Paris Peace Conf. 762.94/2
[Enclosure]
212961/10F/18
Memorandum
31
Early in 1918, the Allied Powers, including the United States, persuaded
the Chinese Government to agree to the expulsion of all Germans [Page 527] in China, estimated to number
about 3500. Shipping was provided by His Majesty’s Government and the
Japanese Government, and the arrangements for their deportation and
internment in Australia were completed for the first batch to start on
June 22nd. At the last moment however the Supreme War Council at
Versailles decided, in view of the pressing need of all available
trained troops on the Western front and also on account of a request for
the re-examination of the question of deportation put forward by the
Belgian Government in consequence of their fears of the reprisals
threatened by the German Government that the vessels allotted for the
purpose should be diverted to Vladivostok for the transport of
Czecho-Slovak troops to Europe, and the deportation of the enemy
residents in China was therefore abandoned.
The Chinese Government then proposed to intern the more dangerous enemy
subjects at Fangshan south-west of Peking and on Chusan Island off the
Chekiang coast. The proposal was approved by the Allied Representatives
at Peking, with the exception of the Belgian Minister who feared German
reprisals against the population of Belgium. By December so little
progress had been made with the internment arrangements by the Chinese
Authorities, that it was evident that the policy could never be made a
success from the Allied point of view. The Allied communities in China
began to clamour for the repatriation of all enemy residents before the
conclusion of peace, and at a meeting of the Allied Representatives at
Peking on December 13th it was decided to recommend to the respective
Allied Governments that all undesirable enemy subjects in China be
repatriated. The Representatives stipulated only that the Allied
Governments should guarantee to provide the necessary shipping before
they approached the Chinese Government. The resolution was worded to
cover only “undesirable enemy subjects” to suit the instructions of the
United States Minister, which did not permit him to go further. The
French Government entirely approved the proposal and His Majesty’s
Government held that the expulsion should be enforced against all enemy
residents and not only against those regarded as undesirable by the
Chinese Government and informed His Majesty’s Minister of their
readiness to provide the necessary shipping. The Chinese Government
viewed the proposal favourably expressing the hope that in return China
would be able to secure the repatriation of a number of Chinese still
detained in Germany.
On December 28th His Majesty’s Minister at Peking reported that the
United States Minister had been informed by his Government that the
question of the repatriation of enemy subjects in China was being
reserved for consideration at the Peace Conference and was [Page 528] therefore no longer prepared
to join his Allied Colleagues in urging the Chinese Government to apply
the measure either to all, or even only to undesirable, enemy
residents.
His Majesty’s Government desire to draw attention to the fact that this
change of attitude on the part of the United States Minister at Peking
on instructions from his Government means that the solution of the
question, already agreed upon in principle by the Allied Representatives
and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs must be deferred until it
will be too late to give practical effect thereto, as the arrangements
for providing shipping and collecting enemy subjects will necessarily
take some time and could hardly be accomplished before the signature of
peace unless proceeded with forthwith.
The result of postponing the present plan for dealing with enemy subjects
in China will be to inflict humiliation on the Allied prestige in that
country and to place the Germans in a position to reap the fruit of
their hostile activities and resume their commercial enterprises in
China on the conclusion of peace. Being on the spot they will moreover
be in a more favourable position to seize upon any new openings offered,
than the Allied businessmen who have sacrificed their prospects for
military duties and whose return to China may be subjected to
considerable delays.
