Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

26. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 30, 1969

SUBJECT

• Soviet Jamming of the Voice of America and our Response

This is in response to your request through Alex Butterfield of June 23 which asked for a brief report of U.S. reactions to increased Soviet jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.²

Soviet jamming of Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts, which had been a fixture of the Cold War scene, ceased abruptly on June 19, 1963. For just over five years the VOA reached Soviet audiences with minimal interference. Then on August 21, 1968, at the time of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia,³ the Soviets resumed systematic jamming which has continued up to the present.

It is difficult to prove categorically that Soviet electronic interference “recently intensified,” in part because of the practical impossibility of accurately measuring reception of VOA programs in all parts of the USSR, and in part because of the use of differing types of jamming.

At least for the area of Moscow, where—because of the presence of the American Embassy—we are able to get regular reports on VOA reception, the Soviet jamming effort appears to have become less selective and more continuous in recent months. A rough estimate would be that 80–85% of the 13 hours per day of VOA programs beamed to the Moscow area (central European Russia) are now subject to a significant level of purposeful interference.

It is harder to give an estimate for outlying areas, where U.S. travel is relatively less frequent, and travel by technical personnel capable of making accurate measurements is quite rare. But certainly there is less jamming in peripheral areas than in and around Moscow. For some reason, for example, we know of no attempt to block VOA programs in the Baltic languages (Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian). However, all other non-Russian broadcasts to the USSR have been targets for jamming along with our Russian programming.

The jamming has taken various forms. Our programming in the 25 meter band and above is generally blocked by superimposition of a strong local Soviet station (Radio “Mayak,” which means “beacon”), broadcasting light popular music, commentary, and news. Below the 25 meter band, VOA broadcasts are generally subject to the traditional, harshly unpleasant electronic buzz of the jammer.

We made an early diplomatic protest, but have taken no action since, in large part because we have expected that the jamming would be stopped after the reconsolidation of the Soviet position in Czechoslovakia. On September 19, 1968, roughly one month after jamming was resumed, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Charles Bohlen gave Ambassador Dobrynin an aide-memoire protesting the Soviet interference as a violation of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Convention of 1965.⁴ On October 9, 1968 the Soviet Embassy delivered a note to the State Department categorically rejecting our protest.

Since then various American officials have made informal protests to their Soviet counterparts on the jamming question both here and in Moscow, but no further formal action has been taken. As recently as June 18 the Assistant Director of USIA for Soviet Union and Eastern Europe raised the matter in a conversation with the Soviet Press Counselor, Soviet Cultural Counselor, and the Managing Editor of the magazine Soviet Life.⁵ The Soviets gave evidence of being embarrassed by the jamming and reacted defensively; one muttered that “this sort of thing reflects special circumstances.” The USIA officer got the impression that the time might be ripe for a new diplomatic démarche on the subject.

We have other options as well. We might raise the Soviet jamming formally through ITU channels, but the practical effect would probably be only to increase publicity. Much the same could be said of the suggestion of bringing the matter to the UN.

Our ultimate—and I think undesirable—option would be to retaliate in kind by reactivating a powerful long wave VOA transmitter near Munich, Germany, which when used, effectively blocks out Moscow Radio broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Our use of this transmitter caused the Soviets to protest through the ITU several years ago and we ceased operations, but the equipment is still in place.

My personal opinion is that the jamming has probably outlasted its usefulness even in Soviet eyes, but once this sort of thing is set in motion, it is difficult bureaucratically to stop it, unless the order comes from the very top. The jamming is of course indefensible and contradicts the Soviet assertion that they favor increased exchanges of information. I think that if we make real progress on preparations for SALT, we should point out the incompatibility of their continued jamming with U.S.-Soviet cooperation on disarmament.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 306, Agency Files, Voice of America. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. An unknown hand wrote “ret 7/2” below the stamped notation. Another unknown hand wrote “AH—NOTE PAGE 3” at the top of the memorandum. Haig sent a copy of the memorandum to Sonnenfeldt under a July 3 memorandum, which read: “Attached is a copy of the memorandum you prepared for the President dealing with Soviet jamming activities. Please destroy this as I am sure Henry would be upset if he thought it had been sent out of the office. Unfortunately we have a monkey which we must be prepared to deal with. Please analyze the President’s instruction and see if we can develop an appropriate plan which would be responsive to it, if only in part, and prepare a memorandum for the President for approval. As you know, this is a Pandora’s box which could work to our disadvantage. On the other hand, if we were to convey the President’s decision directly to State it would probably leak with serious damage to the President. Please scratch your noggin on this one and give me your ideas.” (Ibid.)
2. In a June 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Butterfield wrote: “In the June 18 ‘Staff and Department Brief’ the President read of the Soviet Union’s recently intensified jamming efforts directed at Voice of America broadcasts. He would like a short report from you concerning the reaction on our part.” (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 3, Document 1.
4. The Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) took place in Montreaux September 14–November 12, 1965. Members of the Union approved the International Telecommunication Convention, which entered into force on January 1, 1967. For the text of the Convention and additional documents, see International Telecommunication Convention; Final Protocol to the Convention; Additional Protocols to the Convention; Resolutions, Recommendation and Opinion, Montreaux, 1965. (Geneva: General Secretariat of the International Telecommunication Union, n.d.) For Bohlen’s meeting with Dobrynin, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, footnote 2, Document 302.
5. Reference is to the bi-monthly magazine of Soviet culture and history, which began publication in the 1950s.
6. In the margin below this paragraph, the President wrote: “K Our response has been typically much too soft—I want a protest filed—strong, soon, & hard. RN.”