Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VI

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/55

CF–55

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, June 10, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, June 10, 1919, 11 a.m.

• Present
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson.
  • British Empire
    • Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
  • Italy
    • M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.	}	Secretaries.
Count Aldrovandi.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter.

1. M. Clemenceau said he had circulated the Hungarian reply to the invitation to come to Paris. He suggested that the representatives of Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania should be asked to attend the afternoon meeting. Czech-Hungarian Armistice Proposals

(This was agreed to. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to summon M. Kramarcz, M. Benes, M. Bratiano and M. Misu.¹)

2. M. Clemenceau said he thought M. Orlando’s reply to the latest proposals made to him on the subject of the Italian claims ought to be discussed without delay.

Mr. Lloyd George said that at present he could make no contribution to the subject. Italian Claims

President Wilson said that was his position.

M. Clemenceau said that he had a proposition to make, but thought he had first better discuss it with Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson.

(M. Clemenceau took Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson aside and communicated his proposal to them.)

3. The Council had before them a Project for Reply to German Counter-proposals dealing with Reparation. (W. C. P. 946. A.) (Appendix I.)^1a Reparation

Mr. Lloyd George pointed to the harm done by the Press, whose indiscretions, all of which went to Berlin, gave an entirely false impression in regard to the discussions of the Council. The newspapers gave the impression that the terms of the Treaty of Peace were being torn to pieces. As a matter of fact, only four alterations had so far been proposed.

He said that his own proposals were now ready. He then read the following extract from a memorandum prepared by Lord Sumner:—

“Immediately after the Treaty is signed, Germany may present forthwith and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and examine such evidence, estimates, and arguments in writing, as she may think fit to present. Such documents need not be final, but may be presented subject to corrections and additions.

At any time within four months of the signature of the Treaty, Germany shall be at liberty to submit, and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and consider, such proposals as Germany may choose to make. In particular, proposals will be acceptable on the following subjects and for the following purposes. Germany may offer a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability, or in settlement of her liability under particular categories. Germany may offer to undertake to repair and reconstruct part or the whole of any damaged district, or certain classes of damage in each country or in all the countries which have suffered. Germany may offer labour, materials or technical assistance for use in such work, even though she does not undertake to do the work herself. Without making further specifications, it may be said in a word that Germany is at liberty to make any suggestion or offer of a practical and reasonable character for the purposes of simplifying the assessment of the damage, eliminating any question or questions from the scope of the detailed enquiry, promoting the performance of the work and accelerating the definition of the ultimate amount to be paid. One condition and one condition only is imposed upon the tender of these proposals. They must be unambiguous, they must be precise and clear, and they must be made in earnest. The Allied and Associated Powers have to remark that in the observations submitted the German Delegation has made no definite offer at all but only vague expressions of willingness to do something undefined, and that the one suggestion, namely, as to the payment of £5,000,000,000, which appears to be expressed in concrete terms, is so hedged about with conditions and qualifications as to appear to be intended to provoke controversy and not to promote peace.

Within two months thereafter the Allied and Associated Powers will, so far as may be possible, return their answer to the above proposals. It is impossible to declare in advance that they will be accepted, and if accepted, they will be subject to proper conditions, which can be discussed and arranged. The Allied and Associated Powers, however, declare that such proposals will be seriously and fairly considered; no one could be better pleased than they, no one could profit more than they, if, in the result, a fair, a speedy and a practical settlement were arrived at. The questions are bare questions of fact, namely, the amount of the liabilities, and they are susceptible of being treated in this way. Beyond this, the Powers cannot be asked to go.

Even if no settlement were arrived at, it must be evident that the early production of the German evidence would greatly abbreviate the enquiry, and accelerate the decisions. The information at present at hand comes from one side only. A great part of the damage done has been done by German hands in faithful execution of German plans. The German Authorities have had long occupation of a large part of the damaged areas and have been over the ground, forwards and backwards, within the last twelve or fifteen months. Their information must be extensive and exact. The Allied and Associated Powers have as yet had no access to this mass of material. The mere comparison of the evidence forthcoming on the one side and the other must greatly narrow the field of dispute and may eliminate dispute altogether. It is obvious that, if the class of damages done in the devastated areas can be dealt with in this fashion, the liability under the other categories can be quickly established, for it depends on statistics and particulars of a far simpler character. By giving a satisfactory covenant to execute the work of rebuilding themselves, the Germans could at once dispose of the only difficult or long subject of inquiry.”

M. Clemenceau said that as a matter of principle, he accepted this proposal.

Mr. Lloyd George said he would accept any arguments, but he thought these had been admirably stated in the document prepared by the United States Delegation. (W. C. P. 946.A.)²

President Wilson said that the extracts from Lord Sumner’s paper that Mr. Lloyd George had read only provided a substitute for the portion of the United States paper proposing a fixed sum. Was the remainder of the United States answer acceptable, he asked?

Mr. Lloyd George said that he preferred the first four pages of the United States draft.

President Wilson then read his draft (Appendix), slowly, in order that it might be considered in detail. On the first page, the following alterations were agreed to:—

Line 1. Instead of “consistent to” put “consistent with”.

At the end of the first paragraph, on Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion, it was agreed to insert the actual words from Mr. Lansing’s Note of November 5th, 1918,³ defining the intention of the word “Reparation”.

2nd Paragraph. Line 4, instead of “more difficult” put “the more difficult”.

The last sentence of the second paragraph was re-arranged to read as follows:—

“For the purpose of clarification, however, and in order that there may be no possible ground for misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated Governments submit the following observations”.

3rd Paragraph. For “the Reparation Commission” put “a Reparation Commission.” In the following line, for “the Reparation Commission,” put “this Reparation Commission.”

Page 2. On Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion, it was agreed that as far as possible, where particular Articles of the Peace Treaty were referred to, words explanatory of the contents of the Article should be introduced.

1st Paragraph on Page 2.⁴ For the words “after May 1st, 1921”, put “when once the amount of the liability of Germany is fixed.”

After the first paragraph of page 2, it was agreed to insert the following extract from Lord Sumner’s memorandum:—

“The observations of the German Delegation present a view of this Commission so distorted and so inexact, that it is impossible to believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for interfering with German Sovereignty. It has no forces, which it commands; it has no executive powers within the territory of Germany; it cannot, as suggested, direct or control the educational or other systems of the country. Its business is to fix what is to be paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to report to the Powers, whose Delegation it is, in case Germany makes default. If Germany raises the money required in her own way, the Commission cannot order that it shall be raised in some other way, if Germany offers payment in kind, the Commission may accept such payment, but, except as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot require such a payment. The observations appear to miss the point that the Commission is directed to study the German system of taxation equally for the protection of the German people as for the protection of their own. Such study is not inquisitorial, for the German system of taxation is not an object of curiosity to other Powers, nor is a knowledge of it an end in itself. If any plea of poverty, which the German Government may advance, is to be properly considered, such a study is necessary. The Commission must test whether a sincere application is being given to the principle, accepted in the observations, “that the German taxation system should impose in general on the taxpayer at least as great a burden as those prevailing in the most heavily burdened of the States represented on the Reparation Commission.” If the German resources are to [be] properly weighed, the first subject of inquiry, and perhaps the first ground for relief, will be the German fiscal burden.”

2nd Paragraph on Page 2. Delete the first two lines, and insert the subject matter of the remainder of the paragraph in the above, extract from Lord Sumner’s document.

Page 3, At the end of the first paragraph,⁵ insert the extract from Lord Sumner’s memorandum read by Mr. Lloyd George at the beginning of the discussion, and already quoted above.

At Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion, certain additions were made to the above extracts, and were accepted.

(N. B. These were drafting additions, and will be found in the second draft of the memorandum to be reproduced in the Appendix of a later meeting.)

Page 3. Omit the whole, after the first paragraph.⁶

Page 4. Omit paragraph 1.⁷

Page 4. Paragraph 2. There was a somewhat prolonged discussion in regard to the proposal that specific instructions should be prepared, directing the Commission to permit the retention by Germany for two years of ships designated by the Commission, representing 30% of the tonnage of the total amount of ships referred to in para. 1 of Annex III.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the United States of America, Brazil and Portugal, had all received ships considerably in excess of their losses in the war. France had lost in the war, perhaps a million tons of shipping, and would only receive about 40,000 tons with a proportion of the remainder. Great Britain had lost nearly 8 million tons, and would not receive more than one to one and a half million tons. Consequently, Great Britain would lose, net, to the extent of 6½ million tons, a great proportion of which had been lost not in carrying her own material, but supplies of all kinds for France and Italy, and some in carrying for America. The voyages to France and Italy had been particularly dangerous. He was not fighting for British trade, but what he wished to insist on was that if 30% of Germany’s shipping must be allowed to her, the arrangement must be made on the dead level, and every nation must contribute its share. If this were the case, he was ready to discuss an allocation of 10%, 20% or even 30%. The British people, however, would not understand, if all the loss fell on France and Great Britain. He pointed out that the United States had acquired a net gain of three or four hundred thousand tons of shipping, (and this was some of the best shipping that Germany had possessed), owing to the fact that this shipping had taken refuge in its ports for fear of capture by the British Navy. If the German shipping had not taken refuge in the ports of the United States, Brazil and Portugal, Great Britain and France would have captured the greater part of it.

President Wilson pointed out that this shipping was the only reparation that the United States would receive after all their efforts in the war.

Mr. Lloyd George said that for the next few years, tonnage was worth a great deal more than money. Those who were able first to establish themselves in overseas trades, would gain enormous advantages.

President Wilson pointed out that unless Germany received a certain amount of raw material and retained a certain amount of liquid assets, there would be no reparation to be received.

Mr. Lloyd George entirely agreed. As long as the arrangement was made on the dead level, he did not object. Nevertheless, it would have been easier for him to justify to the British Parliament a claim by the United States for pensions than for these ships. He hoped that no arrangement would be concluded at the expense of France and Great Britain. He had always put France first in speaking of the matter in Great Britain, and he took the same line now.

M. Clemenceau said that he was quite prepared to assist Germany as an arrangement between the Allies, but not to give it the appearance of a concession wrung from the Allied and Associated Powers by the enemy. France had very few ships, quite insufficient for her needs, and it was impossible for him to agree to give up ships to Germany. He realised, however, that it would be to France’s interest to give Germany some facilities.

Mr. Lloyd George said he was willing to consider the German needs fairly, and when the time came, he thought it would be a business proposition to our own people. Having in view, however, the great shortage of shipping, which was entirely due to the abominable system of piracy by Germany, the sinking of ships and leaving their crews far out at sea in open boats, etc., he could not agree to this proposal unless it was carried out on the dead level for all nations.

M. Clemenceau said that the question was as to whether a sum was to be fixed to be paid, or whether Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal should be adopted. He, himself, preferred Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal. The United States proposal would have the effect of changing the whole system of reparation which was only reached after very long discussions and immense difficulties. The various proposals in the United States paper would have the effect of an abandonment of the whole system of Reparations, which had been so laboriously worked out. We had stated that we should make Germany pay for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and by the air. Supposing they accepted a fixed figure, would these damages be repaid? We did not know. As Mr. Lloyd George had said in the course of the discussion, it was France who had suffered most. Though her losses, on land had been very great, they had also been heavy at sea. He must say frankly that he did not believe in abandoning the scheme that had been drawn up. He probably knew the Germans better than any of his colleagues. He had known them very well since 1871. We had brought the proposals made to Germany before the whole world. To abandon them, merely because the Germans had objections, was a thing he could not assent to. It had been proposed to make the Treaty more acceptable to Germany by letting her have ships and gold, by abolishing conscription, by financial advantages, and by admission to the League of Nations. To do this would be to turn the whole world upside down. It would be not the conquerors but the conquered who came out best. For days and days he had followed the discussions, with the intention of agreeing with the majority. He could not, however, agree to something that would turn the world upside down. He was prepared to accept Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal. He was convinced that this or that concession would not make the Germans sign. There was much to be said against the Germans, but they were a people with great qualities even if they had great faults, and at present, they were very anxious to put their country on its legs again. Of course, if Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar, Poland etc. were abandoned, we could have peace tomorrow. When Great Britain had abandoned her policy of splendid isolation and thrown herself into the struggle, she had taken all risks. She must continue to do so to the end. After expending so many men and so much money, and making such prodigious efforts, it was necessary to have peace. The same applied to the United States of America. Peace had become the most essential thing for the whole world. If the Germans were confronted with a strong peace, supported by a firm attitude, then peace would be assured, but otherwise, we should lose the confidence of our own people, while the Germans would be strengthened and we should not get peace. He knew the Germans well, and if a concession was made, they always asked for more. If they were promised admission to the League of Nations, they would only demand ships, and if they were promised ships, they would demand gold. Moreover, when we made these offers to Germany, we pledged ourselves. Germany, however, took no pledges. If Germany had said, “If you will give up this or that, we will accept”, the matter might be worthy of consideration, but Germany had done nothing of the kind. He was willing to accept modifications, but he was not willing to compromise the peace and the victory, which was not British, nor French, nor Italian, nor American, but a peace secured by all.

President Wilson said that the United States had never proposed any concessions to Germany. They had only made certain proposals in a spirit of co-operation. If these were not acceptable to his colleagues, there was no difficulty in withdrawing them. The United States Delegation, however, had taken up a consistent line from the first in this matter.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was in complete agreement with the spirit of the United States document, which, in his opinion, had got hold of the right idea. We did not desire to crush Germany, nor to make it impossible for her to resume her industrial life. He thought that some general proposal should be made to the effect that opportunity would be offered to Germany to obtain raw material, shipping facilities, etc., and during the meeting, he had invited Lord Sumner to draft such a proposal. His view was, that what they required, was not a detailed proposal, but some general assurance.

M. Clemenceau said it was to our own interest to give that.

Mr. Lloyd George admitted that his proposal was open to comment, as being vague, but he did not think the Germans would make this point.

President Wilson said that the only difference between them was that the United States Delegation’s proposals were more specific.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the difficulty of specific promises was that it would be very difficult to draw up a complete list. If shipping and credit facilities, and certain raw materials were mentioned, the Germans would think that anything omitted from the list, had been left out deliberately. Germany needed so many things, for example, cotton, rubber, wool, tungsten, and all kinds of raw materials, most of which were controlled by the Allied and Associated Powers. His view, therefore, was that it would be better merely to make a general statement. He then read the following draft prepared by Lord Sumner:—

“The Powers will, however, make a declaration on another point as follows:—

The resumption of German industry involves access for German manufacturers to the necessary raw materials and provision for their transport to German factories from overseas.

The resumption of German industry is an interest of the Allied and Associated Powers, as well as an interest of Germany. They recognise this fact and therefore declare that they will not withhold (withdraw) from Germany the commercial intercourse and assistance, without which, this resumption cannot take place, but that subject to conditions, and within limits which cannot be laid down in advance, they are prepared to afford to Germany facilities in these directions for the common good.”

This was accepted with the substitution of the word “withhold” for “withdraw.”

(It was agreed that paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 (that is to say the whole of page 4 and whole of page 5 except the last paragraph) should be omitted).⁸

(N. B. The effect of this was to substitute the extract from Lord Sumner’s memorandum quoted above in the minutes for this portion of the document in the Appendix.)

4. There was some discussion as to the advisability of including in the memorandum a passage dealing with the cost of the Army of Occupation. Cost of the Army of Occupation

Mr. Lloyd George favoured the proposal on the ground that the Germans were very apprehensive lest a very large sum should have to be paid for this charge. A bill for 50 million pounds per annum for example, would be very heavy on a country which was already burdened with Reparation.

M. Clemenceau was opposed to the proposal on the ground that the question did not really affect Germany. In any case, she had to pay everything that she could, and it was immaterial to her whether it was expended on the cost of the Army of Occupation or paid out as Reparation. He made it clear, however, that he was not in favour of a large charge for the cost of the Army of Occupation. He wished the Army to be as small as possible, in order that more assets might be available for Reparation.

Villa Majestic, Paris , 10 June, 1919.

Appendix to CF–55

[This appendix is the same as appendix II to CF–54, printed on page 267.]

1. Nicolas Misu, Roumanian Minister in Great Britain; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
2. See appendix II to CF–51, p. 267.
2. See appendix II to CF–54, p. 267.
3. Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 468.
4. Beginning with the words “The provisions of Article 241 …”
5. Following the words “Certainly this is greatly to be desired.”
6. Consisting of the paragraph beginning “The Allied and Associated Governments after examining …”
7. Beginning “Germany proposes to assist …”
8. The portion to be omitted would extend from the paragraph beginning “The Allied and Associated Governments do not ignore …” through the penultimate paragraph of the draft.