462.00 R 29/3457
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Fletcher)
Memorandum of interview held in office of the Secretary of State, Wednesday, March 30, 1921.
Present:
| Mr. Viviani | Secretary of State |
| Mr. Jusserand | Under Secretary of State |
Mr. Viviani, after being introduced by Ambassador Jusserand, informed the Secretary of State that in the first place he wished to correct a misapprehension which had been given currency by newspaper reports to the effect that he had come here to secure remission of the French debt to the United States. He said that this was entirely incorrect; that he wished to say that France had pledged her faith in the obligations to the United States and expected to make payment.
German reparations—Mr. Viviani then turned to the question of the reparations due by Germany to France. He said that France at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles felt satisfied, but that the Treaty had not worked out as she hoped and expected; that England had secured immediate satisfaction in the disposition of the German colonies and merchant fleet, whereas the reparation payments due France, which had necessarily to be deferred, had not so far been satisfactorily adjusted, and sketched rapidly the causes leading up to the present occupation of the Rhineland. He stated that France could not be militaristically inclined, in view of the losses which she had sustained and the million and a half men killed and almost half as many wounded and disabled.
He then turned his attention to the financial situation of France, stating that although the war had cost an enormous sum France had not followed Germany’s example of 1870 by demanding repayment of the cost of the war, but had merely asked a sum sufficient to pay [Page 965] pensions and actual restoration of the devastated district, and he recited figures to prove that payments by Germany, as provided for in the Treaty, were absolutely necessary to save France from bankruptcy; that the French Government has practically reached the economic limit of her borrowing. The Secretary replied to this that our Commissioner in Berlin had been instructed to say to the German Government that this Government felt that Germany should not only acknowledge her responsibility, but that she should pay to the limit of her ability.58
Separate peace.—Mr. Viviani then turned to the subject of a separate peace with Germany. He stated that his Government was extremely apprehensive on this score, and felt that if the United States would make a separate treaty of peace with Germany it would be extremely difficult for the Allies to exact compliance on the part of Germany with the terms of the Treaty of Peace. Mr. Viviani very earnestly sketched the disastrous consequences which he feared would follow a separate peace between Germany and the United States. Secretary Hughes replied that he felt that there was today in the United States greater opposition to the Treaty of Versailles than at the time of the last election even, and that this opposition, which was crystalized during the debate upon this Treaty in the Senate and the last Presidential campaign, had been intensified, if anything, by observation of what had been done by the League in disregard of American rights, and that as sentiment formed against the Treaty, the idea of separate peace with Germany gained ground.
League of Nations—This brought into the discussion the question of the League of Nations. Mr. Viviani was careful to state that in any discussion of the League of Nations he could not speak either as the representative of France or of the League of Nations itself, and that anything that he might say would be purely from a personal point of view. Secretary Hughes replied that he understood that perfectly and that anything which he himself might say must be taken also as a mere personal and informal expression of opinion, in no way binding the Government of the United States. The discussion therefore proceeded on the theory that it was an informal and confidential exchange of views.
Mr. Viviani pointed out that France and the other Allied Powers, with the exception of the United States, had ratified the Treaty, and that as a consequence the League of Nations had come into being and comprised some forty nations of the earth; that it was a distinct international entity. He stated that if our objections related only to Article X, it ought to be a simple matter to come to some understanding, [Page 966] that in his personal opinion Article X was perfectly valueless and unimportant, and as proof of this he referred to the discussion of Armenian affairs before the League at Geneva. He stated that in practice, due to slow operation of the League machinery, the guaranty under Article X was ineffective, that he personally was opposed to it because of the encouragement it might give to the smaller states in their international relations. He said he knew of course of the other objections which have been raised to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that he would be very glad to go over them to see whether the parts objected to by us might not be eliminated. He thought that there would be no difficulty in England and France, after an informal exchange of views, recommending to the League of Nations such amendments to the Covenant as would enable us to take the place in the League which was waiting for us. Secretary Hughes replied that the Peace Conference had departed from the original idea of the League of Nations by making it not only an instrument for conference and conciliation, with a view to preserving the peace of the world, but also by charging it wIth certain definite duties in connection with the enforcement of the terms of the Treaty, and that the opposition of the American people to the League had grown after seeing it in operation, and mentioned as an incident of this action of the League through the Council in its distribution of mandates not only without the consent, but over the formal protest of the United States. The Secretary said that he felt he ought in candor to make very clear to Mr. Viviani the state of public opinion in this country on the subject of the League. He stated that he assumed that Mr. Viviani and the Ambassador would not deny that the United States could not be divested of the rights accruing to it as one of the victorious Allied Powers except by a Treaty signed and ratified by us. This position was readily assented to. The Secretary again referred to the course of the Council in distributing mandates without regard to our rights, and mentioning specifically the case of Yap where the attitude of France and England seemed to be that it was not their affair but that we should settle the matter with Japan, and the information which we had had from the French Government that as far as it was concerned the matter had been definitively settled. Secretary Hughes said that he had referred to this merely as an illustration of the difficulties which had been created as a consequence of making the League of Nations an instrument for the enforcement of the Treaty and of the difficulties which would confront the United States in entering it. The Secretary stated that, as he had informed Ambassador Jusserand in previous conversations, he felt that this question of mandates could not be settled in disregard of the rights of the [Page 967] United States, and that in the case of Yap it was not a matter which depended solely upon an agreement between Japan and the United States, and he asked what France would have said if, in a similar situation to that now occupied by the United States, the other Allied Powers had assigned the Saar Valley to another. The Secretary said that while there was no comparison in the relative importance of the two examples, the underlying principles were the same.
The Secretary asked whether, in view of the state of public opinion in this country with respect to the League and the consequent drift toward a separate peace, the French Government could make an alternative suggestion. Both Messrs. Viviani and Jusserand felt that the French Government would find great difficulty in making any such suggestions and believed that the suggestion should come rather from the United States. Mr. Jusserand then stated that the President had informed him that he was not in favor of a separate peace. Secretary Hughes replied that while the President felt so with respect to a separate peace at this time, yet in view of the strong public opinion in this country with reference to the Treaty and League, unless an alternative were suggested which would have the general support of public opinion here, a separate peace might be the only course left open to us.
- See telegram no. 553, Mar. 29, to the Commissioner at Berlin, vol. ii, p. 40.↩