Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/66

BC–59

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay on Thursday, May 1, 1919, at 4 p.m.

May 1, 1919, 4 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
President Wilson.	Admiral W. S. Benson.
Hon. R. Lansing.	Mr. Rogers.
Secretaries	British Empire
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G. C. M. G., K. C.
Mr. L. Harrison.	Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
British Empire	Captain C. T. M. Fuller.
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	France
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	Admiral De Bon.
Secretary-General	Capitaine de Vaisseau Levavasseur.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Lieutenant de Vaisseau Odend’hal.
Secretary	M. de Peretti.
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.	Japan
France	Vice Admiral Takeshita.
M. Clemenceau.	M. Yamakawa.
M. Pichon.	Captain Yamamoto.
Secretary-General Peace Conference
M. P. Dutasta.
Secretaries
M. P. Gauthier.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.
Japan
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. Viscount Chinda.
Secretary
M. Saburi.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia.
France	Captain A. Portier.
Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

M. Clemenceau called on M. Pichon to explain how the suggestion of submarine cables now stood.

A Question of German Submarine Cables M. Pichon said that on the 24th March, 1919, the following Resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour had been passed by the Council of Ten, namely:—

“The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense submarine cables cut by the Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers”.

It had been agreed that this text should be referred to the Drafting Committee for the submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace. The Drafting Committee had prepared a text (See I. C. 178)¹ which, however, was only accepted by the American representative subject to the approval of his Government. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at the Quai d’Orsay on the 30th April, 1919, the text in question had again come under discussion. Mr. Lansing had been unable to accept the draft text proposed by the Drafting Committee and had proposed certain amendments (See I. C. 178), which both Mr. Balfour and Admiral de Bon had been unable to accept. Consequently, it had been decided to refer the whole question to the Heads of Government for final decision.

President Wilson enquired whether Mr. Balfour held the view that the Article, as drafted by the Drafting Committee, carried out the intentions of the Resolution passed on the 24th March, 1919.

Mr. Balfour, in reply, said he would like to give his version of what had occurred. On the 24th March, 1919, at the Conference of the Ten, which Mr. Lloyd George had not attended, a prolonged discussion of the cable question had taken place. A Resolution had been unanimously accepted, which was to be referred to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Articles of the Peace Treaty. Both Mr. Lansing and he (Mr. Balfour) had adhered to that Resolution, which was to govern the action of the Drafting Committee. The question had now arisen as to the correct interpretation to be given to the original Resolution. Mr. Lansing would no doubt explain his point of view. He, himself, interpreted the clause to mean that all acts taken by the Allies in connection with enemy submarine cables during the war should stand, and that Germany should have no claim to compensation. Thus, for instance, should a cable line have been cut and diverted, the new system so established should stand. On the other hand, Germany would have a perfect right to reconstruct her former cable system as it stood before the war. To illustrate his argument, he would ask the Council to imagine a German cable line going from A to C through B. During the war the cable was cut at B and connected up with a new line from B, to D, so that the line went from A to B to D, as follows:—

Under these conditions, Mr. Lansing held that the piece A–B should now be restored to Germany, whereas the British, French and Japanese representatives contended that as A–B was an essential part of the new line A–B–D, it could not be restored to Germany, though she should have a right to join up the piece B–C with a new line to be laid by her from B to A.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the Germans would have the right to the use in common of the line A–B.

Mr. Balfour explained that it would not be practical for two separate systems to use the same cable line. Consequently, the part A–B would have to be owned by the country that had laid down the line B–D. In his opinion, unless the British interpretation were accepted, the Allies and not the Germans would have to spend an enormous sum of money in making their new cable lines effective. He fully agreed that the number of cables should not be diminished and that the more cables there were, the better it would be; but he thought that it was Germany who should be required to make the expenditure to reconstruct her lost cables. Great Britain had already spent over £400,000 on the changes necessary for adapting the lines taken over from Germany to the new cable systems.

President Wilson said that when he took part in the discussion, it had been with an unfortunate ignorance of technical details. He had not known that the main trunk line could not be used by two parties. He had supposed that the Germans could, at their own expense, connect up their end and operate through the common trunk line. As the trunk line lay at the bottom of the sea, in what might be called no-man’s-land, it was not subject to capture, but was subject to use. He realised that there was no International law on this question. He had assented to the resolution, therefore, under an erroneous impression, which was entirely his own fault. He would take an example. There had been a cable line from Emden by the Azores to New York. The European end had been diverted to Brest, and the American End to Halifax. This had caused great inconvenience to the United States, and he had supposed that a new branch line to New York could be attached to the main trunk line without disturbing the communication with Halifax and similarly that a new German end could be installed without disturbing the line to Brest. But, under the interpretation now given to the resolution, Germany would not have the use of the main trunk line and only the abandoned short ends of the original cable lines would be restored to her, and she would have to replace the main lengths of the line extending to a length of some 3,000 miles. In addition, Germany would have to obtain the right to land in the Azores. This was not what he had assented to, but the error was due to his ignorance. He thought that in a war in which many nations had participated and expended their share of blood and treasure, these indispensable instruments of international communication should not pass into the hands of only three of the parties in the war. He had no desire to re-establish the German cable system, but he had a very decided interest in ensuring the means of obtaining quick cable communication. Wireless, as now developed, had not the same value as cables, since anyone could pick up wireless messages. On the other hand, cables possessed a certain degree of privacy, depending on the good faith of the employees. Again the cable lines across the Pacific passed through the Island of Yap, which thus became a general distributing centre for the lines of communication of the North Pacific. Yap should not, therefore, fall into the hands of one Power.

In his opinion, the case had assumed a new aspect, since he had heard the interpretation now given to the resolution. It was proposed that the German cables were to be turned over entirely to those who had cut them during the war, even though one particular line, Pernambuco to Monrovia, actually terminated at both ends in neutral countries. If any method could be devised to put the cable systems under International control he would be quite satisfied; but it seemed to him a very serious matter that all Powers should not have a common interest in them. He thought a satisfactory solution would be reached, if the enemy cables could be turned over to the Allied and Associated Governments as trustees, and managed under the terms of an International Convention. He asked to correct a slight mistake made in his statement. He found there had actually been two cables from London to New York. One of these lines had been diverted so as to operate between Brest and New York, thus constituting a Franco-American line. The second line had been connected to run from Land’s End to Halifax.

Mr. Balfour said that he wished to repeat the statement made by him at a previous meeting, when discussing the same question, to the effect that he was entirely against monopolies. But the existing cable systems could not be described as monopolies in the bad sense of the word. The Cable Companies in question though registered in Great Britain were actually owned by a majority of American shareholders, which rather disposed of the idea that any undue monopoly existed.

President Wilson pointed out that in accordance with the laws of the United States of America a majority of directors would have to belong to the country in which the Company was registered.

Mr. Lloyd George did not think that the same law applied to Great Britain in the case of international companies. He understood that, although these cable companies were owned by British companies, they were actually operated by American companies.

Mr. Lansing thought that the whole question was merely one of investments. The control of the cable lines was wholly in the hands of the British.

Admiral de Bon said that two definite questions called for decision by the Council, namely: Firstly, the use to which the captured German cables should be put, and secondly, the regulations which the Allies, and especially the United States of America, wished to apply to the use of cables crossing the high seas. In regard to the first question, the cables which had previously constituted the German system could be considered under three different heads. Firstly, the lines which had been taken over by the Allied Governments and organised into new systems which were now in use. He thought no one would suggest the return of these cable lines to Germany, with the resulting disturbance of the existing lines of communication. He felt certain that complete agreement existed on this point. Secondly, bits of cables existed which had been disconnected from the main trunk line and still lay, unused, at the bottom of the sea. President Wilson maintained that these bits of cable belonged to no one and, therefore, Germany should have the right to utilise them in re-constructing her new cable lines. He saw no difficulty in accepting President Wilson’s views even though these bits of cables constituted materials of war, captured during operations of war. Thirdly, there remained the question of the cable from Pernambuco–Monrovia which had been cut by the French, diverted, and made ready for use. The Government of the United States had for political reasons requested that this cable line should not be used, and to this the French Government had assented.

To sum up, complete agreement existed in regard to the first point. The second point was debatable but President Wilson’s point of view could be adopted. The third point constituted a special case, since the cable in question had been diverted to Monrovia and was ready to function. Had America objected before the completion of the work, the line could have been diverted to Konakry and in that case no discussion would have arisen. In any case, he was strongly opposed to the return of that cable to Germany.

In regard to the question of cable communications in general, which the American Government wished to have assured by constituting an international system of control, the question did not appertain to the Treaty of Peace. It could, therefore, well be put aside for further study on the lines laid down by President Wilson. The present task of the Conference would, therefore, be confined to informing Germany that the cables, which, during the period of the war had been cut and utilised by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be restored to her and that they would remain the property of the Allied and Associated Governments. On the other hand, Germany would have the right to regain possession of the cables or parts of cables which had been cut and remained unutilised.

The resolution passed on March 24th stated that Germany would not be debarred from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her own expense any parts of submarine cables which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut, were now in use by any of those Powers. In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments should not permit Germany to lay down new cables without first obtaining the necessary licences. In his opinion, no clause should be introduced in the Peace Treaty which might appear to give Germany the right to avoid such formalities. The Governments concerned must retain the right to decide whether a new licence should be granted or not.

To sum up, as far as the Treaty of Peace was concerned, he thought it would only be necessary to lay down that the Allied and Associated Governments would retain the cables now being used by them, including the Monrovia Pernambuco cable, which had been made ready for use; and that Germany would be allowed to pick up and re-connect the bits of unused cables. It would be unnecessary to make any statement in the Peace Treaty in regard to the future policy of the Allied and Associated Governments on the subject of the control of cables.

Sir Robert Borden said that he had not been able to study the cable situation under discussion very carefully; but Canada was deeply interested in the cables crossing the Atlantic. Though many of the cable lines landed at Halifax, the Canadian Government had no control over that line; the control being American.

Mr. Lansing, intervening, pointed out that only the control was American, the property itself being vested in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the Americans, at all events, controlled the rates to be charged for cables.

Mr. Lansing doubted the correctness of that statement. The Western Union Cable Company of America merely controlled the working of the cables; but the cables themselves were owned by British Companies.

Sir Robert Borden, continuing, said that he was certain of one thing, namely, that the Canadians did not control these cable lines. The Canadian Government had been requested by the British Government to allow the cable line in question to land at Halifax. The permission asked for had been granted and he would now strongly object to its removal. In his opinion, the whole question of cable control required careful consideration by the Governments concerned.

President Wilson pointed out that he did not wish Sir Robert Borden to imagine that anyone held the idea of diverting the cable from Halifax.

Mr. Lloyd George held that if the line in question were handed back to Germany, it would as a natural consequence be diverted to New York.

President Wilson expressed the view that the meeting had to decide only the two following definite questions, namely:—

• “(i) Are submarine cables proper objects of appropriation and can they be retained without reckoning them in the total bill of reparations?”
• “(ii) Can any means be devised to place the cable lines under international control?”

He thought if these principles could be accepted, a satisfactory agreement would easily be reached.

Sir Robert Borden invited attention to the fact that six or seven years ago the Canadian Government had endeavoured to exercise some control over the rates charged for cables. The Government eventually only succeeded in obtaining a reduction by threatening to lay cables of their own.

Mr. Lloyd George maintained that whatever President Wilson’s intention might be in connection with the cable line in question, the effect would obviously be to divert the cable from Halifax. The right to take cables was just as strong as the right to capture ships. He agreed that cables had not heretofore formed the subject of capture; but there had never been a war of the same kind before, and serious risks and heavy expenditure had had to be incurred in order to obtain possession of these cables. He, himself, would be quite prepared to consider the question of the payment of some sort of compensation to Germany for the surrender of the cables, but this was a new proposition and would require careful examination. A direct line of communication to Canada having now been established, the people of Canada who had suffered much in money and life during the war would feel deeply deserted if the suggestion were accepted to return these lines to Germany. In conclusion, he wished to support very cordially what Admiral de Bon had said, namely, that after peace had been established the Governments should meet together and endeavour to arrive at some agreement on the question of the international control of cable lines. The only point, however, now to be decided was whether these particular cables should be restored to Germany or not. He held the view that if such a step were now taken very bitter feeling would be raised.

President Wilson pointed out that there was a side of the question to which Mr. Lloyd George had not referred. If it were merely a question of returning the cables to Germany or not, the solution would be comparatively easy, as this could only be answered in the negative. But the Council was asked to decide whether these cables should remain exclusively in the hands of those who had taken them over, though all parties had taken part in the war. Should a decision to that effect be taken, that might prejudge any ulterior arrangements, whereas, in his opinion, the Treaty of Peace ought to leave the question open.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether President Wilson could make some definite proposal.

President Wilson suggested that the Peace Terms should require the cables in question to be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as Trustees; who would be authorised to determine the future working of the cables in the interests of the Powers concerned.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the Trustees would have the power of diverting the cables to other places.

President Wilson expressed the view that the Trustees would only be empowered to do this as a result of a unanimous decision, on the grounds that such a diversion would be in the interest of the whole of the Powers concerned.

Sir Robert Borden explained that the Canadian Government had intended to make the cable in question State property to be linked up with the land telegraphic system, which already belonged to the Government. In this way, it was thought measures could be taken to reduce rates.

President Wilson thought that the question raised by Sir Robert Borden was not in contradiction with his own proposals, and should be considered when the question of drafting the international convention relating to cables was undertaken.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that President Wilson’s proposal would apply to all cables, and consequently would also affect the French and Japanese Governments.

Baron Makino said he wished to state Japan’s position in the matter. At the last meeting on this subject, Mr. Balfour had proposed a resolution which had been accepted after long discussion. He had not then had time to catch the real purport of the resolution. Accordingly, he had wished to obtain some explanation, but he was told that after the text came back from the Drafting Committee, he would have an opportunity of discussing the question further. At the present moment, he was prepared to accept the policy contained in the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour on 24th March last.

In regard to the appropriation of the cables in question, he would invite attention to the policy that had been pursued, vis-à-vis, Germany, as expressed in the Peace Treaty. It would be found that a certain number of questions had been settled not strictly in accordance with the recognised usages of international law. For instance, in regard to the taking over of private property. Again, Article 13 of the Financial Clauses authorised the taking over of undertakings of public utility. That is to say, the Allied and Associated Governments had, in his opinion, gone very far in taking over German rights and much further than had ever been done heretofore. In his opinion, the same procedure could therefore well be followed in regard to cables. The Cable Company taken over by the Japanese Government had a capital of 15 million marks at its disposal and in addition received from the German Government an annual subsidy of 1½ million marks. These facts clearly proved that the undertaking had not been a commercial one; but part and parcel of the German political system. For this reason, taking into consideration also the general policy introduced elsewhere in the Treaty to which he had just alluded, it was not unreasonable that this cable should be taken over by Japan. That clearly was the Japanese point of view, and after very careful consideration he had been led to the conclusion that the best policy would be to adopt Mr. Balfour’s original resolution.

Next, in regard to the International Convention relating to the future management of cables, his personal opinion was that such an arrangement would be desirable. Such a Convention could be drawn up on the same lines as the International Postal Convention, subject to International agreement. But for the moment he was only willing to accept the proposals contained in Mr. Balfour’s resolution adopted on March 24th last.

Mr. Lloyd George said that President Wilson had put forward a new proposal. So far, he had only been able to have a short consultation with Mr. Balfour, who agreed with him that their experts should be consulted before reaching a definite conclusion. He would therefore ask the Council to adjourn the further discussion of the question, in order to give time for proper consideration of the new proposal. He felt very hopeful that an agreement would be reached; but he would like to consult his experts. In his opinion, it would be a mistake to discuss the proposal until it had received further consideration.

President Wilson explained that he had put forward his proposal for two reasons. Firstly, because he thought it was right and, secondly, because he thought it afforded a solution in the general interest, which would have the effect of creating a solidarity amongst the Allied Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed provided financial solidarity alone was not intended.

Sir Robert Borden was particularly anxious to avoid private companies acquiring too large a monopoly. For instance, he was anxious to approach the American Government with a view to reducing cable rates and ship rates.

President Wilson expressed his complete agreement with Sir Robert Borden’s purpose. The common trusteeship he had proposed was intended to bring about these very objects. He thought that one reason why the German cable referred to by Baron Makino had not paid was because it constituted merely an independent piece, which did not enter into the general system. With the permission of the Council, he would formulate a definite draft resolution for discussion at the next meeting of the Council.

Mr. Lansing thought that the draft resolution might very well be drawn up on the lines of the Article dealing with the surrender of German Colonies.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should formulate a draft resolution for discussion at the next meeting of the Council of Ten to the effect that all German Cables seized during the war should be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees, who would determine the future working of the cables in the interests of the Powers concerned).

The meeting then adjourned.

Paris, 1 May, 1919.

1. FM–10, p. 645.