Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/19

FM–19

Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 23rd May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 23, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present
America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Mr. Herbert Hoover
Secretary	Colonel J. A. Logan
Mr. L. Harrison	Dr. C. Seymour
British Empire	Dr. C. Day
Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Mr. Morison
Secretary	Major. D. W. Johnson
Mr. H. Norman	British Empire
France	Sir Esme Howard
M. Pichon	Hon. H. Nicolson
Secretaries	Mr. A. [W.] A. Leeper
M. Arnavon	General W. Thwaites
Capt. de St. Quentin	Major Temperley
M. de Bearn	General Sir H. H. Wilson } For Item 4. Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope Capt. C. T. M. Fuller Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch
Italy
Baron Sonnino
Secretary
M. Bertele	Lt. Col. J. H. Morgan, For Item 5.
Japan	France
H. E. Viscount Chinda	M. Tardieu
Secretaries	Italy
M. Saburi	Marquis della Torretta
M. Kawai	Count Vannutelli-Rey

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. Burden
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham
Fance	Capt. A. Portier
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi
Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. Frontier of Roumania in Bukovina M. Pichon asked M. Tardieu to make a statement on this subject.

M. Tardieu said he had nothing to add to the Report.¹ The Committee had been unanimous and its award was shown by the blue line on the map attached to the report. He was ready, however, to answer any question that might be put to him.

Mr. Balfour said that in the previous discussion regarding frontiers, the principle had been adopted that whenever the Committee had been unanimous, it was unnecessary for the Council to go over the ground again. He thought this was a good principle and that it should be adhered to. At the risk of breaking his own rule, however, he would enquire whether the Council was asked to consider the space between the red and blue lines.

M. Tardieu said that the red line indicated the claims of the Roumanians, the blue the limits adopted by the committee. The Committee, therefore, had no concern with the space between the red and blue lines.

M. Sonnino said that it would seem that the space between these two lines had been attributed to no one.

Mr. Balfour asked whether according to a previous decision, such areas should not be formally assigned to the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. Laroche said that in discussing the Treaty with Austria, a formula had been accepted whereby all territories not immediately assigned to any new State were to be ceded by Austria to the Allied and Associated Powers for final disposal later on. At that time, the Roumanian frontiers had not been fixed. The territory alluded to by Mr. Balfour would seem automatically to fall under the principle and to be assignable to the Allied and Associated Powers. (See I. C. 186 (6).)²

(No objection having been raised to the frontier proposed by the Committee, the Roumanian frontier in Bukovina was adopted.)

2. Mr. Balfour asked whether the proposed frontier had been unanimously adopted.

Frontier Between Roumania and jugo-Slavia in the Banat M. Tardieu said that it had been reached unanimously.

Mr. Lansing asked whether the Committee had discussed the question of the Dobrudja. He understood that a connection had been established between the concessions Roumania would make in the Dobrudja and the satisfaction of her claims in the Banat.

M. Sonnino pointed out that the question of the Dobrudja had been adjourned in the hope that Bulgaria and Roumania might come to terms.

M. Tardieu recalled the discussion that had taken place on May 16th (I. C. 187, 1. b.).³ He saw no advantage in linking the discussion of the frontier in the Banat with that of the cession by Roumania of territory in the Dobrudja, seeing that Roumanian aspirations in the Banat had not been satisfied.

M. Sonnino suggested that the question of the Dobrudja be allowed to remain in abeyance for a while.

Mr. Lansing suggested that the question of Banat should also be allowed to remain in abeyance.

M. Sonnino said that he had understood that the Roumanians would be ready to yield something in the Dobrudja if they received satisfaction in the Banat.

M. Tardieu said that this was not quite the case. The Roumanians had said unofficially that they might make some concessions in the Dobrudja if Bulgaria gave up Vidin and the Timok to Serbia and thus induced Serbia to forego her claims in the Banat. Meanwhile, the Serbian-Bulgarian frontier had been settled and no such bargain was now possible.

M. Pichon said he entirely agreed with M. Tardieu. Roumania certainly was going to protest against the partition of the Banat proposed by the Committee. M. Bratiano had said that he would not sign the treaty unless the Banat were given to Roumania. It was therefore impossible to say to Roumania “as you now get the Banat, you should give up part of the Dobrudja”.

Mr. Lansing said that presumably it was the object of the Conference to make a durable peace. He thought few people would approve of the way in which Roumania had got possession of the Dobrudja. Should this situation be maintained, it would produce in the Balkans a situation analogous to that of Alsace-Lorraine before the war. There were in the area in question 66,000 Bulgarians, 60,000 Turks and only 867 Roumanians.

M. Tardieu said that if it had been possible to compose Roumania only of Roumanians he would have been delighted; but this had proved impossible. It was not only Bulgarians who were being made subject to the Roumanian State.

Mr. Lansing said that as the United States had not been at war with Bulgaria, he would have no other means of intervening in the discussion of the fate of the Dobrudja unless it were dealt with in connection with that of the Banat.

M. Sonnino suggested that the question of the Dobrudja like that of Bessarabia, which was also undecided, should be allowed to remain in abeyance. He did not think Mr. Lansing would be precluded from expressing his opinion when the subject came up for discussion.

Mr. Balfour said that he sympathised with the views of Mr. Lansing. He thought that the frontier in the Dobrudja was manifestly out of relation with the equilibrium of the population. He did not defend the means whereby Roumania had acquired the country, but the Council was not really concerned with the frontier between Bulgaria and Roumania any more than it was concerned with the frontier of France and Spain. He would regard it as a dangerous practice to reserve decision on all frontiers of Roumania until Roumania had conceded something in the Dobrudja.

M. Tardieu pointed out that the Conference had made a precedent for this. Belgium had made certain suggestions for readjustments between herself and Holland. According to the proposal, the latter was to be compensated at the expense of Germany. The Conference had refused to pronounce in this case because a neutral country was affected. What the Conference was unwilling to do to the detriment of a neutral, could it do to the detriment of an Ally?

M. Pichon said that he was in complete agreement with M. Tardieu and Mr. Balfour. He reminded the Council that the principle of accepting unanimous recommendations of Committees had been adopted. He therefore proposed that the frontier of Roumania in the Banat as recommended by the Committee be adopted and that the question of the Dobrudja be reserved.

Mr. Lansing said that he would accept the proposal but not the rule.

(It was therefore decided to accept the recommendations of the Committee regarding the frontier of Roumania in the Banat. The question of the Dobrudja was adjourned.)

3. M. Pichon asked whether the conclusions in the Report (see Annexure A) were acceptable to the Meeting.

Autonomy for the Ruthenians Mr. Lansing said that he wished to ask one or two questions. He referred to Article 5 providing for the nomination of functionaries. He suggested that the wish be expressed that these functionaries wherever possible be chosen from the Ruthenian population. The curse of these regions had been that their officials had hitherto all been Hungarians and the people had therefore never acquired the habit of self government.

M. Pichon suggested that Mr. Lansing’s comment together with the Report itself should be forwarded to the Commission on New States.

M. Sonnino said that Mr. Lansing, if he understood him aright, did not suggest that this proviso be applied to the Governor.

Mr. Lansing said that what he had in his mind was that police and other minor officials should, wherever possible, be chosen from the local population.

M. Laroche said that the words “as far as possible”, should be given prominence as the Ruthenians were an illiterate people and it might not be possible to find among them all the officials necessary.

Mr. Lansing said that he had another question to ask. As the Ruthenians were to have a form of autonomy and nevertheless to be subject to a State, the majority of whose population would be alien to them, would it not be well to introduce a stipulation enabling them to appeal to the League of Nations in any case in which the sovereignty of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was exercised in a manner regarded by them as in conflict with their rights?

M. Sonnino said that he saw no objection to the principle but thought it might be dangerous to state it too openly. He thought it might be better for the League of Nations to intervene whenever necessary on its own initiative.

M. Laroche pointed out that the status of the Ruthenians was going to be settled by a Treaty between the Powers and the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Treaty would give the former the right to intervene. Such a clause as that suggested by Mr. Lansing if put into the Treaty, might encourage immediate trouble in Ruthenia. There were already Ukrainians in Paris who laid claim to the territory of the Hungarian Ruthenians.

Mr. Lansing said that this territory was to be put in a situation analogous to that of territory subject to a mandate.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought he might assist or even perhaps terminate the discussion by calling attention to the work of the Commission on New States. This Commission had suggested a draft article with the object of safeguarding the wishes of minorities in Poland. Mr. Balfour then quoted Article I of Chapter II of the second Report of the Commission. He would therefore suggest that the question be deferred until the final Report of the Commission.

M. Pichon said that as the proposals were in any case to be referred to this Commission, it would be the simplest procedure to refer them together with the record of the discussion.

(This was agreed to.)

4. Situation in the Baltic Province Mr. Hoover said that the Committee set up by the resolution of May 9th,⁴ had met and considered the Baltic question from the point of view of the supply of food. The Committee concluded that military help was required. It recognised, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers could not be called upon to garrison these countries. The alternative was to encourage the native troops and to supply them with military equipment and expert guidance. The situation was complicated by the German occupation of Latvia and Lithuania. The Committee suggested that a military Commission be sent to Esthonia and that it should have credits allotted to it, to be spent both in cash and in kind. The activities of this Commission might, as occasion served, spread to the neighbouring countries. Since the report of the Committee, (Appendix C) news had been received that the Germans had occupied Riga. Mr. Hoover communicated to the Meeting the following telegram:—

“Communication by courier from Chief of Staff, Russian Detached Corps Northern Army Reval, states that Russians and Esthonians now eighty kilometres beyond Narva towards Petrograd. Asks definite assurance whether we will furnish food for troops and inhabitants of country districts and Petrograd. Bolshevik forces on Narva front completely routed, eight to ten regiments annihilated. Between Army and Petrograd only small and unreliable bodies of Bolsheviks; decision must be made at Omsk depending on our aid whether to advance and take Petrograd or halt. Two thousand tons landed at Reval will supply troops twenty days. Two thousand tons landed at Kotka or Wiborg in Finland supply Petrograd ten days. Asks cost and states payment can be obtained in Tsar or Kerensky roubles. Of extreme importance if food will be sent to know date of arrival at ports of Finland. Will take three weeks for Bolsheviki to concentrate troops for opposition which will be impossible down? (if?) present advance is continued. Later than that chance will be lost. Acknowledge.

Heath”⁵

He summarised the decisions required from the Meeting under the following four heads:—

(1) Should Esthonia be supported with arms, munitions and money?

(2) What action should be taken regarding the German occupation of Riga?

(3) How was the German support of the Baltic boundaries in Latvia and Lithuania to be dealt with?

(4) Were the Allied and Associated Powers directly or indirectly to support the attack on Petrograd?

M. Pichon said that Mr. Hoover’s news and proposals corresponded with the despatches received from the French Commander of the Naval Division at Libau (see Appendix B.)

Mr. Hoover said that if he were allowed he would make a suggestion that was perhaps a little out of his province. He thought that the key of the situation lay in Esthonia. The people there had shown powers of organisation and had set up a form of orderly Government. If helped, they might by degrees solve the German problem in the Baltic Provinces. At the present time it was difficult to remove the Germans merely to let the Bolsheviks into their place. The Germans at present were not in a temper to obey the Allies. It seemed best, therefore, to support Esthonia in every way and thus to enable the Esthonians to spread their authority westwards and in time to enable the Allies to dispense with German occupation. This should be taken into consideration in deciding whether the Esthonians should be encouraged to march on Petrograd.

Mr. Lansing asked whether Mr. Hoover’s proposals excluded similar assistance to the Letts and Lithuanians.

Mr. Hoover replied that under the nose of the Germans it would be difficult to set up a Lithuanian or a Lett army.

Mr. Balfour said that he agreed with the broad lines of the policy proposed by Mr. Hoover. He was not sure, however, that he and his colleagues had authority to consent to a loan of ten million sterling. With this reservation he was in agreement with Mr. Hoover. He particularly wished to ask the Military Authorities to give their opinion on the most recent aspects of the situation in the Baltic Provinces. He understood that in Esthonia there was an effective National Force advancing on Petrograd. This Force claimed a great victory.

Mr. Lansing interjected that the Force was largely composed of Russians.

Mr. Balfour said he would then call this Force a Russo-Esthonian Force. The Meeting was to decide what line was to be taken in regard to its operations. Were the operations to be checked by the refusal of help or were the Allied and Associated Powers to promise to revictual this army and the population of Petrograd, should it fall? He would like the military Experts to say whether the moment was expedient, from the Allied point of view, and what the probable consequences of either action would be. He particularly would like to know what effect it would produce on the Archangel and North Russian fronts, as well as in Latvia and Lithuania. Mr. Hoover said that if the Germans left these countries the Bolsheviks would take their place as the Allies could not fill the void. It was possible that the action of this Russo-Esthonian army might have such an effect on the Bolsheviks as to relieve Latvia and Lithuania automatically. Esthonian influence might thus, as Mr. Hoover had said, spread downwards and save the Letts and Lithuanians from the strange combination of German and Bolshevik oppression. He hoped that Mr. Pichon would ask the military authorities to state their views on the various questions he had formulated.

M. Pichon said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour, but must himself make the same reservation as Mr. Balfour regarding a credit of ten million sterling. He agreed to ask the military advisors to furnish the Council with a report as quickly as possible. He pointed out that they were already in touch with this question.

Mr. Balfour suggested that the Meeting should hear Sir Henry Wilson at once.

General Sir Henry Wilson said that the military situation was obscure because information as to the proceedings of the Bolsheviks was lacking. But according to all the knowledge he possessed the telegram quoted by Mr. Hoover must be incorrect. There were not enough troops in Esthonia and Finland, to exterminate 8 to 10 Bolshevik regiments. The Bolshevik troops, might, for some unknown reason have gone away, and it might be possible to drive into Petrograd in a ear, but it was not possible that a Bolshevik force of that magnitude should have been crushed in a pitched battle. If it were possible to take Petrograd without causing annoyance to Admiral Koltchak, this would be a military event of great importance. The possession of the junction at Svanka would cut the communications of the Bolshevik forces opposed to us on the Murmansk front. Later on, the possession of this junction would establish a liaison between the North Russian forces and the Siberian forces, and, as an ultimate result, should war in Russia continue, the fall of Moscow might be expected. As a soldier therefore, he would favour the occupation of Petrograd, provided Admiral Koltchak were favourably disposed. In the meantime, he thought that a Military Mission should be formed immediately at Libau or Riga, and asked to report without delay on the Military situation of the Baltic peoples. He thought it was essential to act quickly before the summer was far advanced. The head of the Mission should be an English General. There was one already on the spot, and the Mission could be set up within a fortnight. He understood that the proposals of the Committee, with the exception of the credit of 10 millions, had been accepted in principle. Even without the credit, he thought the Mission would be useful, and would therefore recommend that it be proceeded with at once.

M. Sonnino said he agreed.

M. Pichon said that he also agreed, but he could not give formal agreement at once, by reason of the financial responsibilities involved. He was willing, however, to submit the whole proposal to the Council of Heads of States, with a favourable comment.

Mr. Balfour suggested that resolutions to the following effect were required:—

“That the Esthonian Army be supplied with food. That Petrograd, if captured, be supplied with food. That all possible munitions and equipment should be sent, and, lastly, that a communication be sent to Admiral Koltchak, in order to avoid any false impression on his side.”

Mr. Lansing said that he was willing to adopt the first three paragraphs of the Committee’s report (see Annexure “C”). The fourth should be referred to the Council of Heads of States; the fifth and sixth he would accept, and he would propose a seventh to the following effect:—

“That the Director General of Relief should continue to extend ravitaillement in all non Bolshevik areas of the Baltic region without respect to political control”.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not wish to use food for the purpose of propaganda, but, on the other hand, he did not wish the food to fall into the hands of people who would use it for adverse propaganda. For instance, he did not wish it to fall into the hands of the Germans in Lithuania. He was therefore, not sure that he could accept so wide a formula as that suggested by Mr. Lansing.

Mr. Hoover said there was some difference of opinion between the British and American Delegates on the subject of the supply of food. The British Delegates wish to suppress the supply of food to Latvia and Lithuania because the local Governments of these countries had been upset by the Germans. The American view was that food could be supplied through American Committees, in such a way as to benefit the population, and not to benefit the Governments, except in so far as any Government might benefit by the order produced by the supply of food. He did not propose to send food to Bolshevik Governments, but with this reservation, he thought food should be distributed all over the area as far as possible.

Sir Esme Howard said that the position was, he believed, as follows. Some of the British representatives had thought it better to stop food, in order to force the Germans to relax their hold on the Governments of Latvia and Lithuania. The British Delegation, as a whole, however, felt that food should be sent, provided its distribution was so controlled that it did not get into the hands of the Germans.

Mr. Hoover said that possibly 25,000 Germans might get a fraction of the food distributed, but in any case, these Germans were bound to live on the country, by reason of the terms of the Armistice itself. It made little difference, from what source they obtained their food. According to the seventh paragraph suggested by Mr. Hoover, the Allied Food Agents would be able to follow up the Esthonian Army and feed any population, not subject to a Bolshevik Government.

Mr. Balfour said he would agree, provided some caution were added that the food did not fall into German hands and that it should not be used for a political purpose.

Mr. Hoover said that the American officers in charge of the distribution of food had received instructions to this effect.

Mr. Balfour said that as it was the Allied policy, it would be well to state it.

M. Pichon said that the whole proposal should therefore be sent to the Council of the Heads of State. All but the question of the advance on Petrograd and that of the credits could be accepted by the Council.

Mr. Lansing said he preferred not to refer the question of the advance on Petrograd until he had seen a definite formula.

Mr. Balfour suggested the following terms of reference:—

“According to a telegram received by Mr. Hoover indicating that there is an immediate possibility of the occupation of Petrograd by a Russo-Esthonian force, a decision is required as to what directions should be given to that army, regarding this operation, and whether any communication should be made on this subject to Admiral Koltchak.”

Mr. Lansing said that he wished it to be recorded that Article 7, proposed by himself rendered this course unnecessary. He was not disposed to back this proposal and desired his reservation to be entered in the record of the meeting.

(The Articles 1 to 3, 5 to 6 of the Committee’s report were accepted.

Paragraph 4 and the question formulated by Mr. Balfour regarding the advance on Petrograd, together with the 7th Article proposed by Mr. Lansing were referred to the Council of Heads of Governments. Mr. Lansing made a reservation to the effect that Article 7 as proposed by him would fulfil all necessary purposes, and render Mr. Balfour’s suggestion unnecessary.)

5. M. Pichon referred to a letter from Marshal Foch, suggesting that collective action by the Powers should be resorted to as the only means of giving Belgium the satisfaction she required. (Appendix D.)

Belgian Protest Against Retention and Publication by Germans of Belgian Documents He asked in what manner the Allied and Associated Powers could act.

Mr. Lansing said that all that it was possible to do was to register a protest.

M. Pichon observed that this had already been done.

He pointed out further that there were Articles in the Treaty covering the point.

(After some discussion it was decided that no action need be taken.)

6. (It was decided that no action should be taken. See Appendix E.)

Mr. Pichon drew attention to a letter from Marshal Foch. (Appendix F.)

Proceedings of Germans in Poland: (a) Requisition and Removal of Railway Material in Polish Silesia (b) Proposal To Send Allied Stationnaires to Königsberg and Memel (It was decided to send the proposal contained in it to the Naval Experts of the Allied and Associated Powers.)

7. M. Pichon read the following letter from M. Jules Cambon:—

“Paris, May 19th, 1919.

Question of Hearing Ukrainian Representatives by the Commission on Polish Affairs The Committee on Polish Affairs, before presenting its report on the question of Galicia, would consider it just and necessary to hear the Polish and Ukrainian representatives. It hesitates to decide on account of the resolution of the Supreme Council of March 19th, which runs as follows:—

‘The hearing of the Polish and Ukrainian representatives relative to their rival claims is, it should be noted, subject to the formal condition of an immediate suspension of hostilities.’

The attempts to bring about an Armistice having failed, the Committee asks whether the Supreme Council maintains its decision to forbid the hearing of the Polish and Ukrainian representatives.”

(After a short discussion it was decided that there was no objection to the course proposed by M. Cambon, should the Commission desire to hear the Ukrainian representatives.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Paris , 23 May 1919.

Appendix A to IC–190 [FM–19]

Report of the Tchecho-Slovak Committee on the Degree of Autonomy To Be Accorded to the Ruthenes of Hungary

At their meeting on the 8th of May, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided to invite the Territorial Committee on Tchecho-Slovak claims to submit recommendations as to the degree and form of autonomy to be granted by the Tchecho-Slovak Republic to the populations inhabiting the Ruthenian territory south of the Carpathians.

In pursuance of these instructions the Tchecho-Slovak Committee met on Thursday, the 15th of May, and invited Dr. Benes to lay before them the views and intentions of the Tchecho-Slovak Government regarding this question.

Dr. Benes explained that it was the general policy of the Tchecho-Slovak Government to encourage throughout the Republic a process of evolution towards some form of federal organisation. This evolution, however, could only be gradual, and it would be premature to introduce a complete scheme of decentralisation until the various provinces had attained to a greater degree of national consciousness and had reached a level of common cultural and economic development. This principle applied with especial force to the Ruthenes populating the districts south of the Carpathians: the country was poor and the population were backward: much money would be needed for the improvement of agriculture, communications and education: this money would be provided by the Central Tchecho-Slovak Government and would have to a great extent to be applied and administered by officials of the Central Government, since the Ruthenes themselves would not for many years be sufficiently developed adequately to cope with these problems.

Subject to the above reservations Dr. Benes declared that his Government were anxious to give the Ruthenians all possible local autonomy.

The Committee, having taken note of Dr. Benes’ arguments and having agreed with him as to the desirability, within the limits he had indicated, of granting to the Ruthenian populations a special status within the Republic, asked that they might be furnished by Dr. Benes with a written memorandum embodying the form of autonomy which the Tchecho-Slovak Government would themselves suggest.

The scheme accordingly furnished by Dr. Benes, which is given in the Annex to this report, was examined by the Committee at their meeting of the 17th May and was considered by them to be both adequate to the present needs of the population themselves and in harmony with the general principles which the Committee had themselves foreshadowed.

Conclusions

(1) The Committee are unanimous in recommending to the Council of Five that the scheme proposed by Dr. Benes should be adopted as the basis governing the future relations between the Ruthenians and the Tchecho-Slovak Republic.

(2) They consider, therefore, that their report, if approved by the Council of Five, should be referred by them to the Special Committee on New States, who should be asked to embody Dr. Benes’ proposals in such a form as may be in harmony with the general procedure adopted by them in other similar cases.

Paris, May 20th, 1919.

Annex to Report of Tchecho-Slovak Committee

Memorandum by Dr. Benes on the Status of the Ruthenes to the South of the Carpathians Whose Territory Forms Part of the Tchecho-Slovak State

(Translation)

In order to give a special juridical status to the territory of the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians and to manifest the desire of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic to establish a just Government in that territory, the Tchecho-Slovak Republic, although possessing a common central legislature and administration, desire to accord to the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians a wide measure of autonomy. In order to provide guarantees of this autonomy the Tchecho-Slovak Republic might conclude a special Treaty with the Great Powers in this matter.

The following clauses represent the basis of this autonomy.

(1) The territory of the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians, within the whole region comprised by the frontiers delimitated by the Great Powers, shall bear a special name to be determined on by agreement between the Tchecho-Slovak Republic and the Diet of the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians.

(2) The country of the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians shall possess a special Diet. This Diet shall enjoy legislative power in all linguistic, scholastic and ecclesiastical questions as well as in all other questions which the laws of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic may attribute to it in accordance with particular needs. The laws passed by this Diet shall be approved by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic and countersigned by the Governor of the country of the Ruthenes, who shall be responsible to the Diet.

(3) As regards all other matters, the country of the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians shall share in the legislative power of the Legislative Assembly of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic, to which Assembly it will send deputies elected according to the constitution of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic. These deputies will however not have the right of voting upon such legislative questions as will be attributed to the Diet of the country of the Ruthenes.

(4) At the head of the administration of the country shall be placed a Governor nominated by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic. This Governor shall represent the final authority, on the one hand in all linguistic, scholastic and ecclesiastical questions and on the other hand in matters affecting internal administration (political matters). For all other questions, the Ministers of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic shall be the supreme authority. In these Ministries special Ruthenian sections shall be established. The tribunals established in the territory of the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians shall be a part of the judicial organisation of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic. When, however, appeal is made to a higher court situated outside Ruthenian territory, the matter will be brought before a special Ruthenian Court.

(5) Government officials shall be appointed by the Governor up to the seventh class. Superior officials shall be appointed by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic on the recommendation of the Governor or the Tchecho-Slovak Council of Ministers.

(6) The Euthenes south of the Carpathians shall be represented upon the Council of Ministers of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic by a Minister without portfolio, who shall be a native of the Ruthenian territory and shall be chosen by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic.

In order to demonstrate the extent of this autonomy it is necessary to give a general outline of the organisation which the Tchecho-Slovak Government proposes to establish in the other territories of the Republic.

The State is to be divided into Departments.

At the head of the departmental administration there will be a Prefect who in all administrative questions will be subordinate only to the Central authority.

In principle for each department any appeal shall be brought before a competent Ministry. The body (Departmental Council) which shall be constituted to assist the Prefect shall only enjoy administrative powers and the right of supervision. This body will in no case enjoy legislative power which shall be exclusively reserved for the Central Legislative Assembly.

17. 5. 19.

Appendix B to IC–190 [FM–19]⁶

[Information Received From the French Commander of the Naval Division at Libau]

The Germans (are profiting) by the antagonism between the Baits and the Letts in order to dominate (Libau and Lettonia). The pastor Nedra, Germanophile agent of the Baits, has assumed again the power which the National Council had summoned him to lay aside.

The Germans are seeking to establish themselves definitively in the country, and already they push their insolence to the point of threats against the Allies. At Keyne, the French military mission was obliged to make preparations for defense in its hotel in view of the excitement among the German troops over news of the conditions of peace. At Libau, the commander of the German troops declared that he declined all responsibility for breaches of discipline in which the German soldiers might indulge when confronted by Allied soldiers in uniform; but the German soldiers at Libau are well disciplined, and the acts which it was pretended to wish to prevent would not have occurred except by order of those in command.

The conclusions of the commander of the French naval division incline toward “sending as promptly as possible into the neighborhood the necessary means in material and personnel to form a fairly strong Lettish national army”. The form of this national army would afford means to secure order in the country, and to exact ultimately the evacuation of the German troops, whose presence tends to place the Baltic provinces under the hegemony of our enemies.

Conty

Appendix C to IC–190 [FM-19]

[Report of the Committee to Consider the Baltic Question]

Enclosure II

In the course of a Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held on May 9th, 1919, it was decided:

“That a Committee including all the United States, British, French and Italian economic, naval and military representatives should meet to make a report on the best means of establishing and maintaining order in the Baltic Provinces and of revictualling the population.”

This Committee met on the 14th May at the Ministry of Commerce.

It was of opinion:

(a) That the maintenance of order is a necessary condition of the distribution of food in the Baltic Provinces.

(b) That the present situation in Lithuania and Lettland, which leaves the maintenance of order entirely in the hands of the German army, is most regrettable and should in no case long continue.

(c) That, as there can be no question of sending Allied troops to the Baltic Provinces, the only alternative is to organise all that can be obtained in the way of native forces and volunteers from outside.

It was therefore decided, after an exhaustive discussion of the whole question in its different aspects, to submit to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs the following recommendations:

1. In conformity with Article 12 of the Armistice, the Germans shall be required to withdraw from Lettland and Lithuania as soon as it is possible to replace them there by organised local forces, but they should remain where they are till further orders. The organisation of local forces should be proceeded with as soon as possible.

2. A competent Military Mission, under British Command, shall be organised under the orders of a Lieutenant or Major General. Its headquarters shall be at Libau or Reval and its object shall be to advise the Governments of Esthonia, Lettland, and Lithuania on all questions concerning the organisation, equipment and training of the local forces and of the volunteers whom it may be possible to raise outside those Countries. This Mission shall also have the duty of advising the above-mentioned Governments on the best means of defending themselves against the Bolsheviks and of keeping the Germans out of their territory.

3. The volunteers mentioned in Paragraph 2 shall be raised by voluntary recruitment in the Scandinavian States including Finland.

4. A credit of ten million pounds sterling shall be placed at the disposal of the Baltic States by the Allied and Associated Governments. It shall be used as required and in the manner decided by the Political and Military Missions.

5. Food, equipment, clothing, arms, munitions, etc. shall be provided by the Allied and Associated Powers, the expense being met out of the credit mentioned in Article 4.

6. The Political and Economic Missions shall have the duty of enquiring what collateral guarantees can be obtained from the three Baltic States to cover in whole or in part the credit mentioned in Article 4.

Appendix D to IC–190 [FM–19]

Supreme Command of the Allied Armies, General Staff,
Allied G. H. Q., 12th May 1919.

From:—Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,

To:—The Chairman of the Peace Conference (Secretariat-General.)

In your letter of 11th May you informed me that the Supreme Allied Council (Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs) wished to know whether the proceedings complained of by the Belgian Government did not amount to a violation of Article XIX of the Armistice, and whether in that case I did not possess the necessary power, in virtue of the Armistice itself to put a stop to those proceedings.

General Delobbe’s⁷ letter, which I forwarded to you, showed that the General had already dispatched a protest to the German Armistice Commission on 10th April last, and that the protest had been ineffectual.

A repetition of this protest at the present time would probably have no more effect. Moreover, the Belgian Government complains not merely of the retention by the Germans of papers belonging to the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but also of the publication of those documents. Even if Article XIX of the Armistice prohibits the retention of papers, it makes no mention of their publication.

Under these conditions it seems to me that the Armistice Commission would be unable to obtain the satisfaction demanded by the Belgian Government, and that such satisfaction, as General Delobbe points out, must be obtained by collective action on the part of the Allied Powers.

(Sgd)

Weygand

, Major General
by order

Appendix E to IC–190 [FM–19]

General Headquarters, May 15th, 1919.

Letter From Marshal Foch to M. Clemenceau

(Translation)

I enclose herein copy of a telegram from General Henrys reporting to General Nudant that the Germans are making abusive requisitions in Silesia and are taking away from that region rolling stock from the railways.

Those proceedings having been clearly provoked by the communication of the peace conditions with Germany, the Armistice Commission at Spa is not qualified to intervene on the subject with the German Government and it is for the Supreme Council of the Allies to decide what measures shall be taken to safeguard the interests of Silesia.

I have the honour therefore to submit the question to you.

For Marshal Foch
(Signed)

Desticker

[Enclosure]

Berlin, May 14th, 1919.

Telegram

General Dupont to Marshal Foch, Paris, and General Nudant, Spa.

No. 964. General Henrys telegraphs on the 12th May:—

“I learn that in Polish Silesia the Germans are in violation of the conditions of peace requisitioning supplies of all kinds, viz. corn, cattle, flour, etc., and are hastily sending back to Germany rolling stock of railways. Great discontent and agitation of the population have been caused thereby. Rising to be feared. I ask whether Germans are justified or not in removing rolling stock from districts to be evacuated and thus depriving entire province of material indispensable to economic life. If not, I request steps may be taken to stop these proceedings”.

(Signed)

General Dupont

Appendix F to IC–190 [FM–19]

Chief Command of the Allied Armies,
Allied General Headquarters, May 17th, 1919.

The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief of the Allied Armies.

To the President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the telegram which I have received from General Dupont, from which it appears:—

(a) That the Germans are preparing again to take up arms in particular against Russia (sic).

(b) That they have obtained the help of Soviet Russia, and are ready to send there Non-Commissioned Officers as instructors.

I beg leave to draw your attention to General Dupont’s suggestion for the despatch of Allied stationnaires to Königsberg and Memel, and I request you to be so good as to submit it to the Peace Conference for decision.

Enclosure

Spa, May 16th, 1919.

General Nudant, Interallied Armistice Commission.

To Marshal Foch, Paris.

General Dupont has communicated to me a telegram addressed on May 15th by General Spire^* to Colonel Reboul.

In a secret document of April 22nd the German Government says that it will not sign a Peace of violence and that it is preparing a new war especially against the Poles.

It adds that negotiations have been carried on with the Soviet and that their result is satisfactory.

Many German Non-Commissioned Officers who have volunteered to serve in Russia will be collected at Königsberg whence they will start in service dress without arms. General Henrys asks Colonel Rebour to watch the movements of German military cadres towards the Bolshevik army and to report to him.

General Dupont suggests the despatch of Allied stationnaires to watch these movements, especially at Konigsberg and Memel. He asks that Spire’s information may be forwarded to the British stationnaires at Libau.

1. Report No. 1 (April 6, 1919) of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia (Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs).
2. FM–15, p. 711.
3. FM–16, p. 717.
4. See FM–13, p. 687.
5. Maj. F. K. Heath, chief of the food commission sent to Finland by the American Relief Administration.
6. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
7. Gen. Hector Delobbe, Belgian representative on the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.
8. of General Henrys’ Mission at Warsaw. [Footnote in the original.]