Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/92
CF–92
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 4 p.m.
Paris, June 25, 1919, 4 p.m.
-
Present
-
United States of America
-
British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
-
France
-
Italy
-
Japan
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secretaries.
|
| Count Aldrovandi. |
| Mr. A. Portier. |
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter.
|
1. (M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, was
introduced.)
M. Dutasta said that he had seen von Haniel,
who told him he had telegraphed twice to Berlin asking who the German
representatives would be and when they were due to arrive, but had
received no answer. Von Haniel had added that the German Government had
removed from Weimar to Berlin and that their first Cabinet Council in
Berlin was to be held this morning. On the conclusion of that, he
expected an answer. M. Dutasta had asked him to communicate again and he
had promised to do so immediately. According to von Haniel, the German
Government was encountering great difficulty in finding persons ready to
sign the Treaty. He had made von Haniel understand that an answer was
expected this evening, or tomorrow at the latest. Date of Signature of the Treaty of Peace
M. Clemenceau instructed M. Dutasta to proceed
to Versailles tomorrow morning at 9 a.m. unless he had heard in the
meanwhile from Colonel Henri.
2. M. Mantoux said that M. Tardieu was in
attendance to obtain a decision of principle on a point connected with
the desire of the French Government to be allowed to buy or to borrow
United States ships for communication with the French Colonies, for
which France had a great insufficiency of shipping. Shipping for the French Colonies
[Page 670]
M. Clemenceau said the question should first be
sent to experts.
(It was agreed, on President Wilson’s suggestion:—That M. Tardieu should
arrange for a joint memorandum to be prepared by the experts of the
Allied and Associated Powers.)
3. M. Clemenceau, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George,
said it was his intention to hand the Treaty of Peace to Parliament as
soon as possible after the signature. He would not make any explanatory
speech and the next step would be for the examination of the Treaty by
the Commissions of the Chamber and Senate. He did not expect to make his
own statement until after the various Commissions had reported, perhaps
not for three weeks. Ratification of the Treaty of
Peace
President Wilson said that he, himself, would
leave Paris immediately after the signature of the Treaty. As soon as he
arrived in the United States, he would take the Treaty to Congress.
M. Clemenceau thought there were advantages in
President Wilson making the first speech on the subject.
President Wilson said that, in his country,
questions would then be asked as to why other Governments had done
nothing.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he could fit in his
speech about the same time as President Wilson’s, although he was
anxious to be away for the second and third weeks after his arrival in
England.
M. Sonnino said that the responsibility would
be with the new Italian Government, but he thought there was little
doubt they would proceed as rapidly as possible. In view of the
necessity of reports by Commissions, probably a fortnight or so would
elapse before the Treaty could be ratified.
4. Mr. Lloyd George brought forward a proposal
he had received from Sir Ernest Pollock, the English Solicitor-General,
suggesting that, in the light of the experience gained at Scapa Flow and
the burning of French flags, steps should be taken to make the execution
of Clauses 214 to 224 (Repatriation of Prisoners) and Clauses 227 to 230
(Penalties) interdependent. (Appendix I.) Penalties
and Prisoners
(It was generally agreed that this suggestion was a useful one and should
be taken note of, but that no immediate decision should be taken for its
adoption.)
5. Mr. Lloyd George suggested to his colleagues
that the Trial of the Kaiser should take place in some Allied country
removed from those where resentment at the Kaiser was naturally the most
acute. He suggested that either Great Britain or the United States of
America would be the most advantageous from this point of view. Trial of the Kaiser
President Wilson suggested that the Trial of
the Kaiser should not take place in any great city.
[Page 671]
M. Clemenceau said he would like to consult his
colleagues on the subject and would give a reply on the following
day.
6. Mr. Lloyd George read the attached note from
Admiral Hope regarding the disposition of surrendered German and
Austrian surface ships and submarines. (Appendix II.)
Sir Maurice Hankey pointed out that a report
had already been furnished by the Allied Admirals in regard to
submarines, Admiral De Bon having made a minority report. The Disposal of the German Ships and
Submarines
(It was agreed that:—The Allied Admirals should be asked to prepare a
report advising the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers as to what course they now recommended on all three heads.)
7. M. Clemenceau adverted to the point he had
raised at the morning meeting, namely, that France should be compensated
for the loss she had incurred by the sinking of German ships at Scapa
Flow, by being given some of the remaining German merchant ships and
particularly oil tankers. Possible Surrender of
Further German Merchant Ships
(It was agreed:—That a Commission, composed as follows:—
- Mr. Baruch for the United States of America,
- Mr. Hipwood (or representative) for the British Empire,
- M. Monet (or representative) for France,
- M. Crespi (or representative) for Italy, and
- A Japanese representative to be nominated by Baron
Makino,
should meet to consider the possibility of exacting from
Germany some reparation for the sinking of warships at Scapa Flow in the
form of further merchant ships, special consideration being given to the
case of oil tank vessels.)
8. President Wilson read the following
questions presented by the Superior Blockade Council:—
- 1.
- Does the Supreme Council, in view of the authorisation given
by the Weimar Assembly to the German Delegates, desire that all
restrictions upon trade with Germany shall be rescinded
immediately upon the signatures of the Treaty of Peace by the
German Delegation?Questions From the Superior
Blockade Council
- 2.
- If not, upon what date shall these restrictions be
rescinded?
- 3.
- When is the German Delegation expected to sign? If the Supreme
Council desires that the blockade restrictions shall be raised
upon the signature of the Treaty by the German Delegates and if
the signature is likely to take place on Saturday, it is
desirable that the Blockade Council should be so informed today.
At least two days are required in which to terminate the present
restrictions.
At M. Clemenceau’s request the following note
prepared by M. Mantoux, was read:—
“Provision ought to be made for the eventuality of the German
Government signing the Treaty of Peace, but delaying its
ratification [Page 672] in the
hope to embarrass the Allies and to take advantage of any
incidents that might arise.
In 1871, it was stipulated by Art. 3 of the Preliminaries of
Peace that the German troops were to evacuate Paris and the
forts on the left bank of the Seine immediately after the act of
ratification. Much to the surprise of the Germans, the
Preliminaries which had been signed on February 26th, 1871, were
ratified by the Bordeaux Assembly as soon as March 1st, and the
exchange of ratifications took place at Versailles the day
after. Paris was evacuated at once, after less than two days of
occupation, and the triumphal entry of William I, which had been
prepared for March 3rd, was cancelled.
It may be useful today to remind the Germans of the fact that the
blockade shall cease at the same moment as the state of war, and
that legally what brings the state of war to an end is the
exchange of ratifications. But for the sake of humanity, the
Allied and Associated Governments may concede that as soon as
they have been officially notified the ratification of the
treaty by the National Assembly of Germany the blockade shall be
raised.
Such a declaration would encourage Germany to ratify the Treaty
without delay, without fixing a narrow time limit to the debates
in the representative Assemblies of the Allied and Associated
countries.”
Mr. Lloyd George said that this seemed
reasonable.
President Wilson reminded his colleagues of his
reluctance to make women and children suffer for matters over which they
exercised no influence. Nevertheless, the course proposed seemed the
best in the circumstances.
M. Clemenceau said that in the Rhine provinces
there was little hardship.
President Wilson said that in the interior of
Germany Mr. Hoover reported great shortage.
(It was agreed:—That the Blockade should cease on the same date as the
ratification of the Treaty of Peace, as provided for at the end of the
Treaty.)
9. Mr. Lloyd George suggested that a special
Committee should be set up to consider the working out of the various
measures for putting the Treaty of Peace with Germany into effect.
(The proposal was accepted in principle, and it was agreed that the
members should be designated on the following day.) Measures for Putting Into Effect the Execution of the
Treaty
10. With reference to C. F. 83, Minute 3,1 the Council had before them a report by the
Commission on Baltic affairs on the question submitted to it by the
Council on the 23rd June, as to the effect which the evacuation of the
Baltic Provinces by Germany would have on the food supplies in this
region, in the event of the removal of the rolling stock by the Germans.
(Appendix III.) Effect of the Evacuation of the
Baltic Provinces by Germany on the Food Supplies in This
Region
[Page 673]
President Wilson after reading the report
aloud, suggested that the second proposal of the Commission should be
adopted, but he considered that the first proposal to take advantage of
Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany was not feasible. He
suggested that Marshal Foch should be asked to take the necessary action
through the Armistice Commission.
(It was agreed that a copy of the Memorandum by the Baltic Commission
should be sent to Marshal Foch, who should be asked to demand from the
Germans that when evacuating the Baltic provinces they should leave
behind the German railway material now in these provinces as part of the
railway material which Germany was bound to deliver to the Allies in
accordance with the terms of Clause VII of the Armistice of November 11,
1918, and which has not yet been delivered. The railway material so left
would legally be the property of the Allied and Associated Powers and
not of the Baltic States.
It was further agreed that it was to the interest of the Allied Powers to
secure the restoration as soon as possible in the Baltic provinces of
the Russian gauge on the railways in view of the closer economic
connections of these provinces with Russia than with Germany.)
11. The Council had before them a report from the Commission on Baltic
Affairs, covering the recommendation made by the United States, British
and French representatives at Libau. (Appendix IV.)
President Wilson, after reading the Report and
enclosure aloud, remarked that the programme unhappily was not one that
was practicable. Report From the Commission on Baltic
Affairs on Recommendation From United States, British & French
Representatives at Libau
Mr. Lloyd George commented on the fact that
peoples fighting for their liberties wanted to have even their soldiers
paid by the Allies.
President Wilson said that probably they had no
resources for paying them themselves.
Mr. Lloyd George read a telegram from the
British Commission at Helsingfors in regard to the complicated position
that had arisen involving fighting between Esthonians and Latvians.
(In the course of a short discussion it was pointed out:—
- 1.
- That a military mission of the Allied & Associated Powers
under General Gough, has already been sent to the Baltic
Provinces.
- 2.
- That Marshal Foch has already ordered the Germans to evacuate
the Baltic provinces under the terms of the Armistice of
November 11, 1918.
- 3.
- That the Council has sanctioned supplies being given to the
Baltic provinces, and that General Gough has been asked to
advise as to what these supplies should consist of, as a
preliminary to arrangements being made as to who was to give the
supplies.
[Page 674]
It was agreed that no further financial assistance to the Baltic
provinces could be at present given.)
12. Following on the remarks he had made at the morning meeting, C.F. 91,
Minute 2,2
Mr. Lloyd George proposed the text of a note to
the German Delegation in regard to their intrigues on the Eastern
frontier.
After the note had been read and a few suggestions made, it was approved
and signed by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied and Associated
Powers in the attached form. (Appendix V.) Note to
the German Delegation in Regard to the German Intrigues on the
Eastern Frontier
(It was agreed that the letter and the enclosure should be
published.)
13. Mr. Lloyd George said that the present
military position in Russia was that Koltchak’s thrust, intended
eventually to reach Moscow, had failed. The intention had been as a
first step to unite at Kotlas with the forces based at Archangel. The
Bolshevists there had driven Koltchak’s army back. Meanwhile, in the
south Denikin had inflicted a severe defeat on Koltchak [sic]. The Don Cossacks had risen, and had taken
50,000 prisoners and 300 guns from the Bolshevists, and were now just
outside Tsaritzen. Hence the latest information was that Koltchak was
doing badly but that Denikin had routed his adversaries. Russia. Latest Military Information
14. Mr. Lloyd George said he had received a
note from Mr. Churchill (Appendix VI) submitting a proposal for
cooperation of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia with the right wing of
Admiral Koltchak’s army, and requesting that the matter might be dealt
with as one of extreme urgency.
(It was agreed that the question should be referred to the military
representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, a Japanese and
a Czecho-Slovak military representative being added for the purpose.)
Siberia: Co-operation of Czecho-Slovak Troops
With the Right Wing of Admiral Koltchak’s Army
15. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a
letter from the Chinese Delegation stating that they would sign the
Treaty of Peace with Germany, with a reservation relating to Shantung.
He had replied that they must either sign the with the intention of
abiding by it or not sign. They were just as much bound to honour their
signature as the Germans were. Reservation of the
Treaty of Peace by the Chinese Delegation
President Wilson said that Mr. Lansing had
spoken to him of this, and had said that any sovereign Power could make
reservations in signing.
M. Clemenceau reminded President Wilson that
when the Roumanian [Page 675] and the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations had spoken of signing with reservations,
they had been asked to say what they intended by this. A Treaty which
was signed with reservations was not a Treaty.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the Italians
had said they made certain reservations, but they would sign the German
Treaty without any reservation.
Baron Makino said that the Japanese Delegation
had objected to many of the decisions of Commissions, but had bowed to
the decision of the majority. The Treaty would have no effect if anyone
could make reservations.
President Wilson suggested that someone should
be asked to enquire from the Chinese Delegation what was reserved and
what was intended by their reservation. If it was merely a protest, they
were entitled to make this. He understood the Chinese Delegation were
acting under specific instructions from their Government.
M. Clemenceau instructed Captain Portier to ask
M. Pichon to see a representative of the Chinese Delegation and to
enquire the subjects on which they were making reservations, and whether
their reservation amounted to more than a protest.
(Captain Portier telephoned this decision immediately to the Quai
d’Orsay.)
16. Mr. Lloyd George asked that the question of
Turkey might be considered. President Wilson would shortly be leaving.
It was unreasonable to maintain a state of war with Turkey for the next
two months. Would it not be possible, he asked, to agree on some Peace
Terms which would put Turkey out of her misery, outlining the frontiers
of Turkey, but leaving the final dispositions of the territory that had
not to remain Turkish until it was known whether the United States would
accept a mandate. Turkey
President Wilson agreed that the final
dispositions of Turkey ought not to be left for two months. His
colleagues knew his mind on the subject, and could discuss the future
arrangements of Turkey. He suggested that the portions which Turkey was
to lose might be cut off and the Treaty might provide that she should
accept the dispositions of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to
them, just as had been done in the case of Austria.
M. Clemenceau pointed out that this involved
the question of Constantinople.
President Wilson said that the amputations
would involve Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. The Allied troops would
remain there to keep order until the final settlement between the Allied
and Associated Powers.
Mr. Lloyd George asked what would be done about
Armenia. There were no Allied troops there. Turkey at present had some
[Page 676] responsibility for the
maintenance of order. If Armenia was cut off from Turkey, the Turkish
troops would be withdrawn, and the Armenians would be left at the mercy
of the Kurds. It would involve putting in some garrisons.
M. Clemenceau asked what would be done about
the Italians in Asia-Minor.
President Wilson said that this would not
concern the Turks. He thought some formula might be worked out.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the district in
question either belonged to the Turks or it did not. If it did, the Turk
would say: “What are the Italians doing here?”, and the Allies could
only reply that the Italian occupation had been made without their
knowledge or consent.
M. Sonnino demurred to this statement.
President Wilson said that his proposal in
regard to Turkey would be to cut off all that Turkey was to give up; and
to oblige Turkey to accept any conditions with regard to over-sight or
direction which the Allied and Associated Governments might agree to.
His present view was that a mandate over Turkey would be a mistake, but
he thought some Power ought to have a firm hand. Constantinople and the
Straits should be left as a neutral strip for the present, and it was
already in Allied occupation. He would make the Sultan and his
Government move out of Constantinople and he would say what was ceded to
the Allied and Associated Powers. He was only arguing now as to what
could be legally settled as a basis for a Treaty, and he was not
attempting to decide an ultimate settlement. He only proposed an
arrangement similar to what was being made in the case of Austria.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that this involved
the question of whether the Turk was to go out of Constantinople.
President Wilson said that so far as his
judgment was concerned, that was decided. He had studied the question of
the Turks in Europe for a long time, and every year confirmed his
opinion that they ought to be cleared out.
17. Mr. Lloyd George said he had received a
telegram from Feisal in regard to the United States Mission complaining
of a breach of faith that the Commission was not an Allied Commission.
Feisal had interpreted a telegram that General Allenby had sent him, as
suggesting that Great Britain would take a mandate for Syria if no other
Power would do so. At his request, Mr. Balfour had drafted a telegram to
General Allenby stating in the most specific terms that in no
circumstances would Great Britain take this mandate, and calling his
attention to Mr. Lloyd George’s [Page 677] statement on this subject made at an earlier Meeting3 in General
Allenby’s presence. Syria
18. President Wilson said that the hour was
approaching when some demand would have to be made to Holland in regard
to the surrender of the Kaiser. He was anxious that the demand should be
made in such a form as would relieve Holland of any appearance of breach
of hospitality. Holland and the Delivery of the
Kasier
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that a new
principle was involved in this Treaty. A great crime had been
perpetrated against the nations of the world. It had taken five years to
bring this question to fruition, and the Allies could not afford to
allow Holland to stand in the way.
President Wilson agreed that Holland was
morally obliged to surrender the Kaiser, but he wished to make it as
easy for her as possible.
M. Clemenceau said he would be surprised if
Holland objected.
(It was agreed that Mr. Lansing, who had acted as Chairman on the
Commission on Responsibilities, should be asked to draft for the
consideration of the Council, a despatch to the Dutch Government.
President Wilson undertook to inform Mr. Lansing.)
19. The Council took formal note of the attached Note prepared for them
by the Drafting Committee. (Appendix VII.) Presentation of Corrections to the Treaty of Peace With
Germany
20. The Council approved the attached Note to the Polish Government
submitted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, (Appendix VIII).
(The following Note was signed by the four Heads of Governments:— Galicia: Authorisation to the Polish Republic To
Extend Their Operations
“25 Juin, 1919.
Gouvernement Polonais,
Varsovie.
En vue de garantir les personnes et les biens de la population
paisible de Galicie orientale contre les dangers que leur font
courir les bandes bolchévistes, le Conseil Suprême des
Puissances alliées et associées a décidé d’autoriser les forces
de la République Polonaise à poursuivre leurs opérations jusqu’à
la rivière Zbruck.
Cette autorisation ne préjuge en rien les décisions que le
Conseil Suprême prendre ultérieurement pour régler le statut
politique de la Galicie.”4
[Page 678]
The Note was signed by the representatives of the Five Powers, and was
communicated by Captain Portier to a messenger who had brought it from
the Council of Foreign Ministers.)
21. With reference to C. F. 83, Minute 1,5 the Council agreed that the final text of the Note
to the Turkish Government, together with the document read by the
Turkish Delegation to the Council of Ten,6 should be
published after it had been sent to the Turks. (Appendix IX.) Note to the Turkish Government
22. The Council had before them the Note from the Turkish Delegation
dated June 23rd, which was read aloud by President Wilson (Appendix
X).
(It was generally agreed that the document was not a very serious one.)
Note From the Turkish Delegation
Mr. Lloyd George asked that before a reply was
sent, a full discussion on the Turkish question should take place. It
would be a great advantage if a short, sharp Peace with Turkey could be
decided on while the Turkish Delegation were still in Paris.
M. Clemenceau said he was not very hopeful of
reaching a result.
(The proposal was agreed to.)
23. (It was agreed that, if possible, the questions of Reparation and
Finance in the Austrian Treaty, which were at Reparation and present the
result of negotiation with the New States formerly forming part of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, should be considered on the morrow.) Austrian Treaty. Reparation and Finance
24. The Council had before them a draft letter to the German Delegation
prepared by Mr. Balfour and M. Loucheur, with the assistance of M.
Fromageot and Mr. Hurst. Sinking of German
ships
(The letter was approved with the substitution in the seventh paragraph
of the word “justification” for the word “explanation” (Appendix
XI).
(It was agreed that the letter should be sent to the Germans immediately,
and published in the newspapers on Thursday, June 26th.)
25. Mr. Lloyd George insisted on the importance
of settling the form of the Mandates.
President Wilson agreed, but said he wished to
read the question up. Mandates
Villa Majestic, Paris, June 25, 1919.
[Page 679]
Appendix I to CF–92
[Memorandum by the British Solicitor
General (Pollock)]
Responsibilities
In view of the sinking of the German Warships at Scapa Flow, may I
venture to suggest that some guarantees for the observance of
Articles 227–230 shall be taken?
Clause 228, provides for the delivery of the persons wanted for trial
on the charges of having committed violations of the Laws and
Customs of War. Clause 230. provides for the delivery of all
documents and information of every kind necessary for completing and
proving the charges brought against such offenders.
No time limit is fixed by these clauses for compliance with them. But
the implication is that compliance is to be made forthwith upon
demand made.
It may be noted that Article 228. provides inter alia:—
“The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and
Associated Powers, or to such one of them
as shall so request, all persons accused of having
committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of
war”, etc.
A joint application by all the Allied and Associated Powers together
is therefore unnecessary, even though desirable.
By Articles 214–224. of the Treaty, provision is made for the
delivery of the German prisoners of war. Article 215 provides for a
Commission to arrange, and provide, for the repatriation of the
German Prisoners who are to be sent back in vessels provided by the
German Government.
The Germans have endeavoured, in expressed terms, to resist the
delivery of any Germans for trial; and their attitude has indicated
that if it is possible to escape this duty they will do so.
May I venture to suggest, that in the light of the experience gained
at Scapa Flow and the burning of the French flags, steps should be
taken to make the execution of clauses 214–224 (Repatriation of
Prisoners) and clauses 227–230 (Responsibilities)
interdependent?
Ernest M. Pollock
25 June. 1919.
[Page 680]
Appendix II to CF–92
British Admiralty Office,
55, Avenue du Bois de Boulogne
Paris
, 25 June,
1919.
[Rear Admiral G. Hope of the British
Admiralty to the British Prime Minister (Lloyd George)]
Prime Minister:
Besides a decision as to the disposal of the remaining German ships
at Scapa Flow, decisions are required as to the disposal of the
following:—
- I.
- Additional German ships to be surrendered in accordance
with Article 185 of the Peace Treaty, viz.,
- 8 battleships,
- 8 light-cruisers,
- 42 destroyers,
- 50 torpedo boats.
- II.
- Ships belonging to the late Austrian navy.
- III.
- Surrendered German submarines.
(The Admirals have submitted a report on this.)
Appendix III to CF–92
Report of the Commission on Baltic
Affairs
The Commission on Baltic Affairs has considered the question
submitted to it by the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers on the 23rd June7 on the effect
which the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany would have
on the food supplies in this region in the event of the removal of
the rolling stock by the Germans.
The Commission are unanimous in the opinion that it is indispensable
to prevent this removal. There does not, however, appear to be in
the text of the Armistice any article specially applicable to this
case. The Commission considers that advantage might usefully be
taken of Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. They
consider that from the moment at which Germany has declared her
intention of signing the Treaty the Allied Powers are in a position
at once to inform her of their intention to make use of this Article
in order to secure the movements of troops, transport and material
and the supply of relief in the Baltic Provinces.
[Page 681]
The result of such a notification will be that in the event of
Germany removing rolling stock, even if the ratification of the
Treaty is postponed for some days, this removal will forthwith
constitute a formal violation of the Treaty comparable to certain
other actions of the Germans, such as the destruction of the German
Fleet at Scapa Flow, and of the flags to be surrendered to France.
Germany could be called to account for this violation of the Treaty.
In order to facilitate the retention of the material, which is of
great importance, the possibility might be considered of reckoning
this material as part of that which Germany was bound to deliver to
the Allies in accordance with the clauses of the Armistice and which
has not yet been delivered. In this way the material would be
delivered in the east instead of the west and would be at once
available on the spot. It should at the same time be noted that
legally this material would be the property of the Allies and not of
the Baltic States.
The Commission further consider that it is to the interest of the
Allied Powers to secure the restoration as soon as possible in the
Baltic Provinces of the Russian gauge on the railways in view of the
closer economic connextions of these provinces with Russia than with
Germany.
For this reason the proposed solution would be provisional and would
not exclude the speedy and final restoration to the Allied and
Associated Powers of the material left in this district.
Appendix IV to CF–92
Recommendation by Commission on
Baltic Affairs
The Commission on Baltic Affairs submits herewith to the Supreme
Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the text of a
recommendation made by the French, British and American
representatives at Libau, and communicated to the Commission by the
American representative who has been sent from Libau as spokesman of
the Allied representatives.
The supreme importance for a future peace of Europe that Germany
should not obtain a permanent hold on the Baltic provinces through
which she would open the door to getting a predominant influence in
Russia appears to the Commission to be beyond question. It is proved
by various papers communicated to the Commission and by information
received from the representatives of the Allied and Associated
Governments on the spot that this is clearly the ultimate aim of her
present policy and actions in the Baltic Provinces. On the other
hand, the Bolshevik danger is equally serious. In these
circumstances [Page 682] the
Commission, while feeling that the enclosed recommendation, which
includes the suggestion of a credit, is beyond their competence,
feel it their duty to draw the earnest attention of the Council to
the situation as explained therein, and to endorse the view
expressed as to the necessity of providing immediate financial
assistance if any policy is to be adopted which can give any hope of
eradicating German domination in the Baltic Provinces, and meet the
danger of Bolshevism breaking through to the Baltic and
Scandinavia.
[Enclosure]
[Recommendation by the French, British, and
American Representatives at Libau]
In view of the extremely critical position in the Baltic Provinces,
the British and American Political representatives, with the British
and French Commodores here, have to-day agreed on the following
statement—
“No question is more vital than the arrest of the movement of Prussia
towards the North and East. At the same time the Bolshevik danger
must not be under-estimated. The greatest immediate danger lies in
the clash north of Riga, between troops, especially Letts, moving
South from Esthonia and Germans and Baits moving North from Riga.
Provided that the Associated Governments are in a position to
enforce their demands, the Germans should be required, under
penalty, of which the execution should immediately follow upon
non-compliance, to refrain absolutely from advancing further
northwards in the district north of Riga. In the absence of the
Allied Military Mission, we feel otherwise unable to recommend the
exact measures by which the advance of Prussian forces in the Baltic
Provinces should be checked and their withdrawal secured.
“The first need of the situation is the arrival of the Allied
Military Mission. It is, however, requested that the political
representatives of America, France and Great Britain in the Baltic
Provinces may be authorised to make a united statement immediately.
It is suggested that the statement should as nearly as possible take
the following form:—
“‘An Inter-Allied Military Mission, under command of a
British General, will reach the Baltic Provinces
immediately. Arms, equipment, instructors and pay will be
provided for local forces, and for volunteers who may be
raised from external sources, in so far as this may be
determined by the head of the military mission, to be
necessary for the protection of the Provinces against
Bolshevism or for other purposes of defence. The local
distribution of such supplies will depend upon the loyal
acceptance by the forces named of the general direction of
the head of the Inter-Allied Military Mission in their [Page 683] fight against
Bolshevism, their methods of recruitment and their relations
between each other and with the German and Polish
forces.
“‘A loan will be granted immediately to Lithuania and
Esthonia respectively for civil purposes, on condition that
the provisional Governments concerned will undertake to lay
before the political representatives of the Associated
Governments in their countries, their proposals for the use
of the money thus raised, and that no such proposal is
carried out without their approval. On such an arrangement
being concluded the blockade of Lithuania would be raised.
It is intended that this loan should in particular be used
for the provision of the materials required for the
restoration of industry and agriculture and the reduction of
unemployment. A loan on similar terms will be granted to
Latvia as soon as a provisional coalition Government has
been formed, which, in the opinion of the political
representatives of the Associated Governments in Latvia, is
truly representative of the inhabitants of the country. On
such an arrangement being concluded, the blockade of Latvia
will also be raised’”.
This statement was agreed to by:—
- Commodore Duff, E. N. Senior British Naval Officer,
Libau.
- Commodore Brisson, Senior French Naval Officer in the
Baltic.
- Lt. Colonel Warwick Greene, U. S. A. Chief of American
Mission.
- Lt. Colonel Tallents, Chief of British Economic
Mission.
Libau, June 7, 1919.
Appendix V to CF–92
Letter From the Allied and Associated
Powers to the German Delegates
M. le President: The Allied and Associated
Powers feel it necessary to direct the attention of the German
Government to the fact that the Polish authorities have come into
possession of the attached official German despatch8 which states that while the German
Government mean to sign the Peace, they intend to give unofficial
support by all the means in their power to local movements of
resistance to the establishment of Polish authority in the
territories allotted to Poland in Posen, and in East and West
Prussia, and to the occupation of Upper Silesia by the Allied and
Associated Powers. In view of this information the Allied and
Associated Powers think it necessary to inform the German Government
that they will hold them strictly responsible for seeing that, at
the time indicated in the Treaty, all troops and all officials
indicated by the Allied Commission, are withdrawn, and that in the
event of local disturbances in resistance to the Treaty no support
or assistance to the insurgents is allowed to pass across the new
frontier into Poland.
G. Clemenceau
June 25, 1919.
[Page 684]
Appendix VI to CF–92
Memorandum by Mr. Winston
Churchill
The recent reverses sustained by Admiral Koltchak’s forces have led
to the consideration of the various means which might be employed
with a view to restoring the situation on the front held by the
Siberian armies. One possible course is the re-employment on the
front of a portion of the Czecho-Slovak troops now distributed along
the Trans-Siberian Railway.
As the result of an interchange of views between the Secretary of
State for War and Dr. Benes, the following definite proposal is put
forward for consideration, and attention is drawn to the fact that
should the plan be approved, it is necessary that orders for its
execution should be issued with the least possible delay, so that
the project can be carried through to completion before the port of
Archangel becomes ice-bound.
II. The scheme is as follows:—
The Allied and Associated Governments should inform the Government of
the Czecho-Slovak Republic that they are prepared to accept
responsibility for the repatriation of all the Czecho-Slovak troops
now in Siberia on the following basis:—
- (a)
- 30,000 men should take part in an operation on the right
wing of Admiral Koltchak’s army with a view to establishing
a junction with the Archangel forces by advancing via Viatka
and Kotlas to Archangel, whence they will be repatriated
before the end of the current year.
- (b)
- The remainder of the Czecho-Slovak troops to be moved
gradually to Vladivostok and to be embarked for Europe early
in 1920, the 5,000 men already at Vladivostok to be shipped
as soon as possible.
III. Action on the above lines offers several very considerable
advantages:—
- (a)
- The effecting of a junction between Admiral Koltchak’s
armies and the Archangel forces during the period when it is
anticipated that the British will be in occupation of
Kotlas.
- (b)
- The consequential establishment of the Russian forces and
Government in North Russia on a self-supporting basis after
the withdrawal of the Allied units.
- (c)
- The relief of the dangerous situation now developing in
Central Siberia through the presence of the discontented
Czecho-Slovak troops.
- (d)
- The strengthening of the Czecho-Slovak Government at
Prague by the return of the troops from Siberia.
IV. Dr. Benes has been consulted with regard to the proposal and
believes that his government would view it favourably provided that
they were furnished with definite assurances as to the time and
method of repatriating all the Czecho-Slovak troops now in
Siberia.
[Page 685]
V. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the morale of
these troops has been seriously impaired by their long stay in
Siberia, and it is clear that the project can only be proceeded with
on the assumption that the prospect of repatriation will restore the
morale of the elements destined for Archangel sufficiently to enable
them to take part in operations against the Bolsheviks.
VI. It should be recognised from the outset that, owing to the
lateness of the season, there is ground for doubt as to whether the
Czechoslovak troops advancing by Viatka are likely to reach
Archangel in time for repatriation before the winter 1919, as is
shown by the following rough estimates of time and space:—
It is estimated that 30,000 troops could not be concentrated
in the region of Perm before the middle of August.
The distance from Perm to Viatka as the crow flies is 250
miles, and as it is probable that the troops would have to
fight their way throughout this distance, the operation
would almost certainly not be completed under five weeks,
even making full allowances for the nature of the fighting
likely to occur.
From Viatka to Kotlas is another 220 miles, and although it
is possible that very little opposition would be met with
between these two places, the railway would almost certainly
be destroyed by the Bolsheviks, and at least three weeks
should be allowed for the completion of this part of the
movement.
Thus, assuming that all went well, the Czecho-Slovaks would
reach the Dvina at Kotlas about the middle of October. The
port of Archangel is closed by ice about the middle of
November, but in ordinary seasons can be kept open by
ice-breakers for another month.
It will be seen from the above that the possibility of the troops
reaching Archangel too late for repatriation before the winter must
be faced, but this consideration is out-weighed by the great
advantages which are offered by the proposal as set forth in
Paragraph 3.
VII. If the proposal is accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers,
action appears to be necessary as follows:—
- (a)
- To obtain the consent of the Czecho-Slovak Government, and
that that Government should transmit the necessary orders to
the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, explaining clearly what
is proposed, in the manner best calculated to secure their
immediate compliance.
- (b)
- That the French Government should make the necessary
communication to General Janin,9
who should arrange for
- (c)
- Admiral Koltchak to organise an advance on Viatka of the
right flank of General Gayda’s10
army after being re-inforced by the Czecho-Slovaks, who,
after reaching Viatka, would be pushed through to Kotlas and
thence to Archangel.
- (d)
- Sanction to be communicated to General Ironside11 for the occupation of
Kotlas by British and Russian troops during July and August
so as to relieve pressure on General Gayda and stretch out a
hand towards the returning Czecho-Slovak troops.
- (e)
- An agreement to be reached between the Powers concerned as
to the taking over of the sector of the Siberian railway at
present guarded by the Czecho-Slovaks by either Japanese or
American forces or by both conjointly.
- (f)
- Great Britain to provide ships at Archangel during October
and November for all Czecho-Slovak troops returning via
Archangel.
- (g)
- The United States to arrange for the repatriation of the
remainder from Vladivostok, such repatriation to begin at
the earliest possible date.
As soon as the approval of the Czecho-Slovak Government is obtained
as in (a), steps should be taken
simultaneously to give effect to the remaining items indicated
above.
June 24, 1919.
Appendix VII to CF–92
Note for the Supreme Council
By the decisions of the Supreme Council dated the 24th May,
1919,12 the Drafting Committee received instructions
to collect all the “errata” in the German Treaty and prepare a
global list for communication at a later date to the German
Delegation.
The Drafting Committee has the honour to inform the Supreme Council
that such list has been sent to the German Delegation today with the
annexed covering note.
The Drafting Committee takes the opportunity to inform the Supreme
Council that before printing off the signature copy, a final
revision of the text has been made so as to eliminate so far as
possible the risk of divergence. This revision has entailed three
complete readings of the Treaty with a minute comparison of the
French and English texts.
Henri Fromageot
June 24, 1919.
[Enclosure]
Copy of the Note to the German
Delegation
The preparation of the printed copy of the Treaty of Peace and of the
documents intended to be signed by the plenipotentiaries has [Page 687] brought to light various
mistakes and errors in the printing: lists of these are attached
thereto and the corrections have been made accordingly.
Appendix VIII to CF–92
Note by Mr. Balfour
The question referred to the Foreign Ministers by the “Four”, on the
subject of Eastern Galicia, differs in some very important respects
from other problems connected with the frontier arrangements in
Eastern Europe.
We have got, if possible, to find a plan which will:—
- 1.
- Satisfy the immediate Military necessity of resisting the
Bolshevist invasion of Galicia; and
- 2.
- Avoid compromising the future interests of the Ruthenian
majority who now inhabit Eastern Galicia.
These two objects seem at first sight inconsistent, for the only
troops which we have at our disposal for resisting the Bolshevists
in this region are the Poles; and if the Poles are given complete
Military freedom—as from a military point of view they certainly
ought to be—their occupation of the country may compromise the
political future of this district. The Ruthenian majority is
backward, illiterate, and at present quite incapable of standing
alone. The urban and educated classes are largely Polish, and when
not Polish are Jewish. The whole country is utterly disorganised.
There is, or was, (for some slight improvement seems to have taken
place), a most embittered feeling between the Poles and the
Ruthenians, and it is manifestly impossible at the moment to
determine the character of public opinion by a plebiscite, or other
similar methods. If the Polish Military occupation be pertinent [permanent], it is hard to see how this state
of things will find a remedy.
The best suggestion I can make is the following:—Appoint as soon as
may be a High Commissioner for Eastern Galicia under the League of
Nations, as proposed in plan II. a. of the
Report of the Polish Commission. He must be instructed, while the
Bolshevist peril lasts, to work in harmony with the Poles, and to
facilitate the use of Polish troops as Military necessity may
require.
The Poles, on the other hand, must be informed that their Military
occupation of Eastern Galicia is a temporary one, and can only be
allowed to last as long as the needs of common defence against the
invading Bolshevism renders this proceeding necessary, and that of
this the High Commissioner must be the judge. The Ruthenians must be
told that, though the Poles are temporarily in occupation of their
[Page 688] country, they are
acting under the directions of the League of Nations, and that the
Ruthenians will be given a full opportunity of determining by
plebiscite, within limits to be fixed by the League of Nations, what
their future status is to be.
This opportunity will be given them as soon as tranquillity is
restored, and there is some chance of a fair vote being taken.
I do not know whether the Poles would accept this plan, though I
think they might be induced to do so. Its advantages are that:—
- 1.
- It provides for the defence of Galicia against the
Bolshevists, which seems all important, both in the
interests of the Ruthenians themselves, and of the security
of Eastern Europe.
- 2.
- It combines with this [a] policy of self-determination, to
be exercised as soon as circumstances permit.
No other plan that I have been able to think of combines those two
advantages, both of which seem essential to any satisfactory policy
for dealing with this embarrassing problem.
A. J. B[alfour]
Paris
, June
18, 1919.
Appendix IX to CF–92
WCP–1044
(Revised) 23.6.19.
(2nd Revise 24.6.19)
Answer to the Turkzsh
Delegates
(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers on 23rd June, 1919.)
The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have read
with the most careful attention the Memorandum presented to them by
Your Excellency on June 17th,13 and, in
accordance with the promise then made, desire now to offer the
following observations upon it.
In your recital of the political intrigues which accompanied Turkey’s
entry into the war, and of the tragedies which followed it, Your
Excellency makes no attempt to excuse or qualify the crimes of which
the Turkish Government was then guilty. It is admitted directly, or
by implication, that Turkey had no cause of quarrel with the Entente
Powers; that she acted as the subservient tool of Germany; that the
war, begun without excuse and conducted without mercy was
accompanied by massacres whose calculated atrocity equals or exceeds
anything in recorded history. But it is argued that these crimes
were committed by a Turkish Government for whose misdeeds the
Turkish people were not responsible; that there was in them no
element of religious fanaticism; that Moslems suffered from them not
less than [Page 689] Christians; that
they were entirely out of harmony with the Turkish tradition, as
historically exhibited in the treatment by Turkey of subject races;
that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is necessary for the
religious equilibrium of the world; so that policy, not less than
justice, requires that its territories should be restored
undiminished, as they existed when war broke out.
The Council can neither accept this conclusion, nor the arguments by
which it is supported. They do not indeed doubt that the present
Government of Turkey profoundly disapproves of the policy pursued by
its predecessors. Even if considerations of morality did not weigh
with it, (as doubtless they do), considerations of expediency would
be conclusive. As individuals its members have every motive as well
as every right, to repudiate the actions which have proved so
disastrous to their country. But, speaking generally, a nation must
be judged by the Government which rules it, which directs its
foreign policy, which controls its armies; nor can Turkey claim any
relief from the legitimate consequences of this doctrine merely
because her affairs, at a most critical moment in her history, had
fallen into the hands of men who, utterly devoid of principle or
pity, could not even command success.
It seems, however, that the claim for complete territorial
restoration put forward in the Memorandum is not based merely on the
plea that Turkey should not be required to suffer for the sins of
her Ministers. It has a deeper ground. It appeals to the history of
Turkish rule in the past, and to the condition of affairs in the
Moslem world.
Now the Council is anxious not to enter into unnecessary controversy,
or to inflict needless pain on Your Excellency and the Delegates who
accompany you. It wishes well to the Turkish people, and admires
their excellent qualities. But it cannot admit that among these
qualities are to be counted capacity to rule over alien races. The
experiment has been tried too long and too often for there to be the
least doubt as to its result. History tells us of many Turkish
successes and many Turkish defeats:—of nations conquered and nations
freed. The Memorandum itself refers to the reductions that have
taken place in the territories recently under Ottoman sovereignty.
Yet in all these changes there is no case to be found, either in
Europe or Asia or Africa, in which the establishment of Turkish rule
in any country has not been followed by a diminution of material
prosperity and a fall in the level of culture; nor is there any case
to be found in which the withdrawal of Turkish rule has not been
followed by a growth in material prosperity and a rise in the level
of culture. Neither among the Christians of Europe, nor among the
Moslems of Syria, Arabia and Africa, has the Turk done other than
destroy wherever he has conquered; never has he shown himself able
to develop in peace what he has won by war. Not in this direction do
his talents lie.
[Page 690]
The obvious conclusion from these facts would seem to be that, since
Turkey has, without the least excuse or provocation, deliberately
attacked the Entente Powers and been defeated, she has thrown upon
the victors the heavy duty of determining the destiny of the various
populations in her heterogenous Empire. This duty the Council of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to carry out, as far
as may be in accordance with the wishes and permanent interests of
the populations themselves. But the Council observe with regret that
the Memorandum introduces in this connection a wholly different
order of considerations based on supposed religious rivalries. The
Turkish Empire, is, it seems, to be preserved unchanged, not so much
because this would be to the advantage either of the Moslems or of
the Christians within its borders, but because its maintenance is
demanded by the religious sentiment of men who never felt the
Turkish yoke, or have forgotten how heavily it weighs on those who
are compelled to bear it.
But surely there never was a sentiment less justified by facts. The
whole course of the War exposes its hollowness. What religious issue
is raised by a struggle in which Protestant Germany, Roman Catholic
Austria, Orthodox Bulgaria and Moslem Turkey, banded themselves
together to plunder their neighbours? The only flavour of deliberate
fanaticism perceptible in these transactions was the massacre of
Christian Armenians by order of the Turkish Government. But Your
Excellency has pointed out that, at the very same time and by the
very same authority, unoffending Moslems were being slaughtered in
circumstances sufficiently horrible and in numbers sufficiently
large, to mitigate, if not wholly to remove, any suspicion of
religious partiality.
During the War, then, there was little evidence of sectarian
animosity on the part of any of the Governments, and no evidence
whatever so far as the Entente Powers were concerned. Nor has
anything since occurred to modify this judgment. Every man’s
conscience has been respected; places of sacred memory have been
carefully guarded; the States and peoples who were Mohammedan before
the War are Mohammedan still. Nothing touching religion has been
altered, except the security with which it may be practised: and
this, wherever Allied control exists, has certainly been altered for
the better.
If it be replied that the diminution in the territories of a historic
Moslem State must injure the Moslem cause in all lands, we
respectfully suggest that in our opinion this is an error. To
thinking Moslems throughout the world, the modern history of the
Government enthroned at Constantinople can be no source of pleasure
or pride. For reasons we have already indicated, the Turk was there
attempting a task for which he had little aptitude, and in which he
has consequently had little success. Set him to work in happier
circumstances; let his [Page 691]
energies find their chief exercise in surroundings more congenial to
his genius, under new conditions less complicated and difficult,
with an evil tradition of corruption and intrigue severed, perhaps
forgotten, why should he not add lustre to his country, and thus
indirectly to his religion, by other qualities than that courage and
discipline which he has always so conspicuously displayed?
Unless we are mistaken, Your Excellency should understand our hopes.
In an impressive passage of Your Memorandum, you declare it to be
your country’s mission to devote itself to “an intensive economic
and intellectual culture.” No change could be more startling or
impressive; none could be more beneficial. If Your Excellency is
able to initiate this great process of development in men of Turkish
race, You will deserve, and will certainly receive, all the
assistance we are able to give You.
Appendix X to CF–92
WCP–1066
Ottoman
Delegation to the Peace Conference,
June 23,
1919.
memorandum concerning the new
organisation of the ottoman empire
[Note From the Turkish Delegation to
the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]
Translation
Sirs: I have the honour to transmit to Your
Excellency herewith a memorandum concerning the new organisation of
the Ottoman Empire. This is the memorandum the despatch of which I
announced at the meeting of the Supreme Council of Peace on the 17th
June.14
The preparation of a document of this importance having necessitated
lengthy labour, I beg Your Excellency to excuse me for the delay in
forwarding it to you.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure—Memorandum]
The Ottoman Delegation, in accordance with the desire expressed by
Their Excellencies, the Allied Plenipotentiaries, at the interview
which it had the honour to have with them on the 17th June, begs
leave to set forth as follows the views of the Imperial Ottoman
Government as regards the new organisation of the Empire:
Although the Political and Economic situation of Turkey and her
time-honoured relations of friendship with the Western Powers, made
it incumbent on her to observe towards them an attitude of [Page 692] friendly neutrality, she
was, owing to unfortunate circumstances and in spite of the manifest
opposition of the national will, dragged into a fatal war.
It would be idle to dwell at length on the misdeeds committed during
these last four years, which brought sufferings upon the Mussulman
population quite as much as upon the Christians.
Turkey has a glorious history and a glorious past. She has given
proof of power not only on the field of battle but also in
manifestations of an intellectual order, and the mere organisation
of an Empire which was one of the most vast in the world, proves,
above all, a very pronounced political sense. The Ottoman Empire was
never, in spite of affirmations of certain peoples interested in her
downfall, a curse or a cyclone, such as were the Empires of Genghis
and of Tamerlan. Its political organisation was at one moment able
to assure a peaceful existence for some hundred millions of subjects
established on different continents and of distinct races and
religions. The Patriarchates, Communities and Sects had, in matters
of faith, broad religious autonomy thanks to a wise and tolerant
administration.
On the day that the Turks recognised the advantages of European
civilisation, they did not hesitate to adopt a series of reforms;
they were helped with much interest in this assimilation of modern
civilization, which worked so well, that in less than a quarter of a
century Turkey was received into the European concert. The Turks,
who still remember the brilliant position which they thereby
attained, only desire to begin again their forward march towards
improvement with the help of the Great Powers of the West.
Having set forth what occurred in the past, the Ottoman Delegation
comes to questions affecting the present and declares, in the first
instance, that although the question which concerns Turkey presents
three different points, it is in regard to its solution
indivisible.
These points are the following:—
- (a)
- Thrace in Europe.
- (b)
- The Turkish parts of Asia.
- (c)
- Arabia.
The Ottoman Delegation has therefore the honour to submit to the
Peace Conference the following considerations:
1.
Thrace.
In order to ensure a durable peace in this part of Europe, it is
desirable to lay down a frontier line which will prevent the town of
Adrianople, on which depends the security of the capital, from being
easily attacked. The districts situated to the north and west of the
vilayet of Adrianople, including Western Thrace, where the Turks are
in great majority, should, by virtue of President Wilson’s
principles, as well as for economic reasons, come within the limits
of that [Page 693] vilayet. This
problem was examined at length in 1878 at Berlin by the Delegates of
Great Britain and Russia, who found no other solution than that of
adopting a frontier line beginning at Zeitun-Burun, on the Black
Sea, running into the interior by way of Demir-Halny to
Mustafa-Pasha, and from there to Kara-Balkan. From Keucheva the
frontier should follow the river Kara-Su, which flows into the
Aegean Sea to the east of Kavalla, exactly opposite the island of
Thasos.
2.
Asia Minor.
In Asia the Turkish lands are bounded on the north by the Black Sea,
on the East by the Turco-Russian and Turco-Persian frontiers as they
were before the war, including on the south the vilayets of Mosul
and Diarbekir, as well as a part of the province of Aleppo as far as
the Mediterranean.
3.
The islands near the coast, which belong to
Asia Minor from an historical and economic point of view, should
remain under Ottoman sovereignty with a great measure of autonomy,
in order that it may be possible to prevent smuggling and ensure the
safety of the coast.
4.
Armenia. If the Armenian republic established
at Erivan is recognised by the Powers of the Entente, the Ottoman
Delegation will consent to discuss ad
referendum the frontier line which is to separate the new
republic from the Ottoman State. The Imperial Government would grant
to the Armenians who wish to expatriate themselves in order to
establish themselves in the new republic, all facilities in its
power. As regards these who might wish to remain in Turkey and who
are scattered in Thrace, the Caucasus and elsewhere, they would
enjoy, like the other minorities, free cultural, moral and economic
development.
5.
Arabia.
The Arab provinces lying to the south of the Turkish countries, and
including Syria, Palestine, the Hedjaz, the Asyr, the Yemen, Irak,
and all the other regions which were recognised as forming an
integral part of the Ottoman Empire before the war, would have a
large measure of administrative autonomy, under the sovereignty of
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. Representatives of His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan would be appointed at the Holy Places (Mecca,
Medina and Jerusalem), and will have a guard of honour of limited
numbers.
The hallowed custom of sending every year the sacred caravan (surre) to the Holy Places shall be maintained
with its usual ceremonies and in its usual form, as the despatch of
this caravan is one of the ancient prerogatives of the
Khalifate.
The distribution of the revenues of the pious foundations (vakfs) shall continue without hindrance as in
the past. These vakfs were founded partly by
the Ottoman Sultan and partly by private individuals, [Page 694] and have always been
administered by the Khalifate. This system shall be maintained in
its entirety.
The Governor of each autonomous province shall be appointed by His
Imperial Majesty the Sultan, except in the Hedjaz, to which may be
granted a special organisation in agreement with the Power most
directly interested in it. In all the Arab countries the Ottoman
flag shall fly on the territory of the emaret
(principality) or autonomous province. Justice shall be done in the
name of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, and the coinage shall bear
his name Tughra.
6.
Egypt and Cyprus.
The Ottoman Government is quite willing to enter into negotiations at
the proper moment with the Government of His Britannic Majesty with
a view to define clearly the political status of Egypt and of the
island of Cyprus.
The Ottoman Government, having stated above its opinion as regards
the new organisation of the Empire, reserves the right also of
communicating subsequently to the Peace Conference its point of view
regarding financial, economic and juridical questions.
It is understood that as soon as this organisation is settled, the
Inter-Allied forces of occupation shall be withdrawn from Ottoman
territory in a short time which shall be settled by agreement unless
their provisional retention is necessary in some parts of
Arabia.
Nobody in Turkey is unaware of the gravity of the moment. The ideas
of the Ottoman people are however well defined:—
It will not accept the dismemberment of the Empire or its division
under different mandates. No government may oppose the will of the
people, among whom are counted populations from beyond the Taurus
and even Nomads of the Desert, who will not separate themselves from
that Ottoman unity which has been established and hallowed for so
many centuries.
From the manifestations of a great number of patriotic Committees
formed in the provinces, and from the great meetings held at
Constantinople (in which hundreds of thousands of citizens took part
on every occasion) and from the language of the telegrams which the
Government daily receives from all classes of the population, there
emanates but one constant thought: unity and independence.
Trusting in the sentiments of justice of the Peace Conference the
Ottoman people does not despair of reaching a solution in conformity
with its legitimate aspirations and one fitted to ensure in the East
that durable peace which is so greatly needed.
[Page 695]
Appendix XI to CF–92
WCP–1069
Letter From the Allied and Associated
Powers to the German Delegation
Monsieur le President: The terms of the
Armistice signed by Germany on the 11th November, 1918, provided as
follows:—
“Article XXIII. The German surface warships which shall be
specified by the Allies and the United States shall
forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral
ports, or, failing them, in the Allied ports designated by
the Allies and the United States. They shall there remain
under the supervision of the Allies and the United States,
only care and maintenance parties being left on board.”
On June 21, the German warships which had been handed over to the
Allied and Associated Powers and were at anchor in the roadstead at
Scapa Flow, with the German care and maintenance parties on board as
provided in the Armistice, were sunk by these parties under the
orders of the German Admiral in command.
According to the information which has been collected and transmitted
by the British Admiralty the German admiral in command of these
parties of the German naval forces has alleged that he acted in the
belief that the Armistice expired on June 21st at mid-day, and
consequently in his opinion the destruction in question was no
violation of its terms.
In law, Germany by signing the terms of Article 23 set out above
entered into an undertaking that the ships handed over by her should
remain in the ports indicated by the Allied and Associated Powers
and that care and maintenance parties should be left on board with
such instructions and under such orders as would ensure that the
Armistice should be observed.
The sinking of these ships instead of their preservation as had been
provided for, and in breach of the undertaking embodied in Article
31 of the Armistice against all acts of destruction, constituted at
once a violation of the Armistice, the destruction of the pledge
handed over, and an act of gross bad faith towards the Allied and
Associated Powers.
The Admiral in command of the care and maintenance parties belonging
to the German Naval forces has, while recognising that the act was a
breach of the Armistice, attempted to justify it by alleging his
belief that the Armistice had come to an end.
This alleged justification is not well founded as, under the
communication addressed to the German Delegation by the Allied and
Associated Powers on the 16th June, 1919,16 the Armistice would
[Page 696] only terminate on
refusal to sign the peace, or, if no answer were returned, on the
23rd June at 7 o’clock.
According to International Law, as embodied particularly in Articles
40 and 41 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention
of 1907, every serious violation of the Armistice by one of the
parties gives the other party the right to denounce it and even in
case of urgency to recommence hostilities at once. A violation of
the terms of the Armistice by individuals acting on their own
initiative only confers the right of demanding the punishment of the
offenders and, if necessary, indemnity for the losses sustained. It
will therefore be open to the Allied and Associated Powers to bring
before military tribunals the persons responsible for these acts of
destruction so that the appropriate penalties may be imposed.
Furthermore, the incident gives the Allied and Associated Powers a
right to reparation for the loss caused and in consequence a right
to proceed to such further measures as the said Powers may deem
appropriate.
Lastly, the sinking of the German fleet is not only a violation of
the Armistice, but can only be regarded by the Allied and Associated
Powers as a deliberate breach in advance of the conditions of peace
communicated to Germany and now accepted by her. Furthermore, the
incident is not an isolated act. The burning or permission for the
burning of the French flags which Germany was to restore,
constitutes another deliberate breach in advance of these same
conditions.
In consequence, the Allied and Associated Powers declare that they
take note of these signal acts of bad faith, and that when the
investigations have been completed into all the circumstances, they
will exact the necessary reparation. It is evident that any
repetition of acts like these must have a very unfortunate effect
upon the future operation of the Treaty which the Germans are about
to sign. They have made complaint of the 15 years’ period of
occupation which the Treaty contemplates. They have made complaint
that admission to the League of Nations may be too long deferred.
How can Germany put forward such claims if she encourages or permits
deliberate violations of her written engagements? She cannot
complain should the Allies use to the full the powers conferred on
them by Treaty, particularly by Article 429, if she on her side
deliberately violates its provisions.
