5. Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency1
[Omitted here are the title page and the Table of Contents.]
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
How are President Nixon and his new Administration viewed overseas? How is he characterized as a political personality? What do foreign opinion leaders see as his main problems and his prospects for dealing with them? Have their views changed since the election and especially since the inauguration?2 What do they expect him to do with respect to their countries and other areas of the world?
The purpose of this study is to supply at least tentative answers to these questions. It is based on an examination of foreign media content, reports from U.S. diplomatic posts abroad and available survey research. It is focused mainly on the period from the November 5 election to the week following the Inaugural Address. Views expressed in communist countries are treated separately at the end of the study.
There are a few generalizations that can be drawn from the study (none very surprising).
First, President Nixon is very widely seen as a pragmatic, professional, highly experienced political leader. Words like “firm,” “serious,” “hard lining,” “anti-communist” are frequently used to describe him, as are “cautious,” “middle of the roader,” and sometimes “courageous.” In contrast to descriptions of past Presidents and Presidential candidates, such words as “idealistic,” “innovative,” “charismatic,” are virtually absent, nor is the description “Eisenhower Republican” often used. There are indications, however, that the tone and substance of the Inaugural Address have led to a blurring of the earlier image. Some commentators seem less certain that former characterizations such as [Page 15] “hard liner” hold true. For example, a conservative Japanese newspaper predicted after the election that the Nixon administration would favor the use of force. After the Inaugural, it asserted that the Address’s calm and moderate tone indicated the emergence of a new Nixon.
Second, across the spectrum of comment from friendly to hostile, there are no widely accepted predictions of profound changes in U.S. domestic or foreign policies. Possible shifts in attention from foreign to domestic concerns or from Asia to Europe are often foreseen. But these shifts are not expected to be drastic. Some West European left-intellectual commentators predict the new Administration will not pay sufficient attention to problems of youth and the poor. In Africa, some expect Black America will be paid less heed.
The perceived catalog of U.S. problems remains unchanged: Viet-Nam, the Middle East, superpower relations, arms limitation, the alliance system, aid to the underdeveloped nations, the world monetary system, domestic inflation, civil unrest, racial strife. As before, awareness and interpretations of these problems, the importance attached to them, and prescriptions offered for their solution vary enormously.
Third, expressions of confidence in the new Administration’s capacity to deal with foreign and domestic problems tend to vary both according to geographic area and political orientation. West Europeans tend to see the choices open to the new Administration as limited by prior commitments, domestic preoccupations and the world situation. Right and center European opinion appear to have more confidence in the Administration’s abilities. It is notable that some “independent” opinion leaders such as the London Times are cautiously optimistic. By contrast, liberal to left opinion is more skeptical.
In other areas of the world—Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East—there appears to be far less awareness that the range of choice is limited. Emphasis is not on the capacity of the Administration to resolve problems but on its will to bestow or withhold attention and favor.
In East Asia most concern is focused on continued American resistance to communist expansion, although Japanese opinion is somewhat preoccupied with future trade relations. Opinion in the Arab world is totally preoccupied with the new Administration’s intentions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, some Israeli commentators dwell on prospects for diminished U.S. support while others hopefully predict no change. Indian comment often indicates that the measure of the new Administration will be its aid program while Pakistani opinion sees settlement of the Viet-Nam War and reduction of East-West tension as criteria of success. In Latin America, commentators concentrate on the hope for increased U.S. interest, attention and aid and the fear of U.S. neglect. In Africa, too, aid and interest are often seen as the yardsticks against which the new Administration will be measured.
[Page 16]Fourth, there is a pronounced tendency among commentators in most countries to seek indications that relations with the U.S. will improve or at least not deteriorate. Arab commentators looked hopefully to the Scranton visit3 for a change in U.S. Middle East policy. NATO advocates found the Kissinger appointment encouraging evidence of greater attention to Europe. Some Latin American comment viewed the Galo Plaza interview4 as highly significant. Both India and Pakistan look to the new Administration for more sympathetic treatment. Relatively little comment predicts worsening relations.
[Omitted here are the sections: Europe, East Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and The Nixon Image in Communist Propaganda.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1953–1997, Entry P–160, Box 28, S–58–69. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. The paper is entitled “President Nixon in Foreign Eyes: Images and Expectations.”↩
- See footnote 3, Document 4.↩
- Presumable reference to Scranton’s December 1968 fact-finding tour of the Middle East made on behalf of President-elect Nixon. Scranton traveled to Iran (December 2–5), Lebanon (December 5), UAR (December 6–7), Saudi Arabia (December 7–8), Jordan (December 8), and Israel (December 9–11). For memoranda of conversation of his meetings with Middle Eastern leaders, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XX, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 342–344 and 346–347, and ibid., vol. XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 318.↩
- Possible reference to the President’s meeting with Plaza on January 21 at 4:45 p.m. Rogers and Vaky also attended the meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) For additional information, see Benjamin Welles, “President Talks With O.A.S. Chief: Galo Plaza Is Nixon’s First Official Foreign Visitor,” New York Times, January 22, 1969, p. 28.↩