Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/11
FM–11
Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, May 3, 1919, at 4 p.m.
| Present | Also Present |
| America, United States of | British Empire |
| Hon. R. Lansing | Mr. E. H. Carr |
| Secretary | Hon. H. Nicolson |
| Mr. L. Harrison | France |
| British Empire | M. de Peretti |
| The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst | M. Laroche |
| Secretaries | |
| Mr. H. Norman | |
| Mr. E. Phipps | |
| France | |
| M. Pichon | |
| Secretaries | |
| M. de Bearn | |
| Capt. de Saint Quentin | |
| Japan | |
| H. E. Baron Makino | |
| H. E. Viscount Chinda | |
| Secretary-General | |
| M. Saburi | |
| Secretary | |
| M. Kawai |
Joint Secretariat
| America, United States of | Colonel U. S. Grant |
| British Empire | Major A. M. Caccia |
| France | Captain A. Portier |
| Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck. | |
1. Amendment of Article I of Clause in Treaty of Peace Relative to German Colonies M. Pichon said that the first item on the agenda paper had reference to an amendment of article I of the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relative to German Colonies, proposed by the French Delegation. He called on M. de Peretti to explain the case.
M. de Peretti said that Article I of the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relative to German Colonies read as follows:—“Germany renounces in favour of the Five Allied and Associated [Page 660] Powers all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her oversea possessions”. The Belgian Government, after duly considering the article in question, feared that it might be deduced therefrom that only the Five Allied and Associated Powers would hereafter be entitled to be appointed mandatories in the former German oversea possessions. The Belgian Government was obviously not correct in this assumption since the Peace Treaty did not attempt to settle the question of the appointment of mandatories. Nothing, therefore, would prevent Belgium from putting forward in due course her claims to obtain a mandate. Nevertheless, in order to remove all possible cause of complaint and to quiet Belgian public opinion, it had been proposed by the French Delegation that the article in question should be amended to read as follows:—“Germany renounces all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her oversea possessions”. The amendment proposed would in no way alter the substance of the article, and at the same time it would prevent the impression that it had been intended in any way to prejudge the question of the appointment of mandatories.
Mr. Lansing enquired in whom the title of these German Colonies would rest.
M. Pichon said that the new text proposed in no way prejudged the case. He wished to point out that in omitting the words “Five Allied and Associated Powers” an additional inconvenience would be avoided, since it was not known whether Italy intended to participate in the negotiations with Germany, or not. Consequently, it would be better to suppress any reference to the Five Powers. Belgium maintained that she had, at the request of the Allied Governments, taken a very active part in the military operations in Africa, and she now occupied and administered valuable territories in East Africa. Consequently, were anything done to give the Belgian people the impression that in the allocation of mandates their claims would be excluded, would be interpreted by them as an unfriendly act, and would place the Government in an awkward position.
Lord Hardinge expressed the view that Mr. Lansing’s objection to the amendment proposed by the French Delegation could be met by omitting the word “Five” from the original text.
Mr. Lansing suggested that in place of the word “Five” the word “Principal” should be introduced. In addition, a letter should be transmitted by the “Principal” Allied and Associated Powers to the Belgian Government clearly stating that this article was in no way prejudicial to her claims eventually to become a mandatory power in Africa. The difference between the amendment suggested by himself and that proposed by Lord Hardinge lay in this, namely, that many of the small nations, possessing no interests whatever in these territories would be included in the term “Allied and Associated Powers” [Page 661] and, in his opinion, it would be a calamity for such Powers to vote and discuss as to who were to be appointed mandatories. To sum up, he thought the principal Powers should hold the titles, as trustees for the future, until the determination of the mandatories.
Viscount Chinda accepted Mr. Lansing’s proposal on the understanding that the territories in question would be kept in trust by the Allied and Associated Powers only until the mandatory Powers were designated.
(It was agreed that the first article of the clauses in the Treaty of Peace, relative to German Colonies should be amended to read as follows:—
“Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her over-sea possessions”.
It was further agreed that the following letter dated Paris, the 3rd. May, 1919, should be sent to Mr. Hymans, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the signature of M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference:—1
“Monsieur le Ministre,
Le Conseil Suprême des Alliés avait adopté l’insertion dans le traité de Paix d’une clause ainsi conçue:
“L’Allemagne renonce, en faveur des cinq puissances alliées et associées, à tous ses droits et titres sur ses possessions d’outre-mer”.
Le Gouvernement Beige ayant fait remarquer qu’une telle clause semblait exclure toute prétention de la Belgique a obtenir le mandat sur une partie des colonies allemandes, où cependant elle a coopéré avec les forces alliées, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire savoir que le Conseil Suprême, tenant compte de cette observation, a décidé de remplacer dans cette clause les mots “en faveur des cinq puissances alliées et associées” par les mots “en faveur des principales puissances alliées et associées”.
Il est bien entendu que cette décision ne préjuge en rien l’attribution des mandats pour les territoires des colonies allemandes.
Veuillez agréer …
Signé Clemenceau”)
2. Recognition of Independence of Finland M. Pichon said that the second question on the Agenda paper related to the recognition of the independence of Finland. The question had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers by the heads of Governments. A full statement of the case would be found in a letter addressed by Mr. Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, (see Annex A).
M. Laroche explained that the French Government had long ago recognised the independence of Finland. For a time the Finnish Government had been hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers and negotiations had in consequence been broken off. But, since the appointment of Gen. Mannerheim’s Government, friendly relations had again become established. A Finnish Diplomatic Chargé d’Affaires had been accredited to the French Government in Paris. A Finnish Chargé d’Affaires had also been sent to London, but Great Britain had not as yet recognised the independence of Finland. The French Government had frequently expressed the wish that the independence of Finland should be recognised by all the Allied and Associated Powers. It, therefore, cordially supported the proposal now made by the American Delegation.
Mr. Lansing said that he did not favour a joint recognition of the independence of Finland.
M. Pichon replied that a general recognition was not intended as France had already recognised the independence of Finland.
Mr. Lansing said that the Government of the United States of America would recognise the independence of Finland and the Government that now existed as the de facto Government.2
Lord Hardinge said that the British Government was also quite ready to recognise the independence of Finland. It was felt that it would be very desirable to support Gen. Mannerheim’s Government, as it constituted the best guarantee against the outbreak of Bolshevism. Furthermore, the Finnish Government had recently given proofs of its goodwill in expelling German agents from Finland, and also in consenting to take part at a Conference with representatives of the Red Finnish Legion of Northern Russia. It was quite evident, therefore, that the present Finnish Government was anxious to meet the wishes of the Allied and Associated Powers in every way it could. Nevertheless, two questions of considerable importance remained to be settled. The first question concerned the frontiers of Finland in Petchenga, Eastern Kola and the Aaland Islands. No decision need be taken on this question immediately; but it was very desirable that a stipulation should be made that the Finnish Government should agree to accept the decision of the Peace Conference in regard to the frontiers of Finland. The second question related to [Page 663] the grant by the Finnish Government of an amnesty to the Red Finns, who had served with the Allied Forces in Northern Russia. A formal stipulation on this question could not be introduced in the document, recognising the independence of Finland; but the Allied representatives at Helsingfors should inform the Finnish Government that, in recognising the independence of Finland, their Governments felt confident that the Finnish Government would act in a liberal and generous spirit towards the Red Finns, and that it would do its best to carry out the wishes of the Allies in that respect. With the above provisos, Great Britain was very desirous to recognise the independence of Finland.
M. Makino informed the Council that he had received no instructions from his Government in regard to the recognition of the Finnish Government. He could not, therefore, give an official adhesion to the proposal before the Council: but, as a matter of fact, his personal opinion was that it was very desirable that the independence of Finland should be recognised, and he would endeavour to get a definite answer from his Government as soon as possible. In regard to the frontier question, he entirely concurred with the remarks made by Lord Hardinge, namely, that Finland should agree to accept the decisions of the Peace Conference. He wished, however, to add another remark. His information went to show that Gen. Youdenitch was trying to organise a volunteer force for the purpose of attacking the Bolshevik Armies around Petrograd; but the Finnish Government were putting obstacles in the way. It was agreed that the most convenient direction from which General Youdenitch could descend on Petrograd was from Finland, and if the Finnish Government were induced to give him a free hand, it would greatly facilitate his operations and so force the Bolshevists to retire. He understood that Gen. Youdenitch was acting in consultation with Admiral Kolchak and the other anti-Bolshevik parties in Russia. If his facts were correct, he thought this question might also be brought to the notice of the Finnish Government.
M. Pichon explained that the situation of France, vis-à-vis the other Allied and Associated Governments, was exceptional since she had already recognised the independence of Finland. She could not, therefore, now attempt any new stipulations to the original terms of recognition. Nevertheless, he would be prepared in due course to give instructions to the French official representative at Helsingfors, when appointed, to act on the lines laid down by Lord Hardinge and Baron Makino. He wished to invite the attention of the Council, however, to the fact that for the present France was only represented in Finland by an unofficial Chargé d’Affaires for the reason that France had awaited the recognition of Finland by the other Great Powers before making an official appointment.
[Page 664]Lord Hardinge said that he must dissociate himself entirely from the proposal made by Baron Makino. The British Government held the opinion that any military action by General Youdenitch against Petrograd from Finland would constitute a grave danger to Finland, besides being very speculative in its results. In his opinion, if any action were to be taken against Petrograd, it should form part of a combined action in accordance with the agreed policy of the Great Powers. It should not constitute merely an isolated action of an independent leader, like General Youdenitch.
Baron Makino admitted that he was not sufficiently informed in regard to the real facts of the case. He had been told that General Youdenitch was acting in co-operation with Admiral Kolchak and the other recognised anti-Bolshevik elements. Consequently, General Youdenitch’s operation could not be described as an isolated action. He did not, however, wish to insist on this point. He had merely intended to throw out an observation for consideration. In conclusion, he would enquire whether the Finnish Government did not have territorial ambitions in the Murmansk District and in the region of Petrograd.
Lord Hardinge thought that the Ministers were wandering away from the question at issue, and beginning a discussion of Russian policy, which was not within their present mandate. In his opinion, the question of a Finnish attack on Petrograd had nothing to do with the recognition of the independence of Finland.
Mr. Lansing said that he had listened to the discussion with great interest and, as far as the question of making conditions was concerned, he thought that M. Makino’s suggestion was as justifiable as Lord Hardinge’s; but he did not favour either. In his opinion, a nation was entitled to the recognition of her independence, and her government was equally entitled to recognition as a de jure or de facto Government, as a matter of right, and it was not justifiable to put conditions on such a recognition simply to serve some political purpose. He was ready, therefore, to recognise the independence of Finland and its de facto Government without conditions. Naturally after recognition and after the appointment of official representatives he would be quite ready to join the other Great Powers in making representations to the Finnish Government to urge it to accept the conditions mentioned by Lord Hardinge.
M. Pichon said that the French Government would be prepared to act in the manner suggested by Mr. Lansing.
Lord Hardinge said that he also would be ready to follow the same course, on the understanding that France and the United States of America would make representations to Finland in regard to the question of her frontiers and in regard to the granting of an Amnesty [Page 665] to the Red Finns, as soon as official diplomatic agents had been appointed.
Mr. Lansing said it was understood, therefore, that each nation would act separately.
Lord Hardinge agreed. He wished to make it quite clear, however, that the recommendation of the British Government to the Finnish Government would only include the two conditions suggested by himself. It would not apply to the proposal relative to General Youdenitch’s operations against Petrograd.
(It was agreed—
- (1)
- That the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain would forthwith severally recognise the independence of Finland and the de facto Government.
- (2)
- That after the recognition of the independence of Finland and after the appointment of official diplomatic representatives, the Governments of America, Great Britain and France would issue instructions to their representatives to urge the Finnish Government to accept the decisions of the Peace Conference in regard to the frontiers of Finland. Furthermore, the Finnish Government would be urged to treat the Red Finns, who had fought with the Allies, in a liberal and generous spirit by the grant of an Amnesty.
- (3)
- That M. Makino would forthwith communicate the above decisions to his Government with a view to its taking similar action.)
3. Eventual Modification of the Frontier Between Czecho-Slovak State and Hungary M. Pichon said that the next question on the Agenda paper (i. e. the proposed modification of the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary) had arisen from a report submitted by General Smuts, as a result of a conversation the General had had with President Mazaryk. (See annex B.) He, (M. Pichon), proposed that the question should in the first place be referred to the Inter-allied Commission dealing with Czecho-Slovakia affairs, for report.
Mr. Lansing concurred.
Lord Hardinge said that the British Delegation had prepared the following resolution, which he would submit for approval:—
“It is resolved
That in view of the explanations furnished to General Smuts by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic, the general question of the southern frontier of Slovakia shall be referred for further examination to the Sub-Committee of the Tchecho-Slovak Commission. This Committee shall proceed from the assumption that the island of the Grosse Schütt shall be excluded from Tchecho-Slovak territory provided that in return a small enclave opposite Presbourg is ceded to the new Republic, and they shall consider whether the exclusion of this Magyar population renders it possible to modify [Page 666] in favour of Tchecho-Slovakia the frontier proposed in the Eipol valley.
The Sub-Committee shall report at the earliest possible minute.”
Mr. Lansing said he would agree to the first sentence of the draft resolution, but he would oppose the remainder of the text.
M. Pichon expressed his agreement with Mr. Lansing’s point of view. In his opinion, the Council should not prejudge a case until it had received careful examination. He feared there had been some misunderstanding as to what President Mazaryk had said, and that the whole question required to be cleared up.
M. Laroche stated that Mr. Benes had formally stated that after obtaining cognisance of General Smuts’ report of his interview with President Mazaryk, he had referred the matter to the President who had replied that General Smuts had seriously misunderstood what he had said. President Mazaryk in his interview with General Smuts had merely stated that certain parties in Bohemia held the view that the Island of Grosse Schütt might be exchanged for a small enclave opposite Presbourg. President Mazaryk himself, however, did not support that proposal. He maintained that the Island of Grosse Schütt was indispensable in order to ensure free navigation of the Danube. Furthermore the President had received a deputation composed of the inhabitants of the Island of Grosse-Schütt, imploring that the Island in question should be attached to Czecho-Slovakia for the reason that the whole of the products of the Island, including corn, were sent to Bohemia and not to Hungary. Under those conditions the Czecho-Slovak delegation asked that the decision reached by the Commission on Czecho-Slovak affairs should be maintained.
M. Pichon held that the Inter-Allied Commission on Czecho-Slovakia could alone throw light on this question. Furthermore, in his opinion, the question should not be referred to the sub-commission of the Czecho-Slovak Commissions, but to the Commission itself.
Mr. Lansing expressed his complete agreement with M. Pichon’s views. He enquired whether Mr. Benes had submitted a written statement, giving President Mazaryk’s explanation.
Mr. Laroche replied that he had had a personal interview with Mr. Benes, who had expressed his readiness to give evidence before the Commission. Dr. Benes would no doubt also be quite prepared to give a written statement if required.
Mr. Lansing thought that the Council could not do more for the present than to refer General Smuts’ proposal to the Commission on Czecho-Slovak affairs for investigation and report.
Lord Hardinge said that in view of what the Council had just heard, specially in regard to the misunderstanding which had occurred, the British Delegation would withdraw its resolution. It [Page 667] agreed that the whole question should be referred to the Czecho-Slovak Commission for report.
(It was agreed to refer General Smuts’ proposal (see Annex “B”) to the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs for investigation and report.)
4. Allied Policy in the Baltic M. Pichon said that the next item on the Agenda paper related to the Allied policy in the Baltic. He understood Mr. Lansing wished to reserve this question.
Mr. Lansing said that he had made a reservation on this subject because General Bliss, who had given it special study and who was to be present at its discussion, was indisposed and could not attend the meeting. He would very much prefer to have the discussion postponed until the next meeting, which he hoped General Bliss could attend. He wished, however, to state for the information of the Council that the proposal, submitted by certain of the American experts,4 a copy of which had been distributed and attached to the Agenda, did not have the approval of the American Delegation and should not be regarded as embodying the views of the latter Delegation.
(It was agreed to postpone the discussion relating to Allied policy in the Baltic to the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held on Monday next, the 5th May, 1919.)
(The Meeting then adjourned to Monday, May 5th, 1919.)
Paris, May 4th, 1919.
[Page 669]-
Translation of letter:
↩“Mr. Minister: The Supreme Council of the Allies had adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace the following clause:
‘Germany renounces, in favor of the five Allied and Associated Powers, all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.’
The Belgian Government, having observed that such a clause would seem to exclude all claims of Belgium for acquiring a mandate over a part of the German colonies, when she nevertheless cooperated with the Allied forces, I have the honor of informing you that the Supreme Council, taking into account this observation, has decided to replace in this clause the words ‘in favor of the five Allied and Associated Powers’ with the words ‘in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.’
It is well understood that this decision does not do anything to prejudice the assignment of the mandates for the German colonial territories.
Accept [etc.]
Signed Clemenceau”
- The United States recognized the independence of Finland and the de facto Government on May 7, 1919. See Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. ii, pp. 210 ff.↩
- See FM–10, and appendix “A” thereto, pp. 641, 655.↩