to Other Countries
This already sensitive issue—tied in the public mind to the broader question of the arms race—will become even more so with the sale of F–4s to Israel,5 the probable sale of tanks to Pakistan, and the probable resumption of a cash sale policy for both India and Pakistan. A long-overdue review of our substantive policy should be accompanied by an effort to sort out and construct some sort of reasonable public affairs policy, which has thus far been lacking.
5. Space
Advance planning is needed for the possibility that the USSR may land a man on the moon before the U.S. does. If so, the effect on world opinion will be considerable. Simply to repeat that we are “not racing” will do little to counter the impression that the U.S. is in second place both in space exploration and in scientific development in general. USIA should participate in contingency planning.
6. Military bases
The question of U.S. military bases overseas is a continuing one, bearing closely on the sensitivity of other nations to over-dependence on the United States. The factor of foreign opinion, in its many ramifications, should be carefully considered as plans are reviewed. Here USIA can make an important contribution to current State-Defense studies.
[Page 5]7. Chemical-biological Weapons
The development of chemical-biological weapons and their potential use are getting increasing public attention both at home and abroad. The question may pose a psychological problem comparable to—though not so great as—the problem of nuclear weapons. Again, psychological factors are a vital element to be considered.
C. Long-Term or Continuing Issues
1. The Peace/Strength Image of the U.S.
A serious and continuing problem is to assure world opinion of U.S. strength to deter aggression and simultaneously of our dedication to peace. A delicate balance must be maintained. Suggestions were made above for reiterating the U.S. military commitment in NATO. At the same time, we must recognize that much of the world, reacting emotionally to the situation in Viet-Nam, sees U.S. action there as warlike and needlessly destructive. Hence the need also to dramatize our deep national commitment to peace. This might be done through new U.S. initiatives in the U.N.; through greater emphasis on disarmament and arms control (exploiting the Disarmament Agency as an important symbol of our practical aspirations for peace); through identifying the U.S. tangibly with the search for solutions to the great common problems such as health, education, and increased food production.
Communist China
U.S. relations with mainland China loom as a major problem in the years ahead, with implications for U.S. policy world-wide.
[Omitted here are the remainder of Section VIII; Section IX: U.S. Advisory Commission on Information; Section X: Personal Arrangements: The Director and Deputy Director; Section XI: Internal Communications; the bibliography; and the index.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Administration and Management, Assistant Director’s Correspondence File, SUBJ 1968–1972, Entry UD–164, Box 1, INF 14–1 Briefing Papers, Transition Books—Vol. I and II 1968. Confidential. The portion of the briefing book printed here is Volume I. In a November 19, 1968, memorandum to agency officials, Posner indicated that the briefing book consisted of information provided by “all Agency Elements” regarding “policy and program issues.” He continued: “As anticipated, changes in the world situation and the passage of time may make it necessary to up-date some of the materials. We are prepared to make such changes as elements, in their judgment, consider necessary to present a current picture of Agency problems and conditions.” (Ibid.; INF 14–1 Briefing Papers (Orderly Transition of Presidency) 1968)↩
- The Paris Peace Talks, with representation by the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front (NLF), officially began on January 18, 1969. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969, Document 286.↩
- Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia the night of August 20, 1968. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 289 and ibid., vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80–93.↩
- Reference is to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow in July 1968. On July 1, 1968, President Johnson made a statement endorsing the Treaty; Rusk and ACDA Director William C. Foster signed the treaty on behalf of the United States. Johnson transmitted the Treaty to the Senate on July 9. For additional information, see ibid., vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 250. In NSDM 6, issued on February 5, 1969, Kissinger indicated that Nixon had “decided to go forward with U.S. ratification” of the NPT; NSDM 6 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 1969–1972, Document 8. Soviet and U.S. officials signed the ratification documents on November 24. On March 5, 1970, signing ceremonies took place in Washington and Moscow. For the text of the Treaty, see 21 UST 483.↩
- Reference is to Johnson’s 1968 decision to sell F–4 Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel in order to enhance Israeli security. For additional information about the decision, see ibid., vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–68, Documents 306, 308, 309, 311, 317, 330, 332, and 360.↩