21. Potomac Cable 1
NEW INITIATIVES FOR VIET-NAM
Flexibility marks President Nixon’s May 14 statement of important new initiatives for peace in Viet-Nam.2 So does firmness in support of South Vietnamese self-determination.
The President’s statement is the most comprehensive definition so far of American peace aims. It is also the most flexible program of ways to achieve Vietnamese peace that has yet been proposed.
Only one of the principles underlying that program is immutable: That the U.S. will not compromise on the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people, and will stay the course until that right is realized.
In the wake of Mr. Nixon’s major policy statement, U.S. officials emphasize these new initiatives:
—Provision for a peace achieved either by a formal negotiated settlement or by an informal understanding. This is a new flexibility.
—Provision for a simultaneous start of mutual foreign troop withdrawals from South Viet-Nam, for agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable, and for rapid accomplishment. This would extend to withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and Laos too. It would effectively end hostilities.
—Provision for North Viet-Nam to remove its forces from the south without having to admit that they are there now.
—Provision for U.S. participation in multilateral talks on political matters, if South Viet-Nam invites this.
—Provision for a mutually acceptable supervisory body to verify withdrawals and cease-fire arrangements.
[Page 45]U.S. officials point out that these proposals, like the entire statement itself, were made after continuing and full consultation with South Vietnamese President Thieu.
The American officials also underscore:
—The extreme flexibility of the President’s realistic and reasonable proposals of a framework for serious negotiations.
—The willingness of the Nixon administration to hear and discuss counterproposals from any of the parties at the Paris talks.
The tone of Mr. Nixon’s policy statement, and the flexibility of his peace proposals, are evidence of sincere U.S. determination to bring about a mutually acceptable settlement of the Viet-Nam war. It is emphatically not to be interpreted as a sign of weakness—any lessening of U.S. firmness in support of South Vietnamese self-determination.
It would be tragic for the North Vietnamese government to believe that time is on its side—that prolongation of hostilities, or disagreement over Viet-Nam within the United States, will force the U.S. to retreat. That error of judgment could only bring more suffering and bloodshed to the people of Viet-Nam in place of the peace that they desire. In President Nixon’s words: “If the needless suffering continues, this would affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay.”3
Mr. Nixon’s studied proposals allow all sides considerable room for accommodation. What the U.S. and its allies seek is not a paper peace but a peace that is a fact. That real peace is within range of the many possibilities encompassed in President Nixon’s comprehensive and flexible proposals. It is now up to the other side to decide what kind of negotiations they prefer to conduct.
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1969–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 1, Pres. Nixon’s Speech—May 14, 1969. No classification marking. Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research.↩
- In a May 14 address to the nation, broadcast on radio and television networks at 10 p.m., the President discussed the eight points of the settlement U.S. negotiators would seek in Paris, one emphasizing mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces to designated locations over a period of 12 months. For the text of the address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 369–375. For additional information about the speech, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 68. For additional information about Nixon’s discussion of the settlement before a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Cabinet on May 15, see ibid., vol. I. Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 25.↩
- The complete sentence reads: “I must also make clear, in all candor, that if the needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 374)↩