Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/129

IC–177D

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 29, 1919, at 4.30 p.m.

Paris, April 29, 1919, 4:30 p.m.

• Present
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson.
    • Mr. Norman H. Davis.
    • Mr. T. W. Lamont.
    • Mr. V. McCormick.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Klotz.
    • M. Loucheur.
    • M. de Lasteyrie.
    • M. Jouasset.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
    • Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
    • Mr. O. T. Falk.
    • Mr. H. A. Siepmann.
  • Belgium
    • M. Hymans.
    • M. Vandervelde.
    • M. Van den Heuvel.

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Secretary.
Professor P. J. Mantoux	Interpreter.

The Council had before it the claim of Belgium to receive absolute priority in regard to Reparation and to be repaid the whole costs of the war.

1. The Belgian Claim M. Hymans said that he would begin by reading two letters which had been addressed on April 24th to M. Clemenceau and which summarised the Belgian claim.

Costs of the war The first of these letters refers to previous correspondence on the 18th and 22nd February and asks for the insertion in Annex 1¹ of clauses which will allow Belgium to obtain from Germany the repayment (1) of her war expenses, (2) of the expenses required for feeding her population, (3) of the expenses required for the maintenance of Government services abroad. These expenses have been covered by loans which Belgium has contracted in England, France and the United States.

Redemption of currency Belgium further requests that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty to oblige Germany to take back at the price of F. 1. 25 all the Marks introduced into the occupied region at a compulsory fixed rate.

Priority in indemnity Receipts The second letter, referring to clause 6 of the Reparation Draft, proposes that in the allotment of the first instalment of Indemnity paid by Germany Belgium should receive at least 2½ milliards of francs, and that this amount should not be made available for the repayment of credits which have been opened to Belgium on the understanding that they will be repaid out of the first sums received from Germany by way of Indemnity, It is further proposed that the Belgian share of further instalments to be received from Germany should be determined in such a manner that the whole amount due to Belgium should be discharged by Germany within a period of 10 years.

Pledges Given to Belgium M. Hymans said that all these claims were based upon the special position of Belgium which, unlike any other country, was forced into the war through the violation of a Treaty. Belgium relied upon a declaration of Sainte Adresse of the 16th [14th] February, 1916² in which the French British and Russian Governments declared that they would not lay down their arms until Belgium had been largely indemnified for the damages which she had suffered; and she relied also upon point 2 [7] of President Wilson’s 14 points.

M. Hymans said that if he were to speak quite frankly he must admit that the Belgian Government had come to the conclusion that they could not accept the responsibility of taking home to Belgium a Treaty which provided for no preference in regard to Indemnity. Immediate help was necessary to restore the industrial life of the country.

In regard to the redemption of German currency forcibly introduced into Belgium at the price of F. 1.25, M. Hymans read a note detailing the purposes to which these sums would be applied if they were obtained. They are required for (1) the payment of about 3 milliards of francs constituting the principal and interest of the German war tax imposed upon Belgium and represented by short dated inter-provincial bonds which the Belgian banks have been forced to accept; (2) the repayment of one million francs of debt contracted by the municipalities to meet the necessities of the civil population during the occupation; (3) the repayment of 2,200,000,000 Francs of Treasury bonds created for the restoration of the currency and the redemption of Marks.

M. Hymans said that the payment of these sums by Germany was not only intimately bound up with the restoration of Belgium, but was also indispensable to the credit of the economic restoration of Germany.

The Belgium Government had come to the conclusion that if the requests presented in these letters were not agreed to and if no definite assurance were given as to the percentage reserved to Belgium out of the Indemnity, they would feel it their duty to refer the matter to their Parliament.

2. Mr. Lloyd George’s Reply. Priority in Priority in Indemnity Payments
Costs of the War Mr. Lloyd George replied that M. Hymans had raised two very different questions: one of them easy and the other extremely difficult. As regards the claim of Belgium to be allotted a substantial share out of the first instalment to be received from Germany, he was in entire agreement and thought that the amount asked for was moderate and reasonable. He agreed that it might be necessary for the Allies to give some kind of guarantee for the first one thousand million pounds to be paid by Germany if this instalment was to be available in time to be of use to anybody. But as regards the second point raised by M. Hymans, Mr. Lloyd George asked whether he was to understand that Belgium pressed for the repayment of the costs of the war by Germany to all the Allies equally or was asking for a discriminatory clause under which the whole war costs of Belgium should be recovered out of the Indemnity in spite of the fact that no other Ally was putting in such a claim or would have any chance of obtaining the full costs of the war even if the claim were put in.

M. Hymans replied that he was asking for a discrimination in favour of Belgium.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he could not see how any case could be made out for such a discrimination. All statesmen have their Parliamentary difficulties, and he had himself returned to London in order to explain to the British Parliament that Germany could not pay the whole costs of the war to all the Allies. He was sure that M. Hymans would not want to get rid of his own Parliamentary difficulties at the expense of other countries. He was emphatically of the opinion that Belgium should have, so to speak, the first cut out of the German sausage, and that the priority of Belgium’s claim should be recognized, but he could not admit the payment of Belgian war costs—even though there might be some advantage to the United Kingdom if such costs were met by Germany, seeing that the money spent by Belgium on the war had been advanced to her by England, France and the United States. He must oppose the Belgian claim on principle, and he believed that the public in France and in England would not be able to understand the proposed discrimination in favour of Belgium. Moreover Serbia was in the same position: Roumania also had been overrun and had only a corner of her country free from the occupation of the enemy. If the categories were to be reopened they must be reopened all round; for example, France had made a concession in the matter of Alsace Lorraine on the express condition that if such preference were given to Belgium the whole question would have to be reopened.

3. Military Expenses. Administrative Expenses. Ravitaillement M. Van den Heuvel said that the term “costs of the war” required definition. All the Allies were receiving some costs of the war seeing that they were to be reimbursed on account of pensions. The costs of the war for Belgium fell into three different categories. First the Military expenses in strict sense, which amounted to three milliards: second, incidental expenses, including the cost of removing the Government to Le Havre, and the administrative expenses of the Government while in France; third, the expenses of feeding the population. Only about half a million Belgians left the country. It was the duty of Germany to feed the remaining seven millions who stayed in Belgium, but Germany did not fulfil this duty and the cost to Belgium amounted to 2¾ milliards. Belgium had consequently been compelled to borrow in all 5,493 million francs from her Allies and she now claimed to be repaid the whole costs of the war on account of her altogether exceptional position. There was no comparison between the position of Belgium and the position of Serbia, but quite apart from the differences which arose out of the causes and the beginning of the war, Belgium was also in a special position in that the Allies had bound themselves by specific obligations over and over again. The declaration of Sainte Adresse had already been referred to and he would quote further a passage from Mr. Lloyd George’s speech on the 5th January, 1918³ in which it was said that the first condition necessary to Great Britain if she were to be prepared to lay down her arms was that Belgium should be, so far as possible, guaranteed complete restoration.

Germany’s Capacity To Pay Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that here, as elsewhere, the indemnification promised to Belgium was expressly stated to be within the limits of what proved to be possible: in other words within the Germany’s limits of Germany’s capacity to pay. He asked what the Belgian Representative on the Reparation Commission had estimated that Germany could pay.

M. Loucheur said that the Belgian Representative had fully agreed on this subject with his colleagues on the Commission.

4. Unemployment in Belgium M. Van der Velde said that he wished to draw attention to the exceptional gravity of a refusal of the Belgian demands which were strictly moderate and had been reduced to the minimum necessary if the Government of the country were to survive. The King of the Belgians had stated that there were at this moment 800,000 unemployed in the country. These unemployed drew from 7 to 14 francs a head a week at a cost of from 30 to 40 million francs a month to the Belgian Government. There had been an increase in the cost of living amounting to 300 per cent; yet in spite of all these difficulties the country was quiet and the working classes were maintaining order. Two things and two things only made it possible to maintain this order, namely first the good organization of the labour party and second the fact that the Government was committed to obtain for the Belgian people a full measure of Reparation and Indemnity. The working classes were quiet because they relied upon the Government to ensure that Belgium would be completely restored. If satisfaction were not given to this expectation the very existence of the Belgian Government would become impossible.

Comparison of Belgium With Serbia and Roumania M. Van der Velde said that he could not be suspected of not belonging to the party of moderation. He represented the working classes Belgium supporter of exaggerated claims, but he demanded the fulfilment of the solemn promises which had been given to Belgium by her Allies. He protested against the comparison of the position of Belgium with that of Serbia or Roumania. The Allies rendered a great service to Serbia when they came into the war, whereas Belgium, by defending her neutrality, had rendered a great service to the Allies. Belgium came into the war unconditionally, but Roumania came in only on stipulated terms and on condition that she should obtain a reward which was now assured to her. The other Allies were all receiving territorial compensation and it would be an intolerable conclusion if Belgium were deprived of her just claims as the result of her magnanimity in trusting only to the essential justice of her cause.

M. Van der Velde said that in 1917, just after the Russian revolution, he was speaking to the most extreme revolutionaries who objected to the payment of an Indemnity of any sort, but even they made an exception to their rule in favour of Belgium. Even the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg admitted that Germany must make compensation for the wrong which had been done to Belgium. How then could the Allies now refuse, seeing that the Belgian claims were not so much for a privileged position as for the very existence of their country. Mr. Lloyd George had said the other day that he felt a thrill of pride at the distinction which had been drawn by M. Van der Velde himself between the English and the Russian methods. If Belgium were to continue to apply and develop the English method of social reconstruction it was essential that the expectation of her working classes should not be disappointed.

5. Proposed Compromise After some informal discussion M. Hymans said that it had been proposed to him that the claim of Belgium to receive 2½ milliards francs out of the first instalment of the Indemnity should be recognized and that the expenses of feeding the civilian population should be included under the heading of “dommages de guerre,” but at the same time he had not been able to obtain any definite undertaking as to the percentage of the total payments from Germany which would be allotted to Belgium, nor as to the duration within which the whole amount due to Belgium would be paid. This was an arrangement which the Belgian Delegates could not accept on behalf of their Government: the matter would therefore have to be referred to the Belgian Government who would probably feel that they must lay the question before their Parliament.

6. Consequences of Refusal
The Limits of Reparation President Wilson asked what M. Hymans precisely meant by this procedure. The Allies were on the eve of attempting to arrive at a settlement with the Germans and a refusal of the Belgian Government to accept the terms of the Reparation agreement might involve their not being represented at the Peace negotiations. This would be an extremely grave and serious situation and it was to be hoped that the Belgian Representatives would reconsider their decision. They were requesting what had been unanimously decided at the Council to be impossible for any Government. They were well aware that on all hands there was a cordial desire to meet to the utmost every obligation which had been entered into towards Belgium, but the Armistice had been based upon certain statements which he had been authorised to make to the German Government and one of those statements interpreted the liability of Germany as being limited to the damage caused to the civilian population and to their property. Having once defined Reparation as falling within these limits the Allies were bound by their decision and could not depart from it in favour of any particular Government. All the categories included in the Reparation claim to be presented to the Germans fall within the limits of that definition and if any departure from the accepted principles were now made it would mean that the Allies had misled those who they were now bringing to the Peace table.

7. Reference to the Belgian Parliament M. Hymans replied that the Government could not accept the responsibility of telling the Belgian people that they were now to receive nothing or next to nothing and that the matter must therefore be referred to the Belgian Parliament. What would then happen it was not possible to say, but seeing that Belgium is a small country it might be necessary for them to bow to the forces of necessity.

8. M. Clemenceau protested against the statement of M. Hymans that the Belgian people would, under the proposed arrangement, receive next to nothing. They would in fact receive precisely the same treatment as the rest of the Allies.

9. The cost of an Irreconcilable Attitude M. Clemenceau said that his thoughts were not only of the necessities of the moment, but that here, as always, he was thinking of the necessities of the future. Peace had not merely to be signed: it had to be lived. It must be made of such a kind that it would mould the social life of the future. Considerations of sentiment might be left aside since they counted for little in political life, and it was necessary to approach all these problems in a spirit of conciliation and not to insist too strictly on a full measure of concessions or to propose as an alternative a definite breach between those who were charged with arriving at a solution that would guide the tendencies of the future. He himself might often have broken off negotiations if he had insisted on what he conceived to be his rights. Everyone had had to give way on points which appeared to be vital, and everyone must be prepared to take painful decisions and to bear the bitter reproaches of his own supporters. Parliaments were all alike: each of them wanted everything for themselves. Newspapers clamoured for the impossible and the best thing was to pay no attention to them whatever. It would be a fatal mistake if the Belgian Delegates forced an issue on a question of principle on which all sides were only too anxious to come to an arrangement. It would have been preferable if the Belgian point of view had been expressed not in the form of a protest but in the form of an appeal. Belgium would not have found that she was met by men who were indifferent to her claims, for there was a need of solidarity which bound the Allies one to another. It would be well if the Belgian Delegates were to consider rather what position their country must take up among the great peoples of tomorrow. The Tone in Which the Belgian Claim Is Put Forward

10. M. Hymans interrupted M. Clemenceau at this point and said that he was prepared to be reasonable and that all he claimed was five milliards of francs and a good percentage of Reparation.

11. M. Clemenceau said that he would have liked to have finished what he had to say, but that since the Belgian case was put forward in a spirit of recrimination and complaint he preferred to add nothing to what he had said already.

12. Mr. Lloyd George asked whether this meant that the Belgians proposed to negotiate a separate Peace.

M. Hymans said it meant that before signing the Treaty the Belgian Government intended to get into contact with its Parliament which was now sitting.

Representation of Belgium at the Peace Negotiations Mr. Lloyd George asked whether the Belgians would be present on Thursday at the first meeting with the Germans.

M. Hymans replied that he could not say for certain that they would.

13. Mr. Lloyd George said that if Belgian Representatives were not there the Allies would have no right to put forward any claim on behalf of Belgium. It would merely mean that Belgium would be left to make her own terms, seeing that she repudiated the claim which the Allies put forward on her account.

14. Credentials M. Clemenceau said that there was a necessity for an immediate decision seeing that within two days the credentials of all parties would be examined. It would therefore be necessary to know within 24 hours what were the powers of the Belgian Delegates in the representation of their Government.

15. M. Hymans said that the Belgian Government was not responsible for the fact that these questions had arisen at the last moment. They had written immediately to M. Clemenceau on receipt of the letter from M. Loucheur notifying them of the decisions which had been arrived at with regard to Reparation.

16. Urgency of the decision M. Clemenceau said that M. Hymans need not assume that every remark which was made was intended to be a personal reproach directed against himself. Whoever was responsible for the urgency of the situation the fact remained that the Council must be informed within the next 24 hours of the position which Belgium took up in the matter.

17. After further informal discussion the original proposal by which the expenses of ravitaillement for the civilian population were to have been included among “dommages de guerre” was withdrawn, and it was decided that the Belgian Delegates would recommend an alternative arrangement by which the Peace Treaty would include provision for the reimbursement by Germany to the Allied Governments of all sums which Belgium had been obliged to borrow from the Allied Powers as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839.⁴

1. Annex 1 to the draft reparation clauses. See annex 1 to appendix I to IC–176A, p. 168.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1916, supp., p. 17.
3. Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 4.
4. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxvii, p. 1000.