Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/18

FM–18

Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing.	Dr. Haskins.
Secretary	British Empire
Mr. L. Harrison.	Brig. General H. O. Mance.
British Empire	Captain C. T. M. Fuller.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Colonel Twiss.
Secretary	France
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.	M. Laroche.
France	Belgium
M. Pichon.	M. Hymans.
Secretaries	M. Segers.
M. Arnavon.	M. Orts.
Capt. de St. Quentin	M. de Bassompierre.
M. de Bearn.	M. Hostie.
Italy	Holland
M. Sonnino.	M. de Karnebecke.
Secretary	M. Van Swinderen.
M. Bertele.	M. Van Heeckeren.
Japan
H. E. Baron Makino.
Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. Burden.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. Pichon suggested that the discussion concerning the Revision of the Treaties of 1839 should be resumed.

Revision of the Treaties of 1839 M. Hymans said he would like to touch on a few of the points mentioned on the previous day, in order to elucidate them more fully. On the previous day, his Dutch colleague had not known the views of the Powers. M. Pichon had given him information on that subject. He, himself, had also informed his Dutch colleague of the substance of the statement he had made three months ago before the Conference. As a result of this statement, a Commission had been set up and had made a report, and this report had been adopted by the Conference. M. de Karnebecke was now aware of all that had passed.

The Belgian Delegation asked for a revision of the treaties of 1839 for political and economic reasons, and also with a view to ensuring the security and “national defence of Belgian territory. The guarantee of neutrality had been destroyed by the war. The settlement made in 1839 had so disposed all land and river frontiers as to make the national defence of Belgium practically impossible and also in such a manner as to hamper the economic development of the country. The whole prosperity of the country depended on Antwerp. Antwerp’s communication with the sea and with the hinterland, by which he meant not only the Belgian hinterland but the whole hinterland of Central Europe, was entirely held by Holland. The development of the port, therefore, depended on Dutch goodwill. Connection with the sea passed through Dutch territory and connection with Europe to the East passed through Dutch Limburg, a province taken in 1839 against the will of the inhabitants and against the economic interests of the country, whose natural outlet was Antwerp. From the point of view of security and national defence, the system set up in 1839 made Belgium dependent on the sovereign and unhampered decisions of Holland in respect to the Lower Scheldt and the frontiers of Limburg. As the basis of Belgium’s safety had now been destroyed, new adjustments were required. The whole system of neutrality was in contradiction with modern thought: each country should be master of its own economic and military fate. For these reasons, the Belgian Delegation asked for a complete revision of the treaties of 1839. M. de Karnebecke, on the previous day, had said that the Dutch Government did not object to the removal of all limitations on the sovereignty of Belgium. His statement that the Dutch Government was ready to collaborate in the revision in a spirit of goodwill was thankfully noted, but he had appeared to say that the revision ought to be carried out privately between Belgium and Holland. To this treatment of the problem, as an isolated matter only concerning the two countries, the Belgian Delegation could not agree. The treaties of 1839 had made a settlement purporting to be of general European interest. Belgium and Holland were not the sole signatories. This point of view had been fully recognised at the Conference, since not only the Powers with special interests but Powers with general interests had taken part in the Commission set up to examine the question of revision. M. de Karnebecke had also, he thought, assigned a limit to the extent of the revision of the treaties of 1839. He had declined to touch the territorial settlements made at that period. In the view of the Belgian Delegation, no arbitrary limitation could be made: the Conference had made none. It had considered the territorial and fluvial settlements made in 1839 as prejudicial to Belgium, and had taken the view that revision of the treaties should remove all impediments to Belgian sovereignty. The war had proved the inadequacy of Belgium’s defences and he felt sure that M. de Karnebecke would sympathise with the Belgian desire to avoid a repetition of the sufferings lately endured. As M. de Karnebecke had said he was not able to deal with questions of national defence, he would suggest the nomination of a Commission on which the Great Powers should be represented, to elaborate a plan for the adequate defence of Belgium. The main idea in the terms of reference to this Commission should be that Belgium’s frontiers should be made safe not only for the sake of Belgium but for the sake of European security. He suggested that the following questions should be put to the Commission:—

1. Can the line of the Meuse, which is the first defensive line of Belgium, be adequately held and defended according to the territorial status laid down by the treaties of 1839, which, in particular, delivered to Holland the town of Maastricht (“Mosae trajectum”) through which throughout the centuries German invasions have passed into Western Europe?

2. Can the line of the Scheldt, which is the principal defensive line of Belgium and of great natural strength, be effectually held unless Belgium can establish its position on the whole length of the stream?

He had already mentioned that, economically, the fate of Belgium was in Dutch hands. The replies given on the previous day by his Dutch colleague had exhibited the truth of this very clearly. To the Belgian complaint that the deepening and widening of canals, part of whose course lay in Dutch territory, had been made impossible, M. de Karnebecke had replied that any request from the Belgian Government would be favourably considered by Holland. This applied to the improvement of the Scheldt, to the Canal between Ghent and Terneuzen, and to the communications between Belgium and the Rhine. It followed from M. de Karnebecke’s answer that the ultimate decision in all cases remained with Holland. He wished to make it clear that he was not attacking the Dutch Government. His brief was against the Treaty which had established rights in favour of Holland, and he did not blame the Dutch Government for exercising its rights under the Treaty. These Treaties were, no doubt, the last vestige of the traditional Dutch policy of dominating the Scheldt, a policy which he was glad to be assured by M. de Karnebecke had now been abandoned. Accordingly, M. de Karnebecke would not object to a revision of the Treaty in this respect. As, however, the details of any revision of the Treaties regarding these matters of navigation and river control would be very intricate, he would suggest that a Commission be set up, on which the Five Great Powers, Holland and Belgium, should be represented, to deal with the whole question. The assumption would be that, in principle, the alteration of the provisions of the Treaties had been unanimously adopted. To be quite frank, the Belgian Government declared that the revision of the treaty should give Belgium certain guarantees, the principal of which he proposed to read:—

“Belgium demands in substance:—

I. As regards the Western Scheldt and problems connected with it:—

(a) Free disposal of access to the sea through the Scheldt, that is to say, the attributes of sovereignty over the whole course of the Western Scheldt from the main dykes to open sea, and also over all the dependencies of the Western Scheldt, and over the Canal and railway from Ghent to Terneuzen, and over the Mouth of the Canal in the Western Scheldt.

(b) Recognition by the Netherlands of the necessity for Belgium of basing its system of defence on the whole course of the Lower Scheldt, and of the right of using the system in full liberty, and at all times for defensive purposes. This would involve a renunciation by the Netherlands of all military measures which might hamper the exercise of this right by Belgium.

(c) The management by Belgium of the locks regulating the flow of water from Flanders.

(d) Satisfaction of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen of Bouchaute.

II. As regards waterways intermediate between the Western Scheldt and the Rhine:—

The creation at common expense, in place of the means provided by the Treaties of 1839 of a broad section Canal from Antwerp to Moerdijk.

III. As regards Dutch Limburg:—

(a) The establishment in Southern Limburg of a regime which will guarantee Belgium against the danger resulting from the configuration of this territory, and safeguarding Belgian economic interests compromised by the territorial and fluvial clauses of the Treaties of 1839.

(b) A large section waterway Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt.

IV. As regards Baerle-Duc:—

An arrangement putting an end to the difficulties resulting from the present dovetailing of the Belgian and Dutch territories”.

M. Hymans, continuing, said that he had now proposed two Commissions. It might be sufficient to establish one with two sub-Commissions. In conclusion, he would say a few words regarding Belgian policy. The Belgian Government had never desired territorial aggrandisement. In 1916, Baron Beyens¹ had given Holland an assurance in this respect. There had been at that time an agitation in the Belgian Press for the restitution of Limburg. But the Belgian Government thought that the wishes to which it had given expression should now be realised, in order to ensure the future of Belgium. The study by Commission which he had suggested would show whether the end desired by Belgium could be obtained only by territorial re-adjustments, or by some other method.

M. de Karnebecke said that he would willingly make a statement, though he had hesitated to do so as he did not wish to continue the discussion. As, however, his Belgian colleague had raised certain points, he felt bound, in his turn, to make certain comments. He would not begin over again the discussion on the desirability of revising the treaties of 1839. He had already replied on the previous day and wished to avoid any repetition.

M. Hymans had re-stated what he had stated on the previous day, that the development of Belgium was entirely dependent on Holland. If this were really the case, he would ask whether Belgium had any grounds for complaint. He thought not, seeing that the prosperity of Belgium had been considerable under the old regime. Nor could he see in what manner Belgium was at the mercy of Holland merely by reason of an international river. Such a situation existed in other parts of the world and it could not be asserted that one of the riverain States was responsible for this state of things. M. Hymans had also mentioned territories taken from Belgium in 1839. He doubted whether this was an accurate description, as these regions, with the exception of Ruremonde, had only been temporarily occupied by Belgium. Had the treaty of 15th November, 1831,² by which Belgium accepted the 24 Articles, been signed at once by the King of Holland, the occupation would only have lasted a few months, instead of 8 years. Historically, therefore, he did not think that the argument was well founded. M. Hymans had added that, as Belgian neutrality was about to disappear, other elements of security were required for Belgium. In saying this, the Belgian representative seemed to imply a connection between the question of neutrality and the territorial question. No doubt, in 1831, Belgium had laid claim to Dutch Flanders and Limburg, but the Great Powers had not granted Belgium these territories, thinking that an agreement should be formed on the basis of 1790 without any element of conquest or increase of territory. A study of the protocols of that period exhibited the principle quite clearly. He begged leave to quote the following example,³ of which there were many equivalents in the text:—

“The Conference should discuss and concert new arrangements of such a kind as to combine the future independence of Belgium with the stipulations of the Treaties, with the interests and security of other Powers and with the preservation of European equilibrium. This independence must, therefore, be in harmony with three essential principles which form a group and the observation of which could alone guarantee the peace of Europe and the rights of third Powers. The Note Verbale of the 3rd January⁴ tends to establish a right of aggrandisement and conquest in favour of Belgium. The Powers cannot recognise to any State a right which they deny to themselves. It is on such a mutual renunciation of all idea of conquest that the European system at the present time rests.”

No connection between the question of neutrality and the territorial question seemed to have been made during the discussions which took place in 1830 and 1831. In proof of this, he would refer the meeting to an authoritative book on Belgian Neutrality by M. Descamps. M. Descamps says:—

“It was not neutrality which was the stumbling block in the discussions. The principle seems to have been accepted at the very start of the negotiations. During the discussions, it remained rather in the background, while territorial, financial and commercial questions arising from the separation of the two countries were noisily discussed round the green table.”⁵

If, at that time, it was not necessary to connect the two ideas, why was it necessary today? If Belgian neutrality was to disappear, and Holland would raise no obstacles to this; he thought, in accordance with the letter sent by M. Pichon on the 13th March last, that the League of Nations should take the place of the neutrality in order to guarantee the security of Belgium. The question now raised was whether Belgium should receive compensations for the removal of its neutrality. The history of the Treaty of London⁶ showed that this neutrality had been conceived just as much in the interests of Holland, the idea was due to the Russian Delegate, who thought that this solution would facilitate the settlement of all questions which might arise between the two countries. If Belgium wished to abandon her neutrality, Holland made no objection, but saw no reason to offer compensations. As far as he was concerned, he could not admit the connection between the territorial and the neutrality questions. As regards the territorial problem, he must maintain what he had said on the previous day. He had expressed himself somewhat categorically, but he could not do otherwise. M. Hymans had drawn the conclusion from what had been said on the previous day that the Dutch Delegation recognised and confirmed the allegation that the development of Belgium was dependent on Dutch goodwill, simply because he (M. de Karnebecke) had declared that the Dutch Government was ready to take note, in a spirit of goodwill, of any proposals Belgium might suggest for the improvement of communications. This situation, he would point out, was due to geographical conditions alone. There was, for instance, a point which he would not have raised but which he felt it was right to mention, namely, the question of the Meuse. It had been alleged in Holland for several years, whether rightly or wrongly, that works made in Belgian territory along the Meuse considerably hampered the prosperity of Holland. This, therefore, was an analogous case to that of the Scheldt referred to by M. Hymans. M. Hymans had further declared that the Dutch representative appeared to recommend a private and isolated discussion between Holland and Belgium. He would not deny that he had made this proposal on the previous day. He had done it deliberately and for the following reason. The revision of the treaties was not the only question pending between Belgium and Holland. There was also the question of the relations between the two countries. These relations had been influenced by the crisis and he thought it was his duty, first of all, to re-establish mutual confidence between the two countries. For himself, this was the bigger question and he was inclined to give it precedence over that of the revision. He had, therefore, thought that, should the preliminary work be entrusted to the two countries, a useful result would be obtained not only in regard to the treaties but also in regard to the interests of the two countries. He did not wish to emphasise this any further, but he thought it right to mention the matter as a subject for consideration.

As regards M. Hymans’ proposals, he wished to state at once that he had no desire to produce delay or to adjourn the discussion, but the proposals just made were of such a scope that it was impossible for him to make an immediate declaration. Belgium’s desiderata were now, for the first time, placed before Holland. He would ask M. Hymans to hand him the text of his proposals which would be subjected to the most impartial examination, with a view to discovering whether the method of procedure suggested by M. Hymans could be accepted. He would, therefore, examine the proposals as soon as M. Hymans had handed him the text. It might be necessary for him to consult his colleagues in Holland, but he again repeated he had no desire to introduce avoidable delays. It was a question of deciding on the best method and of following it. It might also be desirable for him to consult M. Hymans on certain questions of detail and they might require to consider together what executive consequences should result from the proposals, in particular what programme of work should be submitted to the Commission. He thought it would be easy for them, by remaining in close touch, to hasten the solution of the question.

M. Hymans said that he very willingly accepted this proposal.

M. Pichon said that, as M. Hymans and M. de Karnebecke appeared to agree, he would ask the Council to endorse the suggestion.

M. Hymans said he would like to say a few words regarding an historical point connected with Limburg. During the common regime, the deputies were divided into two groups, those of the Northern Netherlands and those of the Southern, that is to say, the Dutch and the Belgian. The deputies of Limburg were Belgian. In 1830, when the revolution broke out, the Limburg deputies had voluntarily fought on the Belgian side. With the Belgians, they had voted the constitution and had remained with them until 1839. Many traces of Belgian sympathies still existed in Limburg. In 1839, Limburg had been given to the House of Nassau. It was attached to the German Confederation, which it only left in 1867. Article 3 of the Treaty of 19th April, 1839, showed under what conditions Limburg had been given to the House of Nassau:—

“Article 3. In return for the cessions made in the preceding Article, there shall be assigned to His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, a Territorial Indemnity in the Province of Limburg.”

He would point out that it would not be usual to offer as an indemnity anything which previously belonged to the recipient.

He wished to endorse heartily all that his Dutch colleague had said regarding the close and cordial relations that ought to exist between the two countries. He understood full well that conversations between them would be useful, but he thought they could well be made to concur with the negotiations he had suggested. In this respect, his proposal for the nomination of one or two Commissions appeared to him to be of advantage. Delegates working together in a Commission acquired intimate and cordial relations. After hearing M. de Karnebecke, he concluded that he was not opposed in principle to the study of the question by a Commission of Experts. He would, therefore, wait until the Dutch Representative had made his declaration.

M. de Karnebecke said that he must again state that he would not be able to make any definite undertaking on that day.

M. Hymans said that he understood this, but he would point out that there were a number of technical questions requiring study. He would, himself, not be competent to discuss them. The discussion would, moreover, be long and tiresome to the Council of Foreign Ministers before whom they appeared. His proposal amounted to putting the various experts of the Delegations in touch with one another. By this means, public opinion would not acquire the false impression that an assault at arms was going on between the Dutch and Belgian Foreign Ministers. He thought it would be enough for each Power to nominate two delegates, while Holland and Belgium should be permitted to call in all experts they might wish to produce to take part in the discussion.

M. Pichon said that he felt the Council would not refuse M. de Karnebecke the delay he asked for. The Council would ask him to give notice as soon as he had completed his study of the questions and another meeting would then be called.

Mr. Lansing said that this procedure did not entirely meet his views. The Conference could not last for ever, and he thought some limit should be assigned to the delay.

M. de Karnebecke said that it would be equally difficult for him to remain long in Paris. He wished to act quickly, but it was impossible for him to fix a date immediately, before he had even seen the text of the Belgian claims. As soon as he had this text in his hands, he would study it and give a reply in the shortest possible time.

Mr. Lansing asked whether, after he had received and considered the text, M. de Karnebecke could then decide on a date for another meeting.

M. de Karnebecke replied that it might, as he had already said, be necessary for him to consult his colleagues in Holland. He thought that a fortnight might be necessary.

M. Hymans said that he would at once hand the text of the Belgian proposals to M. de Karnebecke.

M. Pichon said that he took note of M. de Karnebecke’s undertaking to reply in the shortest possible time.

Mr. Lansing asked whether a delay of one week could not be fixed. If, at the end of a week, M. de Karnebecke was not ready to make a reply, a meeting might be held to grant him a further delay.

M. de Karnebecke said that he would accept this proposal. He could not, at the present time, undertake more.

M. Hymans asked whether the principle of a Commission could not be accepted at once and whether its members could be nominated.

M. de Karnebecke said that it was impossible for him to accept this. He had not yet had time to examine the Belgian proposals which had been read to him very rapidly and of which he had not been able to take any notes.

M. Pichon said that it was agreed that M. Hymans should, without delay, deliver to M. de Karnebecke the text of the Belgian proposals. The Dutch Minister would examine them and inform the Council in a week, either through the Secretary-General or directly to the Chairman should he prefer it, whether he was ready for a discussion or whether he required more time.

(This was accepted, and the meeting adjourned.)

Paris, 21st May 1919.

1. Baron Eugène Beyens, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from January 19, 1916, to August 4, 1917.
2. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xviii, p. 645.
3. From annex B of Protocol No. 10 of the conferences held in London relative to the affairs of Belgium, 1830–1831. For French text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xviii, p. 757.
4. For French text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xviii, p. 758.
5. Edouard E. F. Descamps, La Neutralité de la Belgique au point de vue historique, diplomatique, juridique et politique (Brussels & Paris, 1902), p. 163.
6. Treaty of November 15, 1831.