Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/16
FM–16
Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 16th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.
Present | Also Present |
America, United States of | America, United States of |
Hon. H. White | Dr. C. Day |
Secretary | British Empire |
Mr. L. Harrison | Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G |
British Empire | Mr. A. Leeper |
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P. | Brig. Gen. H. O. Mance, C. B., C. M, G. |
Secretary | Major H. W. V. Temperley |
Sir P. Loraine, Bt. | France |
France | M. J. Cambon |
M. Pichon | M. A. Tardieu |
Secretaries | M. Laroche |
M. Berthelot | M. Hermitte |
M. Arnavon | M. Aubert |
Capt. de St. Quentin | Italy |
M. de Bearn | Marquis C. Durazzo |
Italy | Colonel Castoldi |
H. E. Baron Sonnino | Comdt. G. Mazzolini. |
Secretary-General | |
Count Aldrovandi | |
Secretary | |
M. Bertele | |
Japan | |
H. E. Baron Makino | |
Secretary | |
M. Kawai |
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of | Col. U. S. Grant. |
British Empire | Capt. E. Abraham. |
France | Capt. A. Portier. |
Italy | Lieut. Zanchi. |
Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck. |
1. M. Cambon proposed to begin the discussion of the Bulgarian Frontiers from the Greek side.
Frontier of Bulgaria: (a) With Greece M. Pichon said that, in that case, he must communicate to his colleagues a letter just received from M. Venizelos (Appendix I). This letter had been received at noon, and the observations contained in it had, of course, not been considered by any Committee. He was in doubt whether it would be advisable for the Council to consider them before they had been examined by the competent Committee.
M. Balfour agreed that it would be useless for the Council to examine the proposals before they had been before a Committee. He thought the method employed by M. Venizelos was a little unusual, as the Committee had heard Greek witnesses, and he had had opportunities of stating his case on many occasions.
M. Cambon said that it appeared to him, after a hasty glance at the letter, that the modifications proposed were small ones, affecting a few villages and small groups of population. He suggested that the Committee’s report1 be considered in general, and that later on these questions of detail should be taken up by the Committee, and, if necessary, that an Annex to the report be made upon them.
Mr. Balfour proposed that if M. Venizelos’ observations only related to points of detail, the Committee be allowed to decide, without further reference to the Council, provided that any large questions that might arise should be at least brought to the notice of the Council.
M. Sonnino said that in the Central Territorial Committee, the American Delegate2 had objected to any decision relating to the frontier of Eastern Thrace until the fate of Constantinople and its surrounding territory was known. In this he had been supported by the Italian Delegate. The question raised by M. Venizelos in relation to various villages could hardly be settled irrespective of the general line of frontiers. If this could not be fixed, neither could the fate of the villages.
Mr. Balfour agreed with Baron Sonnino, but said that he thought the American Delegation had withdrawn their objections, and were ready to recommend a line in Eastern Thrace.
M. Cambon said that the unsolved question of Constantinople had overshadowed the work of the Committee on Greek territorial claims throughout. He had himself repeatedly asked for information on the subject. As no information was vouchsafed, the Committee had proceeded on the proposal, he thought, of the American representative, to fix the northern frontiers of Thrace on the hypothesis that the territory to be attached to Constantinople would be bounded by [Page 717] the line Enos-Midia. If, however, nothing could be done until the fate of Constantinople had been decided, the whole question would have to be put off and the report of the Committee re-written.
M. Tardieu said that the Central Committee on territorial affairs had been inclined to share the view of the Italian and American Delegates, to the effect that the frontiers of Greece could not be fixed in the way suggested by the Committee on a mere hypothesis. Like Mr. Balfour, however, he had assumed when he saw the subject on the Agenda that some decisions had been taken.
M. Sonnino said that he thought it would be useless to proceed until the fate of Constantinople had been decided. He hoped that a decision on this subject would be taken soon, and he suggested that it should be awaited. Nor did he think that it would be useful to examine the frontier in Western Thrace. There, again, the problem would only be dealt with partially, and the points raised by M. Venizelos, among others, would be omitted. He would even propose that the whole question of Bulgarian frontiers be postponed, as there were other questions in suspense, namely, that of the Dobrudja and that of an area near Sofia, as well as that of Constantinople.
M. Tardieu said that, in his view, there was a good deal of difference between the question of the frontier between Serbia and Roumania respectively and Bulgaria, and the question of the Thracian frontier. For the latter a necessary element was lacking. In relation to the former, there were differences of view which might be reconciled by the Council.
Mr. White said that the American Delegate on the Central Territorial Committee had made a reservation which had not yet been withdrawn. He therefore agreed with Baron Sonnino that the Greco-Bulgarian frontier should not be discussed at present, but he also agreed with M. Tardieu that the remaining frontiers should be examined forthwith.
(It was then agreed to postpone the consideration of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier until the fate of Constantinople had been decided by the Supreme Council.
M. Pichon undertook, on behalf of the Foreign Ministers, to draw the attention of the Heads of the Governments, to the importance of deciding this question in relation to the frontiers of Bulgaria.
It was also agreed that the Committee on Greek territorial claims should examine the proposals made by M. Venizelos.)
(b) With Roumania M. Tardieu said that the question of the rectification of the frontier in the Dobrudja had been regarded by the Commission3 as a very delicate matter. It was difficult to ask an Allied country after a victorious war to yield to an enemy State territory which it had possessed before the war. [Page 718] The line shown in blue on the map attached to the report4 represented the proposal of the American Delegate.5 There had been qualified unanimity regarding this proposal. The French Delegate6 thought it inexpedient to alter the frontier at all, but all were of opinion that, if any alteration were to be made, the blue line represented the best alternative frontier.
M. Pichon suggested that the Roumanians and Bulgarians might be informed that, if any rectification of frontier in the Dobrudja was desired by them, the Allies would welcome negotiations between them.
Mr. Balfour said he understood the Commission was of opinion that the blue line represented a better ethnographical frontier than the green line, which was the 1914 frontier. Had the Conference been dealing with an enemy State, it would have applied its principles without reservation, but, as, in this instance, the case affected an Allied State, no modification, even according to the ethnological principle, could be made without the consent of the Allied State. He thought perhaps an appeal might be made to Roumania to offer a modification of frontier in the interest of peace with her neighbours and the general peace of Europe.
M. Pichon agreed that this was the question to be decided.
Mr. White pointed out that in the space between the blue and the green lines, there were 66,000 Bulgarians, and only 867 Roumanians. He agreed that the territory could not be taken from Roumania without her consent, but, in view of the figures quoted, he thought an offer to redress an inequitable frontier should be made.
M. Sonnino asked if there was any reason to suppose that Roumania and Bulgaria had any intention of negotiating.
M. Tardieu said he thought not. Three months ago Roumania might have been tempted to do so, with the object of inducing Bulgaria to yield Vidin to Serbia in exchange for a strip on the Dobrudja. The result of this might have been that Serbia would have abandoned her claims in the Banat and left Roumania a free hand there. This conclusion now appeared improbable, and Roumania would presumably be unwilling to negotiate with Bulgaria about the frontier in the Dobrudja merely on its merits.
M. Pichon [said?] that a hint might be given to Roumania to modify the frontier in the Dobrudja according to the recommendation made by the Committee. Meanwhile, the previous frontier might be provisionally accepted. It would be very difficult for the Allies [Page 719] to take from Roumania what had been given to her in 1914, especially since Roumania had fought on the Allied side against Bulgaria.
M. Sonnino said that a recognition of the 1914 frontier would make it still harder for Roumania to make a move. He thought that the report of the Committee should not be communicated officially to Roumania, but that it should be allowed to leak out unofficially. This might convey a less pointed hint to Roumania to undertake negotiations on her own initiative.
M. Tardieu said that, as far as he was concerned, he was a strong partisan of the original frontier. The new line would bring Bulgaria very close to the port of Constanza.
M. Sonnino suggested that the whole question be deferred, in the hope that the two countries would get together and settle the matter between them. Neither should be officially urged to do so, but an informal hint should be given to Roumania enabling her to make a beau geste. The Council might take the matter up again, should the two countries fail to reach an agreement.
M. Tardieu said that Roumania might answer to any hint of this kind that until she was aware of her frontiers in other regions, she could make no proposals. Her frontier in Bessarabia had been left undecided, by reason of Mr. Lansing’s remark that this frontier could not be decided in the absence of Russia. The frontier in Bukovina was also undecided and the frontier in the Banat was in a similar situation.
M. Laroche said that if Roumania yielded a little ground to Bulgaria in the Dobrudja, she would improve her relations with her neighbours and also confer a benefit on the Allies in general by making the rest of the peace terms more digestible to the Bulgarians.
M. Pichon said that in all probability M. Bratiano, before making any move, would ask for an assurance that Roumania would have the Banat. The Allies would then be forced to confess that the Roumanian frontiers could not be fixed on any side except the Hungarian.
Mr. Balfour observed that the objection to settling the frontier in Bessarabia, as involving a partial dealing with the Russian problem, was a sound one, but he thought the frontier in the Banat could be dealt with at once. He suggested that the Committee be asked to make a report on the subject.
M. Tardieu observed that the Committee’s report had been ready for 2½ months.
M. Laroche remarked that it had been hoped that the two countries concerned would reach an amicable settlement. This now appeared most unlikely and in all probability both sides would prefer that the decision of the Conference should be imposed on them.
(Further discussion of the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria was postponed pending a decision on the Banat.)
(c) Effect on These Questions of Lack of a Russian Policy M. Sonnino observed that a decision on all these questions was [Page 720] continually hampered by the absence of an Allied policy regarding Russia. The Conference hoped to make peace with Germany, Austria and Hungary. The Russian question Policy station still remained without the beginning of a solution. As Mr. Balfour remarked, the problem could not be dealt with piecemeal; nevertheless all sorts of questions would necessarily remain undecided unless something was done to establish a policy in Russia. A month ago Mr. Lloyd George had said that a Russian policy was absolutely necessary. If it was necessary then, it was more necessary now. The present moment, moreover, was a favourable one, as Russia was now divided into two principal forces, (1) the Bolshevik, and (2) all the anti-Bolshevik Governments, under Admiral Koltchak. Unless some steps were taken promptly, the Allies would be too late. The Allies were doing nothing, and the various Russian parties appeared to be shy of making any move. He suggested that the attention of the Council of Heads of States be drawn to the advisability of framing a Russian policy without delay.
(M. Pichon agreed to draw the attention of the Council of the Heads of States to this question.)
(d) With Serbia M. Tardieu explained the report of the Committee regarding the frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria. He explained the reasons why the committee rejected the claims of the Jugo-Slavs, and why, in three instances, it had adopted a modification of the previous frontier between Bulgaria and Serbia. In all these instances, save one, there had been unanimity. In the area between the Dragoman Pass and Pirot, the French and British Delegations proposed a line leaving the Dragoman Pass to Bulgaria, but giving Jugo-Slavia a more favourable position across the seven roads converging on Pirot. The former frontier had given the Bulgarians command of all these roads, and had put Pirot at their mercy. On the other hand, the frontier proposed by the Jugo-Slavs would have put Sofia at their mercy. The Italian and American Delegates preferred that no change should be made in the frontier at this point, as it was so near the capital of Bulgaria. They agreed, however, that the line proposed by the French and British Delegates was the best possible, should the alteration of the old frontier be considered desirable at all.
M. Sonnino asked what views had been expressed on the Central Committee.
M. Tardieu said that each Delegation had maintained its own view.
M. Sonnino expressed the opinion that ethnological reasons were in favour of the Bulgarians.
M. Tardieu said that the population was very small in the area concerned, and that ethnological reasons had no great weight.
[Page 721]Mr. Balfour said that he thought, on the whole, the balance of argument was in favour of a change of the frontier. There was no important question of population changing their sovereignty. The purpose was to make a more defensible frontier. Strong frontiers, as a whole, made for peace. The new frontier rendered Jugo-Slavia more defensible, and did not imperil Bulgaria. A change, therefore, would, he thought, be advantageous to the cause of peace between the neighbouring States.
M. Pichon agreed.
M. Sonnino asked how many inhabitants were concerned.
M. Tardieu said that there were no certain figures, but, roughly speaking, about 7,700 people might be affected.
Mr. White also expressed agreement to the new frontier proposed.
M. Sonnino said that he would not oppose it.
(The frontier proposed by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Jugo-Slavia between Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria was accepted.)
2. M. Pichon read a letter and draft Article sent him by M. Hymans (Appendix 2). He asked whether any objections were raised.
Article Proposed by M. Hymans for Insertion in the Treaties of Peace With Bulgaria and Turkey in Favour of Belgian Subjects Mr. Balfour said he raised no objection, but he would point out that the Belgians had not been at war with Bulgaria or Turkey. Nevertheless, they wished their countrymen to be placed in the same position as subjects of countries which had been at war. He asked whether the United States, who were in the same position, would like to claim the same advantages.
M. Sonnino expressed the view that this would set up a somewhat dangerous precedent.
Mr. Balfour asked whether Belgian subjects suffered any disabilities which could not be cured otherwise.
M. Pichon remarked that no such disabilities were alleged.
M. Sonnino said that it was possible that Belgium might have other remedies than the one suggested.
(It was decided that the question should be referred to the Reparations Commission, which would be asked to take note of the above discussion.)
3. Claim to Restoration of Polish Archives, Works of Art, etc. M. Pichon drew attention to the text of three articles submitted by the Polish Delegation for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. (Appendix 3.) He suggested that this matter should also be referred to the Reparations Commission.
M. Sonnino pointed out that the claim made referred back to events which had taken place a century ago. If claims relating to events before the period of the Napoleonic wars were to be [Page 722] put forward, Italy might take advantage of the precedent to make certain similar claims.
(The question was referred to the Reparations Commission.)
4. M. Pichon drew attention to the letter from Dr. Benes. (Appendix IV).
Protest by Dr. Benes Against Inclusion in the Austrian Delegation of Germans of Bohemia M. Sonnino expressed the view that it was not open to the Conference to make a formal objection. The Austrian Delegation might be told that they had made an indiscreet choice of Delegates, but an official protest appeared to him to be out of the question. Had the Austrian Delegation chosen to give powers to persons born in Italian territory, such as Trent, he would have thought the choice a bad one, but he would not have made an official protest.
M. Pichon said that he had returned a similar answer to M. Kramarc.7 He thought, therefore, that no notice could be taken of Dr. Benes’ protest.
M. Sonnino further pointed out that in all territories transferred from one State to another provision had been made for the inhabitants to opt for the retention of their previous nationality.
Mr. Balfour and Mr. White agreed that no official notice could be taken of Dr. Benes’ request.
(It was, therefore, agreed that no action could be taken.)
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Paris, May 16th, 1919.
[Page 723]- Report of the Commission to Study Territorial Questions Concerning Greece (Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs), March 30, 1919.↩
- Dr. S. E. Mezes.↩
- The Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs.↩
- Report No. 1 (April 6, 1919) of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia (Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs).↩
- The American delegates were Charles Seymour and Clive Day.↩
- The French delegates were A. Tardieu and J. Laroche.↩
- Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩