Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume II
File No. 861.00/734
The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 27.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith in duplicate copies of my despatch of even date to the Embassy on the political and military situation in this district.
I have [etc.]
The American Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the American Ambassador (Francis)
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt last week of the Embassy’s instruction of October 5, 1917, in reply to several requests made by this office in connection with the political and military situation in this district. In answer to my repeated requests for the Embassy’s support in the reorganization of the army on this front by the transfer to it of Armenian and Georgian troops from the other fronts, I note that the Embassy considers this step one relating to internal affairs in which the Embassy can take no action.
Though I am fully aware that my request under ordinary circumstances would not be fully in accord with the established policy of the United States, yet in view of the intensive German propaganda conducted here and throughout Russia and the great difficulties with which the Provisional Government has to contend, I believe it my duty to do all I can to counteract such propaganda and to advise and help both the military and civil authorities. In adopting this course I was guided by the President’s message to Russia in which he states, as reported, that the United States is ready and willing to assist Russia against both her external and internal enemies.
Without our active help, advice, and participation in the internal affairs of the country, it is difficult to imagine or hope for the reestablishment of order by next spring, particularly when the agents of the Central powers are most active in sowing discord and distrust both in the army and among the civil population.
I found the authorities here at times so discouraged by the difficulties of the situation and the apparent lack of support from Petrograd that, if it had not been for the encouragement and support I was able to give them, they would [Page 579] have allowed matters to drift. It is in great measure owing to my efforts that the Caucasus army is still holding its position on this front and the most pressing needs in regard to supplying the army and the population have been met. A number of my suggestions in regard to transportation on the Black Sea have also been adopted. It is owing to my interference with the internal politics of the Caucasus that German intrigue establishing a bloc between the Moslems and Georgians has failed, and more friendly relations have been established with the Armenians and the Cossacks of the north. It was I who discovered that active Russian cooperation with General Maude was at this time impossible and that a reorganization on national lines had to be undertaken in order to secure such cooperation. There are many other points, both military and civil, on which I have given advice that has been gratefully accepted and followed with advantage. I am fully aware of the seriousness of conditions here and have followed every movement with infinite care. My conclusions are based on knowledge so acquired, and these conclusions are fully endorsed and supported by the experienced military representatives of England and France: General Shore, Colonel Marsh, and Colonel Chardigny.
Since last July the general conditions throughout Russia and the rapid development of events have forced me to somewhat revise the opinions which I had the honor to report both to the Ambassador and Senator Root. There seems to be a total lack of patriotism and national spirit towards this country as a whole, and every effort of the Provisional Government to meet this situation has only tended to aggravate it. The Provisional Government has heretofore tended to discourage the local national spirit, considering it as a disruptive force, but recent events have shown that practically the only hope of union and peace lies in the encouragement of this racial or national spirit and the utilization of this force towards the formation of units which in turn would inevitably unite in the formation of a Russian federation on the lines indicated by the Russian declaration of independence. The course of events clearly shows that the people are drifting in that direction notwithstanding German propaganda and the former indecision or even opposition of the Provisional Government. These racial feelings if encouraged and wisely guided would save Russia and would be of particular and lasting benefit to this district.
A union is now on its way between the Armenians, Georgians, and Cossacks of the Terek and the Kuban; the latter are in close understanding with the Cossacks of the Don and are coming to an agreement with a purified Ukraine; this combination in turn finds influence and support among the other Cossack settlements throughout the country. When united, all these groups will be in a position to offer to Russia itself an organized force with which to form a union leading to the federative republic, the ideal which events show the great majority of the people are unconsciously striving to attain. The creation of such a republic by the several races composing it would give that love of country which at present is totally lacking, these same nations having individually and collectively created it. Though there appears at this time little hope of the Russians being able to assume an offensive on the main front by next spring and even strenuous efforts must be made to have them maintain a defensive, conditions on this front are totally different and by the regroupment, in favor of which I requested the Embassy’s support, an effective offensive could be relied on at small cost and less sacrifice. If this measure is not adopted at once and carried out, this district will be gravely menaced [Page 580] and it will cost us a hundredfold to remedy the damage done and we will be guilty as well of the greatest injustice and injury to the Christian population of the Caucasus.
As I have previously stated my advice has been eagerly accepted and followed by the authorities in many instances, but to make such advice continuously effective it is essential to render some material aid, to obtain which I hope I can rely on the Embassy’s cooperation and support.
I have [etc.]