Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VI

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/52

CF–52

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, June 7, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, June 7, 1919, 4 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • President Wilson.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
  • Italy
    • M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey.	}	Secretaries.
Count Aldrovandi.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter.

Note: M. Orlando did not arrive until 4.30. Before his arrival, his three colleagues read and finally approved the proposal handed to M. Orlando later in the Meeting in regard to the Italian Claims in the Adriatic.

After the Memorandum had been agreed, there were short preliminary discussions on matters interesting the four States, and which are briefly recorded below.

1. Mr. Lloyd George said he had just seen the United States Experts, who were anxious to fix on a figure for Germany to pay.

M. Loucheur considered this difficult, and he was inclined to agree with him. Reparation in the German Treaty

President Wilson said that it might be difficult, but it would undoubtedly be best if it could be done.

Mr. Lloyd George said the figure would be so high that Germany would not be able to accept it.

President Wilson said the object of the figure was to get the Germans to agree.

Mr. Lloyd George said he preferred the plan to which he and M. Loucheur were nearly agreeing on, by which Germany would be given three or four months in which to name a figure, and by which she would be allowed to pay a part of her reparation in material and labour. He thought this would be better for the Germans also, and that they would prefer it.

M. Clemenceau said he took the same view.

2. With reference to C. F. 47, Minute l,¹ the Council had before them the Report of the Military Representatives at Versailles.² Fighting Between Czechoslovaks and Hungarians

M. Clemenceau said that this report would require study by the respective Military Advisers of the members of the Council. He thought that some immediate action could be taken pending this study. He recalled that the Roumanians had three times crossed the Armistice line that had been drawn, but they had been stopped from advancing. The Magyars had got to know that the Roumanians were being held back, and had concentrated their forces and fallen on the Czecho-Slovaks, with very serious results. Pending the study of the Versailles Report, he proposed that a dispatch should be sent to the effect that this attack on the Czechs had been made at the very moment when the Hungarians were asked to come to Paris to make peace. If they would stop, we would make peace with them. If they would not, we would take active measures against them.

(It was agreed that General Albi, who was in attendance in the next room, should prepare a draft.

At a later stage of the Meeting, General Albi’s draft was presented and approved, subject to one slight modification, namely, the substitution of some such words as “extreme measures” instead of “force” This was inserted at President Wilson’s suggestion, as he did not like to threaten force when no available force was on the spot.

The agreed dispatch is reproduced in Appendix I.

M. Clemenceau undertook to send the dispatch on behalf of the Council.)

3. The Council approved the attached dispatch prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey under instructions given at the morning’s Meeting, in regard to the fighting in Carinthia. (Appendix II.) Carinthia: Fighting Between Austrians and Yugo-Slavs

M. Clemenceau signed the despatch, and handed it to M. Mantoux, to give to the Secretary-General for immediate dispatch.

4. M. Lloyd George said that he had seen M. Venizelos and M. Paderewski. M. Venizelos was quite definite that he would prefer references to the League of Nations to be permissible only to members of the Council of the League. Both M. Venizelos and M. Paderewski had made the point that the Treaty ought not to enable minorities to insist on the use of their own language. M. Paderewski had said that the Yiddish language used in Poland was not Hebrew, but only a corrupt form of German. To make it an official language would be almost to make German a second official language in Poland. Report of Committee on New States in Regard to References to the League of Nations

President Wilson pointed out that this was not the question on which their opinion had been asked.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, nevertheless, both of them had raised it.

M. Paderewski had promised a written answer, and, when he had received it, he would report again.

(M. Orlando and Count Aldrovandi entered during the following discussion.)

5. The Council had before them a report dated June 6th from the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs, which had met to consider the Klagenfurt question. (Appendix III.)

President Wilson read the report. Klagenfurt. Request for Instructions From the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

M. Orlando said that, given the present situation, which was accepted, the plebiscite appeared to him useless. The Commission recognised that in Sector B the majority of the population was Austrian, in Sector A the majority was Yugo-Slav. The result of the plebiscite in these areas was therefore a foregone conclusion, and it seemed useless to carry it out. The only basis for a plebiscite would be one for the whole area, with a view to obtaining unity for the whole district. He suggested, therefore, that it would be better to take a decision at once that area A, on President Wilson’s map, (i. e., the southern part of the area) should be Yugo-Slav; and area B (namely, the northern part) should be Austrian. He pointed out that there was a small section of the area which was traversed by the Assling-Villach railway. He must make reserves in regard to this. The reason for this was that he had already asked for the question of disposition of Assling to be reserved, and claimed it for Italy. If the railway north of it ran through the territory assigned to the Yugo-Slavs, there would be no object in his reserves in regard to Assling.

President Wilson said he must say frankly to M. Orlando that he had gone out of his way in order to assign the junction of Tarvis to Italy on the understanding that Villach should be Austrian and Assling should be assigned to the Yugo-Slavs. The object of this was to take the line Tarvis-Trieste right out of Yugo-Slav territory. He could not assent, however, that both the lines together with all three junctions should go to Italy.

Mr. Lloyd George said he was by no means certain that M. Orlando was right in saying that area A would vote Yugo-Slav. He had gathered from M. Vesnitch’s evidence that he also was very doubtful. M. Vesnitch’s insistence that the area should be allocated to the Yugo-Slavs without a plebiscite confirmed this view. He thought M. Vesnitch’s evidence rather tended to support the views expressed by President Wilson’s Experts.

M. Orlando said that in this case it would be necessary to organise the plebiscite with all guarantees, and he did not like the proposals of the Yugo-Slav-Roumanian Commission.

Count Aldrovandi pointed out that proposal 3 of the Commission was not in accordance with their instructions.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed. He asked why the administration could not be by five Commissioners using the local authorities.

President Wilson said the assumption was that the local authorities were Austrian. However, any undesirable officials could be excluded during the plebiscite, and his suggestion would be that the Commission should be directed to conform with its previous instructions.

M. Orlando agreed.

(After a short discussion, Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to reply to the Commission in the following sense:—

1. The reply to the question in the second paragraph of the Commission’s Report is that the régime of local Government should apply to zone B, as well as to zone A.

2. The Council agree that the actual procedure at the plebiscite will be very different, according as the date for it is fixed at six months after the signature of the Peace, or three years after, or more. The Council have received a communication from M. Vesnitch, but, instead of giving a reply on this point, it only contained a counter proposal. M. Vesnitch has been asked to give a definite reply to the question that was put to him.

The Council agrees with the Commission that, in the first case, it will be advisable to make arrangements like those proposed for Allenstein and Sleswig, and, in the second, like those adopted in the case of the Saar Basin.

3. As regards the remainder of the memorandum, the Council has read and taken note of the observations of the Commission, but adheres to the original instructions to Mr. Leeper as the basis of the Commission’s work.)

(Admiral Hope was introduced.)

6. Admiral Hope read extracts from a Memorandum prepared by Sir Esme Howard, General Thwaites and himself, and from a Report by General Gough at Helsingfors with regard to the situation in the Baltic Provinces. These Reports revealed a very complicated state of affairs. The Germans were advancing North and North-East from Riga, thereby preventing the Esthonians from advancing on Petro-grad. They appeared to be taking this action in collusion with a Russian Anti-Bolshevist force under Prince Lievin, with whom they had established liaison by aircraft. From the available information it was evident that the Germans intended— Baltic Provinces: Action of the Germans

1. In conjunction with the German Baits in Latvia to advance into Esthonia, and with the co-operation of the German Bait element in the latter country to crush the Esthonian national movement.

2. To make common cause with the North-Russian corps, (whose sympathies are entirely pro-German) in an advance on Petrograd, where they presumably proposed to instal a Government of their own choosing.

Admiral Hope urged that the Germans should at once be ordered:

(a) To stop all further advance Northwards in the direction of Esthonia.

(b) To make preparations for the evacuation of Letland under the orders of the Allied High Command as laid down in Article 12 of the Armistice Commission.

(After some discussion it was agreed that the question should be referred to for report to the Military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom should be associated for the purpose of this enquiry the United States of America, French and Italian navies.)

(Admiral Hope withdrew.)

7. President Wilson on behalf of M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George and himself, handed M. Orlando the attached Memorandum, containing proposals agreed to by himself and his colleagues in regard to the Italian claims in the Adriatic. (Appendix 4.) He explained that the Memorandum was only a sketch containing principles, and the scheme had not yet been formulated in detail by experts. The only parts of the project worked out in detail were the boundaries of the proposed free state. It was hardly necessary for him to remind M. Orlando of the scruples he had in arriving at any half-way agreement. He had thought and still thought that it would be an assumption of unwarranted authority on his part to concur in any suggestion for the transfer of people against their will from one sovereignty to another. At every turn, however, he found himself faced with the difficulty in which his British and French colleagues were involved, but in which the United States of America was not involved in agreeing. Rather than reach an absolute impasse and after conferring repeatedly with his colleagues, he had in association with them formulated this suggestion. Without discussing or expounding it he would place it in M. Orlando’s hands as the joint suggestion of the three Governments. He could not help adding that reasonable people in the United States of America would probably think he was not justified in assenting to the scheme until he had had an opportunity to explain to them the whole circumstances. He made this explanation only to indicate to M. Orlando the impossibility for his Government to go further. He begged M. Orlando to put that aspect of the matter before his colleagues in considering this proposal. As a matter of detail he said he had changed one or two words as compared with a copy sent to his experts owing to the difference in the nomenclature on the map. He would also mention that there was a reference in the memorandum to the line of the Treaty of London. The line adopted was what experts called the Italian version of the line of the Treaty of London. He recalled that the streams in this part of the country ran under ground for a certain distance, and the British had drawn the line at the point where the streams disappeared below ground, whereas the Italians had drawn it where they came out again. Italian Claims

M. Orlando said it was impossible to study the scheme here and now. He thanked President Wilson for all the trouble he had taken in the matter. In loyalty he felt bound to declare that the Tardieu scheme had been studied with an open mind, and when accepting it the Italian Delegation had felt they were making an extraordinary sacrifice. In doing so they went beyond what was their minimum. They only accepted it in a spirit of resignation. He himself was not an extremist and always sought compromise. After waging this war, however, he felt very distressed that the doors of Italy were not closed. He had something in him of the Franciscan spirit, but it was extremely bitter for him to have accepted the Tardieu scheme. On Fiume Italy had received no satisfaction. This was an Italian town that was treated in the same way as some barbarous half civilised people, or as an enemy town. Here was a people of the highest and most ancient civilisation, who had emerged from a victorious war, and yet they were subjected to the same system as some Pacific Island or the Saar Valley. This was a terrible sacrifice, but nevertheless he had accepted it. It was the extremity of the effort which he could make in sacrifice, and he must assure the President and his colleagues that if, as he feared, the new proposal was less favourable than the Tardieu proposal, it would be impossible for him to accept it.

President Wilson said he hoped M. Orlando would not say this, because there were impossibilities on his side also.

Mr. Lloyd George asked what M. Orlando meant by not closing the gate?

M. Orlando said he referred to the Alps and the Istrian Peninsula.

President Wilson pointed out that the crest of the ridge was given to Italy.

M. Orlando pointed out that the proper crest of the Alps was to the eastwards of this ridge.

Mr. Lloyd George objected to the suggestion that the people of Danzig were semi-barbarous. They were one of the most civilised and cultured people in the world.

M. Orlando said he only referred to them as an enemy people.

He undertook to consider the proposal.

8. President Wilson read a proposed reply to Germany’s demand for admission to the League of Nations which he had received from Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, M. Leon Bourgeois and their associates (Appendix V.) Proposed Reply to Germany’s Demand for Admission to the League of Nations

Mr. Lloyd George said he could not agree to the admission of the Germans to the League of Nations within a few months.

President Wilson agreed and suggested to substitute within a “short time.”

M. Clemenceau expressed the gravest doubt as to the wisdom of some of the proposals.

(After a short discussion it was agreed that the document required very careful study, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to get it copied and circulated to the Council the same evening.)

9. The Council had before them a report from the Financial Commission on various points raised by the Polish, Roumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovakian Commissions. (Appendix VI.) Report by Financial Commission on Points Raised in Connection With the Austrian Treaty (Reference to CF–51, Minute 9^2a)

These reports had been remitted to the Financial Commission by the Co-ordinating Commission whose report had been approved on the same morning.

The report of the Financial Commission was approved and initialled by the four Heads of the State. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

Villa Majestic, Paris , 7 June, 1919.

Appendix I to CF–52

WCP–940

Paris , 7 June, 1919.

Telegram to the Hungarian Government at Buda-Pesth, Communicated by Secretariat-General

Translation

The Allied and Associated Governments are on the point of summoning Representatives of the Hungarian Government before the Peace Conference at Paris in order that the views of the Conference on the proper frontiers of Hungary may be communicated to them.

It is at this very moment that the Hungarians launch violent and unjustified attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks and invade Slovakia.

The Allied and Associated Powers have, however, already shown their firm determination to put an end to all useless hostilities by twice stopping the Roumanian Armies which had crossed the Armistice lines and then those of the neutral zone, and by preventing them from continuing their march on Buda-Pesth; also by stopping the Serbian and French Armies on the Southern Hungarian front.

In these circumstances, the Government of Buda-Pesth is formally requested to put an end without delay to its attacks on the Czechoslovaks, otherwise the Allied and Associated Governments are absolutely decided to have immediate recourse to extreme measures to oblige Hungary to cease hostilities and to bow to the unshakeable will of the Allies to make their injunctions respected.

A reply to the present telegram should be made within 48 hours.

Appendix II to CF–52

Telegram

From:—The President of the Conference.

To:— The French Minister at Belgrade.

For the Government of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

On May 31st the attention of the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was called to the situation in Carinthia and a request was made that explicit instructions should be issued to the local Jugo-Slav Commanders to cease all hostile operations in this area and withdraw their troops behind the frontier laid down by the Conference. It was pointed out that such independent action could not but prejudice the cause of those responsible for the continuance of these hostilities.

On the 4th June a reply was received that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had given an assurance that hostilities were terminated.

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers now learn that the offensive which had declined in vigour on May 31st and June 1st was resumed by the Jugo-Slav forces from the 2nd to the 3rd., when they effectively bombarded the ground south of Klagenfurt, and the surroundings of Grafenstein. On June 5th the Jugo-Slavs are reported to have passed the Drava and arrived at a distance of from 6 to 8 kilometres from Klagenfurt. They continued to advance in spite of the fact that Italian Officers notified them of the request to cease hostilities which had been transmitted from Paris to the Serbian Government. A little before midnight on June 5th., two Jugo-Slav Officers entered Klagenfurt.

The Council are unable to reconcile this information with the statements made to the French Minister in Belgrade. You should at once demand explanations from the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and insist on immediate compliance with the requests in my telegram No. 205 of May 31st.

G. Clemenceau

7 June, 1919.

Appendix III to CF–52

M–240

Paris , June 6, 1919.

From: The Chairman of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs met on June 6th 2.30 p.m.

The Commission has first the honour to ask whether the régime of local government provided for applies, as the Commission believes, to zone B as well as to zone A.

It further observes that it has not yet received from the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation the answer promised in paragraph 2 of the Note of June 5th relative to the date of the plebiscite. It thinks that the regime to be established as well for the provisional administration of the territories in question as for the actual procedure at the plebiscite, will be very different, according as the date for it is fixed at six months after the signature of the peace, or three years after, or more.

It considers that, in the first case, it would be advisable to make arrangements like those proposed for Allenstein and Sleswig, and in the second, like those adopted in the case of the Saar Basin.

Should the second solution be adopted, the Commission would beg leave to draw the Supreme Council’s attention to the following considerations:

The territory in question—even zone A—contains a Slovene population of peasants and small artisans only, who will afford to the proposed local Government no material for the formation of an administration. Consequently, with a view to form one, the International Government Commission will have to apply either to the Germans living in the territory in question, or to the Slovenes assigned by the Treaty to Yugo-Slavia, who being the only people speaking both German and Slovene, will be the only ones capable of administering the territory. In both cases serious difficulties may be expected.

The Commission further observes that the military occupation of the country, and the judicial, fiscal, monetary, customs and commercial systems would require, as in the case of the Saar Basin, a detailed examination, for making which, no material is at present available.

The Commission (exclusive of the Italian Delegation, whose point of view is set forth below) thinks it its duty to ask the Supreme Council whether it would not be more expedient to establish the following regime in the zones A and B defined by the Supreme Council:—

1°. The appointment of a Commission of five members nominated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, charged with the task of preparing, in zones A and B, under the authority of the League of Nations, for a free expression of the wishes of the population by ensuring the impartiality of the local administration through the exercise of a right of supervision and veto.

2°. The local administration of zone B provisionally entrusted in these conditions, to the Austrian authorities in accordance with the general rules of Austrian legislation.

3°. The local administration of zone A entrusted in the same conditions to the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene authorities in accordance with the general rules of Serbo-Croat-Slovene legislation.

4°. In each of the two zones a vote allowing the population freely to express its opinion, according to the procedure laid down by the Commission, regarding its final assignment either to Austria or to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. This vote shall take place, in zone A. at the end of a period of . . . . . . . from the coming into force of the present treaty and, in zone B, . . . . . . weeks after the promulgation of the result of the vote in zone A.

This solution would avoid the above mentioned difficulties.

The Commission has furthermore the honour to convey to the Supreme Council the two observations of the Italian Delegation, which, owing to the terms of the Note of June 5th, they did not consider that they had authority to discuss, and which are as follows:—

1°. The Italian Delegation thinks that, owing to the geographical and economic conditions of the Klagenfurt Basin, it is desirable to delimit the two zones provided for in connection with the plebiscite, not from east to west, but from north to south following a line running to the east of Klagenfurt.

2°. The Italian Delegation asks that in any case the triangle in which lies the Northern entrance to the tunnel of Karawanken, and which comprises a section of railway about 10 kms in length essentially important for the port of Trieste, should be excluded from the plebiscite.

The same régime ought to be applied to this triangle as to the zone further to the south in which the territories ceded by Austria are reserved for definitive assignment to the decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Appendix IV to CF–52

M–243

Memorandum as to a Suggested Basis for Settlement of the Adriatic Question, Submitted for Elaboration and Definition re [by] Experts

(Handed by President Wilson on behalf of M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George and himself to M. Orlando on 7th June, 1919)

• First. A free state to be set up within the following limits, except as it may be deemed best by the experts to realign these limits to correspond with the natural configuration of the country: beginning at the “American” line on Parallel 14° just North of Kirchheim, and following that line South to Fianona on the Istrian Peninsula, where it should run to the sea, extending it from Fianona Southward around the Island of Cherso, thence Northward and around the Island of Veglia, striking the mainland just West of the Bay of Buccari, and running thence North and North-east to Mount Risnjak, and thence North-west to join the “London” line due East of Adelsberg or Zirknitz, and thence North-westward along the “London” line to the point of beginning.
• Second. Fiume, within this free state, to be a corpus separatum only in the limited sense in which it has been a corpus separatum under the sovereignty of Hungary. The state to enjoy absolute self-government under the superintendence of a Commission of the League of Nations consisting of two representatives of Italy, one representative of the free state itself, one representative of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and one representative representing a power other than these and chosen by the Council of the League of Nations.
• Third. Full guarantees and safeguards to be provided that the States lying back of the Port of Fiume shall have free use of and access to the port upon terms similar to those upon which the use of the Port of Dantzig is secured to Poland. Full guarantees and safeguards also as to rights of residence without discrimination of nationality, and as to equal opportunities for the use and investment of capital in the development of the port or of its business, without discrimination between nationalities.
• Fourth. At the end of a period of five years from the signing of the agreements upon which this settlement is based, a plebiscite to be taken within this free state as a unit (not by parts) for the determination of the question whether the people of the state desire to be placed under the sovereignty of Jugo-Slavia, or under the sovereignty of Italy, or to remain a free state under the League of Nations. A special commission to be provided for to conduct and superintend this plebiscite, which shall have the right to lay down the conditions under which it is to be held. One of those conditions to be that no one shall have the right to vote in the plebiscite who was not a resident of the area included within the state on the first of August, 1914.
• Fifth. The islands enclosed within a red pencil mark on the attached map³ to be assigned in sovereignty to the Kingdom of Italy, with the exception of those in the immediate vicinity of the Port of Sebenico, on the condition that Italy is to maintain no fortifications whatever on those islands and no naval bases. The same limitations to be imposed upon the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with regard to the islands remaining in their possession.
• Sixth. The rights of national or racial minorities to be guaranteed and safeguarded within all the districts in question in this settlement by both the sovereignties concerned.
• Seventh. The City of Zara to be created a free city under the League of Nations, representation of the city in respect of all its foreign relations to be assigned to Italy.
• Eighth. The Assling Junction triangle to be definitely assigned to the Sovereignty of Jugo-Slavia.

June 7, 1919.

Appendix V to CF–52

M–242

Report to the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers

Proposed Reply to the German Proposals With Regard to the League of Nations

1. It has never been the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers that Germany should be indefinitely excluded from the League of Nations. On the contrary, it is their hope that the League will as soon as possible include all nations that can be trusted to carry out the obligations accepted by Members of the League. As soon as they are satisfied that Germany possesses a stable government which has given clear proofs of its intention to observe its international obligations and to take the necessary steps towards disarmament, the principal Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to support Germany’s candidature for admission to the League, and they see no reason, provided these necessary steps are taken, why Germany should not become a Member of the League within a few months.

2. The Allied and Associated Powers do not consider that an addition to the Covenant in the sense of the German proposals regarding economic questions is necessary. They would point out that the Covenant already provides that “subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League … will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League”, and that a General Convention with regard to Transit questions is now being prepared. So soon as Germany is admitted to the League, she will enjoy the benefits of these provisions.

Further, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that so soon as Germany is admitted to the League, Parts IX, X and XII of the present Treaty shall be subject to revision by the Council, with a view to determining whether some, or all of the obligations thereby laid upon Germany shall no longer apply except on the basis of reciprocity, provided that the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914–1918 shall be borne in mind.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the German delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides for “the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations”. They recognise that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction, and they hope that substantial progress will have been made when the Assembly of the League meets for the first time, as is intended, in October of the present year. In these negotiations the question of universal military service will be carefully considered. The actual execution of any scheme that may be adopted must depend largely on the satisfactory fulfilment by Germany of the disarmament terms of the present Treaty.

4. The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to accord to Germany guarantees, under the protection of the League of Nations, for the educational, religious, and cultural rights of the German Minorities in territories hitherto forming part of the German Empire. They take note of the statement of the German Delegates that Germany is determined to treat foreign minorities within her territory according to the same principles.

June 7, 1919.

Appendix VI to CF–52

M–239

[Translation]⁴

Peace Commission,
Financial Commission—Secretariat,
Paris , June 6, 1919.

The secretariat of the Financial Commission has the honor to send to the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference copies of the letters addressed to the Polish, Roumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak Delegations by the Financial Commission, in reply to the observations submitted by these Delegations on the draft of the financial clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria.

The Financial Commission has replied to all questions of a financial order raised by the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations before the Supreme Council, the examination of which had been referred to the Financial Commission by the Territorial Commission of which M. Tardieu is chairman.

The Financial Commission has thought that, in order to take into account certain observations submitted, it was necessary to submit to the Supreme Council the few modifications or definitions, herewith included, to the text of the clauses adopted by the Supreme Council in its session of May 27, 1919.

Article 7, Par. 2 ⁵

After the words “respective territories” at the end of paragraph 1 of Clause 2 of Article 7 insert the following words: “In making the above calculation the revenues of the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall not be included.”

Article 10, Clause 7, Financial Chapter

Take out the words “and shall observe the priorities … hereinafter described” in the second sentence, and substitute the words “subject, however, to the special provisions of this Article.”

Note for Drafting Committee

Article 12

Property belonging to “the old or new Austrian Government.”

It should be made clear that such “property and possessions” includes property belonging to the former Austrian Empire and also the interests of that Empire in the joint property of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This will leave the “Hungarian Monarchy” property to be covered by the Hungarian Treaty.

Article 15, Line 12

Omit the word “China”.

1. Ante, p. 189.
2. This document does not accompany the minutes.
3. Ante, p. 235.
3. No map accompanies the minutes.
4. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
5. The text of the remaining portion of this appendix appears in the minutes in both English and French. The French text has been omitted.