Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/22
HD–22
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great
Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday,
August 2, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.
Paris, August 2, 1919, 3:30 p.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Secretary
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Sir Ian Malcolm.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de St. Quentin
- Italy
- Secretary
- Japan
- Secretary
Joint Secretariat |
America, United States of |
Capt. Chapin. |
British Empire |
Capt. E. Abraham. |
France |
Capt. A. Portier. |
Italy |
Lt.-Col. A. Jones. |
Interpreter—Prof. P. J.
Mantoux. |
1. M. Clemenceau informed the Council that he
had received a wireless message from Lt-Col. Romanelli, commanding the
Italian Military Mission at Budapest. This message was addressed to M.
Clemenceau. Situation in Hungary
M. Mantoux then read the dispatch contained in
Appendix “A”.
M. Tittoni said that he thought there was some
misunderstanding as to the acceptance of proposals by the Allied Powers.
He did not think the Allied Powers had made any proposals, as was
suggested in the message. He thought that what was alluded to was the
plan explained by General Boehm1 to the Allied Representative in Vienna. He
had himself received a telegram from Vienna, which did not quite agree
with the message read out. According to his information, General Boehm
and M. Peidl2 had told the Prince
Borghese3 and
[Page 481]
Colonel Cunninghame4 that if the Roumanians were stopped, they
would be able to form a Government more completely representative of
public opinion.
M. Clemenceau asked whether it was General
Boehm who had caused the Revolution.
M. Tittoni said that the proposals had been
made by General Boehm as representative of the Socialists and of the
Labour Party. It was necessary that the Allies should take precautions
not to be deceived a second time.
M. Clemenceau observed that there was no motive
for negotiating a second armistice. There was already one.
Mr. Balfour said that he was in agreement. He
thought the proposals referred to were those contained in the message
discussed on the 26th of July. (See H. D. 14, Appendix “A”.5) He had no objection to these proposals,
but what he did object to was that the responsibility for them should be
laid upon the Allies. The Council was concerned with the armistice and
its observance. It was not concerned with the internal Government of
Hungary. No proposals had been made by the Council. That was the first
point that should be made clear.
M. Clemenceau said that the second point to
make clear was that there was already an armistice, and no need of a new
one.
Mr. Balfour said that it was clear that
hostilities must stop, but no new contract was required for this. The
Roumanians could be told to stop by the Council, and they must obey. The
Hungarians must also be told that they were not authorised by the
armistice to advance.
M: Clemenceau said that on this subject he
wished to ask Marshal Foch a question. Was it not true that the present
line of the Roumanians was quite different to the line they held under
the armistice?
Marshal Foch said that the line was in fact
quite different. It was at the present time the line of the Theiss.
Mr. Balfour said that the Council about the
13th of June (See C. F. 65, Minute 12 and Appendices6), had ordered
the Roumanians to go back from the line of the Theiss within their own
frontiers. They had not done so. Their excuse had been that as the
Hungarians had not disarmed as they were bound to do under the
armistice, it was impossible for them to risk giving up a defendable
line for one which was strategically far worse. Under the present
circumstances, he thought that the Roumanians should be ordered to
withdraw to the line originally laid down for them.
M. Tittoni thought that an order of this kind
should be deferred.
[Page 482]
He thought
for the time being that the Roumanians should be ordered to stop on the
positions they now held. If the Hungarians gave evidence of good
behaviour, the Roumanians could then be told to withdraw within their
own frontiers. If, on the other hand, the Hungarians were again
deceiving the Allies, any withdrawal of the Roumanians would be
regretted. Should the Hungarians do all that was required of them, it
would be easy to order the Roumanians to withdraw, and they would
certainly comply.
M. Pichon said that there was another reason in
favour of this. When the Roumanians had been assigned the armistice
line, they had made it clear that it was indefensible. Nevertheless,
they had conformed to it. Then they had been attacked, and, in order to
repel attack, they had advanced to the Theiss. It would clearly be
unfair to them to order them now to abandon that line. It was the
Hungarians who had really violated the essential clauses of the
armistice by maintaining a larger army than was allowed to them. The
first necessity, therefore, was to force the Hungarians to reduce their
forces.
Mr. Balfour said that he thought there was no
great difference between his views and those of M. Tittoni and M.
Pichon. Historically, however, he thought that M. Pichon was not quite
accurate. He did not think that the Roumanian advance to the Theiss had
been made as a consequence of attack by the Hungarians. The Roumanians
had gone to the Theiss, and the Council had stopped them there. The
Council had then ordered them to go back, and they did not do so. They
had given no official reason for this, but, privately, M. Bratiano had
explained that he must keep a defendable line against the large
Hungarian army.
M. Clemenceau said that this explanation had
also been given officially.
Mr. Balfour said that he had not been aware of
this. In any case, the Hungarians had attacked the Roumanians on the
plea that the latter had not observed the armistice. The Hungarians had
been defeated, and Bela Kun’s Government had fallen. He quite agreed
that the Council should avoid making the same mistake as before, but,
personally, he would not make it a condition that they should have a
humane and orderly Government or any specific kind of Government
whatever. This was an interference in their domestic affairs. He would
adhere strictly to the armistice, and call on the Hungarians to observe
it. It might further be added that if the Government set up in Hungary
were such as could be recognised, the Allies would make peace with it
speedily.
M. Tittoni said that he thought there was
really agreement. He
[Page 483]
pointed
out that General Boehm at Vienna had not asked for a withdrawal of the
Roumanian troops, but for their advance to stop.
M. Clemenceau said that the Council had no
cognisance of General Boehm.
Mr. Polk asked whether the Council had not made
a declaration in any manner tying its hands.
M. Clemenceau said that all that had been done
was to make a general declaration to the world (H. D. 15, para. 27)
Mr. Polk asked whether the Council was not tied
in any other way?
M. Clemenceau said it was not. It appeared to
him that the Council was agreed that the understanding alleged in the
message, between General Boehm and Prince Borghese was not binding on
the Council, and that it was unnecessary to negotiate any new armistice
as the old one was still in existence.
M. Tittoni said that though there was no
agreement between General Boehm and Prince Borghese, nevertheless, the
Allied Agents in Vienna had been instructed to conduct conversations
with General Boehm, the result of which had been certain proposals
agreed to by General Boehm.
It was then decided to send a telegram (see Appendix “B”) in reply to the
wireless message received from Lt. Col. Romanelli at Budapesth, dated
August 1st.
2. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a
question from the Danish Government regarding the cost of the troops of
occupation during the plebiscite period in Slesvig. The Danish
Government wished to know whether expenses under the head of “Plebiscite
Expenses” were to include the maintenance of these troops. Danish Request Regarding Expenses of Plebiscite in
Slesvig
It was decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of
August 2nd, that the Inter-Allied Military and Naval expenses of
occupation during the period of the Plebiscite, should be included in
the general expenses of the Plebiscite.
3. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a
request from the Danish Government for the immediate despatch of
warships to Flensburg, so that in case of need, order should be
maintained by their help in the plebiscite zones of Slesvig. It was
decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of
August 2nd, that in the opinion of the Council, the British warship now
present in Danish waters, together with a French warship at present on
its way there, should suffice to maintain order. The British Admiral
Commanding the Naval forces would
[Page 484]
be able to estimate the situation at Flensburg,
and to take necessary measures. Danish Request for
Warships at Flensburg
4. It was decided to refer to the Commission on Political Clauses the
Articles proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty of
Peace with Bulgaria (see Appendix “C”). Reference to
a Commission of Articles Proposed by the Greek Delegation for
Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria
5. (Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives at Versailles entered
the room.)Strength of the Bulgarian Army
Marshal Foch read a statement regarding the
Bulgarian Forces (see Appendix “D”).
Mr. Balfour said that his comment on the
conclusion of the statement read by Marshal Foch, was that it would
appear that the Allies must make a Peace agreeable to Bulgaria because
they were unable to enforce a disagreeable one. He was not very willing
to acquiesce in such a conclusion unless it were inevitable.
Marshal Foch said that Bulgaria had nine
Divisions. These Divisions were easily convertible to war strength.
Against them were very weak Allied Forces. The British force consisted
of 40 men—the Italian of one Battalion—the French of two Divisions,
which would be reduced by demobilisation to 15,000 men. There were also
two thin Roumanian Divisions—one Serbian Brigade & six Greek
Divisions. The last represented the bulk of the available forces.
M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch what he
thought of the military value of the Greek Divisions.
Marshal Foch said that he was not prepared to
express any opinion.
M. Pichon observed that General Guillaumat9
had thought well of them.
Marshal Foch said that the troops that General
Guillaumat had thought well of, were National Defence troops. Since the
check received at Smyrna by the Greek Army, it was not unlikely that the
morale of the Greek troops had suffered.
Mr. Balfour said he would like to enquire
whether the Military stores, which, according to a clause of the
Armistice, had been deposited under Allied guard within Bulgarian
territory, could be seized by the Bulgarian Army should it wish to
resist the orders of the Conference?
Marshal Foch replied that the Bulgarian Army
could probably seize them.
Mr. Balfour said it was regrettable that such a
provision had been made in the Armistice.
Marshal Foch remarked that when the Armistice
was made, better terms could not be obtained.
[Page 485]
M. Clemenceau asked whether a portion of the
military material had not been withdrawn outside Bulgarian
territory.
General Weygand said that the firing mechanism
of one-twentieth of the rifles—one-tenth of the machine guns, and
one-sixth of the guns, had been removed to Salonika. The remainder was
still on Bulgarian soil under Allied guard.
Mr. Balfour asked whether the Allied guard
would be sufficient to protect these stores against the Bulgarian
Army?
General Weygand replied that he thought not,
but he suggested that General Baird,10 who had just come from Bulgaria, should be asked to
make a statement on the present condition of affairs there.
Marshal Foch said he thought it would be well
to hear General Baird. He thought the Bulgarian Government was not
inclined to resist the Conference, but it was possible that the
population might rise and gain possession of these stores.
M. Clemenceau said that he was not very much
alarmed by the Bulgarian situation. He agreed with Marshal Foch that the
Government was unlikely to resist. As to popular risings, he thought
they would not be very serious. Popular forces did not count much
against regular troops. There were in all 15,000 French troops and 6
Greek Divisions, which should, and must, act. Greece was particularly
interested, and her troops would doubtless behave well when acting in a
national cause. Moreover, some of the Greek troops in Asia Minor could,
if necessary, be recalled. If, however, it were required, Great Britain
and Italy would doubtless come to the rescue. Moreover, he did not think
that Bulgaria by herself would defy the whole victorious Alliance.
Germany had been defeated, and the only quarter to which Bulgaria could
look was the Entente. Germany had not dared to defy the Conference, and
it was most unlikely that Bulgaria would. He quite agreed, however, that
it would be useful to hear General Baird, and, if then thought
necessary, to make a communication to the Bulgarian Delegation at
Neuilly.
Mr. Balfour said that he was inclined to agree
with M. Clemenceau’s estimate of the situation. Unfortunately, Bulgaria
was not the only quarter in which the Allies were weak. The American
Congress, the British House of Commons and the French Chamber were all
anxious to demobilise.
M. Clemenceau said that modern war differed
from wars in the past, and the weakness indicated by Mr. Balfour, which
came about at the cessation of hostilities, applied to the enemy as well
as to ourselves. He himself had apprehended resistance by the Germans to
the terms relating to Poland. Germany, however, had acquiesced. He felt
sure that Bulgaria would do likewise.
[Page 486]
(It was decided to request General Baird, through the British delegation,
to be present at a meeting of the Council on August 4th, and to make a
statement on the present situation in Bulgaria.)
6. General Weygand read a letter from General
Nollet11 and a covering
letter from Marshal Foch on the subject of allowances for Allied
Officers on the Missions of Control in Berlin (see Appendix “E”). Scale of Pay for Officer Attached of Control in
Germany
It was decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles for
study and report, the question of allowances for Allied Officers on the
Missions of Control in Germany.
7. General Belin read the report of the
Military Representatives at Versailles (see Appendix “F”).
M. Tittoni said that it was important that the
prisoners should be repatriated in small groups. One of the reasons for
obstacles raised by Poland, Lithuania and other neighbouring States, was
the fear that large batches of Russian prisoners should escape and take
to looting. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War
Interned in Germany
General Belin said that this was a point of
detail which the Commission might deal with.
Mr. Polk asked whether General Belin could make
any estimate of the time that the whole operation would take.
General Belin said that General Malcolm12 thought it should be completed
before the end of the year.
Mr. Polk said that from the American point of
view there was a difficulty. There were about 800 American Officers and
men on duty with the American Mission in Germany. Owing to the American
demobilisation, no money would be available for the upkeep of this
Mission, nor for the supplies of food for the Russian Prisoners of War
for the length of time indicated by General Belin. He pointed out that
there were originally two million Russian prisoners in Germany, but that
this total had now been reduced to 200,000. He suggested that it would
be as well to charge the German Government with the care of the
remainder.
General Bliss said that the substance of what
he meant to say had already been explained by Mr. Polk. He would recall
that it was a report by Mr. Hoover13 to the effect
that the funds available for the upkeep of these Russian Prisoners, had
been exhausted which had led to the examination of the subject at
Versailles. He and Mr. White had recommended in Washington that the
Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should be made responsible for the
care of these prisoners,
[Page 487]
but
this view had not prevailed. It was now necessary to withdraw all
American conscripted men from Europe. In support of this he read the
following letter:—
general
headquarters
american expeditionary forces
office of
the chief of staff
August 2, 1919.
Dear General Buss:
The Commander-in-Chief desires me to request you to use your best
efforts with your colleagues to hasten the permission for him to
withdraw our officers and troops in Berlin. At the time of the
signing of the Peace orders had already been given for the
withdrawal of the entire mission numbering approximately 700
persons. At the request of Marshal Foch on the 30th of June,
General Pershing agreed to suspend the orders for a few days. On
taking the matter up again on his return from London on the 24th
of July, Marshal Foch informed him that the matter of the
withdrawal of our representation there had been taken out of his
hands and was vested in the Commission to Negotiate Peace. With
the Conference between you and me, on the subject since that
time, you are familiar.
Without assuming to discuss the desirability of the United States
maintaining troops in Berlin after Germany has ratified the
Peace, in connection with the repatriation of Russian prisoners
of war, we have imperative orders from the War Department to get
all temporary personnel home by a certain time. It is necessary
from that standpoint that the most expeditious action be had and
a decision reached at the earliest date possible which will
enable General Pershing to withdraw all officers and men now on
that mission.
May I ask that you will help us in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
J. G. Harbord
Chief of Staff
General Tasker H.
Bliss,
American Commission to
Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon—Paris.
He suggested that the only solution was for the Allies
to relieve the Americans of their share in this work, or for Germany to
take over the whole thing.
Mr. Balfour said that he did not think the
scheme elaborated at Versailles very practical. What was proposed was a
Commission. A Commission alone could do nothing. The American share
alone at present required the services of 700 men. The British Red Cross
had, he believed, a considerable personnel, and undertook a considerable
share of the work. Their funds were exhausted, and their personnel was
being recalled. It was clear that this system could not be continued. A
Commission without an Army behind it, could not act as substitute. The
Americans could not provide men. Without consulting Experts, he was
prepared to say that the British could not supply any. He doubted
whether France or Italy could find them. The system would, therefore,
break down. There was another objection.
[Page 488]
If the old arrangement were patched up, it would
appear that the Allies still regarded themselves as responsible. If they
undertook the responsibility and failed to carry out their undertakings,
they would be discredited. He thought the responsibility should be
repudiated. After Peace, it was quite unnecessary for the Allies to
continue supporting Russian prisoners taken by the Germans. He noticed
that it was suggested that 145,000 Russians should be repatriated by
rail. It would be extremely difficult to prevail upon the Poles and
Lithuanians to forward them over land. Meanwhile, he wished to ask who
should feed them. Another 70,000 or 80,000 were to go by sea. He had the
greatest doubt whether shipping could be found for them except at the
expense of more vital services. He therefore recommended that the
responsibility be thrown on the Germans. It was a responsibility they
should have always borne. If the Germans then applied to the Allies for
assistance, it would be time to consider what could be done. This policy
was clear and freed the Allies from a task which they could not
undertake without incurring discredit.
Mr. Polk then suggested the following
resolution:—
That the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers notify the
Government at once that all restrictions heretofore placed on
the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, are
removed, and that henceforth the responsibility of supporting
them must rest with the German Government.
(This proposal was accepted.)
8. M. Clemenceau said that the question was
whether or not the Baltic Commission should concern itself with the
question of access to the Baltic. Proposed Treaty
Regarding Access to the Baltic
Mr. Balfour said that access to the Baltic from
the North Sea at present depended not on any Treaty, but on immemorial
custom. It was now suggested that this custom should be regularised by
formal Inter-Allied sanction. This would establish a common régime for
all the channels. In the Sound and the Great Belt, traffic, he believed,
had never been stopped by the neutrals on their shores. They interfered
neither with trading vessels nor with warships. In the Little Belt,
however, the Germans had stopped traffic, and had laid mines. They could
do so again, and this was not contrary either to the law of nations or
to the practice thereof. If the proposals now before the Council
(Appendix “G”) were accepted, all the channels would be made free for
traffic. Whether it was worth while to engage in difficult negotiations
to obtain this, he did not know.
M. della Torretta explained that the Commission
had not examined the merits of the question, as it did not know whether
it was empowered to examine it at all.
[Page 489]
Mr. Polk questioned whether it would not be
better to send the question to a Special Commission rather than to the
Baltic Commission. He understood that the Baltic Commission was not
composed of naval men. This appeared to be a naval question.
M. Tittoni suggested that naval experts be
attached to the Baltic Commission for the purpose of examining the
question.
(It was decided that the report of the British Delegation relative to
access to the Baltic Sea be referred to the Baltic Commission, assisted
by the naval experts, for examination and report.
The Baltic Commission should be responsible for summoning a joint
meeting.)
9. (It was decided to refer the letter of the Roumanian Delegation dated
August 2nd—Appendix “H”—proposing an amendment to the Economic Clauses
of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty to the Economic Commission, for
examination and report.)Amendment Proposed by
Roumanian Delegation for Insertion in the Economic Clauses of the
Treaty With Bulgaria
(The meeting then adjourned.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, August 2, 1919.
Appendix A to HD–22
[Despatch From the Commander of the
Italian Military Mission at Budapest (Romanelli)]
[Translation]14
Radio (no number) from Budapest, August 1, 1919.
To His Excellency Georges Clemenceau, President of
the Conference, Paris.
The Hungarian Government of the Soviet Republic (Republic of
Councils) has resigned today and been replaced by a Government which
has declared its acceptance of proposals of the Allied Powers in the
form in which they were agreed to at Vienna on July 25 by Prince
Borghese, Minister Plenipotentiary of Italy, and Colonel
Cunninghame, chief of the British Military Mission at Vienna.
The new Government has just charged the undersigned, in his position
as sole representative of the said Powers at Budapest, to deliver to
the commanders of the hostile armies a proposal for an armistice,
which, while awaiting the decisions which Your Excellency may care
to make, I have taken the liberty of transmitting directly to the
said commanders, with a view to preventing further bloodshed. The
proposals offered are as follows:
- 1.
- While awaiting the decisions of the Supreme Council of the
Allied and Associated Powers, to suspend as soon as possible
all hostilities
[Page 490]
between the Allied Armies and the Hungarian Army;
- 2.
- To stop as a consequence all forward movement of the
Allied troops;
- 3.
- To arrange an armistice with the commander of the
Hungarian Army establishing provisional lines of occupation
until the President of the Peace Conference has announced
his decisions on the subject. The Hungarian Government
demands insistently that the armistice line for the
Roumanian Army be fixed at the Tisza.
Commander of the Italian Military Mission Lieutenant
Colonel
Romanelli
Appendix B to HD–22
From President Clemenceau
To Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli at Budapest.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your wireless telegram
of August 1,16 announcing the resignation of the
Government of the Soviet Republic, and the formation of a new
Hungarian Government, and the declarations made by the latter have
been brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Council.
The Allied Council is of the opinion that it has no reason for
interfering in the domestic politics of the Hungarian Republic and
hence cannot take into consideration the proposals suggested by the
two members of the Allied Missions at Vienna.
The sole recognized bases for relations between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Hungary are: 1) the armistice of November 13,
1918,17 whose
conditions must be respected by the new Hungarian Government,
particularly concerning the demobilization of the army; 2) the
notification of the Peace Conference of June 1318 for the
establishment of a line on which the Hungarian troops must be kept
in the direction of the Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian frontiers.
The Allied Council will only ask the Rumanian Government to stop its
troops in the positions that they now occupy by reason of the
aggression on the part of the Hungarian Army, and it will not ask
the Rumanians to withdraw until the new Government at Budapest has
conformed strictly to the terms of the armistice.
The Allied and Associated Powers are waiting for the new Hungarian
Government to prove itself by its acts, and they hope that the
[Page 491]
ascendancy of a Government
which will carry out its pledges and will represent the Hungarian
nation will hasten the moment of the reestablishment of peace and
the resumption of regular economic relations.
Appendix C to HD–22
Articles To Be Inserted in the Treaty
of Peace With Bulgaria Proposed by the Greek Delegation
The articles inserted in this column are those of the
Treaty of Peace with Germany. |
|
Art. 32–33–34. |
Bulgaria recognizes the full sovereignty of Greece over
the territories situated to the south of . . . . . .
renounces in its favor all rights and title over
them. |
Art. 35. |
A commission composed of five members, three of whom shall
be appointed by the Principal Allied Powers, one by Greece,
and one by Bulgaria, shall be set up fifteen days after the
signature of the present treaty to settle on the spot the
new boundary line between Greece and Bulgaria. |
|
Decisions shall be taken by a majority vote, and shall be
binding on the interested parties. |
Art. 36. |
In the territories thus ceded to Greece, Greek nationality
shall be definitively acquired in full right and to the
exclusion of Bulgarian nationality, by Bulgarian nationals
habitually resident in these territories. Nevertheless,
Bulgarian nationals who became resident in the territories
after October 5/18, 1912, shall not acquire Greek
nationality without a permit from the Greek
Government. |
Art. 37. |
Within the two years following the coming into force of
the present treaty, Bulgarian nationals over 18 years of age
habitually resident in the territories transferred from
Bulgarian to Greek sovereignty will be entitled to opt for
Bulgarian nationality. Option by a husband will cover his
wife, and option by parents or guardians will cover children
under 18 years of age. Persons who have exercised the above
right to
[Page 492]
opt must
within the ensuing twelve months transfer their place of
residence to Bulgaria. |
|
They may carry with them their movable property of every
description. No export or import duties may be imposed upon
them in connection with the removal of such property. |
|
They will be entitled to retain their immovable property
in the territories acquired by Greece. |
Art. 38. |
Greece will enter into possession of all goods and
properties of the Bulgarian State situated in the ceded
territories without having to pay or credit the Bulgarian
state under this head. This provision covers all movable and
immovable goods of the public or private domain with all
rights of whatever nature that belonged to the Bulgarian
state or to its administrative subdivisions. |
|
Property of the Crown or private property of the present
or former King shall be considered part of the public
domain. |
Art. 67. |
The Greek Government is substituted in all the rights of
the Bulgarian state over all the railways which were
administered by it and which are actually working or under
construction. The same shall apply to the rights of the
Bulgarian state with regard to railway and tramway
concessions within the territory ceded to Greece. |
|
This substitution shall not entail any payment on the part
of the Greek state to the Bulgarian state. |
|
The frontier railway stations shall be established by a
subsequent agreement. |
Appendix D to HD–22
commander in chief of the allied
armies general headquarters, 3d section
No. 3656
Note on the Condition of the
Bulgarian Forces
I—Armistice of September 29,
191821
The Armistice Commission [convention?] of
September 29 provided
[Page 493]
for
the immediate demobilization of the Bulgarian Army with the
exception of a grouping of all arms including:
- 3 divisions of infantry of 16 battalions each,
- 4 regiments of cavalry.
Two of these divisions should be employed in the defense of the
eastern frontier of Bulgaria, the third in guarding the
railways.
The matériel belonging to the demobilized units should be grouped at
points to be designated by the Allied High Command and then
warehoused by the Bulgarian authorities under the control of the
Allies.
The convention contains no stipulation concerning the limitation to
be maintained on the peace footing. These conditions which now
appear to provide only insufficient guarantees, were justified at
the time by the advantage to the Allied Armies, proceeding with
their operations in Serbia, of delegating to the Bulgarian Army the
task of providing their cover facing Turkey and the army of
Mackensen.22
II—Execution of the Armistice
Conditions and Modifications Explained
The convention has been executed in its entirety by Bulgaria.
Following the cessation of hostilities in the Balkans, General
d’Esperey even obtained, without any difficulty, the demobilization
of the three remaining divisions. All of the Bulgarian Army was thus
demobilized.
But, considering that measures were still necessary to render the
Bulgarian Army incapable of re-mobilizing quickly and resisting the
will of the Allied Powers, General Franchet d’Esperey proposed on
May 19 to the President of the Council, the following
provisions:*
- Reduction of the Bulgarian Army to 3 infantry divisions of
12 battalions each, having only a police function.
- Immediate dissolution of all other units or depots.
- Limitation of the total effectives to 25,000 men.
- Effective Allied control of all war materials.
These proposals were transmitted to the Peace Conference, and have
not been acted upon until the present.
III—Present Situation of the
Bulgarian Army
Even while remaining within the limits of the Armistice Convention of
September 29, which is still in force, the Bulgarian Government none
the less possesses today important resources, which it would be easy
to expand rapidly, at least in part:
[Page 494]
On the first of July, its Army included 10 infantry divisions
on a peace footing, strongly established with officers and
specialists. The total of the effectives was 83,000 men.
Vast quantities of war materials (arms and munitions) were
available† and we could supervise only a very
small part of it.‡
The factories in Sofia were prepared to resume a daily
production of 70,000 cartridges and to repair the
matériel.
Finally, important stocks of powder exist at Sofia and
Choumla.
It is proper to observe, however, that the Army lacks horses,
trucks, and benzine.
Consequently the complete mobilization of large units could be
carried out only with difficulty; but it would be easy rapidly to
fill out the ranks again of the infantry regiments and even of units
of the other branches of the service.
In addition General Franchet d’Esperey ordered General Chrétien§ to require by July 15, a
certain number of guarantees including, among others:
Suppression of two divisions, one by July 15, the other by
August 1;
Disbanding of the military school at Sofia;
Stopping the filling up again to a full complement in horses
of the cavalry and artillery;
Closing the arms repair factory of the Sofia arsenal.
According to the latest report of General Franchet d’Esperey, the
Bulgarian Government would undertake to satisfy these conditions,
and from the present moment its Army would not include more than 9
divisions on a peace footing of 12 battalions, making a total
effective of about 80,000 men.
IV—Situation of the Allied
Armies
Two French divisions of the Army of the Danube are assigned for the
occupation of Bulgaria; one of them (the 30th Infantry Division) is
en route.
It should be noted, on the other hand, that the 122d French Infantry
Division is earmarked to guard the Straits.
Demobilization will have the effect within a month of reducing the
combatant effectives of these three infantry divisions to a figure
of 15,000 men.
[Page 495]
The English and Italian armies of occupation have not yet been
designated.
Up to the present, only an English detachment of 40 men and an
Italian battalion are provided for.
The Greeks have sent to Smyrna 5 divisions out of 11.
The Roumanians have the greater part of their forces at the
Bessarabian and Hungarian fronts: only two divisions are in
Walachia, in process of mobilization.
The Serbians have made important deductions from their detachments
assigned to the supervision of Bulgaria. There remains at the border
a force of one brigade.
V—Conclusion
Bulgaria can put in the line quite rapidly numerous and well armed
effectives, capable of constituting, not a tactical army, but very
strong resistant groupings, capable of resisting by force the
execution of the conditions of the treaty of peace.
In order to modify, to its advantage, this dangerous situation, the
Entente should demand the immediate dissolution of most of the
existing units, and the delivery of the arms and munitions to the
Allies.
But this demand could meet with a refusal.
However:
The Great Powers do not have, on the spot, sufficient troops
to impose by force the acceptance of such conditions; on the
other hand, they do not appear disposed to send additional
troops into Bulgaria;
The unengaged Serbian and Roumanian forces are weak or
nonexistent; those of Greece are half taken up by the
campaign in Asia Minor.
The total of these contingents, heterogeneous and divided by
interest, moreover, would not be sufficient to break the
Bulgarian mass; its intervention would only tend to arouse
national sentiment in Bulgaria and aggravate conflicts.
The Bulgarian question will then be definitively settled by the
treaty of peace.
But it is quite evident that the dangers which have just been pointed
out, could arise, for the same reasons, if the Entente harshly
imposes on Bulgaria conditions of peace which outrage her national
sentiment.
It is important to bear this consideration in mind at the moment when
the demobilization of its armies deprives the Entente of the means
of having its decisions respected.
[Page 496]
Appendix E to HD–22
commander in chief of the
allied armies general staff, 1st section general
headquarters
No. 3597
From: Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied
Armies.
To: The President of the Council, President of the
Peace Conference.
I have the honor to forward you herewith a letter from General
Nollet, relative to the indemnities to be allowed to French officers
who shall belong to the Commission of control of the military
clauses.
I am of the opinion that it is necessary to insure to the French
officers, during their stay in Berlin, a situation which, while
removing any pre-occupation of a financial nature for them and their
families, will permit them to have sufficient prestige with the
Germans.
But, it seems that all the Allied officers who are to belong to the
various Commissions of control should, from this point of view, be
placed on an equal footing.
Furthermore, it must be observed that, the payment of the indemnities
being incumbent upon the German Government, it seems that the
fixation of them should be made by the Allied Governments.
If you share this point of view, I ask you to kindly entrust the
study of this question to a Commission composed of the
representatives of the various governments concerned.
I take the liberty of calling your attention to the urgent need of a
decision, because of the difficulty in recruiting the officers who
are to belong to the Commissions of control which are to be formed,
so long as the material situation to be offered to them has not been
determined.
Annex to Appendix B to HD–22
From: General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied
Military Control Commission.
To: Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied Armies.
I have the honor to submit for your consideration a plan for the pay
and remuneration to be allotted to the Members of the Inter-Allied
Military Control Commission.
[Page 497]
The Officers and Enlisted Men of the Commission will receive in the
first place the pay and allowances which they received at their last
station. In that way no modification will be introduced in their
family situation.
Besides their pay and allowances, a monthly lump allowance, paid in
advance and to count from the day the Mission leaves Paris until its
return to Paris, will be allotted to the Officers and Enlisted
Men.
This remuneration is figured on the basis of the indemnities at the
present time allotted to the Dupont Mission, with a slight increase
as proposed by the Controller of the Army, Gaillard, at the present
time on a Mission in Berlin. Furthermore, it has seemed preferable
that the indemnity be stated in marks, based on the present rate of
0.40 centimes. In determining the rate, a full account was taken of
the fluctuations of the mark exchange, which will result from a
resumption of international commerce and importations by
Germany.
Finally, the indemnity was liberally figured in order to assure the
prestige of the members of the French Mission in their contact with
the German population and their foreign colleagues, and also to
permit the selection of an indispensable elite. The living
conditions of the Mission in Berlin, in a hostile center, cannot be
compared to those of the Missions in Prague and Warsaw and should,
consequently, be ameliorated by a satisfactory material
situation.
As a result, the indemnities, imposed according to the conditions of
the Peace Treaty, to be paid from the German budget, should be
established as follows:
A—Officers:
Brigadier Generals |
12,000 |
marks |
Colonels and Lieut. Colonels |
9,000 |
“ |
Majors |
7,000 |
“ |
Subaltern Officers |
6,000 |
“ |
The Heads of Service to receive, besides, as a function
indemnity:
General Officers (Not Heads of Mission) |
2,500 |
marks |
Colonels (Chiefs of Staff) |
2,500 |
“ |
Colonels and Lieut. Colonels |
2,000 |
“ |
Majors |
1,800 |
“ |
Office expenses to be reimbursed upon the presentation of certified
bills.
Travelling expenses to be handled in the same way. Officers to
receive in advance, the amount of which would be fixed according to
itinerary, the necessary funds.
Family expenses of travel to be reimbursed, based on the expenses of
the trip both ways.
An indemnity of 2,000 francs for the purchase of clothes to be
advanced before departure.
[Page 498]
B—Enlisted Men:
Resident Interpreters |
4,000 |
marks |
Non-Commissioned Officers |
2,500 |
“ |
Enlisted Men |
2,000 |
“ |
The travelling expenses of the Enlisted Men to be looked after by the
President of the Commission, who would reimburse all certified bills
presented. A necessary sum should be advanced for these expenses
before the departure, the amount of which should be determined by
the itinerary.
C—General, President of the
Commission:
It is as yet difficult to judge the character of the functions which
will devolve upon the General, President of the Commission. It will
depend upon the nature of the relations that he will be instructed
to assume with the German military authorities.
In the present state of affairs, based upon the indemnities now
allowed to the Brigadier General, Chief of the Mission at Berlin, by
taking into account the advice of Controller Gaillard, the monthly
indemnity of the General, President of the Commission, should be
15,000 marks, plus 5,000 francs.
D—General Observations:
The billeting of the members of the Commission is to be provided for
by the German Government, and should be arranged for by it.
Campaign allowances to be accorded to the Commission during their
sojourn in Germany.
It should be understood that in case the German Government allots
indemnities greater than those cited above to the Representatives of
the Allied and Associated Governments, the excess should also be
extended to the French Officers and Enlisted Men in the
Commission.
Appendix F to HD–22
SWC–448
Report on the Means of Repatriation
of Russian Prisoners Now in Germany and Maintained at the Cost
of the Allies
By a Resolution, dated July 18, 1919,25 the
Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers directed the
Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council at Versailles:—
“To study, in conjunction with the Naval Experts the means of
repatriating the Russian Prisoners of War, maintained at the
cost of the Allies, in Germany.”
[Page 499]
1. General Situation
(i) Approximate number of prisoners of war to be
repatriated
The number of Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany amounted
at the end of April last to 250,000 men (statement of the General
presiding over the Commission charged with the repatriation of
Russian prisoners of war, 14th May, 1919). After eliminating some
50,000 prisoners who did not wish to return to their homes
(principle accepted by the Supreme Council of the Allied and
Associated Powers) and some 8,000 Letts and Esthonians already in
process of repatriation by German coasting vessels, the total number
remaining to be repatriated amounts to about 190,000–200,000.
(ii) Advantages of Repatriation
- (a)
- The reduction to a minimum of the time during which the
Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany will remain a
source of expense to the Allied and Associated Powers.
- (b)
- The dispatch, though only to a small extent, of reinforcements
to the Anti-Bolshevist armies.
- (c)
- The removal from Germany of Bolshevist propagandists, whom the
Germans would certainly not hesitate to employ in neighbouring
countries where they might wish to create trouble.
(iii) The
Disadvantages of Repatriation
- (a)
- The repatriation of Russian prisoners of war would undoubtedly
favour recruiting for the Red Armies.
- (b)
- This repatriation could not take place without a large use of
maritime transport, and in consequence would cause, for a
considerable length of time, a diminution in the tonnage at
present available for the revictualling of the Allied
countries.
2. General Conditions of
Repatriation
It seems essential to lay down, as a preliminary condition, the
necessity for some form of selection, the object of which would be
to segregate those prisoners of war that are not suspected of
Bolshevist tendencies, in order, firstly, that they should not be
exposed to harsh reprisals, and secondly, to allow of their being
drafted into the Anti-Bolshevist forces on different fronts, either
as reinforcements to existing units, or as new organizations.*
It would also be of importance to consider the transport of this
class of prisoners of war into the zones, where, if they could not
be
[Page 500]
employed in the
reconquest of their own country, they could at any rate be screened
from all such nationalist rivalries as might diminish their fighting
value, or bring about local conflicts.
Lastly, the departure of these contingents ought to be studied and
worked out in such a way as to ensure their eventual concentration
as near as possible to that portion of the front where they would be
called upon to serve.
In this connection it would seem useful to indicate the various
directions that repatriation would follow, on the basis of an
approximate number of 200,000 Russian prisoners of war still
interned in Germany:—
Great Russians |
100,000 |
|
By |
rail. |
Lithuanians |
15,400 |
|
“ |
“ |
Letts |
5,300 |
|
“ |
“ |
Esthonians |
500 |
|
By sea—Danzig to Reval. |
North Russians |
10,000 |
} |
By sea from Stettin to
Archangel |
W. Siberians |
17,000 |
Ukrainians |
40,000 |
|
By sea to Odessa. |
Georgians |
2,200 |
|
By sea—Hambourg to Batum |
Cossacks |
1,400 |
|
By sea to Novorossiisk. |
E. Siberians |
5,000 |
|
By sea to Vladivostock. |
Tartars |
2,200 |
|
By |
sea |
to |
(?) |
Armenians |
1,000 |
|
“ |
“ |
“ |
“ |
3. Conclusions
It would seem that the different operations involved in the proposed
repatriation cannot be prepared, nor carried out, except under the
direction of an organization that is in close touch with the present
situation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany, and having at its
disposal, every means of studying on the spot the physical
possibilities for concentration, embarkation, and transport, and
every facility for dealing with these questions—
- With the “Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council” so
far as tonnage is concerned.
- With the competent Authorities in so far as the use of
railways is concerned.
The Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin, charged with the care of
Russian prisoners of war, transformed into an International
Commission of Control by the addition of German Representatives and
eventually of Representatives of all the other interested countries,
will be in a position to provide most of the essential conditions
required. It should, however, first of all be accredited to the
Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council and to the Governments
interested, and be given the necessary powers to deal with every
question regarding the proposed transport with the means placed at
their disposal by the Allied and Associated Governments.
[Page 501]
In view of these considerations the military and
naval representatives are of opinion:—
- (1)
- That the Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin, charged with
the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war should be
made into an International Commission by the addition of
German Delegates; and eventually of Polish, Lithuanian and
other Delegates, as may be considered necessary.
- (2)
- That this Commission should be directed to study, prepare
and ensure, with the least possible delay, the repatriation
of the Russian prisoners of war at present maintained at the
cost of the Allies in Germany with this reservation, that
they conform their action to the guiding principles of the
Allied and Associated Governments (principles set forth
above in paragraphs 2 & 3).
- (3)
- That on its constitution, this International Commission
should be accredited by the Allied and Associated Powers to
the interested Governments, as well as to the Allied
Maritime Transport Executive Council at London.
Military Representative, French Section,
Supreme War Council. |
Major-General, Military Representative,
British Section, Supreme War Council. |
Military Representative, Italian
Section, Supreme War Council. |
Military Representative, American
Section, Supreme War Council. |
Naval Representative. |
Naval Representative. |
Naval Representative. |
Naval Representative. |
Given at Versailles on the 25th July, 1919.
Certified to be a true copy of the original document.
T. F. Powell
,
Captain.
Secretary, British
Section
Supreme War Council
Versailles, 25 July, 1919.
Appendix “G” to HD–22
[Note From the British Representative
on the Commission on Baltic Affairs (Howard) to the Secretary-General
(Dutasta)]
Your Excellency: The attention of the
Commission on Baltic Affairs has been drawn to the question of the
entrances to the Baltic which has not, so for as the Commission is
aware, hitherto been considered by the Allied arid Associated
Powers. A Memorandum on the subject, prepared by the British
Delegation as a basis of discussion, is enclosed in order to make
clear the nature of the points involved.
The Commission are uncertain whether the subject is one which
properly enters within the competence of the Commission, but as it
[Page 502]
does not appear to
have been dealt with so far by any other Commission, and is
obviously a matter of considerable importance, I am desired by the
Commission on Baltic Affairs to enquire whether, in the view of the
Council of Foreign Ministers, the Commission should take this
question into consideration in consultation with the naval experts,
and submit recommendations on the subject.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure—Memorandum]
The Entrances to the Baltic
1. (a) By a Treaty of 14th March 1857,26 Denmark undertook to abstain from levying dues on
vessels passing through the Belts and Sounds, but this extends to
mercantile vessels alone, and the treaty has little, if any, bearing
on the position of warships.
It appears that there is a traditional general right of transit
through the Belts and Sounds for men-of-war. Denmark and Sweden
recognise this as they have in practice abstained when neutral from
closing the passage of the sound to belligerent men-of-war. There
is, however, no international written instrument embodying this
right of passage.
(b) The geographical position of Germany
enables her to control the passage of the Little Belt, and to a
lesser extent the Great Belt.
Note. It is to avoid this that the
Peace Terms to Germany include the dismantling of all German
fortifications commanding the Little Belts and also those on the
east coast of Schleswig-Holstein (Art. 195, Treaty of Peace with
Germany—Naval Clauses).
(c) It is desirable that a Treaty should be
arranged whereby the countries adjoining should undertake, when
neutral, to keep open within their respective jurisdictions all the
Belts and Channels connecting the North Sea and Baltic south of lat.
58° N. and west of long. 16° E. of Greenwich for passage of all
merchant ships and warships, belligerent or otherwise, and further
that a safe channel through these passages be guaranteed for all
commercial traffic.
2. It is considered that the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia should
be considered at the same time as the above, i. e.
- (i)
- The fortifications of the Aland Islands should be
dismantled and there should be a prohibition against their
re-erection.
- (ii)
- The Gulf of Bothnia should be declared an open sea, and
the channels leading from the Baltic to the Gulf of Bothnia
should be kept open, in time of peace or when the adjoining
countries are neutral, for the passage of all merchant
vessels and warships, whether belligerent or
otherwise.
British
Delegation, 13 June, 1919.
[Page 503]
Appendix H to HD–22
The Roumanian Delegation to the Peace
Conference.
[To] the Secretary General of the Economic
Commission.
Mr. Secretary-General: On July 30th, last,
Mr. Herbette28 telephoned to the Roumanian delegation
requesting that it communicate urgently to the Secretariat of the
Economic Commission and to the Drafting Committee inquiring whether
the words “as well as with Roumania” which were suppressed, at our
request in the Sub-Commission on Treaties, in article 27 of the
draft of economic clauses with Bulgaria (corresponding to article
292 of the treaty with Germany) should remain suppressed or be
reintroduced in order to put this text in accord with the financial
clauses concerning Bulgaria as they were modified on July 29
last.
In our letter of July 31, we requested the retention of the words “as
well as with Roumania,” having in view only the Treaty of Bucharest
of 1918,29 which we have always
considered as null and of no effect. But we made this reply without
having under our eyes the definitive text of the economic clauses
with Bulgaria, which, moreover, we are not yet acquainted with even
today.
In order to avoid all confusion, we propose the following draft of
the article in question:
“Bulgaria recognizes as being and remaining abrogated all the
treaties, conventions, or agreements that she has concluded
with Russia or with any other state or government whose
territory previously constituted a part of Russia before the
1st of August, 1914, or since that date up until the coming
into force of the present treaty, as well as the Treaty of
Bucharest and all the conventions annexed to this treaty
that she concluded with Roumania in 1918.
or: as well as with Roumania since the date of August 15,
1916.”
The Delegation of Roumania never intended and does not intend to
renounce the Treaty of Peace of Bucharest concluded with Bulgaria in
1913.30
Kindly accept [etc.]
The Delegate of the Roumanian Government on the Economic
Commission of the Peace Conference:
Pangrati