File No. 658.119/137
The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy ( Crawford) to the Counselor for the Department of State ( Polk)
[Received November 30.]
My Dear Mr. Counselor: I feel that we should come to a clear understanding in writing as soon as possible regarding policy towards the four northern neutrals. We have reached a substantial agreement in regard to Norway and Denmark. I would only say here, in regard to these two countries, that my Government’s view is that the desiderata of our associated Governments which have now been put in writing to the Norwegian and Danish Governments should be strongly pressed before further concessions are made.
As regards Sweden and Holland, I understand that the American delegates in London approved an invitation to these two countries to send representatives to London to negotiate there. This invitation was sent, but the delegates have now left for Paris and apparently their return is uncertain.
We are instructed to press you to let negotiations with Sweden and Holland be begun in London and to express the earnest hope that Mr. McCormick and Doctor Taylor may return to London to take a leading part in such negotiations as soon as their business in Paris is completed. Our reasons for this proposal are as follows:
- 1.
-
Sweden. There is no one in Washington
accredited by the present Swedish Government or representing
their views. The representative now here is an iron ore
expert, but probably not competent to discuss other
subjects. Neither is there anyone here empowered to
represent the Russian Government, while the presence of
M. Nordmann in London, who has
strong views on the settlement of the Swedish question,
makes it possible to act there more or less in agreement
with Russian interests, even though joint action in such
matters with the present Russian “Government” is impossible.
Moreover, the Swedish question has such an immediate and
serious military significance that discussions in Europe,
taking into account the changing military factors, seem to
be imperative. My Government can not provide for proper
representation in Washington for negotiations so difficult
as this. I understand the policy of my Government in regard
to Sweden to be as follows:
- (1)
- An early attempt to reach a definite settlement to be made. If this prove impossible, the negotiations should be adjourned on the basis of definite proposals put forward on paper and rejected, so that the Swedish Government may be made responsible to the Swedish people for their action.
- (2)
- As large a proportion as possible of Swedish iron ore to be purchased by the Allies. Exports to Germany to be cut down to a minimum. The Allies to attempt to buy the German shares in the Grangesburg Co.
- (3)
- Swedish tonnage to be obtained as in the case of Denmark, to be shared on an equal basis by the I.A.C.E. and the Shipping Board.
- (4)
- Export of foodstuff, including fish, metals, ore other than iron ore, hides and leather to Germany to be stopped. This should not be very difficult, the metals and ores other than iron not being a dominant Swedish interest.
- (5)
- Export to Germany of pulp and chemical preparations and derivatives of pulp to be stopped.
- (6)
- Free transit to and from Russia to be secured.
- (7)
- Swedish loan to the Allies.
- 2.
-
Holland. The Dutch problem consists
mainly of the following questions:
- (1)
- Transit of military material for German account.
- (2)
- Tonnage.
- (3)
- Imports of coffee, tobacco and cinchona for German account.
- (4)
- Export of agricultural produce to Germany.
- (5)
- Smuggling.
- (6)
- Loan to the Allies.
On all the first four questions we have already been obliged to open negotiations with or make demands upon Holland, and we have actually practically secured a tonnage arrangement. The fourth point is intimately bound up with our margarine imports from Holland and with our agricultural agreement. The fifth has been the subject of repeated discussions between ourselves and Holland, while the sixth very closely affects the continuance of our agricultural agreement, the well-being of the French and Belgian relief works, and our whole financial stability. Negotiations in London would, therefore, we believe lead to a much speedier and more satisfactory settlement than at Washington where M. van Vollenhoven has shown little disposition to discuss any other subject than the Dutch ships now in United States ports. At the back of any such negotiations lies, moreover, the military problem which may at any moment become a very urgent one. We believe we can attain all the objects stated above except the export of Dutch agricultural produce. This has been complicated by the recent German agreement and the main conflict will centre round the export of fats to Germany. The degree to which we can succeed will probably mainly depend on the extension of our agricultural agreement and it is to be feared that if the negotiations are carried on solely at Washington the Dutch representatives will prevent any arrangement by referring to this agree [Page 1080] merit as the furthest point to which Holland can go and as being satisfactory to the British Government.
For all these reasons I trust you will consent to the Swedish and Dutch negotiations beginning in London forthwith in order to secure a speedy and clear definition of the policy of our associated Governments towards the northern neutrals with a view to end the present uncertainty. In so far as that uncertainty arises, as it no doubt does, from defects in British representation at Washington in blockade matters, my Government are all the more anxious to be in a position to discuss these matters with their associates and with neutrals at London, where they can explain their views better and in a manner less likely to cause delay at a moment when their main object is expeditious action.
Believe me [etc.]