Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/127
IC–177B
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s Residence in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 29, 1919, at 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- President Wilson.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
- Japan
- H. E. Baron Makino.
- H. E. Viscount Chinda.
- M. Saburi.
- M. Kimura.
- United States of America
| Secretary | Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
| Interpreter | Prof. P. J. Mantoux. |
(1) Shantung and Kiauchow President Wilson said that he had taken the liberty of inviting the Japanese representatives to an hour’s conversation before the Meeting. At the moment at which M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George had joined them, the discussion had reached this point: he himself had said that he understood that the Japanese were willing to re-cede to China the lease and rights in the leased territory, retaining their rights only in the leased district of Kiauchow, and outside of that only economic rights. They were willing, he understood, to forego their right to place troops along the railway and compel the Chinese to accept police instructors. That right had exceeded Germany’s rights outside the leased territory, and went beyond economic rights. He understood that it was contemplated that there should be a joint Chino-Japanese control of the railway, which would be controlled by a corporation. The latter he proposed should have some control in the police also. But to give this right of police control to the Government would convey the same impression to the world as the German control of the Turkish army.
Viscount Chinda said that Japan’s claims regarding police did not in his opinion exceed the rights actually exercised by Germany. The railway was really German-owned property. As German property the railway and its German personnel had the right to extra-territoriality, and this included the rights of policing, as it was the case with the foreign settlements in China.
[Page 328]Mr. Balfour said he had thought that Viscount Chinda had on Saturday told him that the railway ran on Chinese territory and outside of German jurisdiction.
Viscount Chinda said that the territory was Chinese, but the railway had in fact been German-owned, and consequently the railway and its personnel enjoyed extra-territoriality.
President Wilson asked why, because the railway was German-owned, it should enjoy extra-territorial rights? If, for example, the United States of America conceded the property in a railway in its own country to Germany, it would not have the right of extraterritoriality.
Viscount Chinda said that it was because in China foreigners have the right of extra-territoriality. As a matter of fact the Germans had employed Chinese as police, but had had an official of great importance not merely as instructor but as an adviser, and the whole police force had in fact been in his hands, consequently Japan, in asking for instructors, claimed less rights than Germany had exercised.
President Wilson said he did not mind Japan asking for these rights, but what he objected to was their imposing them. He was not arguing as to what rights Germany actually obtained by one act or another, but he was only concerned in what Germany’s rights had been to which Japan succeeded.
Mr. Balfour asked if he was not right in saying that on Saturday Viscount Chinda had made the point that Japan became the heir of the German rights—that as Germany had owned the majority of the shares in the railway, Japan would inherit the same. That, however, surely did not give Japan the right of extra-territoriality. The remainder of the shares, he understood, were owned by the Chinese. It was certainly news to him that a commercial property of this kind covered extra-territorial rights, including control of police.
Baron Makino said he did not think it was contended that the majority of shares gave the right to extra-territoriality.
President Wilson asked if it was contended that the fact that the Government was the owner gave this right.
Baron Makino said that it was a fact that Germany actually established the state of things which had been criticised.
Viscount Chinda said that territorial sovereignty belonged to China. Extra-territoriality applied not to the territory but to the people.
President Wilson said he could not admit this. He did not understand the first part of the settlement, namely, that referring to the control of life. He did not admit by inference that extra-territoriality applied to the personnel administering the railway. He was not [Page 329] contesting the facts of the situation that Germany had brought about, but he did contest what Germany had had the right to bring about if China had opposed it.
Viscount Chinda said that Germany had in fact enjoyed these rights. The police, however, had no right to interfere with the regions outside the railway.
Mr. Lloyd George said that in the United Kingdom the police of railways and docks was very often in the hands of the Company concerned. The Company would arrange with the Home Office to hand over to it a section of the police, but it would remain under the control of the Directors of the Company. It seemed to him that some use might be made of this analogy. Control through the Directors would not be derogatory to the sovereignty of China any more than control of the London & North Western Railway police was derogatory to the sovereignty of Great Britain.
President Wilson pointed out the difference that the London & North Western Railway was not owned by a foreign Government. The police arrangements in the United States of America were somewhat similar, and State or City Commissioners often gave the control of railways to the Companies who paid the wages and were permitted to deal direct with these police. In law, however, the police were the employees of the municipalities, counties, etc. of the Central Government. What he contended was that if the majority of the shares was held by the Japanese which would give a Japanese majority on the Board of Directors, they could in fact control the persons by whom the police were chosen. Why, he asked, should we compel a foreign Government to control what a majority of Directors could control in an administrative manner? If the Japanese Government insisted on Government control, and on Japanese instructors, they would offend the sovereignty of China, and get no more in fact than they could obtain through a majority of Japanese Directors. He remarked that there was no stipulation in the German lease concerning the right of police.
Viscount Chinda said that the matter might not be founded on an express understanding between Germany and China. It might be inferred from the fact of the ownership of the railway by Germany. The Japanese claim in this respect was a matter of precaution to obtain the necessary rights in China for safeguarding the railway. Practically it might work out all right if Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal were adopted.
President Wilson objected to the form of this claim, which he regarded as an unwise one. It would give the impression of offending Chinese sovereignty. He himself was trying to get away from anything that would do this.
[Page 330]Viscount Chinda pointed out that China had accepted the arrangements voluntarily. In that case there would be no infringement of China’s rights.
President Wilson said that the Chinese maintained that it was not voluntary.
Viscount Chinda said it was necessary to draw a distinction between the so called twenty-one points, and the September agreement of last year.
President Wilson said that circumstances and the temper of the parties had altered by 1918, but nevertheless the 1918 agreement had grown out of the 1915 agreement. One had been the supplement of the other.
Viscount Chinda said that the 1918 agreement, was far from having been made under pressure. It had in fact been initiated by the Chinese Government. There had been no question of pressure.
Baron Makino said that the question of police instructors was related to the policy adopted in regard to these instructors. If the instructors were entered on a political basis and took part in the administrative part of their police duties, this would be going too far. The term instructors was rather a vague one. It might be abused as the Germans had done. In their case it had been a matter of a policy of vindication. If such intrusion was carried out it was a misuse. But if the arrangement was voluntarily entered into it would be regarded simply as a police arrangement.
President Wilson said it was extremely difficult for him in the face of public opinion in the United States of America to assent to any part of the arrangement.
He was seeking a way to make it possible for him to agree, and it was not a simple matter. Public opinion in the United States did not agree to the transfer of the concession. He was bound to tell the Japanese representatives that. He was trying to see all views and to find a way out. In these circumstances it greatly increased his difficulty, if there were even an appearance of unusual control insisted on, particularly if the transfer of rights to Japan was greater than those exercised by Germany. He could not possibly justify in the United States his assent to a transfer on such terms. Public opinion would say it did not believe in the transfer of the claims at all and that he had actually given Japan more than Germany had had. He must say frankly that he could not do this. He asked the Japanese representatives to cooperate with him in finding a way out. He wanted to support the dignity of Japan, but he thought that Japan gained nothing by insisting on these leased rights being vested in the Government.
[Page 331]Mr. Balfour referred to his conversations with the Japanese representatives on the previous Saturday and Sunday. In view of these he was rather surprised at the tone of the present conversation. He understood and had stated in his memorandum that the intention of Japan was fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within the leased territory, and only to retain rights which were economic in their character. He had shown this memorandum to Baron Makino, who had expressed himself satisfied with it. Hence he was surprised this morning to find the question being discussed as to whether Japan did intend to exercise some rights of sovereignty. He had thought that that was not in dispute. He had thought that there was only a question of temporary and transitional arrangements, which did indeed transgress sovereignty, but only for a short time.
Baron Makino said he thought that the question of police instructors had been mentioned in their conversation. The conditions of the transfer arranged in 1918 had surely been discussed.
Mr. Balfour said he did not deny this, but the broad issue was as to whether Chinese sovereignty was to be restored in its entirety. If this was to be done Japan would be within her rights in regard to her position in connection with the railway and the concession to negotiate was reasonable. Her position would be analogous with that of other powers which had concessions in China, although no doubt the whole system deserved to be reconsidered and was in need of revision. These concessions, however, would then only be of an economic character. He thought it was agreed that Japan should retain economic rights, and the only outstanding question related to the transitional period. Hence he had felt a good deal of surprise at the line of conversation this morning.
Baron Makino said he was sorry if there had been any misunderstanding. All this, however, was part of the arrangement of 1918.
President Wilson said that if Baron Makino relied on the agreement with China in regard to the police, he must also remind him that this agreement also provided for the maintenance of a military force by Japan in China. Japan did not insist upon that. Why should she insist upon the police?
Baron Makino said that in the conversation that he and Viscount Chinda had had with Mr. Balfour, they had felt considerable surprise at the interpretation that Mr. Balfour placed on the proposed concentration of troops at Chinan and Tsingtau, which he had apparently regarded as indefinite. The reason for his surprise was that the idea had never entered into his head, nor he believed into the heads of the Japanese military experts. The troops hitherto had been lined out along the railway at a number of points, and this concentration [Page 332] had been regarded as a mere step towards the final withdrawal of the troops. That being their standpoint he had been surprised when Mr. Balfour had assumed that it was intended to be for an indefinite period. In regard to the police, the question was of a somewhat different nature to the disposition of the troops. He was not entering into the wisdom of the arrangement, but according to his interpretation one of the stipulations was for the employment of instructors.
President Wilson said that no limit was imposed in regard to troops there.
Baron Makino agreed that on re-reading the article he had found that it might be construed in that sense. This had surprised him and he believed it to be merely a matter of wrong drafting. He admitted the phrase had been ambiguous, but the correct interpretation was the one he had given.
President Wilson said that one of the worst features in the whole of these transactions had been the unfortunate 21 demands and this had included a demand for police instructors, although, of course, on a much wider basis. This had caused the greatest irritation, as it was an invasion of Chinese political and administrative independence. It was impossible to divorce transactions of this kind from the public impression they made. The present arrangement was, in public estimation, tied up with the impression made by the 21 demands. He admitted that the police point in itself was a minor one, but in its implications, both in China and the United States, it was very unfortunate.
Viscount Chinda pointed out the difference that in the case of the 21 demands the idea had been to employ Japanese officers in entire regions. Here, however, it was only proposed to confine the police to the railway itself.
Mr. Lloyd George said that this was a very important point. As the representative of one of the countries bound to support the transfer he was nevertheless very anxious that Japan should reach an agreement with the United States which was not signatory. Was it not possible, he asked, to reach an agreement on the basis of the practice in the United States of America and Great Britain, to which he had already referred? He could quite see that the Japanese did not wish to leave the railway entirely to Chinese administration. They willed to ensure the security of their property and they had not their direct or indirect control. The same applied in the United Kingdom where, as elsewhere, some police administrations were better than others. He asked if this could not be done as President Wilson had proposed earlier in the discussion by putting the police under the directors? His suggestion would be to insert a clause in the agreement putting the police in the hands of the railway company, and [Page 333] providing that China would also do what was necessary to establish that police force. This would even give the right to the directors to employ Japanese instructors and no doubt instruction was a very important element. By these means, Japan would obtain all she wanted. She would substantially obtain the administration of the police of the railway, but the Chinese status would not be damaged.
Viscount Chinda said that the practical result of this arrangement might perhaps be adequate and satisfactory. The difficulty, however, was that it would involve a revision of the treaty or else a statement which would be regarded in Japan as of the same effect.
Mr. Lloyd George asked why Japan should not merely give an interpretation of the treaty in this sense.
Viscount Chinda asked if this would be a mere transitory measure.
Mr. Lloyd George said it would be as a permanent measure, namely, that the arrangement was to be interpreted by Japan as one that would be worked through the directors. He quoted Article 2 of the exchange of notes of September 24th, 1918:—
“The Chinese Government may organise a police force to undertake the policing of the Kiauchau-Chinan Railway.”
He asked if it could not be stated that the police force would be chosen by the directors.
Viscount Chinda said that as a practical arrangement this would perhaps do very well, as long as it did not alter the agreement or involve a public statement tantamount to a reversal of the agreement.
President Wilson said that he and the Government of the United States could not admit that the agreements were consistent with the terms of the German concession. What he was asked to do was contrary to the great volume of opinion in his own country, namely, to extend the German rights.
Viscount Chinda said he could not agree to this interpretation. That was the difference between them. The Japanese contended that the policing of the railway had nothing to do with the sovereignty.
President Wilson said he had examined it on the basis of the text of the transfer to Germany and the notes exchanged between China and Japan. These notes certainly contained more than the German concession.
Viscount Chinda said that the German concession carried with it the right of policing.
President Wilson said he was willing to admit the policing being in the hands of a number of directors, the majority of which might be Japanese and he was willing to admit administrative control by [Page 334] them, but he was not willing to admit the right of the Japanese Government to exercise supervision over the police force.
Mr. Lloyd George read the note of September 24th, 1918, and said he could not find those rights. It did not say that the Japanese would have supervision of the police force. It merely said that they were to be employed at the headquarters of the police, on the principal railway stations and at the police training school. It did not even mention instructors.
Viscount Chinda said that the right of having instructors employed was the Japanese interpretation of the clause.
Mr. Lloyd George said that there was nothing in these clauses which could bear the interpretation of putting the Japanese in the position of repudiating the treaty. It merely said that Japanese were to be employed. He again suggested that there would be no departure from the terms of the treaty if the Japanese said that the Japanese chosen would be selected by the directors of the railway. He had no doubt that in fact the directors would have to apply to the Japanese Government. There would not be many suitable people in China and the Japanese Government would be the only source from which they could be obtained.
President Wilson said that the point was that in the treaty with Germany, we should impose the transfer of the German rights to Japan. His interpretation of the Chino-Japanese agreement was that in handing it back to China Japan would, in fact, extend her rights beyond those exercised by the Germans. The Japanese demanded that these rights should be transferred] with this extension.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the only extension was in respect of police. He asked if the instructors of the police had not, in fact, been Germans?
Viscount Chinda said that they had been termed advisers, but had undertaken the whole of the management. He considered that Japan was asking for less than this.
President Wilson said that Germany had not had any such right, although she had exercised it.
Mr. Lloyd George asked Viscount Chinda to consider his proposition for leaving it to the directors to control the police.
(There was a considerable adjournment, during which Viscount Chinda conferred with his colleagues.)
After some further discussion, Mr. Balfour made certain proposals, which, in the course of the discussion were slightly amended, and eventually reached the following form:—
- 1.
- The declared policy of Japan is to hand back to China in full sovereignty the Shantung Peninsula and to retain only the economic privileges possessed by Germany.
- 2.
- (The intention of the clauses relating to the*) police on the railway is merely to give the owners of the railway security for traffic and will be used for no other purpose.
- 3.
- Such Japanese instructors as may be required to assist in policing the railway may be selected by the company.
President Wilson made the following proposal:—
“Surrender to China of all rights of sovereignty and retention with regard to the railway and the mines only of the economic rights of a concessionaire, retaining, however, the privilege of establishing a non-exclusive settlement area at Singtau.”
Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda undertook carefully to consider the above two formulae and to let the Supreme Council know as soon as possible whether they could accept them or not. If they were unable to accept them or to make any public announcement in regard to them, they undertook to continue the discussion on the following day.
(2) Saar Valley The attached report from Mr. Headlam-Morley and Dr. Haskins was approved. (Appendix I.)
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)
(3) The Rhenish Provinces of Gerrmany Mr. Lloyd George mentioned a speech by the Burgomaster of Cologne which had been brought to his attention intimating the possibility of the establishment of a separate Republic for the Rhenish Provinces and Westphalia. He undertook to communicate a copy to his colleagues.
4. Naval Terms of peace. Article 25 Sir Maurice Hankey said that the British Admiralty had sent a telegram, asking that the Treaty of Peace should provide for the surrendered German ships to be handed over at such Allied ports as might be designated. The reason for this was that otherwise the Allies would have to go and fetch the ships.
President Wilson said he believed the ships were already dismantled.
Mr. Lloyd George thought that the ships would be able to steam. (It was agreed that the first clause of Article 25 should read as follows:—
“Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the Present Treaty, the German surface warships enumerated below will be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Governments at such Allied ports as those Governments may direct.”
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)
(5) Credentials of the German Representatives M. Clemenceau said that he had been advised by M. Jules Cambon that the German plenipotentiaries for Saxony and Bavaria and other States of the German Empire ought to possess credentials not only from the German Central Government but also from their State Governments. The opinion of the Representatives French jurisconsults was that we could not proceed otherwise.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that otherwise the Treaty might be signed by the representatives of the Central Government and yet be repudiated by the State Governments.
President Wilson felt some doubt as to the necessity of this.
M. Clemenceau suggested the question should be remitted to an expert Committee to advise.
(It was agreed that the question should be examined by a Committee composed of Mr. Lansing for the United States of America, Lord Hardinge for the British Empire, and M. Jules Cambon for France.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 29 April, 1919.